Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CRIMJ(P) 1986/19 DATE: 20200717
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Ikdeep Singh, for the Crown Respondent
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DYLLAN ALI; DIQUAN TAYLOR Enzo Battigaglia, for Mr. Ali James Mencel, for Mr. Taylor Applicants
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PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE; CONSTABLE SEAN OSBORNE Sharon Wilmot, for Peel Regional Police Lawrence Gridin, for Constable Osborne Third Party Respondents
HEARD: June 23, 2020, by video conference
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice F. Dawson
[1] Dyllan Ali and Diquan Taylor were two of four passengers in a taxi that was stopped by members of the Peel Regional Police (PRP) in Brampton on August 24, 2018. The stop was based on an allegation that the taxi proceeded through a red traffic light.
[2] Cst. Sean Osborne and Cst. Erik Grant testified at the preliminary inquiry that as they approached the stopped taxi, they made observations of movements inside the taxi which justified their removing the occupants and conducting a search for officer safety. The search revealed firearms and cocaine. As a result, Dyllan Ali faces numerous firearms offences. Diquan Taylor is charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The applicants are to be tried together.
[3] Mr. Ali and Mr. Taylor have applied for an order requiring disclosure of the full contents of disciplinary and criminal investigation files relating to Cst. Osborne. The application is brought pursuant to ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that the information is relevant, particularly to the assessment of Cst. Osborne’s credibility. The applicants emphasize that they allege that they were subjected to an unreasonable search, that they were arbitrarily detained and that their rights to counsel were violated, contrary to ss. 8, 9 and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They submit that the information sought is relevant to assist in establishing the alleged Charter violations and to whether any violations should lead to the exclusion of evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[4] The Charter applications are set to proceed on October 13-16, 2020. A ten day jury trial is scheduled to commence January 11, 2021.
[5] Due to the Covid-19 pandemic this application was heard by video conference.
The Background Facts in More Detail
[6] On August 24, 2018 the police had a Motel 6 under observation. Prostitution and drug trafficking offences had been occurring in and around the motel.
[7] Csts. Osborne and Grant each testified that they followed a taxi away from the Motel 6 because they saw three males and a female enter the taxi. They wanted to determine whether all four were in the rear seat, where only three seatbelts would be available. However, before that could be determined, the taxi went through a red light. The taxi driver testified at the preliminary inquiry that as he approached an intersection to make a turn the light turned yellow and at least one of his passengers told him to “go for it”, or words to that effect.
[8] Cst. Osborne testified at the preliminary inquiry that as he approached the stopped taxi on foot he saw the right rear passenger (not one of the applicants) reaching down inside the cab. He testified that he was concerned for his safety and removed the right rear passenger from the vehicle. In the process he felt a hard object, which he thought was a handgun, in a satchel the passenger had strapped across his body. Upon confirming that there was a handgun in the satchel all of the occupants were arrested for unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.
[9] Cst. Grant testified that he saw similar movements by passengers as he approached the stopped taxi. He saw the front seat passenger reaching down. He ordered him to stop reaching and to show his hands. The front seat passenger was Dyllan Ali. Mr. Ali was also wearing a satchel across his body. It is alleged that he verbally admitted that there was a handgun in his satchel. Cst. Grant felt a handgun inside the satchel and then removed it and unloaded it.
[10] Diquan Taylor was a rear seat passenger in the taxi. When he was searched incident to arrest he was found to be in personal possession of money and cocaine.
The Disclosure of Cst. Osborne’s Disciplinary History and Outstanding Charges
[11] A substantial amount of disclosure has already been provided to the applicants concerning Cst. Osborne’s disciplinary history and outstanding criminal charges. I will review the disclosure that has been made to date to provide the context for the current application. The police and Crown counsel made this disclosure pursuant to the principles outlined in R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, to which I will make further reference below.
