CITATION: R. v. Kazumba, 2026 ONSC 606
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-40000624-0000 DATE: 20260130
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
RIDGE KAZUMBA and THULANI MONCRIEFFE-BELMAR
COUNSEL: E. Jackson and A. Nagra, for the Crown M. Cremer and C. Perry, for Mr. Kazumba A. Monaco, for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar
HEARD: November 27, 2025
RULINGS
1In the early evening of August 24, 2023, gunfire suddenly erupted at the Royal Caribbean Café, a small restaurant on St. Clair Avenue West in Toronto. A total of at least 21 shots were fired within less than 90 seconds. Two people were injured. One died. The events were captured on surveillance security video in the restaurant.
2Two men faces charge arising out of those events. Ridge Kazumba is charged with second degree murder and Moncrieffe-Belmar is charged with reckless discharge of a firearm. Both are also charged with unauthorized possession of a firearm. They are being tried together before me and a jury. I made a number of rulings in the course of the trial with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
I. EVIDENCE
A. Mr. Kazumba’s Attendance at the Café
3Ridge Kazumba, a musician, spent the day working in a recording studio with two friends. They went to the café to order food to take out, but once they were there decided to eat in the restaurant. Mr. Kazumba was armed with a handgun. He testified that he had obtained the handgun because he had been advised by a friend that there were people who wanted to kill him.
B. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s Attendance at the Café
4Thulani Moncrieffe-Belmar spent the day with his friend, Nakhari Henry-Robinson. They went to visit Mr. Henry-Robinson’s girlfriend, Mariah Brooks, who worked at a hair salon near the café. When they arrived, they ate a meal that Ms. Brooks had purchased for herself from the café earlier. Ms. Brooks then telephoned the café to order more food for herself and then went there to get it, accompanied by Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Mr. Henry-Robinson. On their way there, they stopped at a convenience store to purchase surgical masks, which Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Mr. Henry-Robinson put on. According to Ms. Brooks, Mr. Henry-Robinson often wore masks while out in the public.
5When they arrived at the café, Mr. Henry-Robinson told the others that he would not enter because there were Black men in the café. Ms. Brooks and Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar entered while he remained outside. They walked to a counter at the back, going past the table where Mr. Kazumba and his friends were eating. Mr. Kazumba did not know Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar or Mr. Henry-Robinson.
C. Discharging of Firearms
6There is some evidence that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar looked at Mr. Kazumba and his friends and there is some disputed evidence that he said something confrontational to them. A few minutes later, Mr. Henry-Robinson entered the café and walked towards the back.
7Like Mr. Kazumba, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Mr. Henry-Robinson were also armed with handguns. As Mr. Henry-Robinson approached Mr. Kazumba’s table, he moved his right hand to the front pocket of his hoodie, which appeared to have something in it. According to Mr. Kazumba, Mr. Henry-Robinson said, “I’m going to smoke you” to him. Mr. Kazumba stood up, took out his gun, and shot Mr. Henry-Robinson in the chest. As Mr. Henry-Robinson turned and began to leave, Mr. Kazumba shot him a second time in the back.
8As Mr. Henry-Robinson fled from the restaurant, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar took out his weapon and gunfire was exchanged between him and Mr. Kazumba. Mr. Kazumba fled the restaurant, after which Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar fled as well.
D. Injuries
9Mr. Henry-Robinson collapsed soon after the leaving the café and later died of his injuries. According to the pathologist, the first shot fired by Mr. Kazumba caused his death. The injury caused by the second shot did not contribute to his death.
10Mr. Kazumba’s hand was struck by a bullet fired by Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar. A woman who was in the café to purchase food was struck in the leg, but it is unknown who fired the shot that injured her.
