ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Sean Bradley, for the Respondent
Respondent
- and -
AISLYN GRIFFIN
Patrick Metzler, for the Appellant
Appellant
HEARD: January 7, 2015 at Milton
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[On appeal from the judgment of M. Speyer J.
of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated April 22, 2014]
F. Dawson J.
[1] Following her arrest for drinking and driving offences the appellant was video and audio recorded while using the toilet in a holding cell at the Burlington detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police (O.P.P.). The trial judge found that the recording violated the appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted a violation of s. 8 of the Charter. However, the trial judge declined to grant a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter or to exclude the evidence against the appellant pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in relation to her decision that neither remedy was appropriate in the circumstances.
Factual Background
[2] On September 15, 2012 at 2:27 a.m. the appellant was pulled over by O.P.P. Cst. Winiarski shortly after she exited the Queen Elizabeth Way in the Oakville area. The stop was initiated after a citizen who was driving behind the appellant made a 911 call to report a possible impaired driver. The appellant had an odour of alcohol on her breath and failed a roadside test on an approved screening device. She was arrested and transported to the Burlington detachment of the O.P.P. for further breath testing. The appellant was polite and cooperative at the roadside and throughout her time in police custody.
[3] At the detachment the appellant was advised that all of her activities would be video and audio recorded, including in the cell area. There were signs posted to this effect. She was placed in a cell at 3:16 a.m. The cell contained a toilet which was angled towards the cell door and towards a camera mounted on the wall. The camera had a view of the entire cell including the toilet area. All sounds in the cell were also recorded.
[4] At 3:33 a.m. the appellant politely called out. When Cst. Winiarski came to the cell door the appellant requested the use of a toilet in a private area. Although such toilets were available, pursuant to O.P.P. policy Cst. Winiarski advised the appellant that her request could not be accommodated. He provided the appellant with a roll of toilet paper and left the area to give her as much privacy as possible while she used the toilet in the cell. He told the appellant to holler when she had finished. After the appellant finished using the toilet she called out again. Cst. Winiarski retrieved the toilet paper and flushed the toilet remotely.
[5] The camera in the cell was designed to transmit video of what was occurring in the cell to monitors in other parts of the detachment. However, that feature was not working. Repair parts had been on order for some time. The audio and video from the holding cell was, nonetheless, being recorded. A copy of the recording was provided to the appellant’s counsel as part of Crown disclosure.
[6] The video and audio recording was played at trial. The trial judge made an order prohibiting its further publication or disclosure. Everyone agrees that in her reasons the trial judge accurately described what could be seen and heard on the recording.
[7] At 3:36 a.m. the appellant can be seen wiping down the seat area of the toilet. She then turned away from the camera, pulled up her dress and pulled down her underwear. Her naked upper right buttock was briefly exposed. She then sat on the toilet and urinated. The sound of her urination can be heard. Her upper right thigh was visible while she was urinating. The appellant then wiped herself with toilet paper, stood, quickly pulled up her underwear and pulled down her dress. She then took more toilet paper and reached under her dress and appeared to wipe the inside of her thigh. She discarded that paper in the toilet. At 3:37:49 she called out to Cst. Winiarski that she was done. There is no indication that the appellant’s genital area was exposed to the camera at any time.
[8] The trial judge was provided with an affidavit from the appellant in which she swore that her privacy was important to her and that she was embarrassed and degraded to find out that there was a recording of her using the toilet and that it had been distributed to the Crown and to defence counsel. The trial judge accepted this evidence. However, she did not accept the appellant’s testimony that the appellant was unaware she was on camera when she used the toilet. The trial judge noted that this was contrary to what the appellant said in her affidavit and contrary to Cst. Winiarski’s evidence.
[9] The trial judge was also provided with an affidavit from Inspector Alison Jevons, the Detachment Commander at Burlington, sworn on January 13, 2014. Inspector Jevons provided evidence to the effect that the O.P.P. policy concerning the video recording of all prisoner activity was the result of the recommendations from four separate Coroner’s inquests into deaths of persons in O.P.P. custody.
