Colin Sheppard

Kenneth Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the circumstances of the assault on his roommate, Richard Skupien, which resulted in Skupien's death from a ruptured spleen and rib fractures.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the attack on a vulnerable individual in his home, and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, reduced to two years and four months after applying credit for pre-trial custody and the onerous conditions.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to file their expert pathologist's report as a numbered exhibit, which the Crown opposed.

The report detailed the pathologist's critique of the Crown's expert and offered opinions on the timing of injuries, which could support the defence's theory.

The court denied the request, citing the convention against filing expert reports as exhibits, concerns about them acting as prior consistent statements, and the risk of overemphasizing expert evidence without the full context of cross-examination.

The judge also noted the imprecision of the scientific methods for aging injuries and the potential for misuse if the report was admitted without express caveats.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit preliminary hearing testimony of a witness, Mr. Nassirnia, as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (KGB application).

Mr. Nassirnia could no longer recall incidents he testified about at the preliminary hearing.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing evidence lacked sufficient reliability due to the witness's apparent lack of genuine recollection, having repeatedly refreshed his memory from a police statement.

The court found that the necessity requirement was met and that sufficient indicia of reliability were present, particularly the oath and opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, with a direction that Crown counsel should first attempt to refresh the witness's memory with his police statement at trial.

The Crown brought a blended application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act and the principled exception to hearsay (KGB application) to cross-examine its own witness, Michelle Paul, on prior inconsistent statements and to admit those statements as substantive evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had testified at trial but claimed inability to recall details from her prior police statement and preliminary hearing testimony.

The defence opposed, citing reliability concerns due to the witness's apparent intoxication during the police statement and arguing that some evidence constituted inadmissible propensity evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that certain details of the "Birthday Incident" were inadmissible propensity evidence, the "Phone Call" evidence did not materially differ from trial testimony, and the "Misinterpretation" evidence lacked legal relevance.

The court was not satisfied that the ends of justice warranted cross-examination or the substantive admission of the prior statements.

This ruling addresses a Crown application to admit two statements made by the accused, Kenneth Johnson, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a murder trial.

The statements, one to police and one to his landlord, were alleged to be false and fabricated.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court found a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude the statements were false and fabricated, and capable of supporting an inference of guilt, despite some reservations about the compelling nature of the inference for the landlord statement.

The court also considered and rejected the defence's request to exclude the evidence based on residual discretion, finding the probative value, though modest, was not outweighed by prejudice.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior disreputable conduct and ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased in a murder trial where the accused allegedly beat his roommate to death.

The court ruled that statements by the deceased expressing a desire to move out and fear of the accused were admissible under the present state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

However, a statement attributing a 'hard punch' to the accused was excluded for lacking threshold reliability.

The court also admitted most of the circumstantial evidence of the accused's prior physical abuse of the deceased to show context and animus, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, but excluded observations of bruising that could not be directly linked to the accused.

During a jury trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police after he called 911 regarding his roommate's medical emergency.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of the accused's s. 10 Charter rights, alleging he was psychologically detained without being cautioned.

The court found that a reasonable person in the accused's position would not have felt detained, as the police were responding to a medical emergency and had no reason to suspect foul play at the time.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The defendant, Michael Campbell, challenged the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the 'misconduct exception' which limits pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio when an offender is denied bail under section 524(4) or (8).

The court found this provision to be overbroad and in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, declaring it of no force and effect.

Consequently, the defendant was granted enhanced pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with additional credit for harsh institutional conditions and successful house arrest.

The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant for exercising control over a prostitute and possessing a prohibited firearm, imposing a total sentence of 45 months imprisonment, reduced by the enhanced pre-trial credit, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The offender was convicted of armed robbery of a pharmacy, assault with a weapon, wearing a mask, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offender struck the pharmacist with a handgun and stole opioids.

The court considered the offender's youth, criminal record, and the vulnerability of pharmacies.

A global sentence of 6 years was imposed, consisting of 5.5 years for robbery, concurrent sentences for assault and wearing a mask, and a consecutive 6-month sentence for the firearms prohibition breach, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused was charged with armed robbery, assault with a weapon, disguise with intent, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following a robbery at a pharmacy where opioids were stolen.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's post-offence conduct of demanding a ride and threatening a witness near the scene shortly after the robbery.

The court found that the Crown proved the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, despite the weapon not being recovered, the court inferred from the witnesses' observations and the accused's conduct that the weapon was a real firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all four counts.

The accused was charged with assault on a peace officer, escape from lawful custody, and failing to comply with recognizance.

The court considered a Charter application to exclude fingerprint evidence obtained during a traffic stop that evolved into an investigative detention.

The accused argued violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the initial detention and pat-down search were justified, the officer's attempt to handcuff the accused without reasonable grounds constituted an arbitrary detention in violation of section 9.

However, the fingerprint evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical, the impact on the accused's liberty interest was minimal, and the evidence was vital to the truth-finding process.