Elizabeth Bristow

The applicant, Cordell Rumbaki, brought a pre-trial motion alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the execution of a search warrant at his residence, seeking exclusion of seized fentanyl under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that there were sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to issue and execute the search warrant, and that alleged sub-facial defects in the Information to Obtain (ITO) did not invalidate the warrant.

The motion was dismissed, and the seized evidence was deemed admissible for the upcoming trial.

This is a sentencing decision for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and simple possession of fentanyl.

The court considered mitigating factors including a guilty plea, harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody (lockdowns, COVID-19), and the offender's background, which included childhood trauma, learning disabilities, mental health issues, substance abuse, and experiences of systemic racism.

Aggravating factors included a criminal record and being on bail for another trafficking offence.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, arguing the gun was used for drug trafficking, which the court rejected due to reasonable doubt.

The defence sought a time-served sentence (2-3 years equivalent).

The judge imposed a time-served sentence, equivalent to a three-year global sentence, emphasizing rehabilitation through probation with conditions for counselling.

The applicants were stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently investigated for a stolen vehicle.

The police arrested the driver for driving under suspension, detained the passenger, and searched the vehicle based on the smell of burnt marijuana and the presence of two roaches, locating a loaded handgun and drugs.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and delay in providing rights to counsel, as the officers lacked reasonable grounds for the stolen vehicle investigation and the vehicle search.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences, sought release on a 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed release plan involved a single surety who could not provide 24/7 supervision.

The court found that while continued detention was not justified on the secondary ground, it was justified on the tertiary ground.

The serious nature of the charges, combined with a weak release plan that left the applicant unsupervised for periods of time, meant that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for release was dismissed.

The accused was charged with seven firearm-related offences.

The Crown withdrew three counts during closing submissions.

The remaining charges involved possession of a .40 calibre semi-automatic handgun seized from a residence and discharging that firearm at another location.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including documents bearing the accused's name found in a bedroom, a cartridge compatible with the handgun, DNA evidence from the handgun, and ballistics evidence matching shell casings to the seized firearm.

The defence called the accused's sister, who testified that the accused did not live at the residence but visited occasionally, that he was staying in a guest bedroom on the night in question, and that he did not leave the residence during the relevant time period.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove possession of the handgun beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted on all remaining charges.

The applicant was charged with seven firearm-related offences and brought a motion to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant on a residence.

The applicant argued that the information to obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds, contained inaccurate statements and improper generalizations, and that the affiant was not truthful about independently confirming information regarding the confidential informer's reliability.

The court applied the narrow Garofoli review standard and found that despite deficiencies in the ITO, there remained a sufficient basis on which the issuing justice could have issued the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with firearm-related offences arising from a search warrant executed by Peel Regional Police.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the information to obtain the warrant to challenge its validity.

The heavily redacted ITO was reviewed in an in camera, ex parte hearing, and the Crown provided a judicial summary of redacted material.

The applicant proposed five areas of cross-examination.

The court granted limited leave to cross-examine regarding the reliability of the confidential informer's past information, but denied leave on the other four proposed areas: the overall credibility of the informer, the affiant's experience, the identification process used, and the second address mentioned in the affiant's notes.

The offender requested an earlier hearing date for a pending dangerous offender application, arguing the only remaining issue was credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court initially agreed to proceed by teleconference.

However, after reviewing the sentencing briefs, the Crown requested to cross-examine the offender and call institutional evidence regarding Covid-19 measures, prompting the defence to also request to call evidence.

The court concluded the matter was not capable of being heard by teleconference and adjourned the application to its previously scheduled return date.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender assessment under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code following the offender's convictions for multiple firearms and violence offences, including attempt to commit murder.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history, which included a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour, and found reasonable grounds to believe he might be found to be a dangerous offender.

The application for an assessment was granted.

The accused applied under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the warrant was improperly issued due to insufficient grounds and improper use of the telewarrant procedure.

The court dismissed the application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently corroborated under the Debot test, and the telewarrant procedure was appropriately used as "impracticable" does not require urgency.

Even if there was a Charter breach regarding the telewarrant, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, a graduate student at York University, was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, also a graduate student, alleged that after an evening of drinking at two bars with mutual friends, the accused sexually assaulted her at his apartment without her consent.

The accused's defence was that the sexual activity was consensual, characterizing the complainant as the sexual aggressor throughout the evening.

The trial judge rejected the accused's evidence as incredible and unbelievable, finding it inconsistent with the probabilities and the complainant's credible testimony.

The judge found that the accused, motivated by anger and a desire for control after the complainant's friend declined to join them for a threesome, took advantage of the intoxicated and vulnerable complainant.

The judge convicted the accused of sexual assault, emphasizing that consent requires affirmative communication and that the absence of physical resistance does not constitute consent.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm against Raymond King, his step-father.

The Crown sought six months imprisonment while defence counsel sought a suspended sentence or conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of nine months in the community followed by two years probation, with strict conditions including home confinement, no contact with the victim, and mandatory counselling for anger management and substance abuse.

The court applied Gladue principles recognizing the defendant's Aboriginal heritage and difficult background while balancing the serious nature of the assault and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused brought a Charter motion under s. 24(2) seeking exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for a suspected cannabis grow operation.

They alleged the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements and inadequate disclosure and sought leave to cross-examine the affiant officer under the Garofoli framework.

The court held that the accused had standing to bring the application as residents of the searched property and permitted limited cross‑examination concerning alleged discrepancies in the officer’s description of another officer’s observations.

After reviewing the evidence and the affidavit supporting the warrant, the court concluded that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the issuance of the warrant.

The search warrant was found to be valid and the evidence admissible.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Garofoli application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants for his residence and vehicle.

The warrants were based partly on information from a confidential informant and were obtained through a telewarrant.

The court reviewed the unredacted Information to Obtain (ITO) under the step‑six Garofoli procedure and found the affiant had been full, frank, and fair.

The informant’s information met the Debot criteria of being compelling, credible, and corroborated by police surveillance and investigation, providing reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The court also held that the use of the telewarrant procedure under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code was justified because it was impracticable to appear before a justice in person.

No s. 8 Charter breach occurred and, in any event, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).