R. v. Moncrieffe-Belmar, 2026 ONSC 3449

CITATION: R. v. Moncrieffe-Belmar, 2026 ONSC 3449

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-40000624-0000 CR-25-40000623-0000

DATE: 20260611

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

THULANI MONCRIEFFE-BELMAR

E. Jackson and A. Nagra, for the Crown

A. Monaco, for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar

HEARD: April 23, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE¹

SCHRECK J.:

1Thulani Moncrieffe-Belmar was armed with a loaded handgun when he went to a restaurant with his friend, Nakhari Henry-Robinson, and Mr. Henry-Robinson’s girlfriend, Mariah Brooks. While they were there, another man they did not know, Ridge Kazumba, suddenly shot Mr. Henry-Robinson in the chest causing a wound that would later prove fatal. Mr. Kazumba and Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar then shot at each other several times before fleeing the scene.

2Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was charged with reckless discharge of a firearm, contrary to s. 244.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm, contrary to s. 95(1) and possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order, contrary to s. 117.01(1). He was tried by a jury on the first two counts together with Mr. Kazumba, who was charged with second degree murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. The jury found Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar not guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm based on self-defence, but guilty of unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was later convicted of possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order in a judge-alone trial where he agreed to be bound by the jury’s findings. Mr. Kazumba was convicted on all of the counts he was charged with.

3The court must now determine the appropriate sentence for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar.² The following reasons explain the sentence that will be imposed.

I. FACTS

A. Facts Giving Rise to the Charges

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Facts

On August 23, 2023, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar spent the day with his friend, Nakhari Henry-Robinson. They went to visit Mr. Henry-Robinson’s girlfriend, Mariah Brooks, who worked at a hair salon on St. Clair Avenue West. Both men were armed with loaded handguns. At trial, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar testified that the gun he had was not his and that he was holding it for a friend who was on bail and did not want his surety to know that he had a gun.

5At the hair salon, Ms. Brooks telephoned the Royal Caribbean Café to order food for herself and then went there to get it, accompanied by Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Mr. Henry-Robinson. When the three of them arrived at the café, Mr. Henry-Robinson looked through the window and then told the other two that he did not want to enter because there were young Black men inside. He remained outside while Ms. Brooks and Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar entered the café. There were two security video cameras in the café which recorded all of the subsequent events.

6The young Black men Mr. Henry-Robinson saw were Ridge Kazumba and two of his friends, who were seated at a table eating a meal. Neither Mr. Henry-Robinson nor Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar knew them or were known by them. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Ms. Brooks walked past the table where Mr. Kazumba was sitting and stood at the back of the café awaiting her order. There is some evidence that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar looked at Mr. Kazumba and his friends and there is some disputed evidence that he said something confrontational to them.

7After a few minutes, Mr. Henry-Robinson entered the café and began to walk towards the back. As he did so, Mr. Kazumba stood up, produced a handgun and shot Mr. Henry-Robinson in the chest, fatally wounding him. Mr. Henry-Robinson turned and began to run out of the restaurant. Mr. Kazumba shot him again as he did so.

8After shooting Mr. Henry-Robinson, Mr. Kazumba turned and faced Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar, who took out the gun he was carrying. The two men shot at each other several times. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar crawled behind the counter, where Mr. Kazumba continued to shoot at him before running out of the café. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and Ms. Brooks ran out of the café soon after.

B. The Offender

(i) Background

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The Offender

Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was 27 years old at the time of the offence and is now 30. He was born and grew up in the Toronto area. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s parents separated when he was young but remained on good terms and he had a close relationship with both parents growing up, as well as with his older 10 siblings and half-siblings. Although he had a supportive family, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar saw himself as a “misfit” in the family. As he grew up, he began to associate with older individuals were a negative influence on him, something his family tried unsuccessfully to prevent.

10Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar spoke at his sentencing hearing. He acknowledged being influenced by people who “didn’t have my interests at heart.” He described losing several friends to gun violence, which caused him to become fearful of those around him.

11Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s family remain very supportive of him. They have arranged employment for him when he is released from custody and have obtained psychological counselling for him. Several family members wrote letters of support.

12Between the ages of 14 and 18, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was in custody in various youth custodial facilities. I was not advised of the reason why he was in custody. He has no youth record, so I can only surmise that he had either been denied bail on charges he was eventually acquitted of, or he was in custody in relation to a disposition for a finding of guilt that was later set aside on appeal. Regardless of the reason, the experience led to Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar becoming institutionalized and had a detrimental effect on his mental health. It also entrenched his attraction to negative peer associations.