E. Self-Defence
11Mr. Kazumba acknowledges that he caused Mr. Henry-Robinson’s death, but takes the position that he acted in self-defence as he reasonably believed that Mr. Henry-Robinson was about to shoot him. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar also takes the position that he acted in self-defence because Mr. Kazumba was shooting at him. Although both men pleaded not guilty of unauthorized possession of a firearm, neither has put forward a defence to the charge.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Admissibility of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s Criminal Record
(i) Overview
12Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has a criminal record consisting of a conviction for assault in 2016 and two counts of discharging a firearm with intent and one count of assaulting a police officer causing bodily harm from 2018. He has applied to exclude his record on the basis that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, which the Crown concedes. However, Mr. Kazumba wishes to rely on Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s record as well as police occurrence reports that were created in relation to the charges he was convicted of.
(ii) Applicable Legal Principles
13The criminal record of a witness, including a defendant, is presumptively admissible by virtue of s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act on the basis that it is relevant to the witness’s credibility: R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at pp. 685-686. However, the admission of a defendant’s criminal record carries with it the danger that a trier of fact will infer that the defendant has a propensity to engage in criminal activity and is therefore more likely to have committed the offence he is charged with, which is a prohibited line of reasoning. As a result, it is well established that a trial judge has a discretion to exclude all or part of a record on the basis that its prejudicial effect outweighs it probative value, as was explained in R. v. King, 2022 ONCA 665, 163 O.R. (3d) 179, at para. 145:
Where the trial judge is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the probative value arising from the criminal record is outstripped by the prejudicial effect that may arise from its admission, otherwise admissible convictions will be excluded. While not an exhaustive catalogue of factors, in calibrating the probative value and prejudicial effect of admitting the accused’s prior convictions, trial judges typically consider: (1) the nature of the convictions; (2) their remoteness or nearness to the matter under prosecution; (3) the similarity between the offences charged and the prior convictions; and (4) the risk of presenting a distorted picture to the jury. [Citations omitted].
14Different considerations apply when the potentially prejudicial evidence is sought to be adduced by a co-accused, who unlike the Crown has a constitutional right to make full answer and defence. Evidence of a co-accused’s bad character, including a criminal record, is admissible at the behest of the defence unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs it probative value: R. v. Pollock (2004), 187 C.C.C. (3d) 213 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 110; R. v. Sheriffe, 2015 ONCA 880, 333 C.C.C. (3d) 330, at paras. 65-66; R. v. Davani, 2023 ONCA 169, 165 O.R. (3d) 604, at paras. 21-22; R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at pp. 611-612. It follows that a determination as to the admissibility of such evidence requires that the both the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the evidence be clearly identified.
(iii) Probative Value
(a) Overview
15Identifying the probative value of evidence requires a consideration of its cogency in relation to the inferences the party seeking to admit the evidence wishes the trier of fact to draw: R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, at para. 82. The party is not required to establish that the evidence is conclusive in order to have it admitted: Handy, at paras. 94-97.
(b) Credibility
16The probative value of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s record in relation to his credibility depends on the type of factors identified in King, at para. 145, particularly the nature of the convictions and their remoteness or nearness to the time of the co-accused’s testimony.
17With respect to the nature of the convictions, prior convictions will be most relevant to credibility when they relate to offences of dishonesty or where they demonstrate “an enduring disrespect for the law”: R. v. Marshall, 2025 ONCA 638, at para. 54. None of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior convictions are for offences of dishonesty. They are for offences of violence, which “generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity”: Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.), at p. 940 (cited in Corbett, at pp. 740-741, per LaForest J., dissenting on other grounds). The convictions all occurred in 2018 and there have been no subsequent convictions, which does not show an “enduring disrespect for the law.”
(c) Self-Defence
18Evidence of another party’s prior acts of violence can support a claim of self-defence if they are relevant to the reasonableness of the accused’s belief and actions or if they are relevant how the other party likely behaved at the time of the incident in question: R. v. Scopelliti (1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 492. The first does not apply in this case, as Mr. Kazumba did not know of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior acts of violence.
