Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.L., 2026 ONCJ 455

minicounsel

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.— Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.L., 2026 ONCJ 455

DATE: March 30, 2026

COURT FILE No.: FO-22-00000448-0003

BETWEEN:

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto

Applicant

-and-

LL and AC

Respondents

Before Justice S. Sullivan

Heard on July 30, November 13, 2025, and January 7, 2026

Reasons for Judgment released on March 30, 2026

Rachel Buhler................................................................ Counsel for the Applicant Society

LL.................................................................................................................. On her own behalf

David Miller...................................................................... Counsel for the Respondent AC

SULLIVAN, J.:

Part 1 – Introduction

[1] This is the court’s ruling regarding the summary judgment motion brought by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto.

[2] This motion for summary judgment is brought within an amended protection application issued March 7, 2025.

[3] The subject child is ACL, born ***, 2025.

[4] The child’s mother is LL.

[5] The child’s father is AC.

[6] The first return of this protection application was on ***, 2025. At that appearance, Justice Pawagi placed ACL in the temporary care and custody of the Society, on a without prejudice basis. It was further ordered that access by each parent shall be supervised, with frequency, duration, and location to be at the Society’s discretion, to be a minimum of twice per week. Justice Pawagi further ordered that while ACL is in hospital, the parents may have unsupervised access daily, subject to hospital rules.

[7] The parents continue to have access together, twice per week, for one hour per visit, fully supervised by two Society workers.

[8] There have been no motions brought to vary Justice Pawagi’s ***, 2025 order.

[9] The Society seeks the following final order:

(a) Statutory Findings:

i. The child’s name is ACL born ***, 2025.

ii. ACL is not a First Nation, Inuk, or Metis child.

iii. ACL was brought to a place of safety from Toronto, ON on ***, 2025.

(b) Protection Findings:

i. ACL is in need of protection pursuant to subsections 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the CYFSA; the Act).

i. ACL shall be placed in the extended care of the Society.

ii. LL and AC shall have four in-person, fully supervised access visits a year. The location and duration of these visits shall be at the discretion of the Society in collaboration with the caregiver and the child’s schedule. This in-person access may be supplemented by cards and letters and gifts sent by the parents to be monitored by the Society.

iii. ACL shall be the access holder and LL and AC shall be the access recipients.

[10] The Society’s position is that the court can determine these issues via a summary judgment motion as the facts, when considered as a whole, establish that there are no genuine issues that require a trial to resolve.

[11] LL has not filed an Answer and Plan of Care. She was served via special service on March 31, 2025. LL was provided the opportunity to advise the court of her position on November 13, 2025 and January 7, 2026:

(a) On November 13, 2025, LL advised that she wants ACL to come home to her and AC. If this cannot happen, she wants ACL to reside with the maternal grandmother, Ms. BC.

(b) On January 7, 2026, LL advised that she wants her baby home.

[12] AC has filed an Answer and Plan of Care. It is dated ***, 2025. The disposition he requests therein is as follows:

(a) A lesser protection order.

(b) ACL shall be placed in his care and custody, subject to a six-month supervision order.

(c) In the alternative, an order placing ACL in the interim care of the Society for six months, with reasonably gradually increasing access between him and the child.

[13] AC does not oppose the statutory findings and the protection findings being made via summary judgment motion. However, he opposes the disposition in this matter being determined via summary judgment motion. AC submits that the Society’s evidence does not include all the positive changes he has made since the 2024 trial regarding the parents’ other children AD and AM. He says that the Society workers have ‘cherry picked’ what they have put in their affidavits regarding access visits, and the workers have not been cross-examined. AC also submits that it is not fair to determine the issues in this case on written materials, given his literacy challenges and that he better expresses himself verbally than in writing.

[14] At this summary judgment motion, AC’s requests are manifold:

(a) Dismiss the summary judgment motion regarding disposition and set a trial regarding whether ACL should be returned to his care under a six-month supervision order, be placed in interim society care for six months, or be placed in extended society care.

(b) In the alternative, should the court find that a disposition should be made on this summary judgment motion, that the disposition be a six-month interim society care order.

(d) In the further alternative, if both placement and access are determined via summary judgment motion, he have minimum monthly access where he and ACL are reciprocal access holders and recipients.

[15] This summary judgment motion was first before the court on July 30, 2025. It was adjourned to November 13, 2025:

(a) Following the court questioning the appropriateness of proceeding with the summary judgment motion when the final disposition of AC’s appeal of Justice Meyrick’s final order dated November 8, 2024 appeared imminent, and the Society was relying on Justice Meyrick’s findings at the summary judgment motion, the Society requested an adjournment and the parents consented.

(b) The adjournment would allow LL the opportunity to retain counsel, file an Answer and Plan of Care, and prepare materials for this summary judgment motion. Duty counsel was present and advised that LL has a Legal Aid Certificate and that he will assist her with finding counsel to represent her. LL had retained counsel to represent her in the 2024 proceeding regarding AD and AM.

[16] LL did not retain counsel and as noted, she did not file an Answer and Plan of Care.

[17] On September 15, 2025, Justice Sah of the Superior Court of Justice dismissed AC’s appeal of Justice Meyrick’s November, 2024 final order for delay.

[18] By way of chambers endorsement dated November 14, 2025, the court provided AC with the opportunity to file a document brief containing all visit notes, if he wished, to address his concern regarding the incompleteness of the evidentiary record. He did, and the court received oral submissions regarding those notes on January 7, 2026.