[10] Inspector Jevons also outlined in her affidavit the steps the O.P.P. had taken in response to the privacy concerns raised in this case and two prior cases. She indicated that she had met with the Crown Attorneys for Halton and Hamilton to discuss the issue and attached an email dated September 7, 2013 which was sent to all officers under her command. The email instructed officers to ensure that all detainees were advised they were being recorded at all times and that they were permitted to cover themselves with a blanket when using the toilet. Blankets were to be available for this purpose.
[11] Inspector Jevons also explained in her affidavit that the O.P.P. were aware of the decision of Boswell J. in the summary conviction appeal in R. v. Mok, 2014 ONSC 64 and that she had a meeting scheduled with Regional Command staff that day to discuss Justice Boswell’s recommendations about the manner in which privacy might be provided to detainees while using the toilet. Inspector Jevons said the O.P.P. took this issue seriously.
The Grounds of Appeal
[12] Neither party challenges the trial judge’s s. 8 analysis. The appellant focuses on the trial judge’s decision to refuse to stay proceedings or to exclude the evidence.
[13] With respect to the stay issue the appellant concedes that the trial judge was correct to treat this case as one which fell within the residual category of cases where a stay may be warranted. See R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 31. The appellant contends that the trial judge erred by “misdirecting herself” in relation to five factors which she described in her judgment and which she relied upon in deciding that a stay should not be granted.
[14] With respect to the alternative argument that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appellant repeats many of the same arguments and submits that as a result the trial judge erred in her assessment of the three Grant factors and in the final balancing of those factors. See R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.
The Fresh Evidence Application
[15] Uncharacteristically, a fresh evidence application was brought by the respondent not the appellant. The respondent Crown tendered an affidavit from Staff Sgt. Ian Borden. The affidavit reiterated the evidence that was before the trial judge in the affidavit of Inspector Jevons but went on to add evidence about what the O.P.P. has been doing since the trial to respond to the privacy concerns raised in this and a number of other cases. In particular, the affidavit indicates that the O.P.P. are in the process of rolling out a program pursuant to which almost all detainees will be provided with disposable paper hospital gowns which they can use to cover themselves while using the toilet.
[16] The fresh evidence was directed to the prospective nature of concerns that arise in relation to determining whether a stay is an appropriate remedy for a Charter violation and to the systemic issue of whether the O.P.P. are taking privacy seriously and responding to the concerns of the courts in that regard.
[17] I was initially of the view that it would be unfair to the appellant to admit the fresh evidence. The respondent was the successful party at trial on the basis of the record as it was before the trial judge. Adding more evidence to the record that was favourable to the respondent seemed to me to be moving the goal posts after the fact in a manner that could only work unfairly to the disadvantage of the appellant.
[18] However, I was surprised that the appellant consented to the application. On that basis I permitted Staff Sgt. Borden to be called as a witness on the application for the purpose of cross-examination. It then became apparent that the appellant proposed to engage in a wide ranging cross-examination of the witness which would go back over all of the issues that were raised at trial rather than focussing mainly on the “fresh” aspects of the evidence. In my respectful view the appellant was proposing by this means to turn the appeal into a de novo evidential hearing undermining the appropriate processes of an appeal on the record. This would leave the trial judge’s carefully reasoned judgment open to an attack based on a modified record in relation to matters which could have been explored in greater depth at trial.
[19] In these unusual circumstances I declined to permit the extensive cross-examination and, after considering cross-examination on the fresh aspects of the proposed evidence, I declined to admit the fresh evidence.
[20] The admission of fresh evidence on appeal is governed by s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code. That provision is made applicable in summary conviction appeals by s. 822(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 683(1) provides the court with a discretion to admit fresh evidence where the court considers it “in the interests of justice” to do so. For the reasons I have already alluded to I concluded the evidence did not meet that test. I will briefly elaborate in terms of the four criteria for admissibility of fresh evidence set out in R. v. Palmer, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759.
[21] First, a considerable portion of the proposed evidence was not fresh. Some of it was a restatement, almost word for word, of what was in Inspector Jevons’ affidavit. The cross-examination proposed on that part of the affidavit could all have been undertaken at trial. In other words, a large portion of the evidence could have been produced at trial by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, much of the proposed fresh evidence runs afoul of the first Palmer criteria.