19Prior acts of violence not known to the accused are usually admissible when relevant to determining the identity of the initial aggressor or to show that the deceased acted violently on the occasion in question. Where another party’s prior acts of violence show him to have a violent disposition, this can support an inference that it was the other party rather than the accused who initiated the confrontation that led to the accused acting in self-defence: Scopelliti, at p. 492; R. v. Shirley (2002), 155 O.A.C. 210 (C.A.), at para. 26. There are several reasons why Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior record has little probative value in this regard.
20First, there is no suggestion that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was the initial aggressor. It is clear from the video evidence that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar did not discharge his firearm until after Mr. Kazumba shot Mr. Henry-Robinson.
21Second, to evaluate Mr. Kazumba’s claim of self-defence, the jury will have to determine what Mr. Kazumba reasonably believed at the time he shot Mr. Henry-Robinson. The jury will be told that it does not matter if Mr. Kazumba’s belief was mistaken, as long as it was reasonable: R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 948, at paras. 57, 66. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s conduct may be relevant to this issue. There is no issue that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar entered the café wearing a mask. Whether he looked at Mr. Kazumba and how he did so can be readily determined by the jury from the video. While what, if anything, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar said to the people at Mr. Kazumba’s table and how he said it are matters in dispute, the fact that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was convicted of certain criminal offences several years earlier will not assist the jury in resolving those issues.
22Third, while there may be some issue as to whether Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar shot at Mr. Kazumba before Mr. Kazumba shot at him, Mr. Kazumba is not charged with any offence for shooting at Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar. His claim of self-defence is in relation to his fatal shot at Mr. Henry-Robinson, which had already occurred by the time he began shooting at Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar. In other words, by the time Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Mr. Kazumba began to fire at one another, the actus reus of the offence Mr. Kazumba is charged with, second degree murder, was complete.
23For these reasons, the probative value of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior record is slight.
(iv) Prejudicial Effect
24Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior convictions are for offences that bear some similarity to the offence he is charged with, particularly the conviction for discharging a firearm with intent. The prejudicial effect of such evidence is well-established: (1) the jury may assume that the accused is a bad person who is therefore more likely to have committed the offences; (2) the jury may tend to punish the accused for his prior misconduct through a guilty verdict; and (3) the jurors may have their attention deflected from the main purposes of the trial through litigation of the facts of the prior misconduct: Davani, at para. 19. While the third of these is not a concern in this case, the first two are. The evidence has a significant prejudicial effect.
(v) Conclusion
25In my view, while the prejudicial effect of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior record could be addressed through means other than exclusion, such as a limiting instruction to the jury, there is a risk that the jury will misuse this evidence. This prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the very limited probative value of this evidence. As a result, the evidence is not admissible.
B. Admissibility of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s Criminal Record
(i) Overview
26Mr. Kazumba wishes to adduce certain evidence respecting Mr. Henry-Robinson’s interactions with the criminal justice system in the form of two entries on his criminal record together with related police occurrence reports as well as a third occurrence report respecting an investigation into allegations against Mr. Henry-Robinson which did not result in charges or a conviction. The Crown and Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar oppose the admission of this evidence. The parties agree that the admissibility of this evidence depends on whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect: Seaboyer, at pp. 611-612.
(ii) The Record and Occurrence Reports
27In 2018, Mr. Henry-Robinson was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of just under two years (381 days in addition to the equivalent of 279 days of presentence custody). A related occurrence report states that Mr. Henry-Robinson and several other individuals assaulted a young man, causing serious injuries including a severe brain bleed that required the victim to be placed in a medically-induced coma for five days.
28In 2022, Mr. Henry-Robinson was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 17 months and 15 days. A related occurrence report outlines that while investigating Mr. Henry-Robinson on another matter, the police found him to be in possession of a handgun that contained seven rounds of ammunition (including three “hollow point” rounds), one of which was in the gun’s chamber.
29The third occurrence report states that on June 12, 2020, a woman contacted the police and told them that someone had posted threatening messages threatening her and her son on social media, together with photographs of them and their address. She believed that Mr. Henry-Robinson was the person who had posted the messages. The police offered to speak to Mr. Henry-Robinson about this, but the woman asked them not to do so. No charges were laid.
