WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequences of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 ORDER RESTRICTING PUBLICATION—SEXUAL OFFENCES.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) An offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 212.1, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) Any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) Two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION—In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) At the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) On application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE—(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

COURT FILE NO.: CR-65-22
DATE: 2025-07-11
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: His Majesty the King
AND: Michael Allan McIndoo
BEFORE: Spencer Nicholson
COUNSEL: L. Ducharme for the Crown
P. Douglas and G. Cudmore for the Offender
HEARD: May 23 and June 26, 2025

The Oral Reasons shall constitute the official Reasons.

Restriction on Publication

By court order made under s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information that may identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant may not be published, broadcasted or transmitted in any manner. This judgment complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

Decision on Sentence

NICHOLSON J. (ORALLY):

Convictions

[1] By Reasons dated March 4, 2025, I convicted Michael Allan McIndoo of all nine counts on the indictment. These included:

• Three counts of child luring pursuant to s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code;
• One count of making child pornography contrary to s. 163.1 of the Code;
• One count of possessing child pornography contrary to s. 163.1 of the Code;
• One count of extortion contrary to s. 364(1.1) of the Code; and
• Three counts of failing to comply with a prohibition order made under s. 161 of the Code.

[2] These convictions stem from online interactions with three young persons, located around the globe. All three were females under the age of 18 years.

[3] I found that Mr. McIndoo utilized an online persona—Ryan Frost, a fictional 16-year-old boy—to reach out and communicate with the victims. Mr. McIndoo used stock photographs of a handsome young male celebrity to portray Ryan Frost online.

[4] Through Ryan Frost, Mr. McIndoo solicited, and received, photographs from a 13-year-old girl in which she was in her underwear, her bikini and finally nude. A particular feature of Mr. McIndoo’s requests was that the victim send him videos of herself on the toilet, getting off the toilet and showing the contents of the toilet.

[5] The second victim was an 11-year-old YouTuber from Oregon. I found that Mr. McIndoo, through the fictional Ryan Frost, extorted this young person to provide sexual videos of herself and her younger sister, failing which he would have YouTube suspend her account. Again, the sought after material included videos of the victim’s stomach and then her going to the bathroom. Fortunately, this victim did not provide any of the requested videos, although she was clearly terrorized by Ryan Frost to comply with his demands.

[6] The third victim was 15 years old at the time, living in Australia. Again, this victim was coerced to send videos of her belly and then defecating.

[7] A terrible feature of Mr. McIndoo’s crimes is that two of his victims believed that they were in a romantic relationship with a young and attractive Ryan Frost and that they had fallen in love with him.

[8] Mr. McIndoo had been charged and pleaded guilty in March of 2015 to child luring and placed on a s. 161 prohibition order for a period of 10 years. The order prohibited Mr. McIndoo from using the internet or other digital network unless he did so in accordance with specific conditions. I found he breached these conditions. As part of his guilty plea in 2015, Mr. McIndoo admitted to communicating with a young woman under the age of 18, through an email address, using an alias. The communications offered money to the young woman if she would sit on his face, urinate on his face, fart or defecate on his face.

[9] Mr. McIndoo served a 12-month custodial sentence arising out of that guilty plea. However, it is clear that within a couple of years of this, he had resumed the same behaviours.

The Respective Positions on Sentence

[10] The Crown argues that a fit and proper sentence, accounting for totality, is ten years. The Crown argues that the proper range of sentence for child luring is four to five years and proposes that Mr. McIndoo receive three years consecutive for each of the three victims for child luring. It is suggested that he receive three years concurrent for the making child pornography count and two years concurrent for the possession of child pornography conviction. The Crown argues that there should be two years concurrent for the extortion.

[11] Finally, the Crown argues that the breaches of the s. 161 prohibition orders merit an additional one-year consecutive sentence, with one year concurrent on each of the other two breach counts.

[12] The Crown seeks the following ancillary orders:

• a s. 490.012(1) SOIRA order for life;
• a s. 487.051(1) primary DNA order;
• a forfeiture order pursuant to s. 162.4(1) for the device found to contain child pornography;
• a s. 161 order for life; and
• a s. 743.21 non-communication order with respect to each of the three young victims.