(ii) Education and Employment History

13Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), which affected his performance in school. He did not complete high school. His employment history includes work in the construction industry and warehouses.

(iii) Criminal Record

14Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has a criminal record with six convictions. In 2016, he was convicted of assault and theft under $5000, for which he received a suspended sentence and probation for 18 months after being credited for the equivalent of 90 days of presentence custody. In 2018, he was convicted of three counts of discharge of a prohibited or restricted firearm with intent to wound, maim, disfigure or endanger the life of another person. He received an effective sentence of imprisonment of approximately 4.8 years. In 2018, he was convicted of assaulting a peace officer causing bodily harm, for which he received a sentence of imprisonment for seven months.

15At the time of the offence he is being sentenced for, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was subject to two firearms prohibitions: a 10-year prohibition pursuant to s. 110 of the Criminal Code imposed in relation to the 2016 convictions and a lifetime prohibition pursuant to s. 109 imposed in relation to the discharge firearm convictions.

(iv) Presentence Custody Conditions

16Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has been in custody since his arrest on January 23, 2024, mostly at the Toronto South Detention Centre (“TSDC”) and the Toronto East Detention Centre (“TEDC”). Institutional records show that he was subjected to lockdowns on approximately 30% of the days he was at the TSDC and 60% at the TEDC. At the latter institution, he was triple-bunked virtually all of the time.

17Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar swore an affidavit outlining the conditions he faced while in custody and the effect they had on him. He describes being assaulted and stabbed by other inmates because of inadequate security precautions by correctional officers, not receiving medical attention for injuries he suffered, being strip searched and observed in a “dry cell” until he had a bowel movement when there was no basis for this, being unjustifiably assaulted and pepper sprayed by correctional officers, being subjected to noise caused by other inmates which prevented him from being able to sleep, and seeing black mold in the showers. He was never provided with access to fresh air while at the TEDC and only rarely while at the TSDC. He states that these experiences have had a significant impact on his mental health. None of this evidence was challenged by the Crown.

C. The Incident Respecting Disclosure

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The Incident Respecting Disclosure

Counsel for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar filed an application claiming violations of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking a sentence reduction as a remedy. The facts relied on are described below.

19Counsel can provide their clients in custody at the TSDC with electronic disclosure on USB keys, which are kept by the correctional staff and provided to the inmate on request. Inmates who wish to review their electronic disclosure are provided with laptop computers on which to do so. These computers are only able to read the contents of the USB key and do not have internet access. Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s counsel delivered USB keys with disclosure to the TSDC several times, but Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar did not receive them.

20On November 12, 2025, during Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s trial, his counsel, Adele Monaco, was advised that an individual in custody she did not know, R.V., wished to speak to her. Ms. Monaco spoke to R.V. in the courthouse cells and he told her that the USB key on which he had his disclosure also contained portions of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure, including video of the shootings. R.V. told Ms. Monaco that correctional staff had encouraged him to disseminate the video to others.

21In an affidavit filed on the application, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar stated that around the same time, he began to hear rumours at the TSDC that other inmates intended to do him harm. He believed the rumours to be true and connected to unauthorized dissemination of his disclosure.

22Ms. Monaco contacted the Superintendent at the TSDC as well as counsel with the Ministry of the Solicitor General to raise concerns about the dissemination of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure and demanding an investigation into how it happened. An investigation was conducted but was ultimately inconclusive. R.V. declined to participate in the investigation on the advice of his counsel.

23Staff Sgt. Samantha Cornish from the TSDC testified on the voir dire and explained the procedures whereby electronic disclosure is kept and provided to inmates. According to her, the TSDC employees do not look at the contents of the disclosure unless there is a concern that it also contains contraband information. She could not explain how Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure came to be on another inmate’s USB key.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Charter Application

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Analysis

Counsel for Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar submits that the unauthorized dissemination of his disclosure could not have occurred without the participation of TSDC staff, who were responsible for safeguarding the USB keys. As there is no way this could have occurred accidentally, it must have been done on purpose. Whoever did it must have known that doing so would make Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar the target of other inmates. These actions therefore breached Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s s. 7 and s. 12 Charter rights.

25The presence of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure on USB keys belonging to other inmates is troubling. Individuals in custody reasonably expect the contents of their disclosure to be confidential and unauthorized access to it by other inmates creates obvious safety risks. This should not have happened.