[19] The court must determine if the relief sought by the Society should be granted by way of summary judgment and determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial on any of the following issues:

(a) What are the appropriate statutory findings?

(b) Is ACL a child in need of protection?

(d) If so, what disposition orders – placement and access – are in ACL’s best interests?

(e) If ACL is placed in extended society care with access, who should be the access holders and who should be the access recipients?

Part 2 – Evidence

[20] The court has reviewed the following:

(a) Affidavit of M. McGarry dated May 14, 2025;

(b) Affidavit of M. Giustini dated May 13, 2025;

(d) Affidavit of M. Giustini dated June 19, 2025;

(e) Affidavit of M. McGarry dated July 4, 2025;

(f) Affidavit of S. Intelisano dated October 7, 2025;

(g) Affidavit of M. Giustini dated October 8, 2025;

(h) Affidavit of R. Hall dated October 9, 2025;

(i) Affidavit of AC dated June 27, 2025;

(j) Affidavit of AC dated November 3, 2025;

(k) Society’s Plan of Care dated May 15, 2025;

(l) Supplemental Access Notes Brief of AC filed November, 2025;

(m) Statement of Agreed Facts filed in 2023 regarding findings and disposition (3-month interim society care order, with access) regarding AM;

(n) Statement of Agreed Facts filed in 2023 regarding findings and disposition (3-month interim society care order, with access) regarding AD;

(o) Dr. Murphy’s psychological assessment of AC dated January 18, 2024 (assessment completed October 31, 2023); and

(p) Justice Meyrick’s reasons for judgment dated November 8, 2024 regarding AD and AM.

[21] Mr. Miller advised that AC does not object to Dr. Murphy’s assessment report being submitted for the truth of its content.

[22] Prior court orders, reasons for decision, and statements of agreed facts are admissible in subsequent court proceedings. A court can take judicial notice of other court orders. Statements of agreed facts are admissions, which are an exception to the hearsay rule. See: Children’s Aid Society of Waterloo v. M.W., and M.S., 2020 ONSC 1847.

[23] The court has carefully screened the evidence to ensure it only relied on trial-worthy evidence. The court did not give weight to evidence at this motion that would be inadmissible at trial. See: Kawartha Haliburton Children's Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316 (Kawartha).

Part 3 – Facts

3.1 The Parents

[24] LL is forty-one years old; her date of birth is ***, 1984.

[25] LL had a stroke when she was approximately two years old. This has left her with cognitive deficits and a speech impediment. LL has difficulties processing information. She is verbal but her articulation is incoherent, and she must repeat her words a few times for her message to be clear.

[26] AC is fifty years old; his date of birth is ***, 1975.

[27] AC participated in a psychological assessment completed by Dr. Vincent Murphy on October 31, 2023. It was not a parenting capacity assessment. Dr. Murphy concluded that AC’s cognitive functioning falls in the very low range at the 3^rd percentile. Further, his verbal comprehension, working memory, and processing speed indices fall in the very low range at 7^th, 6^th, and 3^rd percentile respectively. AC’s basic literacy skills, mathematical skills, and written language skills are delayed and underdeveloped. AC struggles to sequence and to organize information in his mind as well as to hold onto information in working memory. He seems to quickly lose information from conscious awareness. Given the extent and severity of AC’s cognitive deficits and adaptive functioning delays, he was seen to meet the diagnostic criteria for Mild Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder) (DSM-5 317).

[28] AC’s source of income is the Ontario Disability Support Plan and Worker’s Compensation.

[29] AC is a recovering addict who has been clean and sober since 2017. He attends NA twice weekly. Substance misuse is not a protection concern in this case.

[30] LL and AC have two other children:

(a) AD (born ***, 2022); and

(b) AM (born ***, 2023).

[31] On November 8, 2024, following a trial, Justice Meyrick ordered, in part, that:

(a) AD and AM be placed in the extended society care with CCAST.

(b) LL and AC shall have four in-person supervised visits per year. The location and duration of the visits shall be at the discretion of CCAST in collaboration with the care providers and the children’s schedules.

(d) LL and AC may supplement their access four times per year in the form of cards, letters, photos, and gifts that may be sent from them to the children. These shall first be delivered to the Society who will vet them to ensure they are appropriate for the children.

(e) AD and AM may send their parents artwork, cards, letters, and gifts at their discretion. All such additional communication shall be monitored by CCAST.

[32] LL has another child, BL (born ***, 2006). Pursuant to an order made in November, 2014, BL is in the care and custody of GL and TL.

[33] AC has a son from a previous marriage who is around 30 years old. Justice Meyrick’s November, 2024 reasons for judgment includes that AC does not have a relationship with this son.

[34] AC is married to DM; they married in ***, 2011.

[35] AC and DM separated in 2025 and continue to live under the same roof. AC describes her as a ‘roommate, and not a partner’.

[36] The Society learned of AC’s separation from DM upon receiving and reviewing AC’s June 27, 2025 affidavit.

[37] It is noted in Justice Meyrick’s November, 2024 reasons for judgment that DM has mobility issues.

[38] On November 19, 2024, LL advised Society worker Ms. McGarry and Ms. Balbino (Child, Youth & Family Access and Support Worker, ASW) that DM is really sick and had a stroke.

[39] At the April 25, 2025 access visit, AC told Ms. McGarry that his wife had recently been discharged from hospital.

