Joseph Perfetto

The offender, a high school teacher, was convicted of voyeurism after surreptitiously recording videos of female students' cleavage using a pen camera over an 18-month period.

The Crown sought 12 to 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the underage victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

Finding that a conditional sentence would not adequately address these principles, the court imposed a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' probation.

The Appellant, Young Min Shon, appealed a 10-month jail sentence for assaulting his 12-year-old son, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the punitive effect of his impending deportation and that a shorter custodial sentence would suffice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence was not demonstrably unfit and fell within the acceptable range for the offence.

The court held that the sentencing judge's silence on immigration consequences did not constitute an error impacting the sentence, as deportation was a direct result of the conviction itself, not the length of the custodial term, and the trial judge was fully aware of these consequences.

The offender was convicted of entering into an arrangement with an undercover police officer to commit sexual interference with a person under 16 years of age.

He challenged the constitutionality of the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate.

The court reviewed the gravity of the offence, the offender's high moral blameworthiness, and mitigating factors including his lack of a prior record and genuine remorse.

The court determined that a fit and proper sentence range was 9 to 12 months, concluding that the one-year mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore constitutional.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to determine the voluntariness of videotaped statements made by the accused during a police interview.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary due to subtle promises, oppressive circumstances, and a breach of his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no improper threats, promises, or oppression, and that the accused had an operating mind.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

Two accused were jointly charged with human trafficking offences, including unlawfully recruiting and exercising control over a young woman for the purpose of exploiting her in the sex trade, receiving financial benefits from sexual services, advertising sexual services, procuring for sexual services, and unlawful confinement.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a young mother with a history of drug use and involvement with child protective services.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility, arguing she fabricated allegations to avoid losing custody of her child.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable despite inconsistencies noted by initial police responders.

The court convicted both accused of human trafficking and procurement offences, finding they exercised control and direction over the complainant through threats and coercion, causing her to provide sexual services against her will.

One accused was also convicted of receiving financial benefits from the offences and breaching probation conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The accused, aged 24, consumed alcohol at a bar and then drove his father's vehicle through the Western University campus at excessive speed, striking and killing an 18-year-old first-year student.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was 171 mg/100 mL, more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence as the paramount sentencing principle in impaired driving causing death cases.

A high school teacher was charged with voyeurism after surreptitiously recording female students at school using a concealed pen camera.

The Crown alleged the recordings violated the students’ reasonable expectation of privacy and were made for a sexual purpose contrary to s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that although the students did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the recordings were made for a sexual purpose.

The videos showed fully clothed students and lacked nudity, zooming, or other clear sexualized context.

As the circumstantial evidence did not establish that a sexual purpose was the only rational inference, the accused was acquitted.

A young Aboriginal offender, age 18 at sentencing (17 at the time of offences), was convicted of two counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and possessing a firearm without a licence.

The offender fired two shots at police officers during an armed confrontation, resulting in the offender being shot four times by police.

The offender sustained severe injuries including loss of sight in one eye, brain injury, and permanent nerve damage.

The court imposed a 24-month probation sentence with strict conditions rather than custody, applying Gladue principles and considering the offender's Aboriginal heritage, background of intergenerational trauma from residential schools, history of bullying, and significant physical and psychological injuries sustained as a result of the incident.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code arising from sexual activity with a complainant who had been sleeping in another man’s bedroom after drinking alcohol.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented or whether the accused reasonably believed she was consenting, including the possibility that she mistakenly believed the accused was another individual.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and reviewed evidence from the complainant, the accused, an eyewitness, and forensic experts.

While the judge rejected much of the accused’s testimony and had concerns about aspects of the complainant’s evidence, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown therefore failed to establish the offence on the criminal standard.

The appellant appealed summary conviction offences for impaired operation and having care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The appellant had been found asleep in the driver’s seat of his parked truck and argued he intended only to sleep and drive later after sobering up, thereby rebutting the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority interpreting the requirement of a realistic risk of danger, the court held that a stated intention to drive later does not automatically rebut the presumption.

Even without a contemporaneous intention to drive, a realistic risk of danger may arise where an intoxicated person remains in a position to set the vehicle in motion.

The court concluded the presumption was not rebutted and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the police officer had objectively reasonable grounds to support a breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, which included erratic driving, a strong smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, and an admission of drinking.

The court held that these facts were sufficient to objectively support the officer's subjective belief of impairment, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed her convictions for break and enter and being unlawfully in a dwelling.

The police investigated a burglary where the suspect tracked dog feces into the apartment.

An officer attended the appellant's home, entered her enclosed verandah without a warrant, and observed and smelled dog feces on her shoes.

The Court of Appeal found that the officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the breach was minimal and admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought several pre‑trial applications in a homicide prosecution seeking to admit statements made by the accused to police, evidence of disreputable conduct, post‑offence conduct, and hearsay statements of the deceased reflecting her state of mind prior to death.

The court reviewed the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, including the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability, and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Numerous statements by the deceased to friends, family, and others were admitted where they reliably reflected her state of mind and potential motive related to the accused, while other statements were excluded as overly prejudicial, too remote, or constituting inadmissible hearsay about past events.

The court also ruled that various evidence of the accused’s alleged disreputable conduct and post‑offence behaviour could be admitted as circumstantial evidence relevant to motive and concealment.

The media applied to unseal search warrant materials related to a murder investigation.

The application judge ordered partial unsealing.

Both an accused (Gardiner) and the media appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Gardiner's appeal, finding no error in the partial release.

The Court also dismissed the media's appeal, noting that while the application judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review, remitting the matter would interfere with a publication ban already imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court that had dismissed an appeal from a conviction.

The Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered the matter returned for trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari regarding his committal for trial on charges of criminal negligence causing death.

The charges arose from a tractor-trailer collision that resulted in three fatalities.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others to justify the committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence, including the appellant's knowledge of the trailer's poor condition and tendency to lean, to meet the low threshold for committal.

The respondent pleaded guilty to criminal harassment after travelling from British Columbia to Ontario to attend his wife's home, having recently told his daughter he purchased a gun to bring the family back together.

He received a suspended sentence and three years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's status as a first offender, the distance separating the parties, and the protective conditions imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of the complainant's videotaped statement and failed to review the evidence fairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not invite the jury to use the videotaped evidence impermissibly as a prior consistent statement, and the charge was balanced.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the recognized range and the trial judge properly treated the offences as akin to a breach of trust.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found he continued to suffer from a serious mental disorder and remained dangerous, ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding him dangerous and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's disposition was reasonable, supported by medical evidence of the appellant's lack of insight, illicit drug use, and risk of decompensation.

The appeal was dismissed.