26However, on this record I am unable to make any findings about how Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure came to be on R.V.’s USB key. R.V.’s statement that he was told to disseminate it by correctional staff is obvious hearsay and inadmissible for the truth of its contents. Staff Sgt. Cornish testified that correctional staff do not look at the contents of the disclosure. While I accept her evidence that this is the usual procedure, I cannot discount the possibility that staff could improperly examine the contents of a USB key. However, the possibility that this could occur does not support an inference that it did in fact occur.

27While it is possible that employees of the TSDC were involved in the improper dissemination of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s disclosure, I am not satisfied of this on a balance of probabilities. As a result, the factual basis for the Charter application has not been established and the application must be dismissed.

B. General Sentencing Principles

28Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the “fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society….” This is to be accomplished through the imposition of just sanctions that have one or more of several objectives enumerated in s. 718(a) to (f), including denunciation, general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation. As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 58, the various objectives “will not necessarily point toward the same sentencing disposition” and the court must “prioritize and blend the different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender.”

29While there will rarely be only one possible fit sentence, s. 718.1 of the Code provides that any sentence that is ultimately imposed “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 30.

C. Sentencing for Firearm Offences

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Sentencing for Firearm Offences

The threat posed by the prevalence of illegal firearms in this jurisdiction cannot be overstated. While many cases involve the possession of guns by individuals involved in other criminal activity who carry them as a “tool of the trade” or in connection with membership in a criminal organization, many, like this case, do not. There is no suggestion that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was a member of a gang or involved in any other criminal activity. I do not accept his evidence that he had the gun because he was holding it for a friend on bail. He had the gun because, like many other young men who have guns, he believed that he required it to protect himself. Unfortunately, the events of this case are likely to be viewed by Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and others as a vindication of that belief.

31Mr. Henry-Robinson was initially hesitant to enter the café because he saw young Black men in there. While he did not know them, he appears to have viewed them as a threat, a view which tragically turned out to be accurate. Mr. Henry-Robinson’s fear that people he did not know where a threat to him is likely why he was armed with a handgun. When Mr. Henry-Robinson did enter, Mr. Kazumba shot him because although he did not know Mr. Henry-Robinson, he viewed him as a threat. Mr. Kazumba’s belief that Mr. Henry-Robinson intended to harm him had no reasonable basis. But his belief that Mr. Henry-Robinson had a firearm turned out to be correct. Mr. Kazumba and Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar then exchanged gunfire because each viewed the other as a threat.

32All of these men were armed because they believed, correctly, that people they encounter may be armed. Undoubtedly, many people who learn of the events in the café will conclude that they show why being armed with a handgun is a good idea. Guns beget more guns, creating a danger that the threat posed by them will increase exponentially.

33To be clear, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is not being sentenced for discharging his firearm, nor is the fact that he did so to be treated as an aggravating factor. The jury concluded that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar acted lawfully and was justified in discharging his firearm, and I of course accept that conclusion. But the challenge in sentencing Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is to ensure as best I can that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar and others like him understand that they cannot continue to walk around with loaded guns. This is difficult because when people like Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar believe that they must possess a loaded gun to preserve their own lives, the likelihood that the prospect of a custodial sentence will deter them is significantly diminished.

34To believe that the threat posed by the prevalence of firearms can be entirely or even significantly solved by the imposition of harsh sentences is short-sighted and unrealistic. Much more must be done. Steps must be taken to prevent these weapons from being imported into Canada. We must somehow convince young men like those involved in this case that they do not need to be armed to be safe. We must ensure that they do not experience the socio-economic conditions that lead to the types of hopelessness, marginalization and alienation that breeds violence.

35I must and will sentence Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar in accordance with the established principles of sentencing outlined earlier, but I do so in the hope that this court is not the only institution fulfilling its responsibility to work towards effective solutions.

D. The Applicable Sentencing Range

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The Applicable Sentencing Range

The Crown submits that the applicable sentencing range for individuals who commit a second offence involving possession of a loaded restricted or unauthorized firearm in violation of a prohibition order is imprisonment for six to nine years. This submission is supported by the authorities: R. v. Cole, 2024 ONSC 4243, at paras. 56-62; R. v. Tsegazab, 2023 ONSC 789, at paras. 22-35; R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, at paras. 39-42; aff’d 2020 ONCA 692, 474 C.R.R. (2d) 137, at paras. 24-27; R. v. Dawkins, 2021 ONSC 4526, at paras. 20-21; R. v. Slack, 2015 ONCA 94, 125 O.R. (3d) 60, at paras. 24-28; R. v. Ellis, 2013 ONSC 3092, at paras. 28-32, aff’d 2016 ONCA 598, 132 O.R. (3d) 510, at paras. 74-80; R. v. Brown, [2019] O.J. No. 2846 (S.C.J.), at paras. 22-31. Where Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar falls within this range will depend on aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case.

