Jonathan A. Shime

The applicant, an Indigenous male charged with first-degree murder, sought to challenge potential jurors for cause based on race and pre-trial publicity.

The Crown consented to the challenge based on race but opposed the challenge based on pre-trial publicity.

The court dismissed the application regarding pre-trial publicity, finding the media reporting was minimal and fair, and did not create a realistic potential for partiality.

The court also rejected the applicant's request to use multiple-choice answers for the race-based challenge questions, opting instead for standard yes/no questions to protect juror privacy and avoid vague responses.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to be allowed to sit at counsel table during his trial instead of in the prisoner's dock.

He argued that sitting in the dock undermines the presumption of innocence and fair trial rights, citing the Guy Paul Morin inquiry report and potential prejudice as an Indigenous person.

The Crown argued for the customary placement in the dock for visibility and jury observation, suggesting a jury instruction could mitigate prejudice.

The court, balancing fair trial rights, communication needs, and the absence of security concerns, granted the application, allowing the accused to sit at counsel table.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

Michael Sawicki pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm for transmitting HSV-2 to two intimate partners without disclosure.

The offences occurred between 2016 and 2019, with one victim being a minor.

The court considered the long-term, debilitating impact on the victims and the aggravating factors of intimate partner violence and breach of trust.

Despite the defence seeking a non-custodial or conditional sentence, the court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding that only a real jail sentence would adequately reflect the gravity of the offences and the offender's moral culpability.

Sawicki was sentenced to ten months imprisonment, followed by two years of probation.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

The applicant brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled hearing because she was working as a medic in Ukraine, citing unstable internet access and security concerns that would make it difficult to instruct counsel.

The respondent opposed the motion, noting the late request and scarce court resources.

Despite concerns about the late request and missed deadlines, the court granted the adjournment in the interests of justice to allow the applicant sufficient time to instruct counsel, making the new date peremptory on the applicant.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence and in excluding evidence of the respondent's prior disreputable conduct and criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary rulings on the evidentiary issues, notably confirming for the first time that Gladue principles are relevant to a Corbett application when assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of an Indigenous accused's prior convictions.

The applicant brought a motion to strike portions of the record considered by the DIOC and to determine whether materials provided to but not reviewed by the DIOC form part of the record on judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding that the admissibility of evidence before the DIOC is a matter for the panel hearing the judicial review.

The court directed that unreviewed materials be provided to the panel in a sealed envelope.

The court also granted consent redactions sought by the DIOC and granted interim redactions sought by the applicant to protect her privacy interests pending the panel's decision, applying the Sherman Estate test.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender found guilty of Dangerous Driving Causing Death and Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm.

The incident involved the offender unsafely passing vehicles at high speed on a curved road with double solid lines, resulting in a head-on collision that killed one person and caused severe, permanent injuries to two others.

The offender, a 27-year-old first-time offender with no prior criminal or traffic record, expressed deep remorse and suffered significant injuries himself.

The Crown sought 3-4 years immediate incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence under two years and a 2-year prohibition, highlighting the absence of typical aggravating factors (alcohol, prior bad driving, etc.).

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for dangerous driving causing death (concurrent with 16 months for bodily harm), to be served under house arrest with electronic monitoring, and a 4.5-year driving prohibition.

The judge concluded that a penitentiary sentence was not necessary, and a conditional sentence with strict conditions adequately addressed accountability, denunciation, and deterrence given the specific mitigating factors.

The accused's convictions for attempted murder were quashed on appeal, leading to a reassessment of his sentence for aggravated sexual assault and administering a noxious substance.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced the total sentence from 111 months to 81 months.

The court affirmed that while the mens rea for attempted murder is higher, the accused's conduct, involving deliberate infection of young men with HIV, demonstrated a high level of moral blameworthiness, justifying a substantial sentence despite the quashed convictions.

The court also addressed the application of the Kienapple principle to enter convictions on previously stayed charges.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

The appellant, who is HIV positive, was convicted of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of administering a noxious thing (HIV).

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 14 years, with a net sentence of 9 years and 3 months after credit for presentence custody, plus a five-year long-term supervision order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed the three attempted murder convictions due to misdirection on the mens rea requirement, finding the trial judge failed to adequately explain that the Crown must prove either that the appellant's purpose was to kill or that he believed death was a virtually certain consequence of his actions.

The convictions for aggravated sexual assault were upheld.

The Court ordered a new trial on the attempted murder charges and set aside the stay on the charge of attempting to administer a noxious thing to one complainant, ordering a new trial on that count as well.

The sentence appeal was adjourned pending further submissions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of a minor.

The trial proceeded on the basis of an acknowledged emotional intimacy between the appellant and the complainant, with the central issue being whether that intimacy extended to physical contact.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the use of certain evidence, including out-of-court statements by the appellant, prior consistent statements by the complainant, and evidence of an uncharged incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while some instructions could have been more complete, the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the burden of proof and credibility issues to the jury, and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice resulted from the omissions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his sister-in-law, alleging the conviction was unreasonable.

The complainant alleged approximately 10-50 sexual assaults occurred between 1997 and 1999 when she was 16-17 years old.

The Court of Appeal found that important aspects of the complainant's evidence were demonstrably false, including her claims of being enslaved and controlled.

The trial judge herself had significant misgivings about the complainant's credibility and found that the Crown had not proven most of the alleged assaults beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court determined that the risk of wrongful conviction was too high and set aside the conviction, entering an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault arising from his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status before engaging in unprotected anal intercourse with two complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to acquit if they found the complainants were reckless or prepared to assume the risks of unprotected sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a complainant's past risky sexual behaviour does not negate an accused's legal duty to disclose a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's failure to give a Vetrovec warning, his jury instructions on the evidence, or his failure to give a limiting instruction regarding the appellant's text messages.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and raised a constitutional challenge during sentencing concerning the denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody where bail had been cancelled under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the statutory limitation violated s. 7 of the Charter by infringing the principle of proportionality in sentencing.

Relying on appellate authority recognizing proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice, the court found that the provision could produce disparate custodial outcomes unrelated to the gravity of the offence or the offender’s responsibility, particularly where detention depended on the ability to obtain bail.

The court held that the deprivation of liberty was not in accordance with fundamental justice and that the provision was arbitrary and not minimally impairing.

The infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The offender pleaded guilty to an unprovoked assault causing bodily harm against a stranger while on parole for manslaughter.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 years and a long-term offender designation.

The court sentenced the offender to 3.5 years (reduced to 6 months with enhanced pre-sentence credit) and 3 years of probation.

The court dismissed the long-term offender application, finding that while the offender posed a risk, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending as required by the legislation.