[13] The offender’s position is that a fit and proper sentence is six to eight years globally. It is the offender’s position that this is a significant “jump” from Mr. McIndoo’s prior sentence and that the court should consider the impact on Mr. McIndoo’s spouse and child of a lengthy sentence.

[14] With respect to the ancillary orders, the offender argues that the s. 161 prohibition should not be for life but that a ten-year order will adequately protect the public.

Legal Principles

[15] The Criminal Code sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing in s. 718. The fundamental purpose is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions. Six objectives are then listed, as follows:

• To denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
• To deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
• To separate offenders from society, where necessary;
• To assist in rehabilitating offenders;
• To provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
• To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[16] There are further statutory considerations at play in this case. S. 718.01 provides that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years, the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. Section 718.04 also refers to the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence for offences against vulnerable persons.

[17] S. 718.2(a)(ii.1) specifically obligates the court to take into consideration evidence that the offender abused a person under the age of 18 years. S. 718.2(a)(iii.1) mandates the court to consider the significant impact on the victim.

[18] S. 718.3(7) of the Code provides that when a court sentences an accused at the same time for more than one sexual offence committed against a child, the court shall direct:

• That a sentence of imprisonment imposed for an offence under s. 163.1 (making child pornography) be served consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment it imposes for a sexual offence under another section of this Act committed against a child; and
• That a sentence of imprisonment imposed for a sexual offence committed against a child other than for child pornography, be served consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment it imposes for a sexual offence committed against another child.

[19] Sentencing is a highly individualized, discretionary process. The goal is to fashion a fit sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offences and keeping in mind the degree of responsibility of the offender. Somewhat paradoxically however, the principle of parity requires the court to impose similar sentences to those in similar circumstances who have committed similar offences.

[20] Later in these Reasons I will canvas specific cases and the sentences imposed therein.

[21] Courts must be mindful of the principle of totality, which is codified in s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code. Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be “unduly long or harsh”. The totality principle requires the sentencing judge requiring an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender (see: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9).

[22] With respect to totality, Martin J. in R. v. Bertrand-Marchand, 2023 SCC 26 stated as follows at paras. 91-92:

[91] The sentencing judge first determined the just and appropriate sentence for each offence individually. Next, she considered whether the sentences ought to be consecutive or concurrent. Only after doing this did she consider the principle of totality in s. 718.2(a), which ensures that “the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender” (R. v. M.(C.A.), para 42; see also R. v. Hutchings, 2012 NLCA 2, para 84, and Desjardins v. R., 2015 QCCA 1774, paras 37-42, which have endorsed a similar approach).

[92] I agree with the sentencing judge’s approach in this case and believe it has benefits over the alternative manner of simply setting a global amount for multiple offences. This sequential approach ensures a separate consideration of the fit and appropriate punishment of each offense. Given the separate objectives and distinct criteria for the luring offence, it was appropriate to examine each offence individually “in order to understand properly the weight this offence contributes to the offender’s moral blameworthiness” (Rayo, at para. 55).

[23] Totality requires the court to determine when to impose consecutive sentences. In Friesen, at para. 155, it was described that the general rule is that offences that are so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure may, but are not required to, receive concurrent sentences, while all other offences are to receive consecutive sentences.

[24] R. v. Friesen must be a critical part of this analysis. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the severity of sexual offences involving child victims. The Court recognized the particular vulnerability of children, that offences of these natures involve substantial violence, the long-lasting harm to children who are the victims of sexual violence and their families and society at large. The Court also recognized that Parliament had called for an increase in sentences for those that perpetrate such offences against children. Increased sentences reflect a society committed to protecting children and ensuring their rights and interests are respected.

[25] As the Court noted in Friesen, at paragraph 50, sentencing judges must properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that those offences cause.

[26] Sexual offences rob the victim of their personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, and dignity. Children are particularly vulnerable in that they are susceptible to manipulation by adults in whom they trust. The harm done to a child can remain with them for the remainder of their life and can, in turn, lead to dysfunction and/or disability and, perhaps, repetition of the offences done to them to others. It also can lead to permanent loss of familial relationships beyond the immediate one of perpetrator and victim.