[22] The evidence concerning whether the O.P.P. continue to take the issue seriously and to take steps to respond to the concerns of the courts is relevant to important issues that arise in connection with a stay application. This evidence also is credible. Therefore, the second and third Palmer criteria are met.
[23] However, it seems to me that the appellant is entitled to a determination of whether the trial judge erred on the basis of the trial record and not on the basis of developments subsequent to the trial. In this sense the fourth Palmer criterion is violated. That criterion requires that the fresh evidence, if believed, could have affected the result at trial. Events which had not occurred as of the date of the trial can hardly meet this fourth Palmer requirement.
[24] In addition, this evidence essentially replicates the evidence at trial that the O.P.P. was taking the matter seriously. This also militates against its admissibility. See R. v. Douglas (1991), 1991 CanLII 7328 (ON CA), 5 O.R. (3d) 29 (C.A.); R. v. Schmidt, 2014 ONCA 188, at para. 30-31.
[25] With respect, the respondent is proposing to “pad” the trial record in order to support the trial judge’s conclusion with evidence that did not exist at the time she made her decision but which is to the same effect as the evidence led at trial. In my view it is not in the interests of justice to permit that.
[26] I also rejected the respondent’s alternative submission that the proposed fresh evidence is admissible pursuant to authorities such as R. v. Widdifield (1995), 1995 CanLII 3505 (ON CA), 25 O.R. (3d) 161, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (C.A.). In Widdifield the court held that the Palmer criteria do not apply when fresh evidence is tendered for the purpose of challenging the validity of the trial process rather than a finding made at trial.
[27] However, in this case the issue is not the validity or the fairness of the trial process and I conclude the reasoning in Widdifield has no application. The proposed fresh evidence is tendered on the issue of the correctness of the decision made at trial. In those circumstances Widdifield stands for the proposition that the Palmer criteria apply.
The Appeal on the Merits
The Refusal of a Stay of Proceedings
[28] As noted in Babos, at para. 48:
The standard of review for a remedy ordered under s. 24(1) of the Charter is well established. Appellate intervention is warranted only where a trial judge misdirects him or herself in law, commits a reviewable error of fact, or renders a decision that is “so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice” (citations omitted).
In my respectful view the trial judge did none of these things.
[29] The appellant does not suggest that the trial judge misunderstood or misstated the test to be applied in granting a stay of proceedings. The trial judge correctly stated the test as described in R. v. Zaringchang, 2010 ONCA 286 at para. 57. Zaringchang has recently been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Babos at paras. 43. The trial judge also correctly determined that this was a case which fell within the residual category of cases that could lead to a stay.
[30] The trial judge identified five factors, or categories of factors, that led her to conclude that a stay of proceedings was not an appropriate remedy in this case. It appears to me that the trial judge primarily utilized these factors at the balancing stage discussed in Zaringchang and Babos.
[31] The five factors, which are described at paras. 40 to 44 of the trial judge’s reasons, may be paraphrased as follows:
(1) The O.P.P. practice of monitoring and recording all activities in holding cells is based on sound public policy flowing from the recommendations of four Coroner’s juries.
(2) The officers who dealt with the appellant were respectful of her dignity and tried to give her as much privacy as possible. She was searched by female officers, no one directly observed her using the toilet, the recording was available only to a few people and there was a publication ban respecting the video.
(3) While this was not a case of “first instance” the law on the issue was unsettled at the time and remained so at the time of trial with a number of conflicting decisions.
(4) Based on Inspector Jevons’ affidavit the O.P.P. was taking the matter seriously and was responding to the concerns about privacy expressed in the emerging case law.
(5) The police misconduct was not sufficiently serious to warrant a stay when weighed against the public’s interest in a resolution of the appellant’s charges on the merits, having regard to the seriousness of drinking and driving charges to the community and the appellant’s reduced expectation of privacy while under lawful detention.
[32] The appellant submits that the trial judge “misdirected” herself or fell into error in finding the existence of these factors or in taking them into account.
