R. Alexander Cornelius

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a text message sent by the accused to a police officer inquiring about his mother's life insurance policy.

The Crown opposed, arguing it was self-serving hearsay.

The court found that while the text was presumptively inadmissible hearsay, it should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement's substantive reliability was corroborated by other evidence and that fairness to the accused required its admission to provide a complete picture of his statements regarding the insurance policy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied to re-open a pre-trial statement voir dire under section 551.3(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that fresh evidence showing he received pre-interview advice from a disbarred lawyer acting as a paralegal, rather than a licensed lawyer, undermined the original finding that his statement to police was voluntary and compliant with the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fresh evidence could not have affected the original ruling, as the accused was not detained at the time and had explicitly declined to exercise his right to counsel even if he had been detained.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter challenge to the requirement in the Criminal Code, the Juries Act, and a regulation under the Administration of Justice Act that all jurors be Canadian citizens.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, which directly addressed the issue.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown requested that the lesser included offence of manslaughter be left to the jury, relying on criminal harassment as the predicate unlawful act.

The defence opposed the request.

The court declined to put manslaughter to the jury, finding no air of reality to the predicate offence of criminal harassment.

Specifically, there was no evidence that the victim knew she was being harassed or reasonably feared for her safety, as the accused's surveillance was intended to be surreptitious.

The Crown and defence sought pre-trial rulings regarding the editing of police statements made by the accused, Mr. Lu and Mr. Dookhram, and an application for severance by Mr. Lu.

The court ruled on various excisions to Mr. Lu's statements, removing highly prejudicial opinions from his grandmother and questions about another witness's credibility, while retaining references to his homosexuality and the officer's interview techniques.

The court declined to edit out Mr. Dookhram's references to triads and fear, prioritizing fairness to him over minimal prejudice to Mr. Lu.

Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Lu's application for severance, finding the preference for joint trials was not rebutted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The accused was charged with seven firearm-related offences.

The Crown withdrew three counts during closing submissions.

The remaining charges involved possession of a .40 calibre semi-automatic handgun seized from a residence and discharging that firearm at another location.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including documents bearing the accused's name found in a bedroom, a cartridge compatible with the handgun, DNA evidence from the handgun, and ballistics evidence matching shell casings to the seized firearm.

The defence called the accused's sister, who testified that the accused did not live at the residence but visited occasionally, that he was staying in a guest bedroom on the night in question, and that he did not leave the residence during the relevant time period.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove possession of the handgun beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted on all remaining charges.

The applicant was charged with seven firearm-related offences and brought a motion to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant on a residence.

The applicant argued that the information to obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds, contained inaccurate statements and improper generalizations, and that the affiant was not truthful about independently confirming information regarding the confidential informer's reliability.

The court applied the narrow Garofoli review standard and found that despite deficiencies in the ITO, there remained a sufficient basis on which the issuing justice could have issued the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with firearm-related offences arising from a search warrant executed by Peel Regional Police.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the information to obtain the warrant to challenge its validity.

The heavily redacted ITO was reviewed in an in camera, ex parte hearing, and the Crown provided a judicial summary of redacted material.

The applicant proposed five areas of cross-examination.

The court granted limited leave to cross-examine regarding the reliability of the confidential informer's past information, but denied leave on the other four proposed areas: the overall credibility of the informer, the affiant's experience, the identification process used, and the second address mentioned in the affiant's notes.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The defence applied to re-open and re-consider an earlier ruling that admitted a Super 8 video from the day before an alleged murder.

The defence offered admissions of fact under Section 650 of the Criminal Code to obviate the need for the video.

The Crown opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the video's unique visual probative value, particularly in demonstrating the accused's familiarity with the firearm and concerted action, extended beyond the offered admissions and justified any additional prejudicial effect.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

The Crown applied to admit discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence consisted of video surveillance showing the accused in possession of a long-barrelled firearm at a motel the day before the homicide.