[27] In reviewing Friesen, I note paragraph 67, wherein the Court described that sexual violence against children is all too often invisible to society. “To resist detection, offenders perpetrate sexual violence against children in private, coerce children into not reporting and rely on society’s false belief that sexual violence against children is an aberration confined to a handful of abnormal individuals.” As a result, violence against children is “hidden, unreported and under-recorded”.

[28] Friesen calls upon judges to impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of the sexual offence against children. The court is not to simply use the word “serious” and then fail to address the seriousness of the offence in imposing their punishment.

[29] The seriousness of child luring is made clear by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bertrand-Marchand. In the very first paragraph, the Court states as follows:

[1] Modern means of communication, including the internet, permit unprecedented and unsupervised access to children in many places once thought to be safe havens, such as their homes. Children, who now spend significant amounts of time online, are increasingly susceptible to online exploitation and abuse. The dangers of sexualizing children are increasingly well-documented and the harms that result from their victimization are now more fully understood. As a result, Parliament has taken several steps to prevent and punish the various forms that abuse of children may take, including enacting a separate offence of child luring, which is set out at s. 172.1(1) of the Criminal Code ….

[30] The Supreme Court makes clear that the luring offence is intended “to combat the very real threat posed by adult predators who attempt to groom or lure children by electronic means”. The provision seeks to safeguard children from sexual abuse by identifying and apprehending offenders before they commit a designated offence. (at para. 8).

[31] At paras. 34 and 35, the Supreme Court states:

[34] Sexual offences against children are crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability. In committing the offence of luring, the adult takes advantage of the child’s weaker position and lack of experience and by doing so repudiates the fundamental value of protecting children. Children are particularly exposed and helpless online; the internet allows offenders direct, sometimes anonymous, and often secret or unsupervised access to children, frequently in the privacy and safety of their own homes. In these online fora, there is often very little that can be done to shield children from the inherent power imbalance present in luring. Luring wrongfully takes advantage of this unsupervised access to children and “wrongfully exploits children’s vulnerabilities”.

[35] The sexualization of children is itself morally blameworthy conduct. Luring invades a child’s personal autonomy, sexual integrity, and gravely wounds their dignity. Using any person as a means to an end is unethical, but an adult’s manipulation of a child to satisfy their sexual urges is highly blameworthy conduct. It is for these reasons that luring is recognized as “manifestly harmful and wrongful”. Even when the only interactions with the child occur online, the offender’s conduct is inherently wrong because it still constitutes a form of sexual abuse. While the degree of exploitation may vary from case to case, the wrongfulness of the exploitation of children is always relevant to the gravity of the offence.

(citations omitted by me).

[32] The Supreme Court of Canada, at paras. 38 and 39, address the profound psychological and developmental harms to young victims. This includes manipulation and control over time. Given that the communications in luring often intentionally emulate positive relationships, the victims can have great difficulty in trusting anyone intimately following this experience.

[33] At paragraph 44, the Court notes that the offender uses technology to build a relationship, assert control and psychologically manipulate young persons. Contact-driven luring is not necessarily more or less harmful than luring that leads to sexual abuse that occurs entirely online (para. 45).

[34] The Supreme Court’s comments in Bertrand-Marchand capture Mr. McIndoo’s misconduct perfectly in the case at bar. The Supreme Court’s concerns about the outcome to the child victims are reflected accurately in this case by the Victim Impact Statements of the victims in this case.

[35] Friesen and Bertrand-Marchand make clear that the emphasis in this case must be denunciation and deterrence. Furthermore, they are clarion calls that these are serious offences that merit substantial periods of incarceration.

Circumstances of the Offender

[36] Mr. McIndoo is currently 39 years of age. He is married and has a daughter, who is now 13 years of age.

[37] The Pre-Sentence Report identifies that Mr. McIndoo’s parents separated when he was young. He has a close relationship with his mother, who was a rather vocal supporter in the courtroom during sentencing submissions. His father is described as an alcoholic, although when sober Mr. McIndoo described him as a great father. There is no suggestion that Mr. McIndoo was ever the victim of sexual abuse as a child.