[12] The McNeil disclosure already provided can be divided into two categories. The first relates to two disciplinary findings of “discreditable conduct” made against Cst. Osborne under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, C.P.15 which were made on September 9, 2009. Those findings related to incidents which occurred on September 16, 2005 and October 24, 2006. The McNeil disclosure made so far in relation to those incidents consists of the detailed reasons of the hearings officer who heard Cst. Osborne’s guilty pleas and accepted a joint submission as to penalty. The reasons are five pages in length and recite in detail the agreed facts upon which the findings of discreditable conduct were based.
[13] Those agreed facts stipulate that on September 16, 2005 Cst. Osborne was off duty and attended a party with other off duty police officers. He and others became involved in pursuing and apprehending a group of 16-year-old males whom they believed had damaged cars parked outside the party by riding their bicycles in a reckless manner. The agreed facts stipulate that Cst. Osborne applied unnecessary force during the apprehension and detention of one of the youths, and failed to follow procedure by properly identifying himself as a police officer and by neglecting to inform the youth he apprehended of the reason for his arrest. In addition, he violated police policy by failing to make timely notes and by failing to remain at the scene to brief the on duty officers who arrived to investigate.
[14] In relation to the September 9, 2009 incident, the agreed facts indicate that Cst. Osborne and another officer were dispatched to investigate a “suspicious auto” parked on a roadway. The vehicle had broken down and the male driver and an adult female passenger were waiting for a tow truck. The female’s 14-month-old child was also in the vehicle. The agreed facts stipulate that after arriving on scene Cst. Osborne conducted himself in a manner that brought discredit to the reputation of the PRP.
[15] The agreed facts set out considerable detail. Here it is sufficient to say that when Cst. Osborne was carrying out a search of the vehicle pursuant to the male driver’s consent, the female passenger refused to allow Cst. Osborne to search her child’s diaper bag, although she offered to remove items from the diaper bag herself so the officers could view them. This led to Cst. Osborne arresting and handcuffing the female for failure to identify herself in relation to an alleged seatbelt infraction. The vehicle was then searched while all of the doors were left open and with the 14-month-old child left in the vehicle. The other officer on the scene eventually removed the handcuffs from the female.
[16] The second category of disclosure already made pursuant to McNeil relates to outstanding criminal charges against Cst. Osborne for assault and obstruction of justice, contrary to ss. 266 and 139(2) of the Criminal Code. The charges arise from the recent arrest of a robbery suspect that was made by Cst. Osborne after a foot chase. It is alleged that after the suspect was handcuffed to the rear Cst. Osborne assaulted him. The arrest and alleged assault were captured on video by a security camera.
[17] The obstruction of justice charge alleges that Cst. Osborne made false entries in his notebook to justify the excessive and unlawful physical force he applied to the handcuffed suspect. I infer that the allegation of false notebook entries is supported by the recovered security video.
[18] The McNeil disclosure revealing these allegations consists of two one page typed police synopses. I am advised the police will also be providing Crown counsel with a copy of Cst. Osborne’s impugned notes and a copy of the security video of the arrest and alleged assault. These will then be disclosed to the applicants by Crown counsel.
The Additional Disclosure Sought by the Applicants
[19] Clearly, even if this application were to fail, the applicants will have considerable disclosure of the findings of misconduct and outstanding charges in relation to Cst. Osborne. That disclosure includes the agreed facts in relation to the former and the factual allegations and significant parts of the evidence in relation to the latter.
[20] The applicants now seek production of all of the other contents of the investigative files in relation to each of the three incidents outlined above. In particular they ask for all:
a) occurrence reports; b) witness statements from officers and civilians, in video, audio and written formats; c) photographs of scenes and injuries; d) radio calls, including police calls between officers and calls to dispatch; e) body camera and in car camera footage; f) all surveillance footage; g) the notes of all police officers, including all notes by Cst. Osborne made in relation to the investigation that is the subject of his criminal charges.
[21] To the extent these have not already been provided or agreed to be provided, the applicants submit that they should be part of “first party” disclosure from the Crown pursuant to McNeil and R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1991], S.C.J. No. 83.
[22] In the alternative, the applicants submit that they have met the likely relevance threshold at the first stage of the “third party” disclosure regime developed in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. They further submit that, as the information sought is needed to make full answer and defence and there are no significant privacy interests at stake, the balancing at the second stage of the O’Connor procedure must inevitably lead to disclosure.