[40] At the May 21, 2025 visit, DM joined the parents’ access briefly via FaceTime. Ms. Giusitini observed DM to be in a hospital bed.

[41] In his June 27, 2025 affidavit, AC states, “DM has significant health issues, but I have no responsibilities to her care. If she needs to go to the hospital, I call for an ambulance, and that is the extent of it.”

[42] According to AC, he and LL were in an on-and-off relationship since about 2021, but it is now over. They are now friends. They continue to reside together, but just as roommates.

[43] LL, AC, and DM reside together in a two-bedroom apartment located at ***, ON.

3.2 History of Child Welfare Involvement

[44] LL’s involvement with child welfare authorities regarding BL includes:

(a) In May, 2006, CAST received a referral from Toronto Public Health Nurse Angie Kim who had been working with LL and Ms. BC since March, 2006. Ms. Kim was concerned about LL’s ability to parent a newborn baby, given her developmental delays.

(b) BL was removed from LL’s care at birth and placed in the care of the Society.

(c) CAST’s kinship department completed an extensive assessment of Ms. BC and at that time, rejected the proposed plan based on the evidence reflecting that she had failed to protect LL throughout her life.

(d) On November 22, 2007, Justice Nevins found BL to be a child in need of protection pursuant to subsection 37(2)(l) of the CFSA,

(e) In February, 2010, following a trial on the issue of disposition, Justice Sherr placed BL in Ms. BC’s care, subject to a six-month supervision order. Further supervision orders were made.

(f) BL remained in Ms. BC’s care from March, 2010 to July, 2012 when she was again brought to a place of safety. CAST discovered that Ms. BC had married her partner, and he was living in the home with them, in contravention of the supervision order. Further, BL was having contact with her uncle, who was a registered sex offender.

(g) On November 6, 2014, BL was placed in the care and custody of TL and GL pursuant to section 57.1 of the CFSA.

[45] With respect to AD:

(a) At the time of AD’s birth at Scarborough General Hospital, staff social worker and a doctor expressed concerns about LL’s ability to meet a newborn’s needs. Their concern was based on LL’s inability to follow feeding directions, pick up on the baby’s cues, and that she required a lot of prompting and extensive support to tend to the infant’s needs. The parents suggested that Ms. BC be a caregiver for AD, and LL would reside at the home and AC would have liberal access there. To avoid more intrusive measures, the Society agreed to the plan proposed by the parents, while continuing to assess other plans for AD’s care.

(b) Initially, Ms. BC appeared to be meeting the baby’s basic needs.

(c) However, AD was brought to a place of safety on October 26, 2022 due to concerns regarding Ms. BC’s care of AD. On October 24, 2022, a doctor reported that AD was not getting enough formula nutrition, that his neck and limbs were weak as a result of lack of nutrition, and that he could not push himself up or move his body. AD’s weight did not reflect the amount of formula intake Ms. BC was reporting.

(d) On October 31, 2022, Justice Pawagi placed AD in the temporary care and custody of the Society, with access.

(e) On November 1, 2023, Justice Pawagi found AD to be in need of protection pursuant to subsections 74(2)(b)(ii) of the CYFSA.

(f) On November 1, 2023, Justice Pawagi also made an order that AD be placed in the interim care of the Society for a period of three months with access.

[46] With respect to AM:

(a) AM was born prematurely at thirty-one weeks and was monitored in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit following her birth due to issues related to her premature birth.

(b) While in the hospital, staff noted that LL required a lot of direction and constant reminders to address the baby’s needs.

(c) Baby AM continued to require care in the NICU, and there were no discharge plans in place. AM continued to require a high level of care from her caregivers to ensure her needs were met on an adequate and consistent basis.

(d) AM was brought to a place of safety on ***, 2023.

(e) On November 1, 2023, Justice Pawagi found AM to be in need of protection pursuant to subsection 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA.

(f) On November 1, 2023, Justice Pawagi also made an order that AM be placed in the interim care of the Society for a period of three months with access.

[47] Within the status review application regarding AD and AM, there was a trial before Justice Meyrick. In her November, 2024 reasons for judgment, Justice Meyrick found, in part:

(a) The parents’ home lacks cleanliness. It is unsafe for small children. It has a profound smell of cigarette smoke. It has an acute and chronic bed bug and roach issue.

(b) LL and AC are always early for visits and arrive prepared with food and supplies for the children. AC will often ask for help when he needs it. At times, AC will acknowledge that he is unable to look after the two children at visits without assistance.

(d) A running theme in relation to AC’s access is his inability to regulate his emotions. He has an anger management issue. He is argumentative and overreacts when confronted or re-directed. He is impulsive and aggressive.

(e) AC has been irritated and loud when speaking to or directing LL.

(f) The parents are unable to retain the information given to them and apply it to new situations.

(g) There were numerous examples regarding organization, hygiene, and risk to the children’s emotional and physical safety at visits.

(h) The parents are unable to read the children’s cues and respond appropriately. They do not understand appropriate child development.

(i) AC is often distracted by what he considers the injustices done to his family by the Society, rather than paying attention to his children. He spends his access time arguing with staff about the ‘lies’ they are spreading about him rather than addressing the children and spending positive time with them.

(j) AC denies the importance of the concerns raised by the workers.

3.3 ACL

[48] ACL experienced complications at birth and was in the NICU for fetal distress. At birth, his weight was 32.50 grams, and his APGAR scores were 1 and 7.

