Ingrid Grant

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in marihuana following a CDSA search of an apartment in Toronto during a major gang investigation called Project Battery.

The Crown alleged that police found the defendant sleeping in plain view of a large quantity of marihuana (1114.2 grams) spread throughout the apartment.

The defence challenged both the element of possession and the validity of the search warrant under the Charter.

The court found that the Crown had proven possession beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence including the defendant's use of a key to access the apartment, his association with known drug traffickers, and his presence in the apartment with the drugs.

The court also found that the search warrant was properly issued based on reasonable grounds.

The evidence was admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused brought a motion to stay charges of Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking in Marihuana under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging undue delay.

The accused was arrested and charged in May 2014 and scheduled for trial in April 2016, approximately 22 months later.

The Crown opposed the stay application.

The court found that while the Participation charge was weak and should have been laid sooner, the Crown had discretion in a complex multi-accused prosecution involving extensive disclosure and multiple judicial pre-trials.

The court concluded that the accused's security interests were not violated and that he had not suffered unacceptable prejudice from undue delay.

The application was dismissed and the trial proceeded.

The appellants appealed their convictions for numerous drug, proceeds of crime, and firearms offences following a jury trial.

The appellant Duncan also appealed his sentence.

The appellants argued that the trial judge's jury instructions were inadequate, particularly in relating the evidence to the legal issues and presenting the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the drug and proceeds of crime convictions, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the Court allowed Duncan's appeal on the two firearms convictions, finding the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of trafficking by offer and conspiracy to possess an unauthorized firearm, and erred in applying a reverse onus for the conspiracy charge.

The firearms convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Duncan's global sentence was reduced from 15 years to 14 years to reflect the overturned convictions.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration following guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a minor.

The offender, an Aboriginal man with a hebephilic preference and a history of substance abuse, argued for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court found that while the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender, there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of his risk in the community through intensive treatment, including sex-drive reducing medication.

The court designated him a long-term offender and sentenced him to an additional 2 years in a federal penitentiary, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

During the sentencing hearing for two accused convicted of terrorism offences, amicus and the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment of one of the accused to determine his fitness.

The court held that there is no jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order a fitness assessment after a verdict has been rendered.

However, the court found reasonable grounds to order a further psychiatric assessment under s. 21 of the Ontario Mental Health Act, noting flaws in a previous psychiatric report that had improperly modified the legal test for fitness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle 'over 80', arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his 'slurred' speech when finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly understood the officer's definition of slurring as 'slow and deliberate speech' and that, even if mistaken, the error was not material to the overall finding of reasonable and probable grounds based on multiple indicia of impairment.

The young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent in relation to a 2007 jewellery store robbery.

They brought a motion alleging a violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court analyzed the delay from the time the charges were laid in 2013 following DNA hits.

The court found the total delay of 14 months for one young person and 11.5 months for the other to be reasonable, attributing only 3.25 months to institutional and Crown delay.

The motion was dismissed.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

The appellant challenged multiple drug and criminal organization convictions following a jury trial, arguing the trial judge inadequately answered a jury question on constructive possession, failed to caution on voice identification evidence, and failed to instruct that uncertainty on voice identification could itself raise a reasonable doubt.

The court held the supplemental instruction on possession was erroneous because it conflated control over the place with control over the item, but found the error materially affected only the marijuana possession for the purpose of trafficking count arising from drugs found in common areas.

The remaining conviction grounds failed because the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the burden of proof and identity requirements, and a specific voice-identification caution was not mandatory on this record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted; the sentence on the cocaine possession for the purpose of trafficking count was reduced to ten months, but the global sentence otherwise stood.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence from a border services officer explaining why the appellant was referred to secondary inspection and improperly instructed the jury on that evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the prior authority relied on by the appellant did not bar admission of an officer’s personal observations and permissible non-expert opinion evidence.

The officer’s use of the term 'indicator' was found to be merely descriptive in context and did not amount to profile evidence or impermissible opinion on knowledge.

The charge to the jury, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to treat the officer’s suspicions as proof of knowing importation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction and seven-year sentence for importing 500 grams of heroin.

The trial judge rejected her evidence that she did not know the package contained heroin and was picking it up as a favour.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support a finding of actual knowledge or wilful blindness, noting the package was addressed to her, she attended twice to pick it up, and she provided a false address upon receipt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

On a criminal appeal from fraud convictions, the court considered whether trial counsel’s comment invited an impermissible adverse inference from a co-accused’s silence and whether the trial judge’s charge required an explicit remedial direction under s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The majority held that a trial judge may affirm the right to silence when there is a realistic risk of misuse, but found the charge as a whole adequately conveyed that silence is not evidence.

The court also found the erroneous admission of hearsay did not create a realistic possibility of a different verdict.

The conviction was upheld under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after discharging his trial counsel near the end of the Crown's case.

The trial judge refused the appellant's request for a lengthy adjournment to retain his former preliminary inquiry counsel, finding the request was a sham designed to secure a 'mouthpiece' who would follow unethical instructions.

The trial judge then appointed the discharged trial counsel as amicus curiae.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, finding no error in the refusal of the adjournment or the appointment of former counsel as amicus curiae.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to explain why certain factors did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding fabrication.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The respondent pleaded guilty to participating in a terrorist plot to detonate bombs at the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS Headquarters, and a military base.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence (7 years after pre-trial custody credit) and declined to increase parole ineligibility, emphasizing the respondent's youth, lack of criminal record, and rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge gave inadequate weight to the enormity of the planned mass murder and the unique nature of terrorism offences.

The sentence was increased to 20 years (13 years after credit), and the respondent was ordered to serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for possession of a controlled substance and breaches of a long term supervision order.

Based on fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal set aside two convictions and entered acquittals.

The sentence for the remaining breach of a long term supervision order was reduced to 12 months, less 3 months of pre-trial custody, for a net sentence of 9 months.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault endangering life, break and enter, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with probation.

He sought to set aside his guilty plea, introducing fresh evidence that he was not HIV positive, contrary to an admitted fact during the plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not undermine the conviction, as the appellant admitted to a severe beating with a vase, biting the victim, and being positive for Hepatitis B and C. The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the global 10-year sentence given the appellant's lengthy record and the significant consequences of the attack.