Nicole Horwitz

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought to withdraw life support for a critically ill infant in its temporary care without court authorization, believing it had the authority under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The infant died after life support was withdrawn, but before an emergency court hearing could proceed.

The court, at the parties' request for future guidance, ruled that a children's aid society cannot withdraw life support for a child in its temporary or interim care without explicit court authorization, especially in the absence of parental consent, emphasizing procedural fairness and judicial oversight in such profound decisions.

This is a temporary care and custody hearing under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning a two-year-old child who suffered catastrophic brain damage from an insulin overdose administered by the mother in June 2019.

The mother was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and administering noxious substances and remains incarcerated.

The father sought temporary custody, while the maternal grandparents sought placement with them.

The court placed the child in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to society supervision, finding that he had demonstrated exceptional commitment to the child's complex medical needs and had established comprehensive services and support systems.

The maternal grandparents were granted access at the society's discretion, with a minimum of twice weekly three-hour visits, subject to conditions regarding appropriate conduct and adherence to medical direction.

The birth mother (D.D.) appealed the dismissal of her application for an openness order regarding her Crown ward son (S.S.), who had been adopted in 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) brought a motion to dismiss the appeal.

The court upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the birth mother lacked standing to seek an openness order post-adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also ruled that new issues concerning the validity of the adoption, not raised in the original application, could not be introduced for the first time on appeal.

CAST's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, and D.D. was ordered to pay costs due to her unreasonable litigation conduct.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to terminate the father's access to twin Crown wards (M.M. and D.M.).

The father had missed numerous access visits due to work schedule conflicts and other factors.

The society argued that the father's inconsistent access created instability and negatively impacted the children's behaviour.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, including questions about the quality of the father-child relationship, the society's conduct in suspending access without court order, and the children's actual preferences regarding contact with their father.

A child protection appeal concerning whether a trial was required on the issue of parental access after the children were made Crown wards.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment making the children Crown wards but found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding access.

The appellate court held the motion judge erred in law by importing post-adoption openness considerations into the statutory test under s. 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act and by failing to follow the statutory pathway requiring proof that the relationship was beneficial and meaningful to the children.

The evidence did not establish a genuine issue requiring a trial on that issue.

The court substituted an order providing that there be no access.

This is a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking Crown wardship without access for four children for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the motion and sought dismissal, requesting either return of the children to her care, placement with her sister, or alternatively, access.

The father did not participate.

The court found no triable issue regarding the children's continued need for protection or the appropriate disposition of Crown wardship.

However, the court found a triable issue regarding the mother's access to the children and ordered a focused trial to determine whether the relationship between the mother and children is meaningful and beneficial, and whether an access order would impair the children's future opportunities for adoption.

The respondent parents brought motions pursuant to subrule 33(1) of the Family Law Rules to extend timelines for filing Answers/Plans of Care regarding two children in child protection proceedings.

The society opposed the motions and sought to note the parents in default.

The court found that both children were in need of protection based on the parents' significant mental health issues, chronic substance abuse, domestic conflict, and neglect.

The court granted a limited extension for the parents to file Answers/Plans of Care on disposition and access issues only, narrowing the scope of future proceedings.

The court found that while the parents had recently taken steps to address risk concerns, the case would proceed to trial with findings of fact already established.

In a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act, the court considered whether a child should be made a Crown ward for adoption or returned to parental care.

The Society sought Crown wardship without access based on concerns about the mother's alcohol consumption.

The court found that while the mother had consumed alcohol excessively during the relevant period, the risk could be adequately managed through an order placing the child in the legal custody of the non-biological father (who had acted as the child's father since birth) under Society supervision, with strict conditions regarding the mother's abstinence and monitoring.