Gordon Douglas Cudmore

The court sentenced Michael Allan McIndoo for multiple offences including child luring, making and possessing child pornography, extortion, and breaches of a prohibition order.

The decision reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, the applicable legal principles, and comparable case law.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.25 years, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and child protection, and made several ancillary orders including SOIRA, DNA, forfeiture, and non-communication orders.

Wesley Berman was charged with aggravated assault after stabbing Jordan Stiles during a confrontation over a dog.

Stiles had refused to return the dog despite a court order.

Berman claimed self-defence, stating Stiles attacked him.

The court assessed the credibility of both parties and the elements of self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found Stiles' testimony unreliable and accepted Berman's account that he was attacked and used the knife in self-defence.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Berman did not act in lawful self-defence, leading to an acquittal.

The defendants brought a pre-trial application challenging the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO) for the Thorndale premises, arguing a breach of their s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

They sought to exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the ITO provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the search warrant, concluding that the totality of circumstances, including frequent visits by the target's vehicle to the premises, its movements before and after suspected drug transactions, and counter-surveillance driving, established a credibly-based probability of evidence of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offence.

Therefore, no s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was not serious, and the real and reliable evidence was of significant probative value, outweighing the impact on the accused's interests.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempted murder, unlawful confinement, uttering death threats, and assaulting a police officer.

Although he pleaded guilty, he advanced a mental disorder defence seeking a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The trial judge rejected the NCR defence and imposed a sentence of 20 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, contending it was manifestly unfit and that insufficient weight was given to his mental illness as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction as abandoned and dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding the 20-year sentence was not manifestly unfit and that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's mental condition.

This pre-trial decision addresses the voluntariness of statements made by the accused during a police interview in a case involving charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The court found that statements made prior to the accused's apparent arrest were involuntary and inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove the accused had an 'operating mind' (i.e., awareness that statements could be used against him).

However, statements made after the apparent arrest and subsequent consultation with duty counsel were deemed voluntary and admissible, subject to further Charter arguments.

The court also considered and dismissed arguments of police trickery, finding it did not meet the 'community shock test' or undermine reliability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his daughter when she was between the ages of 3 and 9.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) test and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, her application of the proper legal test, or the adequacy of her reasons.

The trial judge's findings were entitled to deference, and the pathway to conviction was fully explained in the reasons provided.

The offender pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm was caused, contrary to section 252(1.2) of the Criminal Code.

The offender struck a pedestrian with her vehicle on January 1, 2015, causing serious injuries including a fractured skull and dental damage, then fled the scene without offering assistance.

The central sentencing issue was whether incarceration was appropriate.

The Crown sought a jail sentence in the range of six to nine months based on sentencing precedents emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence sought a suspended sentence with probation and community service.

The court imposed a non-custodial sentence consisting of a $1,000 fine, a two-year probation order with 200 hours of community service, and a two-year driving prohibition, finding that jail was not the only viable sentencing option despite the seriousness of the offence.

During a murder trial, the court was required to determine the admissibility of a statement made by the accused to police after earlier statements had been excluded due to a breach of s. 10(a) of the Charter.

The defence argued the later statement was tainted by the earlier constitutional breach and was not voluntary.

Applying the analytical framework for tainted statements and the common law confessions rule, the court held that the earlier breach had been cured by intervening events, including the accused’s arrest for murder and multiple opportunities to consult counsel.

The court further found the police interview tactics did not constitute inducements or oppression and did not overbear the accused’s will.

The statement was proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and was admissible.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit videotaped out‑of‑court statements made by a witness to undercover officers in a “Mr. Big” operation as substantive evidence under the principled hearsay exception.

The witness recanted or professed lack of memory during cross‑examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that although necessity was established, the Crown failed to demonstrate threshold reliability on a balance of probabilities.

The witness’s repeated claims of memory loss prevented meaningful cross‑examination and undermined the jury’s ability to assess reliability.

Additionally, the inducements and incentives inherent in the “Mr. Big” scenario raised serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the statements.

The videotaped statements were therefore ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence.