David North

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside the accused's conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle.

The accused's vehicle was half in a ditch, and he had called a tow truck.

The appeal court judge had ruled that the conviction could not stand because the accused did not intend to set the car in motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge reasonably found a risk of danger that the accused might drive off or inadvertently set the car in motion once it was extricated.

The appellant appealed the ten-year driving prohibition imposed for impaired driving causing bodily harm, having already served the custodial portion of his sentence.

The appellant sought a four-year prohibition, while the Crown agreed that ten years was outside the range but submitted that five years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown, granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, and reducing the driving prohibition from ten years to five years.

The Crown appealed a costs order made by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, agreeing with the Crown that the lower court judge had no jurisdiction to make the order.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of stolen property and break and enter, based solely on his thumbprint found on a pop can inside a stolen vehicle two weeks after its theft.

The trial judge relied on the doctrine of recent possession to convict.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the prerequisites for the doctrine were not met, as there was no evidence the appellant possessed the stolen goods or when the pop can was placed in the vehicle.

The convictions for the property offences were quashed and acquittals substituted.

The sentence for a breach of undertaking conviction was reduced to time served.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judgment that had set aside the respondent's conviction for driving 'over 80'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by misstating the trial judge's finding concerning the reliability of the respondent's evidence and improperly substituting his opinion.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to reject the respondent's evidence to the contrary and had applied the correct burden of proof.

The acquittal was set aside and the conviction restored.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of s. 16(1.02) of the Young Offenders Act.

The issue was whether an oral application for a transfer to youth court made before a justice of the peace constituted an application made in 'youth court'.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that a justice of the peace does not preside over a 'youth court' as defined in the Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's decision was set aside, without prejudice to a future defence application in the proper court.

The accused was committed for trial on multiple counts of sexual assault.

At the preliminary inquiry, defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant about his personal diary to lay the foundation for a subsequent production application at trial under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The preliminary inquiry judge disallowed the questions.

The accused successfully applied for certiorari, and the reviewing judge ordered the continuation of the preliminary inquiry to permit limited cross-examination.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while questions about the actual contents of the diary are impermissible, the accused may ask general questions about the diary's existence, characteristics, and whether certain topics are covered, provided the questions do not intrude on the complainant's private or personal domain.