Linda Hofbauer

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) brought a motion to temporarily place a child (X) with the father's girlfriend (V.P.), or alternatively, arrange graduated access.

The mother opposed this, seeking temporary placement with the maternal grandmother or graduated access.

The court dismissed both motions for temporary placement, finding neither party met the onus under subsection 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to demonstrate that X's best interests *required* a change in temporary placement given the imminent trial and need for stability.

However, the court ordered increased access for X to both V.P. and the maternal grandmother, with the CAS exercising discretion, to facilitate deeper relationships and gather evidence for trial.

The court clarified that X would be the access holder and V.P. and the maternal grandmother would be access recipients, without granting them party status, to avoid derailing the upcoming trial.

The father brought a motion for temporary care and custody of his two young children, supported by the children's aid society.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking to have the children remain in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother.

The court analyzed who had 'charge' of the children prior to the society's intervention under section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, concluding that the mother and maternal grandmother had charge, not the father.

The court found that the society failed to adequately investigate the father's plan and that placing the children in his care would pose a risk of harm.

The father's motion was dismissed, and the children were ordered to remain in the care of the maternal grandmother.

The birth mother (D.D.) appealed the dismissal of her application for an openness order regarding her Crown ward son (S.S.), who had been adopted in 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) brought a motion to dismiss the appeal.

The court upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the birth mother lacked standing to seek an openness order post-adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also ruled that new issues concerning the validity of the adoption, not raised in the original application, could not be introduced for the first time on appeal.

CAST's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, and D.D. was ordered to pay costs due to her unreasonable litigation conduct.

A mother sought to bring a status review application to challenge a Crown wardship order made in 2014.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike the application as statute barred under subsection 65.1(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the application was statute barred because it was issued within the prohibited period running from the service of a Notice of Appeal through six months following the final disposition of that appeal.

The court also found that even if the application were not statute barred, the mother would not meet the test for leave to proceed under subsection 65.1(5) of the Act.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judge's order making their child a Crown ward, without access, for the purpose of adoption.

The child had been apprehended after being found with rickets and testing positive for cannabinoids due to a marijuana grow-op in the home.

The parents subsequently abducted the child and were on the run for five months before being arrested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' application of the best interests test, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no error in the admission of fresh evidence.

The appellants, parents of a four-year-old child, appealed a decision making the child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The child had been apprehended at birth and previously found to be in need of protection.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding a lack of cooperation and failed to give sufficient weight to their positive visits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's key factual findings were supported by the evidence and the disposition was in the child's best interests.