E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

(i) Prior Record

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Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The fact that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has a prior criminal record is, of course, an aggravating factor. However, caution must be exercised in using this to locate this case within the applicable range for gun possession recidivists identified earlier as that range is premised on the existence of a prior record. I do note, however, the Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s prior record is not for simply possessing a firearm, but for recklessly discharging it, which makes his record more aggravating.

38Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has other convictions on his record as well. The 2018 conviction for assaulting a peace officer causing bodily harm is in relation to a crime of violence and somewhat aggravating, although it also somewhat dated. I attach no significance to the 2016 convictions for common assault and theft under $5000.

(ii) Family Support

39Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is fortunate that he has a large and loving family that remains very supportive of him and is taking steps to assist with his rehabilitation by securing employment for him and arranging for psychological counselling. This improves his prospects for rehabilitation and is a mitigating factor.

(iii) Personal Background

40I also note that Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar experienced a number of challenges in his youth, including a lengthy period of incarceration while in his teens that had a significant effect on him and which does not appear to be the result of him having committed any offence. This and other factors led to him associating with negative peer influences. All of this is relevant to his degree of moral culpability.

(iv) Remorse

41While Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar did not plead guilty, he did not contest the charges for which he is being sentenced and his decision to plead not guilty to the charge of reckless discharge of a firearm was entirely reasonable as he was acquitted of it. When he addressed the court during his sentencing hearing, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar expressed remorse for his actions and I accept his comments as sincere.

(v) Presentence Custody Conditions

(a) Prevalence of the Issue

42The unchallenged evidence demonstrates that like most inmates at the TSDC and the TEDC, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar was subjected to numerous lockdowns due to staff shortages and triple-bunking. In addition to this, he was not adequately protected against violence by other inmates, did not receive appropriate medical attention and was denied access to fresh air.

43The occasions on which the unacceptability of these conditions has been the subject of judicial condemnation are too numerous to list. This has been ongoing since at least 2015 at the TSDC, which first opened only a year earlier:³ R. v. Doyle, 2015 ONCJ 492, 23 C.R. (7th) 325, at paras.14-16. At the TEDC, the problem appears to have been ongoing more than twice as long: R. v. Jordan, [2002] O.J. No. 5250 (S.C.J.), at paras. 3-8. In R. v. R.B., [2003] O.J. No. 5627 (C.J.), at para. 15, the court provided the following explanation for giving enhanced credit for presentence custody based on conditions at the TEDC:

It permits the Court to signal those with responsibility for the care and housing of prisoners in our Charter-based society that it is concerned about the conditions in the jails and their impact on the security interests and human dignity of individual inmates, as well as the public interest in the protection of these values.

Those concerns remain unaddressed over two decades later.

44Enhanced credit for presentence custody because of harsh custodial conditions is often called “Duncan credit” after the decision in R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, at para. 6, which recognized the mitigating effect of “particularly harsh” conditions. Consideration of “Duncan credit” is no longer restricted to cases of “particularly harsh” conditions. It has become a routine feature of virtually every sentencing case involving individuals who have been in presentence custody in certain institutions, including the TSDC and the TEDC. As my colleague Molloy J. put it in R. v. Shaikh, at para. 15, “[t]he issue is not whether some credit should be given, but the extent of it.” However, I agree with my colleague Mirza J. in R. v. Crawford, 2025 ONSC 345, at para. 183, that these conditions cannot be permitted to become “normalized.”

(b) Quantifying the Mitigating Effect

45In R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, a para. 53, the court stated that assigning a specific number to the mitigating effect of unacceptable presentence conditions is “not necessarily inappropriate” but cautioned that “it may skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence.” Since then, sentencing courts have been divided on whether it is appropriate to quantify the mitigating effect of this factor. In Shaikh, at paras. 22-23, Molloy J. concluded that quantifying the mitigating effect is “preferable, not merely acceptable” for the following reasons:

Transparency and consistency are two important underlying principles of sentencing that are best served by specifying the amount of the Duncan credit. If a sentencing judge merely states that the punitive pre-trial custody conditions have been factored in, without specifying how, neither the accused, the public, the government, nor correctional officials will know the extent to which this has been done. In the result, there will be no public knowledge of the impact deplorable conditions in the prisons are having on the sentences served by offenders, providing little incentive to those in authority to fix the problem. While the amount of credit to be given is a matter of discretion to which deference would typically be afforded, sentencing judges being transparent about the amount of the sentence reduction given will also provide a better opportunity for appellate oversight and error correction.

