Erin Carley

The appellant, Nicholas Jenkins, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's error in admitting lay opinion evidence from five police surveillance officers, who opined that the appellant's observed conduct was consistent with drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found this evidence inadmissible as neither expert nor proper lay opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, emphasizing the heightened risk of prejudice in a jury trial, the prominence of the inadmissible evidence, and the lack of an overwhelming case against the appellant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking narcotics and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon, and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the drug trafficking convictions, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and factual findings owed deference.

However, the court quashed the conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon, ruling that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof and requiring the defence to prove the shuriken was not a prohibited weapon, rather than requiring the Crown to prove it was.

The global sentence was reduced by two months due to the acquittal on the weapon charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for various drug and firearm offences and his nine-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the validity of a search warrant under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, particularly regarding the inclusion of facts from prior withdrawn or stayed charges.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the ITO, based on the totality of evidence and corroborative facts, justified the warrant.

The sentence appeal argued the nine-year global sentence was excessive, but the Court found the trial judge's sentencing discretion was reasonable.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day for drug trafficking and related offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's conduct of his defence as an aggravating factor and by failing to consider collateral immigration consequences.

Admitting fresh evidence of the appellant's acceptance into a residential treatment program and considering his severe PTSD from being a child soldier in Sierra Leone, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown appealed a youth sentence, arguing that the trial judge misinterpreted s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act by not imposing a custodial sentence despite finding it an 'exceptional case'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that an 'exceptional case' determination under s. 39(1)(d) does not automatically mandate a custodial sentence if the sentence imposed adequately reflects societal values and the YCJA's principles.

The Crown applied for a further extension of time for the detention of seized items under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code.

The extension was sought due to new conflicting information from interviews and practical complications arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated proceeding by way of a Production Order instead of executing search warrants.

The respondent did not object.

The court granted a five-month extension, finding it in the best interests of the administration of justice given the complexity of the investigation and the absence of prejudice.

The offender, previously convicted of tax fraud and ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture, applied to extend the time for payment under s. 734.3 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown brought a cross-application for a warrant of committal under s. 734.7 due to default in payment.

The court dismissed the offender's application, finding that s. 734.3 does not apply to fines in lieu of forfeiture.

The court also dismissed the Crown's application, concluding that the Crown had not established that the offender refused to pay without reasonable excuse, nor that civil enforcement mechanisms were inappropriate.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant appealed a 12-month prison sentence imposed for fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an accountant and real estate agent, had prepared 292 false tax returns using clients' personal information without consent between 2009 and 2012, obtaining $35,321 through fraudulent tax refunds while attempting to obtain $343,840.

The sentencing judge rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation as paramount in fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider his offer of restitution.

The Court of Appeal found the failure to consider restitution was an error in principle but held it did not impact the sentence imposed, as restitution must take a secondary role to deterrence and denunciation in large-scale fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The applicant, Kevin Ekow Plange, sought a state-funded counsel order (Rowbotham order) under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his ss. 7 and 11(d) rights without representation.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Plange failed to satisfy the first criterion for a Rowbotham order, as he had not been forthright with Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) regarding his financial information, leading to the refusal of legal aid.

The court also noted that such orders are exceptional at the preliminary hearing stage and found no exceptional circumstances here, nor was it satisfied that Plange lacked the means to employ counsel.

The offender, Lawrence Watts, was found guilty of fraud exceeding $5,000 for preparing fraudulent income tax returns for 241 taxpayers, reporting non-existent business losses.

The intended loss to federal tax revenue was over $10 million, with an actual payout of $2.75 million.

Watts personally benefited by $149,128.11.

The court considered sentencing objectives, principles, and aggravating/mitigating factors, including the magnitude of the fraud, degree of planning, and breach of public trust.

Watts was sentenced to six years in federal penitentiary and ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $149,129.11, with a default imprisonment term of two years consecutive.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking leave to introduce summary evidence in the form of spreadsheets summarizing voluminous documentary evidence in a complex fraud prosecution.

The evidence related to hundreds of tax returns allegedly containing false business loss claims prepared for numerous clients.

The spreadsheets categorized documentary evidence, linked electronically to supporting records, and illustrated the alleged pattern of conduct and amount of tax evaded.

The court held that demonstrative summary evidence was permissible and necessary to assist the jury in understanding complex and voluminous records, provided its accuracy was established.

The motion was granted and the Crown was permitted to introduce the summary evidence at trial.

The accused applied for particulars under s. 587(1) of the Criminal Code in relation to a fraud charge alleging he participated in preparing false T1 income tax returns defrauding the Government of Canada of more than $5,000.

The accused argued the indictment was vague and failed to specify whether the alleged victim was the public or a person, identify co-participants, and identify the individuals referenced in the indictment.

The court held that a fraud against the Government of Canada clearly constitutes a fraud against the public and rejected the accused’s reliance on contrary appellate authority.

The court further found that the accused had already received extensive disclosure, including the identities of the 241 individuals whose tax returns were involved.

The indictment contained sufficient detail to comply with s. 581 of the Criminal Code, and the request for further particulars was dismissed.

The accused applied to quash production orders and search warrants obtained during a CRA criminal investigation into alleged tax-related fraud.

He argued that the Income Tax Act had not been proven to have received Royal Assent, that Ontario Court of Justice judges lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrants, and that requests for his tax returns violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 8.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that consolidated statutes published by the Minister constitute evidence of the statute’s existence, that Criminal Code investigative powers permit warrants issued by a justice, and that the requests to file overdue tax returns did not violate the Charter.

After excising references to the accused’s later tax returns from the information to obtain, the court found that reasonable grounds for the search warrants remained.

The accused was charged with two counts of defrauding the Government of Canada contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused operated a business called Fiscal Arbitrators that prepared false income tax returns for numerous clients, charging fees plus a percentage of fraudulently obtained refunds.

A second count alleged similar fraud in relation to the accused's own personal tax returns.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence from ten civilian witnesses whose tax returns had been prepared by Fiscal Arbitrators, as well as testimony from the lead investigator from the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to stand trial on both counts.