Enzo Mario Battigaglia

Monique Clarke, a payroll administrator, was convicted of fraud over $5,000 against her employer, Acxsys Corporation, involving a sophisticated scheme of unauthorized transactions totaling over $300,000.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, the planned nature of the fraud, and a prior conviction for dishonesty, balanced against mitigating factors such as family support, education, and a medical condition.

The Crown sought 30-36 months imprisonment, a prohibition order, a DNA order, and restitution of $254,798.00, plus a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The defence sought a suspended sentence and probation.

The court imposed a 36-month federal prison sentence, a lifetime prohibition from positions of financial trust, and a restitution order of $12,282.78, declining the DNA order and fine in lieu of forfeiture.

Monique Clarke, a payroll administrator, was charged with fraud over $5,000 against her employer, Acxsys Corporation.

The Crown alleged she manipulated payroll records to divert funds to terminated employees' accounts, which were then deposited into seven different bank accounts, including one jointly held by her husband, and also granted herself unauthorized excess remuneration.

The court found the ADP and banking records reliable through comparison, establishing a total fraud of over $300,000.

The defense argued lack of proven actual loss and suggested other perpetrators, but the court dismissed these arguments, finding that Clarke had the exclusive opportunity and motive to commit the fraud.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Clarke committed the fraud.

In a criminal fraud prosecution arising from alleged payroll manipulation and diversion of employee funds, the court determined the admissibility of electronic payroll records generated through a third-party payroll service.

Because the Crown had not complied with the statutory business-record procedure under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act for the ADP records, it relied on the common law hearsay exception.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the common law business-records criteria, and a prima facie authentication threshold, the court held the electronic payroll records were sufficiently authenticated and inherently trustworthy to be admitted as prima facie proof.

The court also allowed the Crown to re-open the voir dire to call additional evidence on the bank records and admitted both the bank records and the ADP records.

The applicant sought civil forfeiture under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 of cash seized during the execution of a search warrant at a rural property associated with extensive drug activity.

Police discovered large quantities of controlled substances, trafficking paraphernalia, weapons, and significant cash bundled in a manner consistent with drug trafficking.

A claimant asserted ownership of the money, alleging it derived from a dog breeding and farm animal business and the sale of a vehicle.

The court rejected the claimant’s evidence as unsupported and internally inconsistent, noting the absence of business records and the implausibility of the explanation.

On a balance of probabilities, the court found the funds were proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking and ordered forfeiture.

Sentencing following conviction for aggravated assault arising from a knife attack outside a bar after a heated altercation involving racial insults.

The accused, a first-time substantive offender, slashed the victim with a large knife approximately twenty minutes after a verbal confrontation in which the victim directed racist epithets at him.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were primary sentencing objectives for a serious violent assault with a weapon.

However, mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, significant rehabilitation prospects, and the racially provocative circumstances preceding the offence.

A custodial sentence below the penitentiary range was imposed, followed by probation with anger management counselling.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case, arguing there was insufficient evidence of participation or of planning and deliberation.

The accused also sought exclusion of the victim’s eyeglasses, alleging police testimony regarding their discovery was fabricated and compromised trial fairness.

The court held that the Crown had led evidence capable of supporting findings of identity, causation, and the requisite mental state, including forensic evidence and BlackBerry Messenger communications indicating a planned killing.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could reasonably find the murder was planned and deliberate and dismissed the directed verdict motion.

The court also refused to exclude the eyeglasses, finding credibility issues regarding the officer’s testimony were matters for the jury and noting the defence had not objected when the exhibit was admitted.

The accused brought an application to stay drug trafficking charges under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 30 months.

The court found that the delay was largely attributable to the inherent time requirements of a complex case involving multiple accused, extensive disclosure, and numerous officers.

The institutional delay fell within acceptable guidelines, and the accused suffered minimal prejudice.

The application was dismissed.

During a jury trial for robbery and murder, the Crown sought to reference similarities between a prior cheque fraud scheme and the alleged murder during closing submissions.

The prior fraud evidence had previously been admitted only to establish financial motive and not as evidence of modus operandi.

Defence counsel objected, arguing that such submissions would improperly expand the permitted use of the evidence and prejudice the defence.

The court held that permitting the Crown to rely on the fraud to characterize the accused’s roles would effectively revisit the earlier evidentiary ruling and risk distracting the jury from the central issue of guilt.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from referring to similarities between the fraud and the murder in closing argument.

In a jury trial for first-degree murder, the court ruled on pre‑charge issues concerning the theories of liability that could be left with the jury.

The Crown sought to rely on constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code based on alleged forcible confinement, and on contracted murder under s. 231(3) arising from BBM messages suggesting a promise of a vehicle in exchange for participation in the killing.

The court held there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave constructive first‑degree murder to the jury because there was no evidence of unlawful confinement distinct from the killing itself.

However, the BBM messages were capable of supporting a reasonable inference of a murder-for-hire arrangement involving a vehicle as consideration.

The court therefore ruled that the contracted‑murder pathway under s. 231(3) could be left with the jury but not the constructive first‑degree theory.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling that gestures made by the deceased immediately before death constituted dying declarations.

