Olena Brusentsova

This decision addresses a temporary care and custody motion under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto sought to place the child, E.G., in the temporary care of the father, V.G., with supervised access for the mother, O.G. The court found that the mother’s significant mental health challenges, including erratic behavior and refusal of treatment, posed a risk of harm to the child.

The mother’s social media postings identifying the child and participants in the case were found to violate subsection 87(8) of the Act, leading to a prohibition on such postings and an order for their removal.

The court emphasized the child’s best interests, the need for stability, and the importance of protecting the integrity of child protection proceedings from cyberbullying and intimidation.

This decision addresses the costs of a complex motion concerning the interpretation of an interim preservation order's "usual and ordinary course of business" term.

The applicant sought partial recovery costs of approximately $105,000, while the respondents proposed $25,000.

The court awarded the applicant $98,000, finding them overwhelmingly successful on the key issues.

The court emphasized proportionality, the complexity and high stakes of the litigation, and the respondents' conduct, including significant delays, late affidavit delivery, and a "scorched earth policy" which unnecessarily increased costs.

This motion concerned the interpretation of the term “usual and ordinary course of business” as it applied to corporate respondents in an interim preservation order.

The corporate respondents sought an expansive interpretation to allow significant financial transactions, including leveraging properties and transferring funds for a private mortgage lending business.

The applicant sought a narrow interpretation to preserve assets.

The court applied principles of judicial order interpretation, emphasizing context and purpose, and found the respondents' proposed interpretation would negate the preservation order's effect.

The court adopted a narrow definition, limiting “usual and ordinary course of business” to day-to-day operations and management, explicitly excluding large-scale asset encumbrance or intercorporate fund transfers for investment.

All other relief sought by the respondents was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a temporary parenting order to increase his parenting time with the parties' child, who has Autism Spectrum Disorder.

The court found no material change in circumstances but determined the original order was time-limited, allowing for a review.

Applying the maximum contact principle, the court partially granted the motion, expanding the father's summer parenting time to four non-consecutive weeks and extending his alternate weekend parenting time to Monday mornings, while denying his request for additional mid-week overnights.

The defendant brought two motions: one to compel the plaintiff to re-attend for oral discovery and another for security for costs.

The plaintiff opposed both.

The court ordered the plaintiff to complete her discovery via video conference due to medical reasons, with shared costs.

The court also granted the security for costs motion, finding the plaintiff ordinarily resident outside Ontario, and ordered $15,000 in security for future costs, payable in tranches.

No costs were awarded for the motions.

The applicant, Nadia Hosein, brought a motion seeking enforcement of a previous parenting order, an updated s. 30 assessment of the children's needs, and sanctions against the respondent, Anoop Dhamoon, for breaching court orders and engaging in parental alienation.

The respondent sought to dismiss or stay the applicant's motion due to unpaid costs and opposed the other requests.

The court found that the applicant had substantially complied with past costs orders, that the respondent had breached the parenting order and engaged in parental alienation, and ordered an updated s. 30 assessment, therapy for the applicant and the eldest child, strict compliance with the previous access order, and costs against the respondent.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision upholding the validity of a marriage contract, arguing it should be set aside due to lack of financial disclosure and unconscionability.

The trial judge had set aside only the spousal support waiver and ordered a further hearing on support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding trial costs was also dismissed.

The applicant husband sought a divorce, and the respondent wife sought to set aside their 1996 marriage contract, which waived spousal support and property equalization.

The court found the contract valid under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting the wife received independent legal advice and signed voluntarily despite the husband's failure to provide full financial disclosure.

However, the court set aside the spousal support waiver under section 33(4) of the Family Law Act, finding that enforcing it would result in unconscionable circumstances given the wife's 16-year financial dependence in a traditional marriage.

The applicant husband sought a divorce, and the respondent wife sought to set aside their 1996 marriage contract.

The contract waived spousal support and equalization.

The wife argued she did not understand the contract, signed under duress, and that the husband failed to disclose assets.

The court found the contract valid under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting the wife received independent legal advice and signed voluntarily despite being advised not to.

However, the court set aside the spousal support waiver under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act, finding that enforcing it after a 16-year traditional marriage where the wife was financially dependent would result in unconscionable circumstances.

A costs decision arising from a motion to change a child support order.

The respondent father sought to reduce his monthly child support obligation based on a decrease in income.

The parties settled the motion on March 31, 2015, with the father agreeing to maintain the original support amount until the child completed secondary school, while the mother abandoned her claim for past special expenses.

The court determined that the mother achieved greater success and awarded her partial costs of $3,000, finding divided success but favoring the applicant's position.

The respondent father brought a motion for temporary orders regarding custody, access, child support, and financial issues including carrying costs of the matrimonial home and an equalization payment.

The court ordered temporary joint custody with the children's primary residence remaining with the father, and granted the mother generous access.

The mother was ordered to pay interim child support and a proportionate share of Section 7 expenses.

The financial claims regarding the matrimonial home and equalization were adjourned to trial as they presented genuine issues requiring adjudication on proper evidence.

Following a long motion in a family law proceeding where success was divided, the court considered the costs submissions of the parties.

The applicant wife was more successful overall, having secured interim spousal support and protective orders regarding property, though the respondents succeeded on the sale of the home and dismissing a motion to strike pleadings.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs as there was no bad faith or unreasonable conduct.

The applicant was awarded $10,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside an uncontested custody and child support order.

The appellant had failed to respond to the initial application, leading to the uncontested hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's refusal to set aside the order, noting the appellant failed to explain his failure to respond to the proceedings and that the best interests of the children were considered.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant spouse brought an interim motion in family litigation seeking various remedies including striking the respondents’ pleadings, interim spousal support, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and restraining orders.

A co-owner brother of the respondent spouse brought a cross-motion seeking partition and sale of the jointly owned property under the Partition Act.

The court held that the evidentiary record raised multiple triable issues concerning ownership contributions, occupation rent, and mortgage liabilities.

The court ordered the matrimonial home to be listed for sale but directed that the net proceeds be held in trust pending trial.

Interim spousal support of $1,500 per month was ordered and the husband’s share of certain trust funds was allocated toward support.

Claims regarding child support, final distribution of sale proceeds, and other financial disputes were reserved for trial.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside an order made after an undefended trial that granted the mother sole custody, adjusted parenting time, imputed income to the father, and ordered child support.

The moving party sought leave to file an answer and financial statement, arguing the order resulted in injustice and that he had not participated in the proceeding.

The court held that the Family Law Rules did not authorize setting aside the order and that the Rules of Civil Procedure provisions respecting default judgments could not be applied by analogy.

Even if applicable, the moving party failed to provide any explanation for his default and did not satisfy the criteria required to set aside a default judgment.

The court further found no manifest injustice warranting use of inherent jurisdiction.