The Applicable Legal Principle
First Party Disclosure
[23] These have recently been summarized by Watt J.A. in R. v. Pascal, 2020 ONCA 287 and by Rowe J. in R. v. Gubbins, 2018 SCC 44, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 35. It is difficult to improve upon the concise statements of the law found in these authorities.
[24] Pursuant to Stinchcombe, the Crown’s obligation is to disclose all information in its possession that was obtained in the course of the investigation in relation to the charges before the court which is not privileged or clearly irrelevant. This first party disclosure obligation is triggered by a request from the accused. Such information is known as the “fruits of the investigation”. The fruits of the investigation do not include operational records or background information which does not arise from the specific investigation leading to the charges before the court: Pascal, at para. 105; Gubbins, at para. 22.
[25] The purpose of first party disclosure is to protect the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. “That right will be impaired where there is a reasonable possibility that undisclosed information could have been used by the accused to meet the case for the Crown, to advance a defence or to otherwise make a decision which could have affected the conduct of the defence”: Pascal, at para. 102, citing Gubbins, at para. 18.
[26] Aside from the prosecuting Crown, other Crown entities and the police are third parties for the purpose of disclosure. They are not subject to the disclosure obligations of the prosecuting Crown: Pascal, at para. 103, Gubbins, at para. 20; McNeil, at para. 22. However, the investigating police force or other authority responsible for the investigation leading to the charges faced by an accused has an obligation to turn over the fruits of the investigation to the prosecuting Crown for disclosure to the accused. In addition, the prosecuting Crown has an obligation to make inquiries of the police or other Crown agencies when put on notice that they may have relevant material in their possession: Pascal, at para. 104; Gubbins, at para. 21; McNeil, at para. 52.
[27] In McNeil the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the first party disclosure obligations on the prosecuting Crown and the investigating police force beyond the fruits of the investigation to include other information in the possession of the police which is “obviously relevant” to the accused’s case: McNeil, at para. 59.
[28] In R. v. Jackson, 2015 ONCA 832, 128 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 125, Watt J.A. concluded that the phrase “obviously relevant” did not set “a new standard or degree of relevance”. Rather, it was a reference to relevance that was plain to see or obvious in nature. Watt J.A.’s characterization of “obviously relevant” in Jackson was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gubbins, at para. 23.
[29] It is now clear, therefore, that the Crown’s first party disclosure obligation extends beyond the fruits of the investigation to include anything else in the possession of the investigating police force which is obviously relevant in the sense just described. In McNeil that was held to include “findings” of serious police misconduct which were either related to the investigation of the accused or which “could reasonably impact on the case against the accused”: McNeil, at para. 15.
[30] However, the McNeil court also held as follows, also at para. 15: “Production of disciplinary records and criminal investigation files in the possession of the police that do not fall within the scope of the first party disclosure package is governed by the O’Connor regime for third party production.” At para. 25 the court added: “[P]roduction of criminal investigation files involving third parties, and that of police disciplinary records, usually falls to be determined in the context of an O’Connor application.”
Third Party Disclosure
[31] To obtain disclosure from a third party the accused must make an application to the court. At the first stage of the O’Connor procedure the accused bears the burden of showing that the records sought are likely relevant. Where that burden is discharged the records will be produced only to the court and the judge will consider a number of factors to determine whether and the extent to which the records sought should be disclosed.
[32] The likely relevance test will be satisfied where there is “a reasonable possibility that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify”: O’Connor, at para. 22; Gubbins, at para. 26.
[33] The likely relevance test is described as significant but not onerous. It is a lower threshold than true relevance, is a generous test and “includes information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it may assist the accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence”: McNeil, at paras. 29 and 44; O’Connor, at para. 21; Gubbins, at paras. 26-27.
