Jonathan A. Shime

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to be allowed to sit at counsel table during his trial instead of in the prisoner's dock.

He argued that sitting in the dock undermines the presumption of innocence and fair trial rights, citing the Guy Paul Morin inquiry report and potential prejudice as an Indigenous person.

The Crown argued for the customary placement in the dock for visibility and jury observation, suggesting a jury instruction could mitigate prejudice.

The court, balancing fair trial rights, communication needs, and the absence of security concerns, granted the application, allowing the accused to sit at counsel table.

Michael Sawicki pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm for transmitting HSV-2 to two intimate partners without disclosure.

The offences occurred between 2016 and 2019, with one victim being a minor.

The court considered the long-term, debilitating impact on the victims and the aggravating factors of intimate partner violence and breach of trust.

Despite the defence seeking a non-custodial or conditional sentence, the court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding that only a real jail sentence would adequately reflect the gravity of the offences and the offender's moral culpability.

Sawicki was sentenced to ten months imprisonment, followed by two years of probation.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender found guilty of Dangerous Driving Causing Death and Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm.

The incident involved the offender unsafely passing vehicles at high speed on a curved road with double solid lines, resulting in a head-on collision that killed one person and caused severe, permanent injuries to two others.

The offender, a 27-year-old first-time offender with no prior criminal or traffic record, expressed deep remorse and suffered significant injuries himself.

The Crown sought 3-4 years immediate incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence under two years and a 2-year prohibition, highlighting the absence of typical aggravating factors (alcohol, prior bad driving, etc.).

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for dangerous driving causing death (concurrent with 16 months for bodily harm), to be served under house arrest with electronic monitoring, and a 4.5-year driving prohibition.

The judge concluded that a penitentiary sentence was not necessary, and a conditional sentence with strict conditions adequately addressed accountability, denunciation, and deterrence given the specific mitigating factors.

The accused's convictions for attempted murder were quashed on appeal, leading to a reassessment of his sentence for aggravated sexual assault and administering a noxious substance.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced the total sentence from 111 months to 81 months.

The court affirmed that while the mens rea for attempted murder is higher, the accused's conduct, involving deliberate infection of young men with HIV, demonstrated a high level of moral blameworthiness, justifying a substantial sentence despite the quashed convictions.

The court also addressed the application of the Kienapple principle to enter convictions on previously stayed charges.

The appellant, who is HIV positive, was convicted of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of administering a noxious thing (HIV).

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 14 years, with a net sentence of 9 years and 3 months after credit for presentence custody, plus a five-year long-term supervision order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed the three attempted murder convictions due to misdirection on the mens rea requirement, finding the trial judge failed to adequately explain that the Crown must prove either that the appellant's purpose was to kill or that he believed death was a virtually certain consequence of his actions.

The convictions for aggravated sexual assault were upheld.

The Court ordered a new trial on the attempted murder charges and set aside the stay on the charge of attempting to administer a noxious thing to one complainant, ordering a new trial on that count as well.

The sentence appeal was adjourned pending further submissions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of a minor.

The trial proceeded on the basis of an acknowledged emotional intimacy between the appellant and the complainant, with the central issue being whether that intimacy extended to physical contact.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the use of certain evidence, including out-of-court statements by the appellant, prior consistent statements by the complainant, and evidence of an uncharged incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while some instructions could have been more complete, the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the burden of proof and credibility issues to the jury, and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice resulted from the omissions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his sister-in-law, alleging the conviction was unreasonable.

The complainant alleged approximately 10-50 sexual assaults occurred between 1997 and 1999 when she was 16-17 years old.

The Court of Appeal found that important aspects of the complainant's evidence were demonstrably false, including her claims of being enslaved and controlled.

The trial judge herself had significant misgivings about the complainant's credibility and found that the Crown had not proven most of the alleged assaults beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court determined that the risk of wrongful conviction was too high and set aside the conviction, entering an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol on December 6, 2012.

He brought a motion under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to a trial within a reasonable period of time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to expected trial conclusion was approximately 16 months.

The court analyzed the delay by considering the length of delay, periods waived by the defence, reasons for the delay (inherent time requirements, accused's actions, Crown's actions, and institutional resource limitations), prejudice to the accused, and the balance between the accused's interests and society's interests in a trial on the merits.

The court found that the delay attributable to the Crown was 7.5 months, which fell below the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

Although the defendant suffered significant prejudice in terms of stress, anxiety, and physical health impacts, the court concluded that this prejudice was outweighed by society's strong interest in a trial on the merits for serious charges involving impaired driving and personal injury.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an Approved Screening Device test, the officer breached the accused's section 10(b) rights by failing to provide a Prosper warning and obtain an unequivocal waiver when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, failure to yield to a pedestrian contrary to sections 140(1)(a), and turn not in safety contrary to section 142(1).

The Crown proceeded only on the careless driving and turn not in safety charges.

The accused struck a pedestrian with his truck while making a left turn at a signalized intersection.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove carelessly and that the accused failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court found the accused guilty of careless driving and entered a conditional stay of proceedings on the turn not in safety charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault after failing to disclose that he was likely infected with HSV-2 (genital herpes) before engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainant.

The complainant subsequently contracted the virus and suffered significant physical and emotional harm.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with one year of probation, including 80 hours of community service and a ten-year SOIRA order, rather than a custodial sentence or conviction.

The decision represents a "test case" on sentencing for sexual transmission of herpes through non-disclosure, with the court emphasizing the novel nature of the offence and the disproportionate immigration consequences that would follow a conviction.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from the alleged transmission of genital herpes (HSV-2) to the complainant.

The defendant brought a section 276 application seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity to support two defences: (1) that the defendant was not the source of the infection (causation), and (2) that the complainant would have consented to unprotected sexual activity even if informed of the defendant's positive viral status (negating fraud-based vitiation of consent).

The court granted the application in part, permitting limited cross-examination of the complainant regarding her sexual history within a defined timeframe and scope, while excluding evidence that would invoke the "twin myths" that prior sexual activity makes consent more likely or credibility less worthy.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The offences occurred between April 2011 and May 2011.

Police investigation identified the accused's computer sharing 105 suspected child pornography files on a peer-to-peer network.

Upon execution of a search warrant, two laptops belonging to the accused were seized containing a total of 404 child pornography videos and 40 child pornography images—the largest collection of child pornography videos ever seized by the Waterloo Regional Police.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months custody followed by 3 years probation, with ancillary orders including DNA collection, a section 161 order for 5 years, and lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act.

A real estate lawyer pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The first count involved operating a Ponzi scheme over 14 years (1994-2008) defrauding individual clients of approximately $4.9 million.

The second count involved defrauding financial institutions of approximately $4.8 million between November 2007 and March 2008.

The Crown sought 10 years imprisonment; the defence sought a blended sentence of 3 years in penitentiary plus a 2-year conditional sentence.

The court imposed a concurrent 6-year penitentiary sentence, rejecting the conditional sentence component and finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount given the breach of trust by a member of the legal profession.