[38] There is no doubt that, subject to periods of criminal difficulty, Mr. McIndoo has been gainfully employed for most of his adult life. Troubling given the offences here and the 2015 guilty plea is Mr. McIndoo’s prior employment as a cook in a daycare centre. However, there is no indication that anything untoward occurred during that employment.

[39] Mr. McIndoo has a prior criminal record. As noted, the most concerning conviction is the offence of child luring which was remarkably similar to the offences for which I have convicted him, and his return to this type of activity upon his release from custody. Other convictions include fraud under $5,000.

[40] There can be no doubt that Mr. McIndoo’s immediate family has been decimated by the charges and ultimately the convictions that flowed therefrom. I am advised that the family lost their home and without Mr. McIndoo’s financial input, they had to move to an apartment. Mr. McIndoo’s daughter has been forced to change schools at an age where her peer group would undoubtedly be important to her. Mr. McIndoo appears to have been very involved in her extra-curricular activities. The Childrens’ Aid Society has been involved given the charges and there is no suggestion that Mr. McIndoo’s predilections have involved his own daughter.

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

[41] The Crown argues that there are no mitigating circumstances.

[42] I would not go so far.

[43] Mr. McIndoo has family support, certainly from his mother and, I accept, his wife and daughter. However, given his prior conviction, it is also clear that neither his wife nor his mother was able to prevent him from re-offending. I do wonder if they know or understand the nature and severity of Mr. McIndoo’s misconduct.

[44] Mr. McIndoo’s bail was revoked when I convicted him, pending sentencing. Since that time, he has been involved in some programming while in custody. This is somewhat mitigating. However, as the Crown points out, none of the programming is designed to deal with his behaviour in relation to young persons. I accept that a greater array of programming is likely to be available to Mr. McIndoo in a penitentiary than in his present environs.

[45] The nature of the offences, as described in Friesen and Bertrand-Marchand, are very aggravating. I reiterate the harms that befall children that are the victims of child luring. Here, the victims were coerced and/or tricked into sending Mr. McIndoo sexualized videos where they expose their bodies. Two of the victims believed that they were in a romantic relationship with a very handsome 16-year-old boy. I consider that they have been robbed of an innocent and wonderful experience that having a first love entails. They were entitled to have a real first love, not a fictionalized one with a middle-aged man hiding behind a computer screen.

[46] I want to thank the victims once again for their Victim Impact Statements. It is incredibly important for the sentencing judge to hear and understand how the victims’ lives have been upended by the offences.

[47] The Victim Impact Statements make clear the costs that online predators wreak upon their victims. I note that the Victim Impact Statement from S.D.’s mother describes the deception that their daughter undertook to hide her ongoing relationship with Ryan Frost when her parents tried to end it. She chose to believe Mr. McIndoo’s lies over her parents’ efforts to extricate her from that relationship. Clearly, Mr. McIndoo’s actions have taken a significant toll on that family.

[48] The Victim Impact Statements reveal that S.D.’s life has had all of the horrific features that the Supreme Court in Bertrand-Marchand warns about. Her life has been riddled with poor relationship choices, physical abuse, suicidal ideation, and teenage pregnancy. During the sentencing submissions, I was hesitant to infer causation for this behaviour from the relatively brief interactions with the fictional Ryan Frost. Upon reading Bertrand-Marchand, I now believe that I was wrong to downplay the cause and effect on her life. Her life has been a textbook case of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court, and I apologize to her for diminishing that nexus. I ought not to have done so.

[49] The Victim Impact Statement of V.M. was also very moving to the Court. I note that her comments exhibit strength and resilience that I hope that she can muster. Her words reflect her justifiable anger in being exploited by Mr. McIndoo at that time in her life.

[50] There is no Victim Impact Statement from K.W. from Oregon. However, her turmoil in the moment was palpable from the communications between her and the fictional Ryan Frost with respect to the cancellation of her YouTube channel if she did not comply with his demands. Unlike the other victims, she was spared from having the misguided belief that she had found her soulmate. However, in the short time that Mr. McIndoo attempted to extract videos from her to satisfy his own depraved desires, she unquestionably suffered.