[34] In terms of the significance of the likely relevance test and what must be demonstrated to satisfy it, Doherty J.A. held in R. v. Batte, (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 75:
The determination of likely relevance under the common law scheme requires the same approach. The mere assertion that a record is relevant to credibility is not enough. An accused must point to some "case specific evidence or information" to justify that assertion. In my view, an accused must be able to point to something in the record adduced on the motion that suggests that the records contain information which is not already available to the defence or has potential impeachment value.
Bridging the Gap Between First Party and Third Party Disclosure
[35] In McNeil, Charron J. developed the concept of “bridging the gap” between first and third party disclosure. She recognized that an accused is often in a difficult position when trying to demonstrate that material he or she has not seen is likely relevant. Charron J. held that by requiring first party disclosure of anything which was obviously relevant the gap between the two regimes could be bridged, making an accused’s task in seeking additional third party disclosure less difficult.
[36] Charron J. held in McNeil, at para. 57, that the findings made by the Honourable George Ferguson, Q.C., in his January 2003 report entitled Review and Recommendations Concerning Various Aspects of Police Misconduct (the Ferguson Report) could provide useful guidance on what should be disclosed as first party disclosure to bridge the gap. The Ferguson Report recommended disclosure of the following (paraphrased):
a. Any conviction or finding of guilt under the Criminal Code or Controlled Drugs and Substances Act; b. Any outstanding criminal charges; c. Any conviction or finding of guilt under any other federal or provincial statute; d. Any finding of guilt or misconduct under the Police Services Act; e. Any current charge of misconduct under the Police Services Act for which a Notice of Hearing has been issued.
Analysis
[37] Before dealing separately with the disciplinary proceedings and the outstanding criminal charges, I observe that the respondents have indicated that there is no body camera or in car camera footage. The PRP do not utilize such devices. The applicants have not adduced any evidence to dispute such assertions.
[38] The police and Crown counsel cannot be expected to produce material which does not exist. This aspect of the application is dismissed.
Investigative Files Regarding the Previous Disciplinary Proceedings
[39] In McNeil, at para. 15, the court held that disciplinary “findings” which could have a bearing on the criminal prosecution of an accused are obviously relevant and should form part of the Crown’s first party disclosure obligation. Here the disciplinary findings and a complete record of the facts on which those findings were based have already been disclosed.
[40] I am unable to accept that the other items sought in relation to the disciplinary proceedings can be viewed as obviously relevant. The applicants have no prima facie right to go behind the disciplinary findings or the agreed facts they are based upon. The principle of finality in judicial and quasi judicial proceedings embodied in the doctrines of issue estoppel, res judicata, abuse of process and the rule preventing collateral attack on previous judicial findings stands in the way of finding any obvious relevance to the investigative files underlying the disciplinary proceedings. See Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, especially paras. 23, 33, 46 and 55; Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594, at p. 599.
[41] I also observe that the incidents leading to the disciplinary findings occurred many years ago. This also detracts from the notion that the investigative files leading to the agreed facts supporting the disciplinary findings have any obvious relevance to the current prosecution of the applicants. As emphasized in McNeil, it is the “findings” which may be obviously relevant and accordingly fall within the Crown’s first party disclosure obligation. The investigative files will usually fall within the category of third party records. I conclude that is the case here.
[42] Turning to the third party disclosure regime, I am of the view that the applicants have failed to discharge their onus to demonstrate that the occurrence reports, witness statements and other contents of the investigative files behind the disciplinary proceedings are likely relevant. The applicants have not pointed to any case specific evidence or information to demonstrate, even to the modest standard of likely relevance, how the additional information they seek will provide them with more information than they already have or would otherwise assist them in making full answer and defence. Their submissions amount to mere assertions that are speculative rather than case specific in nature.
[43] In this regard, I observe that in O’Connor, at para. 22, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that, in the context of third party production, the test for relevance should be higher than it is in the case of first party disclosure. In the first party disclosure context relevance is determined on the basis of whether the information may be useful to the defence. In Stinchcombe, at paras. 16 and 20, the court held that (first party) disclosure applied to non-privileged material which was not “clearly irrelevant”. Where the third party disclosure regime applies, the O’Connor court held, at para. 22, that a finding of likely relevance requires that “the presiding judge must be satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to testify”. This extends beyond material issues to credibility.
