Rosalyn Train

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of a residential property under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, alleging it was the proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity (marihuana trafficking).

The respondent property owner argued she was a legitimate and responsible owner who purchased the property with an inheritance.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence, finding the property was acquired with proceeds of unlawful activity and used as a marihuana distribution centre.

The court held the respondent was not a legitimate or responsible owner and that forfeiture was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

The applicant sought civil forfeiture under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 of cash seized during the execution of a search warrant at a rural property associated with extensive drug activity.

Police discovered large quantities of controlled substances, trafficking paraphernalia, weapons, and significant cash bundled in a manner consistent with drug trafficking.

A claimant asserted ownership of the money, alleging it derived from a dog breeding and farm animal business and the sale of a vehicle.

The court rejected the claimant’s evidence as unsupported and internally inconsistent, noting the absence of business records and the implausibility of the explanation.

On a balance of probabilities, the court found the funds were proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking and ordered forfeiture.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion under Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside forfeiture orders made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The forfeiture orders were granted after the appellants failed to comply with a peremptory timetable to respond to the Attorney General's application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants' failure to obtain necessary bank documentation did not constitute 'facts arising or discovered' after the order was made, and thus Rule 59.06(2) did not apply.

The appellant was charged with theft of hydro and marijuana offences, but entered a diversion program under s. 717 of the Criminal Code, accepting responsibility for the acts.

The Attorney General subsequently brought a successful application under the Civil Remedies Act for forfeiture of cash and the net proceeds from the sale of the appellant's house.

On appeal, the appellant raised Charter arguments and challenged the finding that the cash was proceeds of unlawful activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Charter arguments were subsumed by his acceptance of responsibility in the diversion program, and that there was overwhelming evidence supporting the forfeiture of the cash.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there were genuine issues of fact and credibility that required a trial for determination.

The court noted that the appellant was an undischarged bankrupt, but the respondents did not challenge her right to proceed.

The motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and the appellant was awarded costs of $22,500.

The patient, who was found incapable of making treatment decisions, had previously refused anti-psychotic medication while capable.

His mother, acting as his substitute decision-maker, refused consent to new anti-psychotic medication based on his prior wish.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the prior wish inapplicable due to the patient's deteriorated condition and the availability of new, more effective medication with fewer side effects, ordering the mother to consider his best interests.

The Superior Court overturned this decision as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the psychiatrist's appeal, restoring the Board's decision, holding that it was reasonable for the Board to conclude the prior wish was not applicable to the changed circumstances and that the substitute decision-maker must act in the patient's best interests.