[49] ACL had to remain in the NICU after his birth for approximately twenty-six days.

[50] ACL was discharged from hospital on ***, 2025.

[51] Since his admission into foster care, ACL has remained in the same foster home.

[52] Overall, ACL has done well in foster care.

[53] ACL has been described as a beautiful and happy baby, and as being strong and resilient. He has also been referred to as a calm baby who is very easy to manage, and as a baby who rarely fusses.

[54] On May 12, 2025, the Society’s Health Specialist, Ms. Allen made a referral to Centennial Infant & Child Centre, and suggested that the foster caregiver request a referral to a pediatrician for further assessment regarding the following observations she made of ACL on May 9, 2025:

(a) Hemangioma right side of head;

(b) Right sided head lag;

(d) Bulbus / prominent forehead; is that familial; and

(e) Snoring and bilateral minimal chest in drawing with no distress.

[55] On May 13, 2025, Ms. Allen spoke to Jessie Kimmell, Intake Services at Centennial, who advised that it would be helpful for ACL to have neonatal or pediatric services, followed up with an eventual developmental/genetic assessment.

[56] On June 4, 2025, Ms. Lozano, worker from Ontario Health at Home advised Ms. Giustini that she will be making a referral for ACL to receive physiotherapy.

[57] On June 8, 2025, pediatrician Dr. Azzopardi arranged for ACL to have a spinal x-ray referral for a head ultrasound.

[58] On June 19, 2025, Ms. Allen wrote an email to the service team providing recommendations that could be shared with the parents regarding how to encourage ACL to look towards his non-favoured side. In her email, Ms. Allen stated that the priority is to ensure that ACL is comfortable and not forced into any position which may cause discomfort or distress.

[59] Dr. Azzopardi has diagnosed ACL with macrocephaly; this is a condition where an infant’s head circumference is significantly larger than the average for their age and sex. ACL also has positional plagiocephaly, known as ‘Flat Head Syndrome’. Dr. Azzopardi queries whether ACL has scoliosis.

[60] ACL’s medical conditions require many supports. For example:

(a) ACL is supported by Grace Vo, an Early Childhood Interventionist from Centennial Infant and Child Center. The purpose of the Early Intervention program is to support children from birth to childcare or kindergarten who have delays, or risk of delays, in two or more areas of development.

(b) ACL has continued with physiotherapy, and his caregiver does exercises with him at home.

(c) In September, 2025, ACL attended the Hospital for Sick Children (HSC) for a neurology consult with Dr. Christian who recommended a follow-up in a couple of months for an MRI brain scan, due to the benign enlargement in the subarachnoid space. Dr. Christian also provided teaching around Flat Head Syndrome.

(d) Referrals have been made to appropriate services to follow up with his diagnosis of macrocephaly and to further assess whether he has scoliosis.

[61] In her September 22, 2025 final report, Ms. Allen (health specialist) notes that ACL has been making positive developmental strides and progress with the listed supports for his fine and gross motor skills.

[62] AC and LL were present at the virtual September 11, 2025 plan of care. AC advised that he forgot about the meeting and was out, but that he could still attend via phone. Ms. Giustini spoke of ACL’s foregoing medical conditions. When ACL’s diagnosis of macrocephaly was discussed, AC advised that he has a watermelon head and giggled. He stated that ACL just has a big head. When ACL’s positional plagiocephaly was referenced, AC stated that he did not notice this, and instead he sees ACL’s head as being pointier. AC also stated that he does not think ACL needs physiotherapy.

3.4 Access

[63] ACL had access to his parents while he was at St. Michael’s Hospital following his birth:

(a) On February 28, 2025 St. Michael’s Hospital social worker Faiven Ghirmai advised Ms. McGarry that when the parents visit in the NICU they have been appropriate.

(b) On March 13, 2025 Ms. Ghirmai advised that the parents visited with ACL almost daily; they usually arrive around 11:00 a.m. and stay until around 3:00 – 4:00 p.m.

[64] Since ACL’s discharge from hospital, to date, ACL has been having access to his parents on Mondays and Wednesdays, for one hour each visit. These visits are fully supported and supervised by two members of the Society’s service team. The visits occur at McGregor Park Community Centre. Protocols are implemented to minimize bed bug exposure at visits.

[65] As of July 7, 2025 ACL’s access to his parents was virtual, as a bed bug was found at the June 25, 2025 visit. On August 13, 2025, access resumed to in-person visits at McGregor Park Community Centre.

[66] There are positives regarding access visits. For example:

(a) The parents attend regularly and are consistently early.

(b) The parents demonstrate love and affection for ACL. For example, there are warm greetings, and the parents show excitement and happiness over being with ACL. The parents kiss ACL goodbye after each visit.

(d) The parents speak to ACL in a caring manner.

[67] There have been improvements in AC’s conduct at visits since those he attended with AD and AM. For example:

(a) There have been no concerns of AC being irritated or loud when speaking to or directing LL.

(b) While AC has not been consistently receptive to the guidance provided by Society workers, he has not overreacted when redirected. On occasion, he has even agreed with what the Society workers have said. For example, on August 13, 2025, AC agreed with Ms. Intelisano when she said that it was not a good idea for LL to put her finger in ACL’s mouth after using hand sanitizer, given it was alcohol based.

(c) AC has not been impulsive, aggressive, or emotionally dysregulated. For example, on September 24, 2025 when ACL was around 30 minutes late for an access visit, AC was understanding and responded appropriately.

