Erik Van Drunen

This decision concerns the sentencing of Nicholas Ditoro for luring a child, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, where the Crown proceeded summarily, triggering a 6-month mandatory minimum sentence.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of this mandatory minimum under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court applied the two-step test from R. v. Nur and considered the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen regarding the gravity of sexual offences against children.

The court found that while the 6-month mandatory minimum was harsh for a youthful first offender with mitigating circumstances, it was not "grossly disproportionate" to the fit sentence, nor would it be in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios, given the serious nature of child luring and Parliament's intent to impose tougher sanctions.

The s. 12 Charter application was dismissed, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences after police found cocaine during a search incident to arrest.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no section 10(b) Charter breach when police delayed his access to counsel for 3.5 hours while preparing a search warrant for his residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by officer and public safety concerns due to credible information that the appellant possessed a long firearm.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay in his trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court had to determine whether the delay calculation began on the date of arrest or the date the information was sworn, and whether the 'end of trial' included the time taken to hear the post-verdict s. 11(b) application.

The court held that the delay calculation begins when the information is sworn and ends when the verdict is rendered.

As the total delay was 29 months and 24 days, falling below the 30-month ceiling, and the accused conceded he could not establish unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the application was dismissed.

The accused parents were charged with abducting their child from the care of the Children's Aid Society during a supervised access visit.

Prior to trial, the accused brought an application seeking to challenge the validity of the initial apprehension warrant issued under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court dismissed the application, holding that challenging the warrant at the criminal trial would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a judicial order.

The court found that the statutory scheme provided an adequate remedial mechanism to challenge the apprehension, and allowing a collateral attack would jeopardize the orderly administration of child protection matters.

The plaintiff brought a motion in Small Claims Court seeking to add a corporate party as a defendant or to substitute the named individual defendant with the corporation after the limitation period had expired.

The court considered when the limitation period began in the context of a production contract where payment depended on invoicing.

Applying authority holding that a cause of action arises after a reasonable time to issue and pay an invoice, the court determined the limitation period began after reasonable periods for invoicing and payment had elapsed.

The court further held that the amendment sought was not merely correction of a misnomer but the addition of a new party after expiry of the limitation period.

As the plaintiff had notice of the correct party before the limitation period expired but failed to bring a timely motion, the amendment could not be granted.