Justice M.M. Rahman

The accused were charged with robbery, pointing and discharging a firearm, and in one case, breaching bail conditions, arising from an incident at a bar in Mississauga on October 9, 2019.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the victim, who gave inconsistent statements to police and at trial.

The court admitted the victim's prior police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on procedural reliability.

However, the court found that the victim's evidence contained significant inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the alleged shooting, and that video evidence did not support her account.

The court concluded that the victim's evidence could not safely carry the whole weight of the Crown's case and acquitted both accused on all charges.

The applicant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief on September 1, 2018.

His trial was scheduled for September 25-26, 2019, but was adjourned when he was charged with new offences on the first day of trial.

Those charges were withdrawn approximately six weeks later.

The rescheduled trial was set for December 23-24, 2020, resulting in total delay of 27 months and 23 days.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay in violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to justify the excess delay by taking reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The defendant was charged with sexual exploitation under section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant invited the complainant, a 17-year-old volunteer at a nursing home, to engage in mutual masturbation while the defendant was in a position of authority over the complainant.

The defendant denied making such an invitation, claiming the complainant initiated the discussion about masturbation.

The court found that the defendant did invite sexual touching but acquitted him because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The brief supervisory relationship during a single afternoon of volunteering was insufficient to establish the requisite position of authority.

The accused was charged with seven firearm-related offences.

The Crown withdrew three counts during closing submissions.

The remaining charges involved possession of a .40 calibre semi-automatic handgun seized from a residence and discharging that firearm at another location.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including documents bearing the accused's name found in a bedroom, a cartridge compatible with the handgun, DNA evidence from the handgun, and ballistics evidence matching shell casings to the seized firearm.

The defence called the accused's sister, who testified that the accused did not live at the residence but visited occasionally, that he was staying in a guest bedroom on the night in question, and that he did not leave the residence during the relevant time period.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove possession of the handgun beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted on all remaining charges.

The applicant was charged with firearm-related offences arising from a search warrant executed by Peel Regional Police.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the information to obtain the warrant to challenge its validity.

The heavily redacted ITO was reviewed in an in camera, ex parte hearing, and the Crown provided a judicial summary of redacted material.

The applicant proposed five areas of cross-examination.

The court granted limited leave to cross-examine regarding the reliability of the confidential informer's past information, but denied leave on the other four proposed areas: the overall credibility of the informer, the affiant's experience, the identification process used, and the second address mentioned in the affiant's notes.

The applicant was charged with 20 counts including dangerous driving, drug-impaired driving, using a firearm while committing an indictable offence, and assault with a weapon.

The charges comprised two separate informations: the first laid in July 2017 relating to an incident on July 15, 2017, and the second laid in April 2018 relating to historic offences from 2016.

The charges were consolidated into a single information and tried together.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated.

The court found that the net delay on the first set of charges exceeded the presumptive 18-month Jordan ceiling and granted a stay on those counts.

However, the court treated the second set of charges separately and found the delay was within the presumptive ceiling, dismissing the stay application for those counts.

The offender was convicted of five counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and one count each of impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

On July 22, 2018, while driving at excessive speed (157-159 km/h) on the QEW with a blood alcohol concentration between 100-155 mg/100mL, the offender struck a vehicle containing five occupants, causing serious and lasting injuries to all victims.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence, finding that while the offender had mitigating factors including genuine remorse and rehabilitation prospects, the gravity of the offence, the severity of victims' injuries, and the paramount sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a substantial custodial sentence.

The appellant was convicted of picking up a passenger for compensation without proper authorization at Pearson International Airport, contrary to section 39.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

He was fined $1,000 and placed on probation for one year.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) that the trial court reversed the burden of proof; (2) that he was entrapped by police; and (3) that the enforcement of section 39.1(1) at the airport violated the constitutional principle of interjurisdictional immunity.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $500 and varying the probation condition to permit the appellant to pick up fares at the airport if properly licensed by the airport authority.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle after police observed him driving erratically on December 29, 2017.

At trial, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the drug recognition evaluation (DRE) and seizure of his urine sample, arguing that a 25-minute delay caused by a second call to duty counsel violated his section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found no breach of section 8, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement in section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is not a statutory pre-condition for lawfulness, and alternatively, that the evaluation was conducted as soon as practicable.

The court also found that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

She applied for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The main issue was whether a five-month period during which the Crown failed to provide video disclosure in a playable form constituted defence delay.

The court found that the three-week adjournment after receiving the playable video constituted defence delay, and that the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings by not seeking a judicial pre-trial earlier.

The net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and care and control while over 80 following a police response to a domestic dispute call at a school.

The defendant challenged the arrest and breath sample seizure on Charter grounds, arguing lack of reasonable grounds, failure to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement, and violations of the right to counsel.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter due to insufficient reasonable grounds for arrest, but found no breach of section 10(b).

Under the section 24(2) analysis, the evidence was admitted despite the Charter breach.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood).

A police officer conducting a RIDE program sobriety check stopped the defendant's vehicle and, after smelling alcohol, demanded an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The defendant failed the test and was arrested.

At the police station, Intoxilyzer tests revealed blood alcohol levels of 230 mg and 220 mg.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity and the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests.

The court dismissed all challenges and found the defendant guilty.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a 12-year-old complainant from British Columbia to testify by video link in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

Alternatively, the Crown sought an order permitting testimony via closed-circuit television.

The defendant opposed the video link application but did not oppose the closed-circuit television application, though he sought to cross-examine the witness from within the closed-circuit television room rather than from the courtroom.

The court granted the video link application, permitting the complainant to testify remotely from British Columbia, and addressed the placement of defence counsel during examination.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

The Crown sought three years imprisonment; the offender sought 21-24 months.

The court imposed 27 months for sexual assault (reflecting a 90-day reduction from 30 months for pre-sentence custody and Downes credit) and 4 months concurrent for assault.

The court rejected the offender's argument for a lower sentence despite it being a single incident, finding the violence surrounding and during the assault, combined with significant victim impact, warranted a penitentiary sentence to fulfill denunciation and deterrence objectives.

Immigration consequences were not considered as a mitigating factor.

Ancillary orders included DNA, SOIRA registration for 20 years, weapons prohibition, and contact prohibition.

The applicant was charged with public mischief and brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in trial.

The Crown failed to disclose a critical video statement for nine months after the charge was laid.

Although the net delay of 13 months and 2 days fell below the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the applicant was required to demonstrate both meaningful defence initiative and that the case markedly exceeded reasonable time requirements.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings, particularly by not seeking earlier judicial intervention regarding disclosure delays.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant appealed an order under the Dog Owner's Liability Act requiring that his dog be destroyed.

A stay of the destruction order was granted pending the appeal.

The applicant then applied for the dog to be returned to his custody pending the hearing of the appeal, subject to conditions ensuring the dog remained on his property.

The court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant such an order.

While the court recognized it had ancillary jurisdiction to stay the destruction order itself (to prevent frustration of the appeal), it held that returning the dog to the applicant's custody was not necessary to prevent frustration of the appeal and therefore fell outside the court's jurisdiction.