(d) AC has shown insight into his past misconduct. For example, on April 7, 2025, AC spoke to Ms. Giustini about doing things differently this time around and doing what the Society says is needed; he said that he did not listen with his other children. Also, on April 9, 2025, AC told Ms. McGarry that he knows that his tactics with the workers regarding AM and AD and court did not work, so he will now try to be more cooperative. Further, on May 14, 2025, AC told Ms. Giustini that he was disrespectful to the previous workers and acknowledged that he was not the nicest. AC has made a real effort in this regard.

[68] LL and AC have become accustomed to the structure and routine of their hour-long visit. They regularly carry out some of the expected, simple tasks associated with ACL’s care. For example, they wash their hands on arrival and AC routinely checks ACL’s diaper at the beginning of the visits. Over time, AC has learned how to complete a proper diaper change.

[69] At access, the parents frequently pass ACL back and forth between themselves, and they share the responsibility of tending to his needs.

[70] However, even within the structure of brief, supervised access, the parents have not consistently been able to meet all of ACL’s relatively limited needs; to read ACL’s cues and respond appropriately; and to retain information provided and apply it to new situations. Regular intervention by the access supervisors is required.

[71] On several occasions, the parents have been observed lifting/holding ACL in an unsafe manner, despite numerous reminders not to do so. For example:

(a) On April 9, 2025, AC required a reminder from Ms. McGarry of the need to hold ACL securely, and to support his head, but not from his head.

(b) On April 11, 2025, AC did not support ACL’s head properly and ACL’s head was observed flopping. Ms. Intelisano told him that he needed to support the baby’s head at all times.

(c) On April 16, 2025, AC was observed lifting ACL by putting both hands on the baby’s neck/throat area and pulling him up. Ms. Intelisano immediately intervened and cautioned AC about the dangers of lifting a baby in the way that he did. AC responded that ‘he knew’.

(d) On April 25, 2025, LL had to be reminded to support ACL’s head.

(e) On May 5, 2025, LL was observed holding ACL solely by his neck with one hand, while adjusting her shirt with her other hand. Ms. Intelisano intervened by placing her hand on ACL’s bottom to support his weight.

(f) On May 7, 2025, AC was observed holding ACL awkwardly on his lap, with one hand around his neck, facing him. He appeared to be holding the baby’s neck firmly, and Ms. BC pointed this out and told him to be gentle. Ms. Intelisano also pointed out to AC that he was holding ACL’s neck too firmly on one side and suggested that he change position. AC argued that the way he was holding ACL was fine but eventually agreed to change position. Later in the visit, AC lifted ACL awkwardly, pulling him by his neck. Ms. Intelisano immediately told AC that it was not safe to hold the baby solely by the neck and demonstrated how to properly lift the baby. AC denied holding ACL in an unsafe manner and accused the worker of wanting to ‘write lies for the court’. After a few minutes, AC agreed that he could have been more careful as he was lifting the baby and repeated that he was not to lift the baby by holding him by the neck.

(g) On May 14, 2025, AC was observed to not support ACL’s head while turning him over on a floor mat. Ms. Intelisano asked AC to pay attention to the way he is holding ACL at all times, ensuring his head is supported. He acknowledged what Ms. Intelisano said and responded, ‘I know’.

(h) On May 21, 2025, Ms. Giustini had to remind AC to hold ACL’s head.

(i) On May 26, 2025, AC was observed holding ACL awkwardly and had to be redirected several times to adjust his position, to which he responded, ‘he is okay’ or ‘I know’. In the same visit, AC was later observed not supporting ACL’s head as he picked him up. He was reminded to support the baby’s head at all times. AC responded that he ‘did not do it on purpose’.

(j) On June 2, 2025, LL required direction to support ACL with both hands, and to not hold him solely by the neck.

(k) On June 4, 2025 LL needed a reminder to support ACL with both hands, one to support the baby’s bottom and the other to support his head.

(l) On June 11, 2025 AC required direction to properly support ACL’s head while holding him.

(m) On June 18, 2025 LL needed reminders and assistance with how to hold and support ACL’s head safely; she often held him awkwardly. Ms. Intelisano reminded LL to use one hand to hold ACL’s head and one on his bottom.

(n) On August 13, 2025 AC needed a few reminders to support ACL’s head while holding him.

(o) On August 25, 2025 AC was observed picking ACL up abruptly and laying him flat on his lap. ACL’s head appeared to flop back. Ms. Intelisano advised AC to lift the baby up and support his head properly. She explained that ACL’s head was heavy and would flop back if not supported when he laid him flat on his lap.

(p) On September 3, 2025, AC sat ACL on a windowsill unsupported. ACL was unable to hold the weight of his head and hit the back of his head on the window. Ms. Intelisano reminded AC that ACL was not able to hold his heat yet and he needed to support it consistently.

(q) On September 22, 2025, AC refused to accept Ms. Intelisano’s recommendation to place a floor mat under the blanket on the floor so that there would be additional safe room for ACL to roll. ACL rolled off the blanket and hit his head on the floor. Ms. BC had to tell AC to pick ACL up, as he was crying. Ms. Intelisano had to remind AC to support ACL’s head while he was holding him.

[72] Both parents have struggled to appropriately feed ACL in a consistent manner. For example:

(a) On April 9, 2025, AC took the bottle out of ACL’s mouth prior to him being halfway through the bottle and while ACL was actively sucking.

