O. Goddard

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations made decades after the alleged events, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and general principles governing credibility, reliability, delayed disclosure, and the avoidance of sexual assault myths, the court found significant concerns with the reliability of the complainants' memories and with aspects of their credibility.

The court accepted the accused's evidence where it conflicted with the complainants' evidence and, in any event, held that the record left a reasonable doubt.

All counts on the indictment were dismissed.

The accused, a former teacher of the complainant, was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation arising from a sexual relationship that developed after the complainant left his class and later worked under his supervision at a drama camp.

The court accepted that a consensual sexual relationship involving intercourse existed by March 2011, but found the complainant's evidence on timing left a reasonable doubt whether the relationship began before she turned 16.

The accused was therefore acquitted on the under-16 counts.

The court nevertheless found that the relationship flowed directly from the earlier teacher-student bond and subsequent supervisory employment relationship, and that the accused remained in a position of trust or authority toward the complainant when she was 16 to 17.

A finding of guilt was entered on the sexual exploitation count under s. 153.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons.

The conviction was based on an incident in a grocery store checkout line, where the complainant alleged the appellant touched her inappropriately.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to address three material inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and the store security video.

Because the trial judge did not provide cogent reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite these contradictions, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.