[51] The seriousness of the offences and the impact upon the victims is therefore a very significant aggravating factor.

[52] Mr. McIndoo has not acknowledged the harm he caused or taken responsibility for his actions. This is not an aggravating factor. However, he does not get the benefit of articulating any remorse. Similarly, like many of the cases which I will review, he does not get the mitigating benefit of a guilty plea. As the Crown pointed out, the victims were all required to testify in this case, despite not being cross-examined.

[53] It is not a mitigating factor, as I read Bertrand-Marchand, that there was never any contact between Mr. McIndoo and any of the victims. The offence had a profound impact on the victims despite the lack of direct contact. Once an image or video is sent online, can the victim ever be assured that it no longer exists?

[54] The level of deception and manipulation employed by Mr. McIndoo is an aggravating factor in this case. He took great pains to create a fictional persona as part of his luring. He used the carrot and the stick to coerce these young persons to send him videos and images. Mr. McIndoo’s cruelty is evident in his ability to be sweet and loving when required, and downright menacing when required. He also created a separate persona to support Ryan Frost in his manipulation of V.M. There was substantial planning and effort undertaken by Mr. McIndoo.

[55] The number of victims is aggravating, as well as their ages at the time. Once he initially contacted his victims, the frequency of his communications was unrelenting, particularly towards K.W. and his threats of cancelling her YouTube channel. The volume and frequency that he demanded videos and images were required to be sent to him is aggravating.

[56] There simply can be no question that the degree of Mr. McIndoo’s culpability and moral blameworthiness in this case is high. He knew the ages of the victims in this case as the events were unfolding. He has used these victims for his own selfish sexual gratification.

Review of Comparable Cases

[57] As noted earlier, parity is an important principle. Mr. McIndoo should be treated similarly to similarly situated offenders.

[58] The Crown has presented a helpful brief of cases. I do not have the time to recite all of the facts of those cases but can only provide a brief synopsis.

[59] In R. v. Bergsma, [2022] O.J. No. 5552, the offender had pled guilty to 24 offences in total, including nine counts of luring children ages 15 to 17. There were more victims involved in Bergsma. Unlike Mr. McIndoo, Mr. Bergsma had no prior criminal record. The court noted the significance of the guilty pleas and that the victims were not required to testify. The court noted that there were a number of separate and distinct legally protected interests at play that called for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Mr. Bergsma received a sentence of 13 years after considering totality.

[60] In R. v. Pathmanathan, 2023 ONCJ 142, there were eight victims between the ages of 12 and 15. Again, there were guilty pleas to 39 sexual offences, including 8 luring convictions and this was a first-time offender. Quoting from R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, the range for child luring was described as three to five years. Mr. Pathmanathan was given 12 years.

[61] In R. v. Gamble, 2024 ONSC 4696, Fuerst J. dealt with an offender who pleaded guilty in respect of five victims. He was also a first-time offender. Mr. Gamble’s luring closely resembles the tactics used by Mr. McIndoo. However, there was physical sexual contact made between Mr. Gamble and his victims. The total sentence was eight years.

[62] In R. v. Cooper, 2023 ONSC 875, the offender pleaded guilty to ten counts, which included child luring and making child pornography. He had an unrelated criminal record. Nakatsuru J. imposed a sentence of five years total, with two years for two of the counts of child luring consecutive. I note that the Crown sought six years.

[63] In R. v. Moss, [2024] ONCJ 471, a local case of the Ontario Court of Justice, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to five offences, including luring and making and distributing child pornography. I note that the age ranges of his victims were from approximately one to 14 years of age. He had no prior criminal record. Of note, Mr. Moss saw nothing wrong with having a sexual relationship with a young girl. Miller J. imposed a global sentence of 7 years, including 4 years for the luring.

[64] In R. v. Sinclair, 2022 MBCA 65, the Manitoba Court of Appeal approved of consecutive sentences where there are multiple victims of child luring. The Court increased the child luring sentence to five years, before reducing it to three and a half years for totality. The overall sentence was increased to eight years.

[65] In another local case, R. v. Eddy, unreported, before Orsini J. of the Ontario Court of Justice, three years was imposed for child luring.