(b) On April 11, 2025, AC attempted to give ACL the remainder of his bottle while the baby was asleep; he tried to put the nipple in his mouth several times.

(c) On April 11, 2025, LL needed several reminders to tilt the bottle in order to keep the nipple full and avoid baby sucking on air. LL also needed a reminder to burp the baby.

(d) On April 14, 2025, AC picked ACL up awkwardly with one hand behind his head and attempted to give him more milk, despite ACL being asleep.

(e) On April 16, 2025, LL needed several reminders to tilt the bottle to keep the nipple full at all times.

(f) On April 16, 2025, AC attempted to feed ACL while he was sleeping.

(g) On April 30, 2025, near the end of the visit, as AC fed ACL, he showed signs of not wanting his bottle; he was observed moving his head from side to side and moving his arms and legs more. Ms. Intelisano suggested to AC that he take the bottle out of ACL’s mouth because it seemed as though ACL did not want it. AC argued that ACL was still sucking, and he didn’t notice the other behaviours Ms. Intelisano did. A discussion ensued regarding the importance of figuring out what the baby was trying to communicate.

(h) On May 21, 2025 AC fed ACL, but he was turning his head and did not seem hungry. Ms. Giustini asked if he was taking any of the bottle; AC said he was, but he was not. Ms. Giustini spoke with AC about ACL being the one to advise if he is hungry. He was reminded that ACL last ate at 1:30 p.m. and feeds approximately every four hours. AC said that he would try again in a bit. Ms. Giustini reminded him that if ACL is not showing signs of being hungry or taking the bottle, that it was okay. AC again said that he will offer the bottle in a bit.

(i) On May 23, 2025, Ms. Intelisano suggested to AC that he offer ACL his bottle. AC said that ACL did not want milk. The accompanying social worker pointed out that ACL was opening his mouth in a way that indicated he may be hungry. AC heated up the bottle and provided it to LL, who fed ACL.

(j) On June 2, 2025, ACL was gagging and choking as AC fed him. Ms. Intelisano told AC to take the bottle away. Ms. Intelisano further suggested that AC angle the bottle slightly and sit ACL up a bit, which he did.

(k) On June 4, 2025, AC attempted to feed ACL as he cried. Ms. Intelisano had to tell him to remove the bottle from the baby’s mouth as he did not seem to want it and was crying. AC complied.

(l) On August 20, 2025, AC needed several reminders to hold the bottle properly so that the nipple would be inside ACL’s mouth. AC insisted that he did not require help and then blamed Ms. Intelisano for handing him a bottle with the cap still inside. AC did not notice the milk was not flowing as he fed ACL.

[73] Many times, at access, AC was observed to have turned his attention to interacting with the Society workers and had to be reminded to focus on ACL. For example, this occurred on May 23, 2025; May 28, 2025; June 4, 2025; August 20, 2025; and October 1, 2025.

[74] AC has not consistently responded to ACL’s medical circumstances in an appropriate manner. For example:

(a) On May 14, 2025, Ms. Giustini advised AC and LL that Ms. Allen had made a referral for ACL to be assessed regarding her observations of ACL (noted above in paragraph 54). AC stated that nothing was wrong with ACL and that he did not feel there was a need for him to be assessed. Ms. Giustini advised AC that there may not be anything concerning, but Ms. Allen wanted to ensure this by getting a second opinion.

(b) At the May 21, 2025 visit, Ms. Giustini spoke with the parents about ACL’s preference to the right side of his head. AC said that he feels ACL may need physiotherapy and advised that if he was home, he would get it. Ms. Giustini assured AC that ACL was being assessed and there would be follow-up with any recommendations made. AC tried turning ACL’s head to the left, however, ACL would not go to the left and fussed. Ms. Giustini asked AC not to force ACL.

(c) At the May 26, 2025 visit, AC attempted to turn ACL’s head on the left side, stating that he never turned his head toward the left. Ms. McGarry suggested that AC talk to ACL as a means to encourage him to turn his head towards the sound. Physiotherapy was mentioned as a possibility to help ACL strengthen his neck muscles and improve his head control. AC stated that he did not want ACL to have physiotherapy, as he wanted ACL to ‘do it on his own’. Ms. McGarry and Ms. Intelisano explained that sometimes children need a little help with development to prevent further issues and that a physiotherapist was a professional who could work on exercises to encourage ACL.

(d) On May 28, 2025, AC talked about ACL’s preference for his right side and that he mostly turned his head towards that side. AC said that he knew how to ‘fix the issue’. AC further advised that he was going to tilt ACL’s head towards the left side, and he proceeded to do so. Ms. Intelisano advised AC that they were not medical professionals, and it was best to wait for the specialist’s recommendations. AC insisted that he knew what to do and did not need the doctor to tell him as he had gone through the same issue with AM. Ms. Intelisano told AC that AM and ACL were different children, and it was best not to do anything unless directed by the doctor, as they do not want to cause any damage or make things worse. Ms. Intelisano suggested that AC sit on the floor on the left side and talk or sing to ACL to encourage him to turn towards him. Ms. Intelisano also suggested using the rattle.