[33] I am not persuaded that the trial judge made the errors alleged. I will deal with each submission in turn.
[34] The appellant’s first submission is that the trial judge erred by failing to recognize that, in the absence of contemporaneous monitoring of the camera feed from the cells, the public policy safety justification for video and audio recording of the holding cells lost its force.
[35] I disagree with this submission. This submission was made to the trial judge and rejected by her at para. 31 of her reasons. She found that there was also a benefit in having a complete and accurate record of what occurred because it preserved evidence of any police or prisoner misconduct. This finding was consistent with the evidence before the trial judge. Coroner’s juries had recommended video recording as well as monitoring. Clearly, there was the intent to monitor as well as to record, although the monitoring feature had been unavailable at the Burlington detachment for some time. The trial judge had turned her mind to this submission and concluded on the basis of Inspector Jevons’ affidavit that the video surveillance and recording was still supported by a valid public policy consideration. This was a reasonable finding on the evidence and reflects no error.
[36] The appellant’s second submission is that the trial judge “misdirected herself” by minimizing the gravity of the breach by relying on her conclusion that the officers who dealt with the appellant were respectful of her privacy, only a few people saw the video and there was a publication ban.
[37] The appellant is really asking this court to retry the case. I observe that it was the trial judge’s role and responsibility to make findings of fact based on the evidence. There was ample evidence in the record to support her factual conclusions and the findings are reasonable. I reject the submission that the trial judge erroneously minimized the impact of the breach. Her reasons reflect that arising from her factual findings there were both objective and subjective considerations which had a bearing on this issue and the trial judge took both into account.
[38] In the course of his submissions counsel for the appellant referred to a number of other cases where courts have found a more severe impact on privacy from video monitoring and recording of detainees using a toilet. I point out that the facts of each case are different. Here the appellant was wearing a dress. This permitted her to use the toilet while revealing little to the camera. That was not the situation in some other cases where the video camera captured and recorded full frontal views of a detainee’s genitalia.
[39] The trial judge accepted and took into account that the appellant found what occurred to be humiliating. However, she was also entitled to take into account other relevant factors, including objective factors, which had an impact on the appellant’s privacy interests, including what could be seen, by who it was seen, and under what circumstances. The trial judge also factored in that the appellant had a reduced expectation of privacy while lawfully in police custody.
[40] The appellant’s third submission is that the trial judge erred by failing to appreciate that this was not a case of first instance and in relying on a finding that the law was unsettled. The appellant submits that the reported case law up to that point “made it clear that there were issues of the constitutionality of this practice”.
[41] I observe that at the time of the appellant’s arrest on September 15, 2012 there were only two decisions which had been released. They were the trial decision by West J. in R. v. Mok, 2012 ONCA 322, [2012] O.J. No. 2177 (O.C.J.), which was released May 3, 2012 and the trial decision of Cooper J. in R. v. King, [2012] O.J. No. 2574 (O.C.J.), which was released May 31, 2012. Both jurists found that video monitoring and recording of detainees using the toilet violated s. 8 of the Charter. However, West J. entered a stay of proceedings and Cooper J. refused a stay, finding the police needed time to adjust their procedures.
[42] I do not think in these circumstances the trial judge can be criticized for saying that the law was unsettled. This was an issue that was just beginning to emerge at the provincial court level in a few jurisdictions. I see no error in the trial judge’s identification and articulation of the third factor she took into account. A series of subsequent cases show that the law was and continues to be unsettled in this area. See for example, R. v. King, [2012] O.J. No. 2574 (O.C.J.); R. v. Teixeira, [2012] O.J. No. 6653 (O.C.J.); R. v. Chasovskikh, [2013] O.J. No. 16 (O.C.J.); R. v. Deveau, [2013] O.J. No. 5424 (O.C.J.), aff’d 2014 ONSC 3756; R. v. Arbdo, 2014 ONCJ 275, [2014] O.J. No. 2765 (O.C.J.); R. v. Mok, 2014 ONSC 64, [2014] O.J. No. 44 (S.C.J.); R. v. Joseph, [2014] O.J. No. 5091 (O.C.J.); R. v. Orenchuk, 2014 ONCJ 650, [2014] O.J. No. 5864 (O.C.J.).
