Elizabeth Wilson

The accused was tried on one count of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The court reviewed the child’s adopted video-recorded statement, viva voce evidence, and the mother’s contextual evidence, while applying the reasonable doubt standard and principles governing assessment of child witness credibility.

The court found the complainant’s evidence materially inconsistent internally and over time, implausible in important respects, and affected by a demonstrated motive to fabricate arising from the surrounding parenting and relocation dispute.

Although the complainant’s age and the sexual character of the alleged touching would have been established if the acts had occurred, the Crown failed to prove the touching beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault with a weapon following an encounter with the complainant at his apartment.

The complainant testified that she initially consented to vaginal intercourse but revoked her consent when the defendant digitally penetrated her rectum.

She alleged the defendant ignored her protests, used a belt around her neck as a weapon, and forced further non-consensual sexual acts.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework, found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, and rejected the defendant's version of events as illogical.

The defendant was found guilty.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Nicholas Ditoro for luring a child, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, where the Crown proceeded summarily, triggering a 6-month mandatory minimum sentence.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of this mandatory minimum under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court applied the two-step test from R. v. Nur and considered the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen regarding the gravity of sexual offences against children.

The court found that while the 6-month mandatory minimum was harsh for a youthful first offender with mitigating circumstances, it was not "grossly disproportionate" to the fit sentence, nor would it be in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios, given the serious nature of child luring and Parliament's intent to impose tougher sanctions.

The s. 12 Charter application was dismissed, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The plaintiffs' home was severely damaged by a fire while undergoing renovations.

The plaintiffs alleged the fire was caused by the spontaneous combustion of stain-soaked rags left by the defendant painting subcontractor, and sought to hold the general contractor vicariously liable.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the cause of the fire on a balance of probabilities, accepting the painter's evidence that he did not leave rags in the home and noting that electrical arcing could not be ruled out as a cause.

The court declined to draw an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to call another fire investigator.

The action was dismissed, though damages were assessed at $1,348,939.91 in the alternative.

The 80-year-old accused was convicted of sexual interference involving a 9-year-old victim whom he tutored.

The Crown sought 12 months in jail, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court noted the accused's severe medical issues and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in a custodial setting.

Applying the recent decision in R. v. Sharma, which struck down the prohibition on conditional sentences for offences with a 14-year maximum penalty, the court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence, finding that incarceration would likely be a death sentence for the accused.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her action for delay.

The court considered the four factors from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., finding that the plaintiff provided a satisfactory explanation for delay, largely due to her former counsel's misconduct and illness, and that the failure to set the action down was inadvertent.

The motion was brought promptly, and the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

Emphasizing the principle that a client should not be irrevocably jeopardized by counsel's neglect, the court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal order, allowing the action to proceed to a determination on its merits.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to confirm the voluntariness and admissibility of statements made by the accused during a police interview.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault.

The court applied the confessions rule and the operating mind test, finding that the police officer's defective caution and ambiguous comments created a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused comprehended that his statements could be used against him in criminal proceedings.

The Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and the statements were excluded.

The Crown applied for the appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the self-represented accused, who was charged with criminal fraud.

The accused suffered from severe, ongoing physical and mental health issues that repeatedly delayed the trial and impaired his ability to represent himself.

The court found that a Rowbotham order was not applicable but concluded that an amicus curiae was necessary to ensure a fair and orderly trial.

The court appointed an amicus to advise the accused, discuss issues with the Crown, speak to the court, and cross-examine witnesses, but declined to set specific funding rates, noting it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of dangerous driving, flight from police, mischief over $5,000, resisting arrest, and possession of methamphetamine following a 41km high-speed police pursuit.

The court rejected the accused's argument that the Kienapple rule should stay the flight from police conviction, finding it protects a different societal interest than dangerous driving.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the extreme driving conduct, the court declined to impose a conditional sentence and sentenced the accused to a global term of 30 months in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with a 3-year driving prohibition.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference against his 15-year-old step-sister.

The victim subsequently committed suicide, with diary entries indicating the abuse played a significant role in her decision.

The accused had a prior conviction for sexually assaulting his biological sister.

The Crown sought two years less a day, while the defence sought 16 months.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the devastating impact on the victim and her family, the breach of trust, and the accused's lack of insight or remorse.

The accused was sentenced to 22 months in custody, followed by three years of probation, along with various ancillary orders including a 20-year s. 161 prohibition and a lifetime SOIRA registration.

This pre-trial decision addresses the voluntariness of statements made by the accused during a police interview in a case involving charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The court found that statements made prior to the accused's apparent arrest were involuntary and inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove the accused had an 'operating mind' (i.e., awareness that statements could be used against him).