(e) At the June 9, 2025 visit, AC put his hands on ACL’s neck and titled the baby’s head towards the right. Ms. Intelisano advised that it was best to encourage ACL to turn his head using a rattle or talking to him. Ms. Intelisano explained that ACL’s assessment report has not been received and therefore the recommendations are not known. AC said that ‘he knew’ and was going to do something about ACL’s neck as he was not going to wait for the doctors. Ms. Intelisano advised AC that it was best to wait for the specialist’s recommendations as we do not want to cause any further damage or hurt ACL. Ms. Intelisano observed AC to appear irritated, and he said he knew what to do and would continue to do so, and he would speak to the judge about this. Ms. Intelisano encouraged him to speak with his lawyer and asked him again to please refrain from tilting ACL’s neck until the specialist report was received. AC took a rattle from LL and shook it; ACL did not turn his head. AC stated that this was not working. Ms. Intelisano advised that he needs to be patient and keep trying consistently. AC put the rattle away.

(f) On June 18, 2025, prior to the access visit starting, Ms. Giustini spoke to the parents about Ms. Allen attending an access visit to provide insight into how to best support ACL’s head and neck. AC stated that he does not want the health specialist in a visit and stated that if she were to come to a visit, the Society was to let him know, as he will stay home. Ms. Giustini and Ms. Intelisano tried to explain that the health specialist is a nurse. AC responded that she is not a physiotherapist, and he does not need her input.

(g) On June 18, 2025, LL and AC were also advised that ACL had a spinal x-ray and a head ultrasound done. AC suggested that nothing was wrong with ACL, and that he believed he just needed to work on it. He stated that if ACL was home with him, he would be having a physiotherapist working with him. Ms. Giustini told him a referral for physiotherapy had been made.

(h) At the July 9, 2025 virtual visit, AC asked the foster mother whether ACL had started to move his head more freely and the foster mother said he was doing much better moving his head to the middle and left now. Both parents said that this was good. AC asked if ACL had started physiotherapy, and the foster mother replied that he would be seen next week.

(i) At the August 13, 2025 visit, ACL was observed lifting and turning his head from the left side to the right side on one occasion, and both parents cheered and clapped.

(j) At the August 27, 2025 visit, at one point, AC was interacting with ACL, and Ms. Guistini asked AC to make the silly noises to ACL’s left side; he did and ACL turned his head a bit to the left side. Later, Ms. Guistini asked AC to do that on his left side so that ACL can practice turning his head to that side; AC said that he won’t. Ms. Intelisano told AC that it is important for them to continue doing this so that he practices getting to his left side.

(k) At the September 29, 2025 visit, Ms. Intelisano read the communication book to the parents and thus they were advised that ACL had started physiotherapy. AC stated that ACL did not need physiotherapy and questioned why. Ms. Intelisano reminded AC that they had discussed several times that ACL needs some support with his motor skills development, as he was mainly turning to the right. Ms. Intelisano explained to AC the purpose of the physiotherapy was to do exercises to encourage ACL to turn his head towards the left and strengthen his neck muscles. AC said that ACL did not need physiotherapy, and he was fine.

(l) At the October 1, 2025 visit, AC stated that ACL did not need physiotherapy. Ms. Intelisano reminded AC that they had discussed several times that ACL needs support with his motor skills development as he mostly turns his head to the right. Ms. Intelisano explained that the purpose of the physiotherapy was to provide exercises to encourage ACL to turn his head to the left and strengthen his neck muscles. AC insisted that ACL was fine and did not need support.

3.5 AC’s Plan

[75] On April 25, 2025, AC asked Ms. McGarry if his wife, DM could attend an access visit, because if ACL is placed with him, she will be there as part of the plan. He did not make this request again. DM has not attended an access visit with ACL in-person. She has attended a handful of visits virtually, for brief periods of time.

[76] AC’s plan, as noted in his June 27, 2025 affidavit and at the hearing of this summary judgment motion, is that ACL be placed in his sole care, subject to a six-month supervision order.

[77] LL and DM are not part of AC’s plan. They will not provide parenting support for AC.

[78] Terms of supervision proposed by AC include:

(a) He will fully cooperate with the Society.

(b) He will fully cooperate with any service or program recommended by the Society for him or for ACL.

(d) He will cooperate with the Society regarding dealing with any bedbug issue in his residence.

(e) He will ensure that ACL receives regular medical attention from the family physician or pediatrician as deemed necessary by the physician or the Society worker. He will follow through with any recommendations made by any medical professionals who may become involved with the child.

(f) He shall ensure that ACL attends full-time daycare.

(g) He shall be ACL’s primary caregiver. ACL shall not be left unsupervised in the care of anyone else who has not been approved in advance by the Society.

(h) ACL shall not be left unsupervised with LL or DM.

[79] AC advises that there are a couple of daycares near where he lives.

[80] AC says that he now recognizes his own limitations but does not state what they are. On April 9, 2025, AC stated to Ms. McGarry that the Society lied and that is the only reason AD and AM were not returned to him. On April 14, 2025, AC stated to Ms. McGarry and Ms. Intelisano that the children were taken because they had bed bugs in their home and because the Society workers lied to the judge. AC said the Society is not giving them a ‘fair shot’ and all Society workers lied on the stand during trial for his other children.

[81] In his affidavit evidence filed for this summary judgment motion, AC states, in part, that:

(a) He has been demonstrating that he is able to retain information that he has been taught about parenting and that he has been able to apply that information consistently.

(b) He is open to help, support, and advice from the Society or from any professionals.

(d) He is able to parent ACL independently and appropriately through the access visits without support or direction.

[82] At the September 11, 2025 plan of care meeting, AC advised his plan is to go to trial. He stated that he will not be agreeing to anything and that he plans to appeal like he did for his other children.