[44] I reiterate that the applicants already have the findings of misconduct and the facts behind the findings. They have not made the slightest showing that they would be permitted to go behind those. In addition, as I have said, the investigative information sought is dated. I am far from satisfied that the additional material sought is likely relevant or that it will add in any fashion to what the applicants have already been provided with.
[45] It follows that the application for further disclosure in relation to the disciplinary matters fails.
Investigative Files Related to the Outstanding Criminal Charges
[46] I have reached a different conclusion in relation to the investigative files for the outstanding criminal charges. In my view those investigative files should be provided to the applicants as part of the Crown’s first party disclosure obligation.
[47] In Pascal, at para. 123, Watt J.A. said that two questions must be answered to determine which disclosure regime applies. The first is whether the information is in the possession of the prosecuting Crown. It is not suggested that the Crown prosecuting the applicants has the information sought by the applicants in its possession for the purpose of this prosecution. However, the police or the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) must have it in their possession in relation to the prosecution of Cst. Osborne.
[48] The second question posed by Watt J.A. must then be answered: is the information sought of such a nature that the police or another Crown entity in possession of it ought to have supplied it to the prosecuting Crown? Based on the legal principles outlined above, as the information sought is not the fruits of the investigation the answer to this question depends on whether the investigative files for the outstanding criminal charges are “obviously relevant”: see Pascal, at para. 126.
[49] I am of the view that the information sought is obviously relevant for several reasons. I observe that the outstanding charges are of recent origin. It is alleged that recently Cst. Osborne falsified his notebook entries in another case to cover up the fact that he had engaged in serious misconduct during an arrest. That, in turn, suggests that Cst. Osborne was also prepared to testify falsely to the state of events as recorded in his notebook. If substantiated, such allegations could undermine Cst. Osborne’s credibility, which is likely to be in issue in relation to the applicants’ Charter application and at the trial.
[50] In addition, the alleged assault and falsification of his notebook, if substantiated, would demonstrate that Cst. Osborne has recently engaged in a gross violation of his duties as a police officer. Viewed together with the past findings of misconduct, the alleged misconduct associated with the outstanding charges is capable of being viewed as evidence of a propensity by Cst. Osborne to pursue objectives while in the course of his duties in an unlawful manner. Obviously, such determinations will be for the motion judge and/or the trial judge to make. However, the potential is there, rendering the information sought obviously relevant to more than just the assessment of Cst. Osborne’s credibility. It could render any alternative version of events about what happened in this case, which may be brought forward in testimony by the applicants, as being viewed as more likely to be accurate.
[51] As noted above, the applicants will have a considerable amount of information about the outstanding charges by the time of their Charter application and their trial, even without the additional material sought. However, that does not undermine my conclusion that the additional information is obviously relevant. That is because the additional information may assist the applicants in making decisions about how to conduct their defence, how to structure their cross-examination of Cst. Osborne and in formulating what questions to ask him. As noted by Watt J.A. in Pascal, at para. 130: “Relevance is the controlling principle, not the likelihood of use or prospect of success.” In the same paragraph Watt J.A. stressed the relevance of outstanding charges against a Crown witness and of evidence of the circumstances underlying such charges. Cst. Osborne will clearly be an important witness on the Charter application and at trial.
[52] I point out that it is not the fact that Cst. Osborne is charged that is significant. Cst. Osborne is entitled to the presumption of innocence and the fact that he is charged could not normally impugn his character or his credibility: Pascal, at para. 109. However, in terms of the case against the applicants, Cst. Osborne will appear as a non-accused witness. Therefore, he will be open to cross-examination on unrelated misconduct for the purpose of undermining his credibility and, potentially, to suggest that he has a propensity to misuse or abuse his position as a police officer. See Pascal, at para. 109; R. v. Gassyt (1988), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 546 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 37.