However, statements made after the apparent arrest and subsequent consultation with duty counsel were deemed voluntary and admissible, subject to further Charter arguments.

The court also considered and dismissed arguments of police trickery, finding it did not meet the 'community shock test' or undermine reliability.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder in a cold case, brought a pretrial application to exclude statements made to undercover officers during a 'cell insert' operation.

The accused argued the operation breached his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the undercover officers actively elicited information from the accused, exploiting his vulnerabilities, including mental illness and drug addiction, and the circumstances of his confinement.

The court concluded that the accused's right to silence was breached and excluded the statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant, a New York resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The respondent insurer paid New York no-fault benefits but failed to advise the applicant of her right to claim more generous Ontario statutory accident benefits.

Years later, the applicant sought retroactive Ontario benefits.

The insurer argued the claim was time-barred and that the applicant had elected New York benefits.

The arbitrator held that the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay because the insurer breached its statutory duty to provide information about Ontario benefits.

The arbitrator found no valid election was made and the insurer was bound by its Power of Attorney and Undertaking to provide the more generous Ontario benefits.

The insurer was permitted to set off the New York benefits already paid but was statute-barred from claiming an alleged overpayment.

The accused was charged with second degree murder in the death of a 17-month-old child who died from acute craniocerebral trauma on September 12, 1994.

The Crown alleged the accused inflicted fatal blunt force injuries to the child's head and torso while alone with her in the bedroom.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence existed for manslaughter but argued the Crown had not established the requisite mens rea for second degree murder, specifically that the accused intended to cause bodily harm he knew was likely to cause death.

The court found that based on the nature and extent of the injuries, a reasonable jury could infer the accused intended the natural consequences of his violent actions and committed the accused to stand trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The appellant, Paul Anthony Baker, appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death to the complainant and breaching a probation order.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's assessment of evidence, including credibility findings and the W. (D.) analysis of the accused's testimony.

The appellant argued that even if the threatening words were uttered, the necessary mens rea was absent.

The court found that the complainant's testimony, detailing her fear and intimidation in response to the accused's words, was sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for uttering threats, consistent with the principles in R. v. O’Brien.

The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code for alleged incidents occurring during a house party.

The complainant testified that she woke twice to unwanted sexual touching by the accused while she was in bed with another woman.

The accused testified that he dozed off in the bed and denied all allegations.

The court found the accused not guilty, determining that the Crown had not discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, corroborating evidence from a third party in the bed, and inconsistencies in the complainant's account.

The provincial director applied under section 98 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to continue custody for a young person convicted of attempted murder who had been released to community supervision.

The court found the application was improperly brought under section 98 rather than section 104, but proceeded on the merits applying the section 104 test.

The young person, now 19, had committed a brutal stabbing of his 8-year-old foster sibling at age 17.

Despite troubling psychiatric evidence regarding violent and sexual ideation disclosed in therapeutic settings, the court dismissed the application, finding that community-based supervision programs, including intensive monitoring, mental health treatment, and structured support, were adequate to manage risk and better serve the purposes of rehabilitation and reintegration under the YCJA.

The accused was charged with failing to remain at the scene of a motor vehicle collision and provide her name and address contrary to section 252(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her section 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court found that police deliberately misled the accused regarding the extent of her jeopardy during a police interview to extract an admission of driving.

The court excluded the accused's statements as a result of the Charter breach.

However, the court convicted the accused on the basis of care and control of the vehicle independent of driving, finding that as the vehicle owner, she had a duty to ensure her name and address were provided at the scene of the collision.

The Children's Aid Society brought an interim motion to change the placement of two children subject to a supervision order during a status review application.

The court applied the test under section 64(8) of the Child and Family Services Act, which presumes that a child shall remain in the care of the person having charge unless the child's best interests require a change.

The court found that the mother's cognitive limitations, psychological denial, inability to create a stable home environment, and the children's significant behavioral and developmental needs clearly outweighed their short-term interest in continuity of care.

The court granted the motion and ordered the children removed from parental care, adjourning the matter for an expedited trial.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund commenced an action against an insurer seeking reimbursement of accident benefits after serving a Notice of Dispute under the inter‑insurer arbitration regime created by Ontario Regulation 283/95 under the Insurance Act.

The insurer moved for summary judgment arguing that once the Fund initiated the statutory arbitration process it could not abandon that process and instead pursue restitution through litigation.

The court held that the Fund had sufficient information to commence arbitration within the one‑year time limit but failed to follow up and allowed the limitation period to expire.

The “proper case” exception permitting a restitution action outside the arbitration regime did not apply where the Fund’s inability to arbitrate arose from its own inaction.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the action.