Leslie Maunder

The appellant was convicted of robbery, disguise with intent, and possession of an imitation firearm, and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine his mother, an alibi witness, on a prior false police report, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination was generally permissible but the jury instructions were inadequate.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day to reflect the youthful offender's excellent prospects for rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence, including a loaded handgun and drugs, after finding that the police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by seizing his cell phone during an investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer was justified in seizing the cell phone for officer safety and evidence preservation, as the accused was heard telling someone 'they're here now'.

The Court found no s. 8 breach and further held that even if a breach occurred, it was not serious and the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his conviction for an alcohol-related driving offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of involuntary intoxication and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary conviction appeal court judge's decision, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the appellant's experience with alcohol were supported by the record.

The court also dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting it was raised for the first time on appeal and lacked evidentiary support.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and encouraging others to act on a forged document, for which he received a four-year sentence and a restitution order.

He argued he was entitled to use investors' funds as he chose and raised procedural fairness issues regarding his self-representation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant misrepresented how funds would be held and used them for operational expenses.

The court also found the trial judge provided appropriate assistance to the self-represented appellant and did not unfairly restrict his cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for oral reasons delivered in open court.

The sentence appeal was adjourned to a later date to allow the appellant to make submissions.

The appellant's request for an extension of bail pending the sentence appeal was denied, as any potential reduction in sentence was unlikely to reduce his remaining day parole, and bail was revoked.

The appellants, who were 16 years old at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to six violent convenience store robberies.

The Crown successfully applied to have them sentenced as adults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The sentencing judge imposed five-year sentences in addition to three years' credit for pre-sentence custody, and ordered both to serve their sentences in adult penitentiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentences and the quantum of the sentences, finding no error in the judge's approach to accountability, rehabilitation, or pre-sentence custody credit.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the placement of one appellant, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly evaluate expert evidence recommending he remain in a youth facility, and ordered a new placement hearing for that appellant.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order dismissing an application under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act and ordering the disclosure of edited police files relating to a confidential informer.

The accused, charged with weapons offences after a police stop based on an informer's tip, sought the files to challenge the search under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in finding that the edited documents would not tend to identify the informer.

Given the precise details provided by the informer, the pool of potential informers was very small, and any disclosure risked violating informer privilege.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to appreciate the unsavoury witnesses' motives to fabricate, provided insufficient reasons for judgment, and erred in rejecting a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witnesses, provided reasons adequate for appellate review, and sufficiently explained his rejection of the witness's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder after a shooting outside a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a single identification witness who refused to answer questions during cross-examination by the defence.

The trial judge admitted the witness's evidence and provided an inadequate warning to the jury regarding the lack of cross-examination.

The trial judge also erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement of another witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence regarding the police manhunt for the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was undermined.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal shooting at a nightclub.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the deceased in revenge for a prior stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown relied on eyewitness identification and out-of-court statements made by the deceased to his mother, which were admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Chartier instruction regarding eyewitness identification and by admitting the hearsay statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Chartier instruction was not required as there was direct recognition and supporting evidence, and that the trial judge did not err in finding the hearsay statements met the threshold reliability criterion.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud.

The trial judge had imposed a lengthier sentence than originally imposed, explaining the reasons for the increase, including the magnitude of the frauds and the absence of an early guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge's reasons for dismissing the charges did not meet the requirements of R. v. Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to explain why the traffic stop was arbitrary and violated s. 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge had accepted the appellant's evidence and rejected the officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop.

The Court of Appeal restored the order dismissing the charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by applying a Vetrovec warning to a key defence witness who claimed to have committed the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed that applying a Vetrovec warning to defence evidence was an error in law.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong eyewitness identification evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay from arrest to trial was 44 months.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing two periods of delay as neutral rather than institutional or Crown delay, particularly a 7.25-month adjournment sought by the Crown to rejoin the appellant's trial with a co-accused after previously agreeing to a severance.

The Court concluded that 25.25 months of the delay were unjustified, violating the Morin guidelines.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies between the complainant's evidence and statements she allegedly made to former friends regarding her sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and accepted the complainant's explanations.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and carrying a firearm for the purpose of forcible confinement.

At trial, the Crown relied on DNA and fingerprint evidence, while the appellant relied on a denial and an alibi defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made three reversible errors: giving a deliberate fabrication instruction without independent evidence, improperly instructing the jury on the late disclosure of his alibi, and making a prejudicial Corbett ruling that allowed the Crown to elicit that he had other unspecified convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors cumulatively rendered the trial unfair and deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to have the jury consider his defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that contradicted her explanation for using cash to purchase airline tickets to Jamaica.

The appellant claimed she used cash because she lacked a credit card due to unpaid student loans.

The Crown introduced evidence proving this explanation false, which the Court of Appeal held was not collateral as it provided circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge raising an irregularity in the appellant's diploma.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to distinguish between the appropriate period of incarceration for a custodial versus a conditional sentence.

However, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of assaulting his mother-in-law and father-in-law following a family dispute.

The trial judge relied on the appellant's failure to apologize after colliding with his mother-in-law as post-offence conduct to infer intent and reject his claim that the contact was accidental.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that neither the appellant nor the victim was asked about an apology during their testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in making this finding and using it to assess credibility and intent.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.