Linda Hofbauer

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) brought a motion to temporarily place a child (X) with the father's girlfriend (V.P.), or alternatively, arrange graduated access.

The mother opposed this, seeking temporary placement with the maternal grandmother or graduated access.

The court dismissed both motions for temporary placement, finding neither party met the onus under subsection 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to demonstrate that X's best interests *required* a change in temporary placement given the imminent trial and need for stability.

However, the court ordered increased access for X to both V.P. and the maternal grandmother, with the CAS exercising discretion, to facilitate deeper relationships and gather evidence for trial.

The court clarified that X would be the access holder and V.P. and the maternal grandmother would be access recipients, without granting them party status, to avoid derailing the upcoming trial.

The birth mother (D.D.) appealed the dismissal of her application for an openness order regarding her Crown ward son (S.S.), who had been adopted in 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) brought a motion to dismiss the appeal.

The court upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the birth mother lacked standing to seek an openness order post-adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also ruled that new issues concerning the validity of the adoption, not raised in the original application, could not be introduced for the first time on appeal.

CAST's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, and D.D. was ordered to pay costs due to her unreasonable litigation conduct.

A mother sought to bring a status review application to challenge a Crown wardship order made in 2014.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike the application as statute barred under subsection 65.1(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the application was statute barred because it was issued within the prohibited period running from the service of a Notice of Appeal through six months following the final disposition of that appeal.

The court also found that even if the application were not statute barred, the mother would not meet the test for leave to proceed under subsection 65.1(5) of the Act.