Amandeep Nagra

This criminal trial involved three defendants charged with various offences, including break and enter and aggravated assault, stemming from an altercation with a tenant.

The court heard conflicting accounts from the Crown's witness and the defence witnesses.

Applying the rule in R. v. W.D., the judge assessed the credibility of all principal witnesses, noting inconsistencies and weaknesses in both narratives, particularly concerning 911 calls and witness actions.

Ultimately, the court found significant reasons to doubt the credibility of all parties, leading to a reasonable doubt as to the events of the altercation.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, and all charges were dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to permit the complainant in a sexual assault and sexual interference case to testify by closed-circuit television (CCTV) from outside the courtroom.

The complainant, who was nine years old at the time of the alleged offences and is now 23, expressed fear and nervousness about testifying in court and seeing the respondent (her stepfather).

The court granted the application, finding that allowing remote testimony would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and was in the interest of the proper administration of justice, noting the lowered threshold for such orders following the 2015 amendment to the Criminal Code.

In a sexual assault trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of the complainant's Apple Watch data, which recorded sleep activity.

The defence argued an expert was required to interpret the data.

The court held that data automatically generated by a personal electronic device is computer by-product evidence, not hearsay, and generally does not require expert testimony for admissibility.

The complainant's testimony was deemed sufficient to authenticate the data under section 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act, with its ultimate weight to be determined at trial.

The Crown applied for a sexual assault complainant to testify with the aid of a trained support dog.

The defence did not oppose the application.

The court granted the application, finding jurisdiction based on its inherent authority to control its own process and the rights afforded to victims under section 13 of the Victim's Bill of Rights Act.

The ruling emphasized a non-rigid interpretation of testimonial aid provisions to ensure witnesses can provide full and candid accounts of traumatic events.

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order disposing of weapons seized from the respondent, Alexander Stevenson, and a 5-year prohibition order.

The respondent sought the return of the seized items.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent posed a risk to himself or others, despite his mental health and substance use history.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ordering the return of the seized items.

This criminal trial concerned Richard Jason Boswick, charged with uttering threats to cause bodily harm to Kevin Metcalf.

The alleged threat was made in a 2.5-minute segment of a 90-minute video posted online, where Boswick referred to shooting Metcalf with a rubber-coated marble.

Boswick argued his comments were not directed at Metcalf but a general group, were hypothetical, or were political banter, and raised a self-defence claim.

The court found that the words objectively constituted a threat directed at Metcalf (or a group including him), that conditional threats are still threats, and that intoxication did not diminish their significance.

The self-defence claim was rejected as there was no reasonable ground for belief of imminent force from Metcalf.

The court found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and registered a conviction.

The accused, self-represented, brought a motion for a mistrial due to the Crown's failure to disclose the complainant's videotaped statement to the police.

The Crown conceded the breach of disclosure but argued it did not warrant a mistrial.

The court found that the accused failed to demonstrate that the non-disclosure impaired his ability to make full answer and defence or compromised the overall fairness of the trial, as the primary evidence against him was his own recorded statement, not the complainant's.

The motion for a mistrial was dismissed.