Enzo Battagaglia

The court found S.A. guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault against his niece, D.D., who was four years old at the time of the alleged incident.

The decision turned on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, which the court found to be internally consistent, age-appropriate, and corroborated by peripheral evidence.

The court rejected the defendant’s denial as not credible and found that the complainant’s one instance of fabrication did not undermine her overall reliability.

The verdict was based on a careful application of the reasonable doubt standard and the law on assessing the evidence of child witnesses.

The applicant, S.M., charged with two counts of sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 19 months and 26 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown sought to deduct 3 months for COVID-19 backlog, relying on R. v. Korovchenko, but failed to provide an evidentiary record demonstrating a causal link between the pandemic and the delay or mitigation efforts.

The court found no defence delay and, without sufficient evidence from the Crown to quantify COVID-19 related delay, declined to make any deduction.

Consequently, the delay remained above the Jordan ceiling, and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards his wife in a domestic sexual assault and common assault trial.

The court applied the two-part test for admissibility, finding the evidence relevant to provide context for the relationship, demonstrate animus, establish motive, and explain the complainant's delayed reporting.

The court concluded that the probative value of this contextual evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly as the discreditable conduct was less serious than the charges.

The application was granted, allowing the evidence to be admitted at trial.

In a murder prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of multiple statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, and further challenged the legality of his arrest.

The court found that statements made at the crime scene, during a witness video interview, and in post‑arrest interviews were voluntary and not the product of threats, promises, or oppression.

The court determined that the accused was detained prior to arrest without being immediately informed of his right to counsel, constituting a s.10(b) Charter breach.

Applying the s.24(2) framework from Grant, the court held the breach was technical, had minimal impact on the accused’s interests, and did not justify exclusion of the statements.

The court also concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for murder.

The accused sought exclusion of a knife alleged to be the murder weapon in a first‑degree murder prosecution, arguing it was discovered as a result of statements obtained in breach of their Charter s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that several statements were indeed elicited in violation of the right to counsel, including roadside questioning and later questioning in hospital.

However, applying the framework in Grant, the court concluded that the knife was independently discoverable through the planned search of the defined area and the canine track leading to the creek.

While the seriousness of the Charter breaches favoured exclusion, the reliability of the physical evidence and its independent discoverability attenuated the impact on the accused’s interests.

The statements were excluded but the knife was admitted into evidence.

In a first‑degree murder prosecution, the court ruled on the admissibility of a video statement given by one accused to police after earlier Charter breaches involving statements obtained before the right to counsel was provided.

The defence argued the later statement was derived from and tainted by the earlier unconstitutional interrogations.

The court held the statement to the interviewing detective was voluntary and not sufficiently connected to the earlier breaches.

A “fresh start” occurred after the accused consulted counsel, received proper cautions, and was interviewed hours later by a different officer.

Even if s. 24(2) of the Charter applied, the court concluded the statement would still be admitted under the Grant framework.