(iii) Probative Value
30Mr. Kazumba acknowledges that he had no knowledge of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s history at the time of the shooting. However, he submits that Mr. Henry-Robinson’s history could support an inference that he has a violent propensity from which the jury could infer that it is more likely that he made threatening comments to Mr. Kazumba, which in turn supports Mr. Kazumba’s claim of self-defence. Whether or not Mr. Henry-Robinson made these threats is one of the central factual issues in dispute. I agree that Mr. Henry-Robinson’s record has some probative value in relation to this issue: Scopelliti, at p. 492.
(iv) Prejudicial Effect
31Counsel for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar submits that the evidence is prejudicial because of her client’s close association with Mr. Henry-Robinson, whom he was “following like a puppy” on the day of the shootings. She submits that admitting the evidence would taint Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s character in the eyes of the jury. The Crown supports her submissions in this regard.
32Another potential prejudicial effect of this type of evidence was described in R. v. Varga (2001), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 71, where Doherty J.A. stated, “Attacks on the character of the deceased are often easy to make and risk the conclusion that it is a defence to a murder charge to show that the deceased’s demise was a civic improvement.” See also R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 514, at para. 156.
(v) Conclusion
(a) Criminal Record and Related Occurrence Reports
33In my view, the probative value of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s criminal record and the related occurrence reports is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The jury is already aware that Mr. Henry-Robinson was in illegal possession of a loaded firearm: R. v. Patterson (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.), at paras. 21-22.
34While there is a risk that the jury could conclude that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is of bad character because of his association with Mr. Henry-Robinson, in my view concerns of this nature can addressed by a strong limiting instruction to the jury about what use it can and cannot make of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s record and that it cannot be used to draw conclusions about Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s character.
35I am less concerned that the jury will view Mr. Henry-Robinson’s death as a “civic improvement.” Mr. Henry-Robinson’s record, while serious, is not such that any reasonable person would conclude that he did not deserve to live. In any event, concerns of this nature can also be addressed with a judicial instruction.
36For these reasons, the evidence of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s record and the related occurrence reports is admissible.
(b) The June 12, 2020 Occurrence Report
37I take a different view of the June 12, 2020 occurrence report. Quite apart from any concerns about its probative value, it is double hearsay and for that reason alone is inadmissible.
C. Occurrence Reports Relating to Mr. Kazumba
38Counsel for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar seeks to adduce evidence of three synopses of charges that were laid against Mr. Kazumba in 2019 and 2024, none of which resulted in convictions. She submits that this evidence is necessary to “level the playing field” if the evidence of Mr. Henry-Robinson’s criminal record is admitted.
39This evidence is manifestly inadmissible for a host of reasons: (1) the synopses are hearsay or even double hearsay: R. v. Burton, 2016 ONCJ 278, at para. 52; (2) Mr. Kazumba was presumed innocent of the charges, a presumption that was never displaced: R. v. Krasniqi, [2008] O.J. No. 5815 (S.C.J.), at para. 37; (3) police synopses are often unreliable: R. v. Williams, 2018 ONCA 437, at para. 55; R. v. Downey, [2018] O.J. No. 6133 (S.C.J.), at paras. 16-17; (4) to the extent that the allegations were likely to be disputed, admitting the evidence had the potential to distract the jury: R. v. Jackson, 2013 ONCA 632, 301 C.C.C. (3d) 358, at para. 49.
III. DISPOSITION
40Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s criminal record is not admissible.
41Mr. Henry-Robinson’s criminal record and the related occurrence reports are admissible, but the occurrence report from June 12, 2020 is not.
42The occurrence reports involving Mr. Kazumba are not admissible.
Justice P.A. Schreck
Released: January 30, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Kazumba, 2026 ONSC 606 COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-40000624-0000 DATE: 20260130
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
RIDGE KAZUMBA and THULANI MONCRIEFFE-BELMAR
RULINGS
Schreck J.
Released: January 30, 2026