3 total
Majority upheld fitness findings and dismissed fresh-evidence challenges to the murder conviction.
The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.
Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.
The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.
A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.
Spousal support provisionally terminated and enforcement stayed after payor diagnosed with dementia and lost income.
The applicant, a 76-year-old former lawyer, brought a motion for a provisional order to terminate spousal support and a temporary stay of enforcement pending a confirmation hearing in British Columbia.
The applicant had recently been diagnosed with dementia, forcing him to close his law practice and leaving him with nominal pension income.
The court found a material change in circumstances due to the applicant's medical condition and inability to earn income, provisionally terminating spousal support.
The court also granted a temporary stay of enforcement, finding the applicant met the test by acting promptly and establishing a prima facie case for variation.
Acquittals set aside; trial judge erred in characterizing automatism as non-mental disorder rather than mental disorder.
The Crown appealed the acquittals of the accused on charges of sexual assault.
The trial judge found that the accused's actions were involuntary and occurred while in an automatistic state caused by a series of small strokes, characterizing it as non-mental disorder automatism.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to presume the automatism was caused by a mental disorder, by treating the medical classification of a brain disease as determinative of the legal classification of a mind disease, and by improperly assessing the continuing danger factor.
A new trial was ordered to determine whether the automatism should result in a verdict of not guilty or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.