Gordon Omar Akilie

The accused, Mario Bixhi, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for the purpose of distributing and selling, possession of proceeds of crime, willfully resisting a police officer, and taking a weapon from a peace officer.

The case arose from a search warrant executed at Bixhi’s apartment.

The court found Bixhi guilty of the cannabis-related offences and resisting/taking a weapon from police, but acquitted him of the cocaine trafficking charge, finding a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge and control over the cocaine, given the evidence of a third party who claimed sole responsibility for the cocaine.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Larry Bomberry guilty of possessing methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possessing property obtained by crime.

Despite thin evidence of active trafficking at the time of arrest, the court held that the quantity of drugs (62.48 grams) and over $1,400 in cash supported the inference that Bomberry possessed the drugs as part of an ongoing trafficking operation.

The court rejected Bomberry’s claim that the drugs were for personal use based on implausible explanations for his cash, inconsistent timeline evidence, and expert testimony on trafficking indicia.

The decision applies the W.(D.) principles and the Villaroman circumstantial evidence framework to conclude that trafficking was the only reasonable inference.

The accused, Jiapeng Wu, was charged with second-degree murder.

The central issue at trial was whether he was a party to the murder under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, specifically if he subjectively knew that murder was a probable consequence of the planned robbery.

The Crown argued that the accused orchestrated the violent robbery and foresaw the probable use of a firearm and murder.

The defence contended that the accused only intended robbery, not murder.

The court found the Crown's principal witness credible despite prior inconsistencies.

Considering the accused's history of violent currency exchange robberies, his role as organizer, his arming of accomplices with loaded handguns, and his post-offence conduct, the court concluded that the accused subjectively knew murder was a probable consequence.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

Sentencing for guilty pleas to two counts of possession of child pornography, one count of making child pornography, and one count of sexual interference involving a child.

The court applied the Supreme Court's guidance on sentencing for sexual violence against children, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code.

Aggravating factors included the victim's young age, the offenders' position of trust as babysitters, repeated and recorded abuse, substantial physical interference, and a very large child pornography collection.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, remorse, a dysfunctional upbringing, low assessed risk to reoffend, and exceptionally punitive pretrial custody conditions.

A global sentence of 10 years less enhanced pretrial custody was imposed, together with multiple lifetime ancillary orders and forfeiture.

Sentencing following a guilty plea to making child pornography arising from repeated recorded sexual abuse of a child by caregivers acting in a position of trust.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in child sexual violence sentencing, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code and considering aggravating factors including breach of trust, the complainant's young age, repeated abuse, and significant physical interference.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, remorse, mental health and addiction issues, and expert evidence assessing a low risk of sexual reoffending and reduced moral blameworthiness relative to the primary perpetrator.

The joint submission for a five-year penitentiary sentence was accepted as fit and not contrary to the public interest, together with multiple ancillary orders.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

During a trial for a shooting that resulted in one death and two injuries, the Crown sought to introduce photographs of a mark on a hallway baseboard taken seven years after the incident, along with related property manager testimony and expert opinions from a forensic video analyst and a firearms expert.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in determining whether the accused fired a weapon and in assessing witness credibility significantly outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The expert opinions met the threshold requirements for admissibility.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to re-open its examination-in-chief of a witness to refresh her memory using a prior statement, after having closed its examination but before cross-examination began.

The witness had given testimony inconsistent with her prior statement regarding the actions of the accused after the shooting.

The trial judge granted the request, applying the Coffin procedure and finding that allowing the Crown to refresh the witness's memory would not cause prejudice or trial unfairness, as the defence could cure any prejudice through cross-examination.

The defence applied to exclude evidence of prior discreditable conduct, known as the "Austin incident" in a murder and aggravated assault trial involving Tyrone Chambers and Joshua Warner.

The Austin incident, a minor assault accompanied by a threat to shoot, occurred shortly before the main shootings.

The defence argued its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The Crown contended the incident was relevant to the accused's knowledge of each other's gun possession, their willingness to back each other up, and the overall narrative of the night's events, forming part of a continuing transaction.

Applying the R. v. Handy test for similar fact evidence, the court treated the Austin incident as prior discreditable conduct but found its high probative value, particularly concerning narrative, the accused's knowledge and state of mind, Section 21 party liability, and self-defence, greatly outweighed the limited moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence admissible.

During a second trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied under section 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the prior trial testimony of a key witness who had left Canada for Ghana just before the trial commenced.

The court reviewed the principles from R. v. Potvin and subsequent jurisprudence regarding the principled approach to hearsay and the Crown's obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to establish necessity as it had not pursued alternatives like commission evidence or offered to fund the witness's return, and that admitting the evidence would operate unfairly against the accused.

The Crown and the two accused brought several pre-trial motions ahead of a re-trial for murder and aggravated assault arising from a shooting at a house party.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various pieces of evidence, including post-offence conduct, a photograph of the deceased, a lead fragment, ammunition, and black socks with gunshot residue.

The court also dismissed a Charter application challenging a search warrant, finding the accused lacked standing as he had abandoned the apartment.

Finally, the court denied the accused's request to sit at counsel table, ordering them to remain in separate prisoner's docks with leg belts due to significant security concerns and antagonistic defences.

The accused was charged with Theft under $5000 and Possession of Property Obtained by Crime for items stolen from two vehicles in a parking garage.

While the Crown established all elements of the offences except identity through surveillance video evidence, the court found that the identification evidence was insufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The surveillance video lacked sufficient clarity to identify the accused, and the constable's recognition evidence, based on limited prior contact, was unreliable.

The charges were dismissed and an acquittal was entered.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the doctrine of recent possession and the W.D. framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law from R. v. Kowlyk by considering all circumstances to determine if an inference of knowing possession or theft was available.

The court also held the trial judge properly assessed the evidence under W.D. and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.