David North

The applicant, Valeri Gueorguiev, challenged search warrants executed on his property, alleging that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors and misleading information, thereby violating his rights under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The Crown conceded some errors in the ITO but argued that, even with corrections, sufficient reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrants.

The court found that the corrected ITO provided adequate grounds for the warrants and that the police errors were not intentional or reckless.

Consequently, the application to quash the warrants and exclude evidence was dismissed, and the evidence was deemed admissible.

The accused was charged with assault and disobeying a court order (non-communication bail condition) in relation to a domestic incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence applied for a directed verdict (non-suit) on the breach charge.

The court considered six issues: admissibility of the original Information as evidence; whether documentary evidence of a bail order constitutes proof of the accused's knowledge; whether a voice mail message constitutes "communication" under the bail condition; whether the Crown proved the accused made the call; whether the message necessarily breached the order given other residents in the home; and whether the Crown proved the timing of the breach.

The court dismissed the defence application, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed trier of fact to find guilt on the breach count.

The two accused were charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hotel room.

The complainant alleged she blacked out from alcohol consumption and awoke to find one accused sexually assaulting her while the other was present, after having been assaulted by the first accused while unconscious.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding her memory loss unreliable, noting it conflicted with toxicological evidence and her behavior captured on video.

Both accused testified, with one claiming consensual sex and the other denying any sexual contact.

The court found the evidence of the accused raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted both men.

Following a traffic stop after surveillance at a nightclub, police found two loaded handguns hidden in a vehicle.

The court held that circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused personally carried and secreted a loaded Smith & Wesson handgun under the dashboard and was guilty of the related possession, vehicle-occupant, and concealed weapon offences.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the same accused possessed the second handgun hidden under a rear floor mat, given the equal plausibility that another passenger placed it there.

The owner-driver was acquitted entirely because his exculpatory testimony raised a reasonable doubt and the Crown failed to prove knowing possession or control of either firearm.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to assault with a weapon and failing to appear.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission recommending a 60‑day intermittent sentence and probation and instead imposed consecutive six‑month custodial sentences after the appellant failed to attend for sentencing.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by effectively sentencing the offender for the later failure to appear, disregarding the joint submission without explanation, and imposing a sentence far outside the appropriate range.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a probation order and in refusing to make mandatory ancillary orders, including a DNA order and consideration of a weapons prohibition order.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence reduced to time served, and a probation order and ancillary orders were imposed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, and speeding.

On August 24, 2012, police observed the defendant operating a van at excessive speed on Keele Street in Toronto.

Following a roadside investigation, the defendant registered a fail on a screening device and was arrested.

Breath samples taken at the police station showed readings of 100 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving due to lack of temporal connection between observed impairment and driving.

The court also found the defendant not guilty of driving over 80 mg due to unreasonable delays in obtaining breath samples that violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code.

The accused brought an application for a change of venue in a criminal proceeding.

The written reasons for decision were subject to a publication order and therefore omitted from the publicly available decision.

However, the court issued an order under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code directing that the trial be moved from Barrie to another location.

The precise location of the trial was to be determined by the Regional Senior Justice pursuant to the protocol of the Council of Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Ontario.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sentencing following convictions for three robberies, two counts of using an imitation firearm during the commission of an indictable offence, and assault with a weapon.

The offender suffered from schizophrenia and had shown significant stabilization and improvement through psychiatric treatment in the community.

The court considered whether the seriousness of the robberies required a penitentiary sentence of two years or more, which would preclude a conditional sentence under the framework in R. v. Proulx.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence against rehabilitation and the risk that incarceration would significantly worsen the offender’s mental health, the court determined a global sentence under two years was appropriate.

A blended sentence was imposed consisting of a conditional sentence, a mandatory custodial term for the imitation firearm offences (reduced after enhanced pre‑trial custody credit), and probation.

The accused were charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

In a pre-trial application, they argued their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 were violated during a police stop in a parking lot, and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and cell phones under s. 24(2).

The court found that the accused were arbitrarily detained and their rights to counsel were violated, rendering the subsequent searches unreasonable.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police acted in good faith and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the breaches.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court that had allowed the accused's appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Paszczenko and Lima appealed his conviction for driving over 80.

In both cases, breath tests were taken outside the two-hour presumption window, requiring the Crown to rely on expert toxicology reports.

The central issue was how the Crown must prove the four standard assumptions underlying these reports: no bolus drinking, no post-incident drinking, a standard elimination rate, and a two-hour plateau.

The Court of Appeal held that the elimination rate and plateau are matters of scientific knowledge that courts can take judicial notice of without case-specific proof.

The assumptions of no bolus drinking and no post-incident drinking require case-specific proof, but the trier of fact may apply a common sense inference that people do not normally engage in bolus drinking, placing a practical evidentiary burden on the accused to put the issue in play.

The Crown's appeal in Paszczenko was allowed and Lima's appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a 7-year sentence imposed on the respondent.

The trial judge had felt constrained by the principle of parity to impose the same sentence as a co-participant, despite the co-participant having cooperated, pleaded guilty early, being younger, and having a lesser criminal record.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by ignoring these distinguishing features.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to 10 years, less credit for time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the onus of proof regarding his knowledge and control of the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to infer knowledge and control, and concluding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the sentence.

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving and, upon speaking with duty counsel, was advised to refuse to provide a breath sample.

He followed this advice and was charged with refusing to comply with a breathalyzer demand.

At trial, he sought a stay of proceedings based on the defence of officially induced error.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court held that the defence was unavailable because duty counsel is not a government official.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, confirming that duty counsel does not speak on behalf of the state and is not a government official for the purposes of the officially induced error defence.

The youth appellants were convicted of armed robbery and related offences.

At trial, the judge admitted hearsay statements from a victim and a co-accused under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reliability analysis for the hearsay statements.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed.

The trial judge erred by considering general deterrence, which is not a principle of youth sentencing.

Given the passage of time and fresh evidence of the appellants' successful rehabilitation, the court reduced their sentences to periods of open custody and community supervision.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasons of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge, noting that he considered the same issues raised on appeal and committed no error in law.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving two child victims.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two errors regarding the burden of proof: first, by treating the absence of a finding that the complainant lied as sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, by improperly relying on the complainant's subsequent conviction for sexual assault as corroboration.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction.

The trial judge had found that the respondent had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel before a roadside screening device arrived, based on the late hour and the short, anticipated delay of five to ten minutes.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court substituted its own findings of fact, concluding the respondent had a cell phone and faced an unknown delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in substituting its findings, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.