[53] Counsel for the respondents refer to the collateral facts rule and submit that because the main purpose of cross-examining Cst. Osborne on the factual circumstances underlying his outstanding charges is to attack his credibility, the applicants will be stuck with Cst. Osborne’s answers. The submission is made that because the collateral facts rule will prevent the applicants from calling evidence to contradict Cst. Osborne’s answers on such matters the investigative files are not relevant, let alone obviously relevant, and so do not fall within the scope of either the first party or third party disclosure regimes. I am unable to accept this submission for two reasons.
[54] First, assuming that the collateral facts rule will prevent the applicants from calling evidence to contradict Cst. Osborne’s answers to questions about the circumstances of his outstanding charges, I believe the contents of the investigative files could be of considerable assistance in helping the applicants to formulate their questions and structure their cross-examinations of Cst. Osborne in such a way as to benefit their positions. This is an important aspect of making full answer and defence. For example, Cst. Osborne will be under oath. He will understand that he could be subject to prosecution for giving untruthful or misleading evidence. A cross-examination about the outstanding allegations that is carefully structured to present a series of relevant questions based on evidence and provable facts is more likely to produce answers helpful to the applicants than one that is not so carefully structured. There is a real possibility that witness statements and the other contents of the investigative file could aid the applicants in their preparation. A more effective structure to the cross-examination is likely to prove beneficial in circumstances where the applicants may be prevented by the collateral facts rule from contradicting Cst. Osborne’s answers by other evidence.
[55] For this reason I do not agree that the collateral facts rule undermines the obvious relevance of the disclosure sought. As held in Pascal, at para. 102, a failure of disclosure will impair an accused’s right to make full answer and defence “where there is a reasonable possibility that undisclosed information could have been used by the accused to meet the case for the Crown, to advance a defence or to otherwise make a decision that could have affected the conduct of the defence” (citations omitted).
[56] Second, as I have already said, there is at least the potential to make an argument that Cst. Osborne has a propensity to misconduct himself in a way that could assist in establishing facts important to the applicants’ Charter application. So viewed, evidence relating to the outstanding charges against Cst. Armstrong could be relevant to proof of a material fact or to prove a relevant bias or motive on the part of Cst. Osborne. Should a motion judge or a trial judge so decide, that could take the matter outside the scope of the collateral facts rule.
[57] Counsel for Cst. Osborne relied heavily on the fact that in Gassyt, an appeal concerning a failure by the Crown to make disclosure discovered only after the trial was complete, the Court of Appeal relied on the collateral facts rule as a basis for dismissing the appeal. Counsel referred to paras. 29-40 of Gassyt.
[58] In my view the result in Gassyt does not impact the result in this case. In Gassyt the outcome of the appeal turned on whether the fresh evidence concerning the undisclosed material was admissible as fresh evidence. That depended on whether the fourth criteria in the Palmer test for the admissibility of fresh evidence had been satisfied, namely, whether the fresh evidence, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, could be expected to have affected the result. See R. v. Palmer (1979), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.), at p. 205.
[59] In Gassyt the court held that, because the collateral facts rule would have prevented the undisclosed evidence from being used at trial to contradict the main prosecution witness, the fresh evidence could not have affected the result at trial. It was for that reason that the fresh evidence was not admitted and the appeal was dismissed.
[60] Gassyt was not a case about whether pretrial disclosure should have been made. It was a retrospective analysis about whether a failure to make pretrial disclosure affected the result of an already completed trial. In the present case the focus is prospectively on the usefulness of the information sought to the applicants’ trial preparation. That is a very different question. In my view the outcome in Gassyt does not dictate that the application before me should be dismissed.
[61] As I have also mentioned, it is arguable in this case that the collateral facts rule may not apply. That will be for the motion judge and/or the trial judge to determine based on how the evidence develops.
[62] For these reasons I am satisfied that the investigative files in relation to the outstanding charges against Cst. Osborne should be provided to the applicants pursuant to the Crown’s first party disclosure obligations. The investigation of Cst. Osborne for recent allegations that he abused his powers as a police officer and falsified his notes to cover that up is of obvious relevance and should be disclosed to facilitate the applicants’ rights to make full answer and defence.
Justice F. Dawson
Released: July 17, 2020