The deceased, who had suffered catastrophic stab wounds and could not speak, pointed to his abdomen and then toward one of the accused while officers attempted to render aid.

The court considered whether such gestures could qualify as hearsay falling within the dying declaration exception.

Applying the criteria for dying declarations, the court found the circumstances permitted the inference that the deceased expected imminent death and that the gestures related to the circumstances of the homicide.

The judge concluded that the gestures could constitute assertions by conduct and therefore fall within the dying declaration exception, subject to further argument regarding admissibility.

In a first‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct arising from Blackberry Messenger chats and related events, including possession of a stolen vehicle, a cheque‑cashing fraud, a concurrent plot to rob and kill another individual, and evidence relating to the accused’s financial misrepresentations.

The court considered the governing principles for admitting prior discreditable conduct, requiring a link to a live issue and a probative value that outweighs prejudice.

The court admitted evidence relating to a stolen vehicle, a cheque fraud shortly before the murder, efforts to obtain firearms, and chats revealing a concurrent plot to rob and kill another individual because they were intertwined with the narrative and relevant to motive, planning, deliberation, and state of mind.

However, the court excluded certain other evidence, including a photograph involving an imitation firearm, related web searches, and earlier unrelated robbery‑murder planning discussions, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their limited probative value.

Evidence concerning the accused’s financial misrepresentations was admitted as relevant to motive.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of digital evidence obtained from Blackberry phones and a Blackberry Playbook after the court previously found the searches violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the Charter breach, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court admitted certain communications data, including BBM chats, SMS messages, emails, notes, and call logs, but excluded other categories of device data such as browser history, cookies, multimedia files, and related metadata.

The accused also challenged production orders issued to telecommunications and health authorities.

The court rejected those challenges, holding that sufficient grounds existed for the issuing justice and declining to excise references to chats that were also lawfully obtained from another device.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a Charter motion challenging the search of Blackberry devices and other electronic devices seized during the investigation.

The police conducted physical chip extraction and later re‑examined the resulting data using updated forensic software, which revealed deleted Blackberry Messenger communications.

The applicants argued the search warrant was overbroad and the searches were conducted unreasonably contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the police exceeded the limits of the warrant by conducting a sweeping search of multimedia, browser data, and other information beyond communications authorized in the Information to Obtain.

The searches of the Blackberry devices were found to violate s. 8, while other search warrants and production orders challenged by one accused were upheld.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant used to extract data from their Blackberry phones.

They argued the warrant was facially invalid because it referenced the OPP property vault as the place to be searched, contained outdated language permitting searches related to the 'suspected commission' of an offence, and imposed a time limit that allegedly expired before the forensic analysis occurred.

They also argued the warrant did not authorize data extraction and that a later re‑analysis of the data with updated software required a new warrant.

The court held that the warrant, read together with the Information to Obtain and appendix, authorized the search of the phones and their data.

The court further found the time limitation applied only to entry and seizure, not to later forensic analysis, and that the subsequent software‑based re‑analysis constituted a further analysis of lawfully seized data rather than a new search.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault following a knife attack outside a bar.

The attack occurred shortly after a heated verbal altercation inside the bar involving racial slurs.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony, relying on eyewitness recognition and video surveillance to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, applying Ancio, the court found the Crown failed to prove the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of aggravated assault.

The applicant, a complainant in a sexual assault prosecution, sought certiorari to review a preliminary inquiry ruling refusing to admit proposed expert evidence regarding the limited reliability of facial demeanour in assessing credibility.

The proposed expert intended to testify about social science literature suggesting that observing facial expressions does not meaningfully improve the ability to detect dishonesty.

The court applied the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan and held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in declining to qualify the expert or admit the evidence, noting that the proposed opinion relied primarily on a literature review outside the expert’s field of direct research and lacked necessity.

The court further held that the complainant, as a third party whose Charter interests were directly affected, could seek certiorari review, but no jurisdictional error or error of law was established.

The accused brought two applications: one seeking a variation of bail conditions based on an alleged material change in circumstances, and another seeking further disclosure from the Crown.

The disclosure request targeted confidential informant files, occurrence reports, redacted officer notes, and additional police notebook entries.

The court reviewed the law governing informer privilege and disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe, emphasizing that informer privilege is near-absolute and cannot be balanced against other interests except where innocence is at stake.

The court held that the requested informant materials were protected by privilege and that additional materials sought were either irrelevant or outside the investigative file relied upon for the search warrants.

Finding that disclosure had been provided in a reasonably timely and adequate manner, the court concluded that no material change in circumstances justified varying the accused’s bail.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court determined whether two accused had committed offences related to possession and storage of a firearm and ammunition found during a police response to a break and enter in progress.

The accused Robinson was the former tenant of the apartment who had been evicted that morning.

The accused Williams was not present at the scene.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit Robinson to trial on charges of unlawfully being in a dwelling and possession of the firearm and ammunition, but discharged Williams on all counts due to insufficient evidence of knowledge or control.