Leslie Maunder

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence following a conviction for aggravated assault causing catastrophic and permanent brain injury to the victim.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge did not err by placing significant weight on the brutal nature of the attack, the callous abandonment of the victim without medical assistance, and the devastating consequences of the assault.

The court found that the sentencing judge also properly considered mitigating background factors, remorse, prospects of rehabilitation, and pre-trial custody.

A 9-year penitentiary sentence was held to be within the appropriate range and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexually assaulting his three young granddaughters.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the evidence of the three complainants.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury that a finding of collusion among the complainants would diminish their credibility, and by improperly addressing Crown counsel's remarks regarding the absence of medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the total sentence of 8 years' imprisonment given the egregious breach of trust, the severity of the assaults, and the appellant's prior conviction for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, raising several grounds including errors in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, improper comments on the evidence, and the admission of crime scene photographs and prior statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to two murders committed by a principal.

The Crown relied on the principal's murder convictions to prove the principal committed the offences.

While the appellant's appeal was pending, the principal's murder convictions were quashed, and the principal subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal admitted the quashed convictions and the manslaughter pleas as fresh evidence.

The Court dismissed the appeal but substituted the appellant's conviction for the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter, imposing a sentence of time served.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder arising from an armed robbery where the deceased was shot in the back of the head.

On appeal, the appellant raised several grounds, including errors regarding a potential Corbett application, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, comments on the right to silence, mischaracterization of defence positions, instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and the trial judge's suggestion that the deceased was on his knees when shot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors and concluding that any imperfections in the jury charge did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence from a three-year custodial term imposed for criminal harassment, arguing the sentence was excessive relative to the Crown's position.

The court held the sentence was not unfit given the numerous aggravating factors, including a lengthy criminal record, prior assaults on the victim, repeated disregard of court orders, and the victim's resulting need to change employment and residence.

Applying the principles in Bates, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted only to delete the parole ineligibility order because counsel had no opportunity to address it and no reasons were given for its imposition.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment, impaired driving, and other offences, and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in imposing a mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition under s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code because the Crown had not provided notice under s. 727(1) that it would seek a greater punishment based on prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that a mandatory lifetime prohibition for a subsequent offence constitutes a greater punishment requiring notice.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the lifetime prohibition for non-restricted firearms was varied to 15 years.

The appellant appealed convictions for break and enter, breaking out of a house, and failure to comply, as well as a three-year sentence.

The court held that the trial judge did not err in declining to exclude shoe evidence seized in breach of s. 8 of the Charter, emphasizing the deference owed to a trial judge’s s. 24(2) determination.

The court also rejected the unreasonable verdict argument because the eyewitness testimony was supported by footprint evidence and injuries consistent with the intruder’s escape.

The sentence appeal was dismissed after the court found no failure to consider the appellant’s background as an aboriginal offender and held the sentence fit given the criminal record.