E. E. Gillese J.A.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, rendered inconsistent verdicts, and failed to consider the defence theory of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Court agreed the sentence was a marked departure from similar cases involving sexual assault and intimate partner violence.

However, the Court dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding it was not in the public interest to incarcerate the offender given his 14 months of strict house arrest, prior bail conditions, and fresh evidence of a serious motor vehicle accident requiring ongoing rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed a decision declining to quash a municipal by-law.

The municipality had failed to provide proper notification to the appellant that the by-law had been passed.

The application judge found no bad faith on the part of the municipality and no prejudice to the appellant, and thus declined to exercise his discretion under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act to quash the by-law.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

Two insurers, Wawanesa and Lombard, appealed preliminary arbitration decisions regarding a priority dispute over accident benefits.

Wawanesa, the first insurer to receive the application, deflected it to Lombard.

Lombard paid benefits but later disputed priority without providing the required 90-day notice.

The arbitrator ruled that Wawanesa's breach of the regulation prevented it from relying on Lombard's failure to give notice, but also ruled that Wawanesa was not permanently precluded from disputing priority.

The applications judge upheld both decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the reasoning below.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence, misdirecting the jury on after-the-fact conduct regarding intent, and misdirecting the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the appellant's prior record, the senseless nature of the killing, and the jury's recommendation.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

Following a successful appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellant mother appealed an order reducing her spousal support from $2,200 to $1,150 per month.

The motion judge had imputed income to the appellant after finding she unreasonably failed to complete her nursing program, rejecting her evidence that childcare responsibilities prevented her completion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the competing affidavits raised significant credibility issues that could not be resolved without a trial.

The court directed a trial on the issue of spousal support and reinstated the original support amount in the interim.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their counterclaim against the respondent solicitors for negligence in drafting loan documents and releasing security documents held in escrow.

The motion judge had dismissed the counterclaim on the basis that the appellants had signed a release in favour of the solicitors.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the release was executed in the context of a fee dispute and did not specifically list the matters raised in the counterclaim.

The Court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the scope, operation, and potential unconscionability of the release.

The appellant, a professional bus driver, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving after he drove a bus too far to the right and struck a curb.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of steering failure and that the reasons for judgment were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the steering was functional prior to impact and that the appellant's delayed reaction constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The parties entered into a separation agreement to resolve corollary relief proceedings.

The respondent brought a motion to compel the appellant to comply with the agreement, which was granted.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement by way of motion rather than application, and that the motion judge erred in awarding interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a motion was appropriate because the underlying action had not been dismissed, and that the motion judge had statutory authority to award interest under the Courts of Justice Act.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for administering a stupefying drug to and sexually assaulting his cousin.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his father's alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge properly concluded the alibi was incomplete as it left a window of opportunity for the offence.

The Court also upheld the sentence of 90 days' custody followed by probation, finding it appropriate under the Youth Criminal Justice Act given the breach of trust and violent nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he breached his duty of confidentiality to his former employer by exploiting information related to a government contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the information regarding the contract's renewal and the client's needs was not confidential, as it was widely known and solicited by the government.

Furthermore, the appellant's knowledge of his own skills and qualifications, which he provided to a competing bidder, was his own information and not the property of the respondent.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, mischief, and theft of electricity, as well as his 90-day intermittent sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding he had control over the prohibited substance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to infer control given the obviousness of the grow operation and the appellant's 37-minute stay in the residence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the size and sophistication of the operation.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to obstruct justice following a guilty plea.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence demonstrating that she honestly believed the information she asked a social worker to provide to the police was true, and that her trial counsel failed to identify and investigate this defence of honest mistake of fact.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that trial counsel's failure to investigate the defence resulted in an uninformed guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order striking out portions of his Amended Statement of Claim on the basis of res judicata, abuse of process, or vexatious proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion, noting that claims for lost income as a lawyer lacked an air of reality since the appellant had been disbarred for misappropriation of trust funds.

The court also dismissed the appellant's arguments regarding the motions judge's jurisdiction to award costs and allegations of bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault against his separated wife, which occurred in the lobby of her brother's apartment building.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim, misapplied the W.(D.) test regarding credibility, provided insufficient reasons under Sheppard, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence claim, appropriately assessed credibility, and provided adequate reasons for the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while subject to a prohibition order under s. 100(2) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the original order was invalid because it failed to specify a reasonable period for surrendering ammunition as required by s. 100(13).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that challenging the validity of the original order constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court also found the actus reus was proven, as possessing ammunition three years after the order exceeded any reasonable time limit, and dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed an eleven-month sentence for breaching a non-contact clause in a recognizance of bail on a pending sexual assault charge.

The breach involved an unintentional, two-minute meeting with the victim with no threats or violence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was outside the appropriate range, granted leave to appeal, and reduced the sentence to four months, with two months' credit for pre-trial custody.

A young person appealed both a finding of guilt for sexual interference and the custodial disposition imposed after a cadet camping trip incident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating an evidentiary burden as having shifted to the accused and by linking the accused's failure to meet that burden to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, contrary to the W.(D.) framework.

The court also accepted that it was an error to permit use of the accused's statement to police without first holding a voir dire on voluntariness.

A new trial was ordered, rendering the disposition appeal moot.