[66] Finally, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, heard an appeal of sentence following guilty pleas. The trial judge had imposed an eight-year global sentence. The Court imposed three and a half years consecutive on the child luring charge. Paciocco J.A. reviewed the case law and noted that he accepted that the upper range for a count of child luring has been increased to five years.

[67] From these cases, I accept that the established range for a single count of child luring is from three to five years.

[68] It is an important distinguishing characteristic in all of the cases cited by the Crown that the offenders pleaded guilty, saving the victims from having to testify. Requiring a child to re-live the abuse suffered in child luring cases by testifying itself contributes to the victims’ traumatization.

[69] The Crown stresses that the convictions for breach of s. 161 orders are significant in themselves, while stressing that the breach should not be double counted as an aggravating factor. In R. v. Gilbert, 2025 ONCJ 158, Garg J. reviewed sentencing ranges for breaches of s. 161 and found that six to eighteen months was generally correct.

Defence Arguments

[70] As noted during the sentencing submissions, I do not find that the defense position in this case, six to eight years, is an unreasonable position. In taking that position, the offender makes two main arguments that I will now address.

[71] I begin with the jump principle. The jump principle cautions a court against imposing a dramatically more severe sentence than the sentences imposed upon the offender for similar offences in the recent past, provided the subsequent offence is not significantly more serious (see: R. v. Parker, 2024 ONCA 591, para 41). It is noted, however, that the jump principle “has little application where the severity of the offender’s crimes shows a dramatic increase in violence and seriousness”. Favreau J.A in Parker, considered that there were “certainly justifications” for a significant increase given that Mr. Parker was a repeat offender who committed the same offences while on probation and while subject to a prohibition order.

[72] Thus, while I do have to consider that the Crown is asking for a much longer custodial sentence than Mr. McIndoo experienced with his first conviction, I note that his behaviour now is much more serious, involves multiple, and younger children, and involved online activity throughout the world. In short, Mr. McIndoo’s behaviour escalated significantly, which, in my view, limits the applicability of the jump principle to reduce what would otherwise be a fit and proportionate sentence. I also consider that he was on a s. 161 prohibition order at the time, and it obviously was no deterrent. Finally, Mr. McIndoo’s lack of remorse or acknowledgement, which again is not aggravating, concerns the court that this behaviour is not likely to be successfully addressed by him. The safety of children, not only in our community but in communities throughout the world, justifies a substantial increase from Mr. McIndoo’s last sentence.

[73] The offender also relies on R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, for the proposition that collateral consequences in relation to the offender’s family should be a valid consideration in the offender’s favour. In that case, the offender’s incarceration caused his family to lose their apartment, harmed both of his parents’ health and forced his younger sister to interrupt her studies to support the family.

[74] I take the Crown’s point that the Court of Appeal in Habib was actually furnished with compelling evidence of those consequences, and I have no such evidence before me.

[75] In Habib, the offender’s circumstances were considerably different than Mr. McIndoo’s. He immigrated from Afghanistan and his family experienced severe financial hardship, poverty and insecurity when they arrived in Canada.

[76] I agree with the Crown that placing too much emphasis on the consequences to the offender’s family risks a mitigating impact in almost all cases where the offender has a family. A person that commits an offence should anticipate that his or her incarceration will have significant negative ramifications for his or her family. Nevertheless, the Habib case makes it clear that the consequences to the family must be considered.

[77] At para. 43 of Habib, it was noted that the consequences on the offender’s family must not, however, overwhelm the other principles of sentencing. The consequences are not an excuse to overlook the harm that the criminal conduct caused victims of crime, or the importance of protecting those victims and society, or the need for denunciation and deterrence.

[78] Mindful of the lack of direct evidence as to the impact upon Mr. McIndoo’s family, but prepared to accept that his family unit has had to move from their home, I accept that the circumstances must be considered as part of the sentencing in this case. It is my view that it affects the totality analysis. However, it is a secondary concern in this case for much the same reason as the jump principle must give way. Mr. McIndoo is a repeat offender who committed the within offences while subject to a prohibition order. There are now multiple victims, and his behaviour has significantly escalated. There is, quite simply, too significant a child protection issue in this case to place too much weight upon the admittedly unfortunate consequences to Mr. McIndoo’s family. Furthermore, this was not an isolated incident, this was a pattern of ongoing, carefully orchestrated, deliberately deceptive conduct to exploit children. During the course of that conduct, Mr. McIndoo had an opportunity to consider how engaging in that conduct might impact his life, and his family life, if caught. He chose to ignore that risk.