[43] The appellant next submits that the trial judge erred in finding that the O.P.P. was taking the matter seriously and that this militated against the need for a stay. The appellant submits that the evidence before the trial judge was to the contrary. Counsel for the appellant emphasizes that Inspector Jevons did not send the email referred to in her affidavit until almost a year after the appellant was arrested and 16 months after the trial decisions in Mok and King. Counsel also referred to the evidence of the officers who testified at trial to the effect that the policy not to allow detainees to use private washroom facilities was applied in an unbending fashion and that they were unaware of Inspector Jevons’ email. He refers again to the evidence that the monitoring capability in the Burlington detachment had been out of commission for some time.
[44] Again, I am not persuaded by this submission. Inspector Jevons’ affidavit was sworn January 13, 2014. Inspector Jevons swore that the O.P.P. as an organization was aware of the recommendations that had been made by Boswell J. of this court who heard the summary conviction appeal in Mok. Justice Boswell made a number of suggestions concerning steps the O.P.P. could take to address the privacy concerns that led to findings that s. 8 of the Charter had been violated. The tenor of Inspector Jevons’ affidavit was that the O.P.P. was following the issue in the courts and taking steps to respond.
[45] This is again an area where it was for the trial to make findings based on the evidence before her. The trial judge found that the O.P.P., as an organization, was taking the matter seriously. This finding was a reasonable one with ample evidence to support it. The fact that some officers in one detachment were not aware of Inspector Jevons’ email did not mean the O.P.P. did not take the matter seriously. No palpable and overriding error has been demonstrated in relation to the trial judge’s factual finding.
[46] Once it was made this factual finding was clearly relevant to the application of the legal test for a stay of proceedings. There was no legal error in taking this finding into account.
[47] The appellant’s final submission, as stated in her factum, is that the “trial judge misdirected herself in finding that the public interest in having these charges resolved on their merits outweigh police misconduct”.
[48] With respect, this is not what the trial judge said. The trial judge said, at para. 44 of her reasons, that she was “not satisfied that the misconduct by the police is sufficiently serious to warrant a stay when weighed against the public’s interest in having these charges resolved on the merits.” This is a meaningfully different statement than that reflected in the appellant’s articulation of this ground of appeal. As indicated in Babos, at para. 44, when the request for a stay falls within the residual category this balancing of interests must take place as part of the application of the test for a stay of proceedings. Unless the appellant could satisfy the trial judge that this onerous burden had been met the appellant could not succeed in obtaining a stay. The trial judge was indicating that the appellant had not met her burden in this regard.
[49] The appellant submits that the trial judge erred at this point in her reasons because she considered the drinking and driving charges to be serious, although she later acquitted the appellant on the impaired driving charge and convicted her only on the less serious “over 80” charge.
[50] In my respectful view this submission misconceives what is at issue. What is at issue is whether the police misconduct is so serious that it should deprive the public of a trial on the merits, which trial might lead to either an acquittal or a conviction. The fact that the trial that was ultimately held led to an acquittal is beside the point. The seriousness of the specific conduct is not in issue. What is at issue is the balance between the community’s interest in having the case determined one way or another on its merits and the need to protect the integrity of the administration of justice from any serious tarnish that might flow from allowing the trial to proceed.
[51] The trial judge made careful findings concerning the nature and extent of the violation of the appellant’s s. 8 Charter rights, having regard to the appellant’s reduced expectation of privacy, the nature of the O.P.P.’s response to the findings of such violations in similar cases, and balanced that against society’s interest in a disposition on the merits. As I have said above, I conclude that all of the trial judge’s findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence. It was for her to determine whether the balancing she was required to perform led to the conclusion that this was one of the clearest of cases, where the affront to the integrity of the justice system was so serious that the trial should be stayed. I see no error in her statement of her fifth point concerning how that balancing came out in this case.
[52] The trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings.
The Refusal to Exclude the Evidence
[53] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that considerable deference is owed to a trial judge concerning their findings leading to a decision to either admit or exclude evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. As held by Arbour J. in R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 44:
Deciding whether each of the preconditions to exclusion is met requires an evaluation of the evidence and the exercise of a substantial amount of judgment which mandates deference by appellate courts (citations omitted).