Other courts have adopted this approach: R. v. Reid, 2026 ONSC 136, at para. 33; R. v. Correia, 2025 ONCJ 662, at para. 43; R. v. Sacchetti, 2025 ONCJ 696, at paras. 154-160; R. v. Sheikh, 2025 ONCJ 551, at paras. 66-67; R. v. Pilliatis, 2025 ONSC 5401, at para. 86; R. v. Crawford, 2025 ONCJ 385, at para. 99; R. v. Pintyi, 2025 ONSC 3371, at paras. 55-56; R. v. Noor, 2024 ONSC 6026, at para. 61-62.

46I intend to adopt the same approach in this case, while having regard for the need to avoid “skewing” the calculation of the ultimate sentence. As observed in Pintyi, at para. 55, “[q]uantification is not a precise mathematical calculation but is simply an approximation of how much of a sentence reduction is appropriate … while imposing a sentence that is proportional and individualized.”

F. The Appropriate Sentence

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The Appropriate Sentence

Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has spent much of his life in custody. His criminal record shows that he received a 56-month sentence on January 24, 2018, to which a seven-month sentence was added for assaulting a peace officer. This means that at the time committed these offences, it had been only a few months since the expiry of his last sentence. While this suggests poor prospects for rehabilitation, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s family continues to support him and are motivated to set him on the right path. This fact, together with Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s statement at his sentencing hearing and the fact that he has now reached the age of 30, leads me to view his prospects for rehabilitation with guarded optimism.

48At the same time, appellate direction on sentencing for gun offences involving recidivists requires me to impose a sentence that emphasizes the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

49Having regard to all of the circumstances and the relevant sentencing principles, I have determined the appropriate sentence in this case is imprisonment for six years for unauthorized possession of a firearm and one year consecutive for possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order, for a total of seven years.

50From this I will deduct 18 months to give effect to the mitigation resulting from the unacceptable conditions of Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar’s presentence custody.⁴ The government has made it abundantly clear that it is content to ignore the courts’ views of the unacceptability of those conditions and has chosen to do nothing about them. Because of that choice, individuals like Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar who have committed serious crimes will spend less time in jail than they otherwise would have.

G. “Summers Credit”

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Summers Credit

The total sentence is therefore 66 months. By my calculation, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar has spent 870 days in presentence custody. In accordance with R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, he is entitled to a credit of one and half days for each day, for a total of 1305 days, or approximately 43 months.⁵ This leave 23 months to be served.

III. DISPOSITION

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Disposition

The sentences of imprisonment are as follows:

Unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm:⁶ 60 months.

Possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order:⁷ 6 months, consecutive.

From this total of 66 months, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is entitled to a credit of 43 months for 807 days in presentence custody. The sentence that remains to be served is 23 months.

53Pursuant to s. 109(1) of the Criminal Code, Mr. Moncrieffe-Belmar is prohibited from possessing the items described in s. 109(3) for life.

Footnotes

1. 1An abbreviated version of these reasons was delivered orally in court on June 11, 2026. In the event of any inconsistency between those oral reasons and these written reasons, the written reasons should be taken as correct.
2. 2Mr. Kazumba was sentenced separately to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 12 years for second degree murder and five years concurrent for unauthorized possession of a firearm: R. v. Kazumba, 2026 ONSC 2490.
3. 3https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/28298/toronto-south-detention-centre-opens-its-doors.
4. 4I will arbitrarily deduct 12 months from the sentence for unauthorized possession of a firearm and six months from the sentence for possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order.
5. 5As is now commonly done in the s. 11(b) Charter jurisprudence, I have converted days to months by treating each month as consisting of 30.417 days in accordance with R. v. Shaikh, 2019 ONCA 895, 148 O.R. (3d) 369, at fn.1, and then rounding the total up to the nearest month.
6. 6Count 4 on Indictment CR-25-40000624-000.
7. 7Count 1 on Indictment CR-25-40000623-000.