The Fit and Proper Sentence

[79] I have already indicated that Mr. McIndoo’s misconduct in this case involves a very high degree of moral culpability. The primary focus must be on denunciation and deterrence. I also consider that there is a very substantial child protection concern in this case, given that Mr. McIndoo’s last conviction obviously had no deterrent impact on him. Instead, he appears to have escalated and employed more deceptive practices to further his deplorable goals.

[80] While I rarely believe that an offender is beyond rehabilitation, given the lack of acknowledgement of wrongdoing, I have little confidence that Mr. McIndoo will take the necessary steps to halt his predatory behaviours.

[81] As noted, I find that the appropriate range of sentence for luring is from three to five years. I further find that Mr. McIndoo’s sentences in respect of each victim should be served consecutively. I also find that the sentence in respect of each victim should be the same, although the consequences to S.D. appear to have exceeded the consequences to the other victims.

[82] I would impose a sentence of four years for each count of luring, consecutive to one another, before considering totality.

[83] The making and possessing of child pornography and the extortion offences are part of the luring behaviour, or the result of the luring, and I would make those sentences concurrent to the luring charges. I impose sentences of two years for each of those offences, concurrent to the luring sentences.

[84] Finally, I agree that the s. 161 breach is a significant standalone offence, demonstrating wilful disobedience of a court order. The purpose of those orders is to protect vulnerable members of our society by keeping predators offline. When those sentences are ignored, the behaviour continues. I impose a one-year sentence for each of the breaches, concurrent with one another, but consecutive to the luring sentence.

[85] This would result in a global sentence of 13 years, and I agree with the Crown that this needs to be reduced on the basis of the totality principle. For that reason, I reduce each of the luring sentences from four years to 2.75 years. In doing so, I have also considered the impact upon your family of a longer sentence. Three times 2.75 is 8.25 years, plus one year for the s. 161 breach is 9.25 years.

[86] This brings your sentence in line with those imposed in the cases of Bergsma, Pathmanathan and Gamble, recognizing that they were all first-time offenders who pleaded guilty, but that there were more victims in the first two cases and an actual assault in Gamble.

[87] Mr. McIndoo, if you would please stand.

[88] Throughout this process, you have frankly presented as a cooperative and pleasant man. I suspect that many people know you in that way. However, I have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you have a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde side to you that compels you to commit these offences for your own sexual gratification. In this case, the investigation connected you to three victims from around the world.

[89] I believe that the fit and proper sentence in this case is 9.25 years globally and I sentence you accordingly, to be served in the penitentiary.

[90] You are entitled to a Summers’ credit for the time that you have been in custody awaiting sentencing since you were convicted. I convicted you on March 4, 2025, and revoked your bail at that time. I calculate 136 days and invite counsel to double check. Accordingly, you are entitled to a deduction for time served in the amount of 204 days.

[91] Thus, the total sentence to be served is a further 3,172 days.

[92] I also impose upon you the SOIRA order for life. All of the criteria under s. 490.012(1) are met and you have been convicted in relation to two or more designated offences requiring the lifetime imposition. I am satisfied that the nature of the offences is such that there is a pattern of behaviour demonstrating an increased risk of re-offending.

[93] I impose a primary DNA order, as required under s. 487.051, given the nature of the offences.

[94] I grant the forfeiture Order.

[95] I grant the s. 743.21 non-communication order.

[96] Finally, I have considered the duration of the s. 161 order that should be imposed that would prohibit you from using the internet or other digital network. It is my view that given the evidence in this case, and in particular your efforts to hide on your device your internet activity, as well as the use of an alias, that the prohibition should be for life.

[97] Mr. McIndoo, I urge you to get whatever help is available to you over the next few years. Quite clearly, you are in need of help.

Spencer Nicholson
Date: July 11, 2025

Released: July 14, 2025