[54] In Buhay, Arbour J. went on immediately to quote the following from R. v. Law, 2002 SCC 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 32:
While the decision to exclude must be a reasonable one, a reviewing court will not interfere with a trial judge’s conclusion on s. 24(2) absent an “apparent error as to the applicable legal principles or rules of law” or an “unreasonable finding”…
[55] The trial judge stated the test for the exclusion of evidence correctly and the appellant does not argue otherwise. However, the appellant submits that some of the trial judge’s findings were unreasonable. A number of the submissions to this effect repeat the arguments advanced in relation to the alleged error in failing to grant a stay. I have already decided that the trial judge’s findings challenged in those submissions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.
[56] With respect to the first Grant factor, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the deliberate nature of the breach and in “seeming to rely on good faith”. Again I disagree that any error is demonstrated.
[57] The trial judge’s comment that Cst. Winiarski was acting in good faith is found at para. 44 of her reasons. It was made together with the statement that the officer was acting in accordance with “well-founded safety policies that were in place at the time”. Earlier in the same paragraph the trial judge noted that the s. 8 violation did not flow from the policies but from the manner in which those policies were implemented. Consequently, the trial judge was aware that the s. 8 violation was deliberate in that it flowed from the application of those policies. When she said in this context that the officer was acting in good faith she was essentially indicating a lack of bad faith because the officer was following the policy. All of this was relevant to a consideration of the first Grant factor and was properly taken into account by the trial judge.
[58] The appellant next submits that the trial judge erred in assessing the second Grant factor, the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused. The appellant submits that this factor is concerned with human dignity, something which the appellant submits was undermined by the trial judge’s unreasonable minimization of the significance of the breach. I would point out that at para. 50 of her reasons the trial judge specifically stated: “Section 8 aims to protect Ms. Griffen’s personal human dignity”.
[59] This submission has in most respects already been dealt with above. As previously indicated, the trial judge took both subjective and objective factors into account. She considered the appellant’s evidence that she felt degraded. She also considered that in the particular circumstances of this case not much was revealed. The appellant was wearing a dress and this assisted in protecting her privacy when she used the toilet. She was aware she was under surveillance and she had a reduced expectation of privacy.
[60] Different judges may have come to different conclusions in relation to the second Grant factor based on this evidence. However, the trial judge’s conclusions were certainly within the range of reasonable conclusions based on this evidence. I am not persuaded that the trial judge’s conclusion that the impact of the breach was minimal is unreasonable.
[61] The appellant further submits that the trial judge erred in relation to her assessment of the third Grant factor, society’s interest in the adjudication of the matter on its merits. The appellant submits the trial judge erred by effectively saying that all drinking and driving cases are serious and by not considering the context of this specific case.
[62] This argument is very similar to the appellant’s final argument in relation to the failure to grant a stay. I would reject it for substantially the same reason. The exclusion of the evidence in this case would have ended the prosecution of at least the “over 80” charge. Under the third Grant factor the court is concerned with society’s interest in a determination of cases, one way or another, on their merits. There is no doubt the community generally considers drinking and driving offences to be serious. This was a factor the trial judge was not only entitled but required to take into account.
[63] I point out that the trial judge identified a number of factors that went into the mix with respect to her consideration of the third Grant factor. They were the community’s strong interest in the trial of drinking and driving cases on their merits, the fact that Intoxilyzer test results are presumptively reliable, the fact that the evidence was essential to the Crown’s case on the “over 80” charge, and the appellant’s reduced expectation of privacy while lawfully in police custody. The trial judge took all relevant factors into account and her conclusions that the third Grant factor favoured admission of the evidence was completely reasonable.
[64] This ground of appeal also fails.
Conclusion
[65] For the foregoing reasons the appeal is dismissed.
F. Dawson J.
Released: February 10, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: 74/14
DATE: 20150210
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
- and –
AISLYN GRIFFIN
Appellant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
F. Dawson J.
Released: February 10, 2015