John Patton

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm offences following a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the eyewitness identification evidence and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the identification by two independent witnesses, corroborated by gunshot residue on the appellant's hands, provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable trier of fact to convict.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed her appeal from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave, finding that no question of law or matter of public importance was raised, and declined to hear a new issue raised for the first time on appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for dangerous driving and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his moral blameworthiness and awareness of risk after he took medication that caused drowsiness and drifted across the centre line.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the trial judge properly applied the Beatty test, concluding the applicant's conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care and he was aware of the risk.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the trial judge did not prematurely foreclose a conditional discharge.

The Crown appealed the 30-month sentence (reduced to one day after pre-trial custody credit) imposed on the respondent for manslaughter.

The respondent had strangled the victim after discovering her in his home attempting a robbery and being attacked by her.

The Crown argued the sentence was unfit and outside the established range for manslaughter involving strangulation and disposal of a body.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the acceptable range given the unique circumstances, including the victim's unprovoked attacks, the respondent's lack of prior record, and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after arming himself with a handgun and shooting into a vehicle, killing the victim.

The trial judge characterized the offence as close to murder and imposed an effective sentence of 19 years (10 years plus 9 years pre-trial custody credit).

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was beyond the range and violated the parity rule, as the person who hired him received 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for a near-murder manslaughter and the higher sentence was justified by the appellant's role.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation arising from allegations by a child family member, arguing that the trial judge conflated credibility with reliability, misapprehended material parts of the defence evidence, and applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge expressly considered both credibility and reliability, properly applied the criminal burden of proof, and was entitled to assess the child's evidence in light of her age.

The court further held that no material misapprehension tainted the rejection of the appellant's denial and that the trial judge did not impose a harsher standard on the defence evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for attempted murder and endangering, as well as the sentence imposed for several serious gun-related offences arising from a shooting in a restaurant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the acquittal appeals, finding no error of law regarding the attempted murder charge and noting the Crown's refusal to seek a new trial on the endangering counts despite a misdirection.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the effective sentence of 8.5 years manifestly inadequate given the paramount importance of general deterrence and denunciation.

The sentence was varied to an effective term of 10 years.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault.

The determinative issue was whether the trial judge erred in failing to provide an adequate answer to the jury's questions concerning the timeline of various events.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge did not properly answer the questions and it was not satisfied the result would have been the same had they been properly answered.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. framework by asking if his evidence 'might reasonably be true' rather than if it raised a reasonable doubt.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the inapt phrase, the trial judge clearly understood the Crown bore the burden of proof throughout.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the error could have affected the verdict given the credibility issues.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari to quash a decision made at the conclusion of a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by considering the evidence in isolated segments rather than as a whole.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred regarding the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was not serving any sentence when sentenced on these charges, having completed his prior sentence nine months earlier.

The trial judge properly gave 2:1 credit for the nine months of pre-sentence custody.

The totality principle under s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code had no application.

The total sentence of 42 months was well within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by rejecting a joint submission without adjourning the matter to allow the Crown who negotiated the resolution to attend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation on the trial judge to adjourn the case on his own motion, and agreeing that the joint submission was inappropriate and would have brought the administration of justice into disrepute.