The court found that the evidence was highly probative of the accused's possession, concealment, and familiarity with the weapon, which was relevant to the issues of intention, planning, and deliberation.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the video admissible.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter arising from a planned robbery of a banquet hall poker tournament that resulted in the fatal shooting of a bystander.

At sentencing, the court made factual findings consistent with the jury’s verdict and concluded the accused was a principal organizer of the robbery and knew or ought to have known that firearms would be used.

Aggravating factors included extensive planning, the presence of over 100 patrons, the use of firearms, significant prior criminal record, and the death of a Good Samaritan attempting to intervene.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as dominant sentencing principles in armed robbery-related manslaughter.

The offender’s difficult background and limited mitigating factors did not outweigh the seriousness of the offence.

On a Garofoli review motion, the applicants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant on three Part VI authorizations arising from a robbery and homicide investigation.

The court reviewed the governing principles from Garofoli and Pires and held that there is no automatic right to cross-examine a wiretap affiant, but leave should be granted where there is a reasonable likelihood the questioning will assist the court on a material issue bearing on the authorization's validity.

Given the proposed areas of inquiry concerning the state agent, other suspects, and investigative omissions, the court found an evidentiary foundation sufficient to meet the threshold.

Leave was granted, limited to the questions identified in the applicants' factum.

In a murder jury trial, the Crown brought mid-trial applications to adduce bad character evidence against two accused after cross-examination of a Vetrovec witness.

The court held that defence counsel had not put either accused's character in issue by vigorously challenging the Crown witness's credibility, criminal lifestyle, planning role, or motive, particularly where much of that material had already been elicited in chief.

Applying the governing bad character principles, the proposed DNA, youth record, intercepted communications, firearms evidence, and criminal record evidence were all inadmissible propensity evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The timing of the applications also created unfairness because defence cross-examinations had been conducted in reliance on earlier evidentiary rulings and agreed redactions.

The applicants sought to quash Part VI authorizations arising from a homicide and robbery investigation, alleging the affiant failed to make full, fair, and frank disclosure regarding a state agent, a related firearms investigation, and inquiries into another suspect.

Applying the Garofoli line of authority, the court held the informations to obtain had to be assessed holistically and not by piecemeal dissection, and that the alleged omissions and inaccuracies did not undermine the existence of sufficient grounds for the authorizations.

One category of bad character intercept material concerning unrelated firearms was held to be excisable, but the remaining record still supported issuance.

In the alternative, applying Grant, the court held any breach would not justify exclusion because the police acted in good faith, the privacy impact did not warrant exclusion on these facts, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits was high.

In a jury trial, one accused sought editing of an intercepted communication containing inculpatory remarks by a co-accused.

The court accepted that the intercept was admissible only against the declarant but held the impugned passage was highly probative against that accused and that any prejudice to the moving accused could be adequately managed through clear and emphatic limiting instructions.

Applying the authorities on editing co-accused statements, the court found the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect and that editing risked distorting the meaning and flow of the evidence.

The application was dismissed.

In a murder prosecution arising from a fatal shooting during a robbery at an illegal poker tournament, the moving party sought exclusion of DNA evidence found on a revolver that was not the murder weapon.

The Crown argued the evidence linked the moving party to the person controlling a cache of firearms that included the murder weapon and corroborated a Vetrovec witness.

The court held the inferential gap was too large because the DNA showed only that the moving party touched or handled the revolver at an unknown time and under unknown circumstances, and the revolver was found in a separate locker.

The evidence carried a real risk of impermissible propensity reasoning and its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value.

The application to exclude the DNA evidence was granted.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a shooting at a residential home in Brampton on February 9, 2012.

Between 8 and 10 shots were fired into the Dos Santos family home using a restricted firearm belonging to the accused.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the accused's connection to a person with apparent motive (Z.A., who had been arrested after threatening the family) and his exclusive control over the firearm used.

The accused testified in his defence, denying involvement and suggesting his younger brother Danish may have been responsible.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as internally inconsistent and found him guilty of most charges, finding that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused committed the shooting.