Ingrid Grant

The appellant, Ian Bullens, appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting a "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions that allegedly prevented him from seeing his children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that the issue was not fully brought to the sentencing judge's attention and that Downes credits are reserved for "stringent" conditions, which were not met in this case.

The conviction appeal was abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Francis Norman, on charges of drug trafficking and breach of probation.

Norman had conceded smuggling drugs into a correctional centre but claimed duress due to threats against him and his brother by another inmate.

The trial judge found an air of reality to the duress defence and that the Crown failed to disprove it.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in finding an air of reality to the "no safe avenue of escape" element, given Norman's opportunities to seek help.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the modified objective standard for duress, considering the specific circumstances of the prison environment and the threats to the respondent and his brother.

The two accused were charged with multiple firearm offences, including shooting a pedestrian in a nightclub parking lot following a brief physical altercation.

The Crown alleged the passenger shot the pedestrian, while the defence argued the pedestrian brought his own gun in a satchel, which discharged during the struggle.

The court found the driver's testimony credible and consistent with the physical evidence and video footage.

The court concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to who brought the gun and fired the shot, resulting in acquittals for both accused on all counts.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for multiple offences against an intimate partner, including sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his likelihood of recidivism and failed to properly assess the intractability of his conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence on age-related decline in violent behaviour.

The Court held that the sentencing judge's findings on intractability at the sentencing stage could be applied to the designation stage, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's poor treatment prospects and high risk of violent reoffending.

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export cocaine and sentenced to five and a half years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instruction on the element of conspiracy, specifically regarding the formation of an agreement.

The appellant argued the instruction was confusing and failed to adequately direct the jury to consider what the agreement was for and whether discussions about exporting cocaine crystallized into an actual agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge, read as a whole, clearly left all elements of conspiracy for the jury's consideration and properly framed the legal framework.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range and the trial judge had properly considered the duration of the conspiracy.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Diane Werendowicz, who was sexually assaulted and strangled in 1981.

The appellant's DNA matched semen found on the victim.

The case proceeded through four trials: the first resulted in conviction (later overturned on appeal), the second and third ended in hung juries, and the fourth resulted in conviction.

The Crown's key evidence included a 911 call traced to a phone booth near the appellant's workplace, voice identification evidence, and DNA evidence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the call tracing evidence, voice identification evidence, and other matters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and fair.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against a nine-year-old child.

The trial judge found that the appellant, who had prior convictions for similar offences involving foot fetishism, breached his probation conditions and sexually assaulted the child by forcing her to rub her feet on his penis.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate scrutiny of the complainant's evidence, misuse of similar fact evidence, and misapprehension of defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the child's credibility despite inconsistencies in her testimony, appropriately used similar fact evidence to corroborate the complainant's account, and correctly weighed the defence evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment of a former girlfriend and his sentence of 14 months imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis and failed to stay the charges due to alleged Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or misapprehension of fact in the trial judge's reasons and determined that the sentence was not unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference with a person under the age of 14 years.

The victim alleged that the appellant touched her vagina while she was sleeping on a mattress in the appellant's living room.

The appellant denied the allegations, and his son testified in support of his father.

On appeal, duty counsel raised grounds challenging the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and alleging that the trial judge mischaracterized evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered both credibility and reliability, fairly characterized the evidence, and was entitled to make the credibility findings as made.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences under the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in respect of fraudulent refugee applications totalling 170 applications.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 45 months' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the conviction appeal, noting that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the trial judge's findings and that the trial judge properly evaluated witness credibility and the appellant's unworthy evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the serious aggravating factors including the number of fraudulent applications, multiple breaches of trust, and the appellant's motives of financial gain and community standing.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought an adverse inference instruction regarding the accused's failure to call witnesses to support an alibi mentioned in his police statement.

The defence had argued in closing that the alibi was uncontradicted and raised a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge declined to give the adverse inference instruction, finding that the defence's closing submissions did not leave an unbalanced picture with the jury and that it would be unfair since the Crown had introduced the statement containing the alibi.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a victim on June 20, 1981.

The applicant had been tried four times for the offence: the first conviction was set aside on Charter grounds, the second and third trials resulted in hung juries, and the fourth trial resulted in conviction.

The applicant had been on bail for many years during the proceedings and had complied with all bail conditions.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: (1) the appeal is not frivolous; (2) the applicant will surrender into custody; and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The court found all three criteria satisfied and granted bail pending appeal, increasing the recognizance to $750,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction on counts of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on sexual assault.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of four years on the invitation to sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury verdicts were not inconsistent because the trial judge's instructions created a reasonable basis for the jury to understand that sexual assault required force applied by the appellant to the complainant, whereas sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching required only touching or an invitation to touch.

The court dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of an illegal weapon, challenging the trial judge's finding that the firing pin for the weapon was "readily sourced and available." The appellant argued this conclusion was speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidentiary record, including evidence that the gun was common in the United States where parts were readily available, and that smuggling of parts into Canada occurs despite legal prohibitions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence of a firearm found in a vehicle he was operating.

The appellant argued he was arbitrarily detained and that police violated his Charter rights by failing to immediately advise him of the reason for detention and his rights to counsel.

The trial judge found the detention was not arbitrary, as police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the cumulative behavior of the occupants, and found Charter violations but admitted the evidence under the R. v. Grant test.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder following his third trial for the offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into juror bias after receiving a note expressing safety concerns, by giving inadequate instructions on eyewitness identification, and by refusing to grant a mistrial over the Crown's closing remarks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's withdrawal of the note negated the need for an inquiry, the identification instructions were adequate, and the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in addressing the Crown's remarks with an ameliorative instruction.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial date was approximately 20.5 months, none attributable to the defence.

The delay resulted from delayed disclosure by the Crown and institutional delays.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court trials.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the case was straightforward, the jurisdiction was not plagued by systemic delays, and the Crown's reliance on the seriousness of charges was not reasonable given the disclosure failures.

The charges were stayed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for historical sexual offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to resolve an inconsistency between the complainant's prior statement and her trial testimony regarding whether her mother and brother entered the room during the assaults.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the inconsistency did not detract from the overall claim of repeated sexual misconduct and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was proportional to the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who suffers from Asperger's Syndrome, had a lengthy criminal record but had never previously received a penitentiary sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the three-year sentence offended the proportionality principle and the "step" principle.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and substituted a sentence of time served plus one day, as the appellant had already served over 27 months.