3.6 Society’s Plan

[83] The Society’s plan is to search for an adoptive home for ACL, if an extended society care order is made.

Part 4 – Is there any genuine issue requiring a trial?

4.1 Legal Considerations

[84] The Society brings this motion pursuant to Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules (the Rules).

[85] The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. They must provide affidavit evidence that "sets out specific facts showing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial." See: Rule 16(4).

[86] The responding party must provide factual evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. Mere allegations or denials are not enough. See: Rule 16(4.1). This has been referred to as a party being required to put their "best foot forward". The court is entitled to assume that the responding party has presented all the evidence they would be able to adduce at trial. See: CAS of the Niagara Region v. S.T., 2020 ONSC 727 ; Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. K.T., 2000 CanLII 20578 (ON CJ), 2000 O.J. No. 4736 (OCJ); Sweda v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200 ; CCAS of Hamilton v. T.E. et al., 2021 ONSC 3151 .

[87] Although Rule 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the responding party to provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the responding party's evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. See: Kawartha.

[88] If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim, the court shall make a final order accordingly. See: Rule 16(6).

[89] The court may grant summary judgment on some issues, while ordering a trial or mini-trial on other matters in relation to which there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. See: Rule 16(6.2).

[90] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 (Hyrniak), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that there will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.

[91] The standard for fairness within a summary judgment motion is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that they can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute. See: Hryniak.

[92] In Hryniak, the court set out a two-stage process for summary judgment motions:

(a) The judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact findings powers in Rule 16(6.1) and (6.2).

(b) If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, the judge should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using fact-finding powers (per Rule 16(6.1)) provided it is not against the interest of justice to do so.

[93] The powers in Rule 16(6.1) involve the weighing of evidence, evaluating credibility, drawing inferences, and possibly receiving oral evidence on the motion. The use of these powers is discretionary, provided that they do not run contrary to the interests of justice. Their use will not be against the interests of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability, and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole. See: Hyrniak; CAS of Waterloo v. M.W. and M.S., supra.

[94] With respect to the use of summary judgment motions in child welfare proceedings:

(a) In Kawartha, the Court of Appeal stated that a fair and just determination on the merits must recognize the distinctive features of child protection matters; such proceedings engage Charter rights for a vulnerable segment of our society. Consequently, when determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court must exercise caution and apply the objectives of the CYFSA including the best interests of the child.

(b) The child protection jurisprudence reflects a cautious approach to the genuine issue "for trial" or "requiring trial" analysis by applying a test that has been referred to in a number of ways. It has been equated with "no chance of success" or that it is "plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed". The test has also been enunciated as being when the "outcome is a foregone conclusion" or where there is "no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that sought by the applicant". See: Kawartha, at para. 72.

(c) In L.M. v. Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel, 2019 ONCA, 841, the Ontario Court of Appeal clarified that the cautious approach in Kawartha, “neither precludes the use of summary judgment in child protection matters, nor suggests a different summary judgment test in this context.” Summary judgment in child protection cases can ensure a fair and just determination in a prompt and proportionate manner, but each case must be decided on the issues and evidence presented bearing in mind the particularly high stakes and Charter rights of parents and children in child protection cases.

(d) Judicial assistance must be provided for self-represented litigants. In particular, judges must engage in managing the matter and must provide assistance in accordance with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) established by the Canadian Judicial Council. See: Kawartha, at para. 80.

(e) The special considerations that apply to Indigenous children must be part of every decision involving Indigenous children, including summary judgment motions. See: Kawartha, at para. 80.

4.2 Analysis

[95] The court has exercised exceptional caution before proceeding on a summary basis as this is a child protection case. The court recognizes and has considered that in child protection proceedings there are Charter implications at stake for vulnerable litigants.

[96] The court has been consistently mindful that notwithstanding the obligations placed upon the Respondents pursuant to Rule 16(4.1), the burden of proof lies with the Society.

[97] The court finds that it is in the interest of justice to proceed summarily with respect to all issues before the court. The court can make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law to those facts. It is a proportionate, more expeditious, and less expensive means to achieve a just result. The summary judgment process allows the court to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute.

[98] The court finds that it can make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law to those facts based on the evidence before it, without the need to use any of the expanded powers to weigh evidence or assess credibility.

[99] The court finds that the evidentiary record is sufficiently comprehensive on all aspects of the case that the court can make a fair and just determination of the issues on the merits without the need for a trial. For the most part, the material facts are not in dispute, and in the instances where AC disagrees with the Society’s evidence, he provides no more than a bald denial.

[100] As noted above, the court provided AC with the opportunity to file a document brief containing all visit notes, and for all parties to make oral submissions regarding these notes. It is not known if this satisfies AC’s concerns regarding the fact that the Society workers were not cross-examined. If not, the court adds the following to the foregoing:

(a) It is not sufficient for a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to say that the evidence before a court might be weakened on cross-examination. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.R., 2016 ONCJ 215.

(b) If cross-examination is desired to weaken the other party’s evidence, it should be completed in advance of the motion. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.B., 2009 ONCJ 782.

[101] With respect to AC’s other submissions regarding fairness of proceeding via summary judgment, the court notes:

(a) AC has been represented by Mr. Miller since this application started.

(b) All requests made by the Society and AC for extensions of time to serve and file materials for this motion have been granted.

[102] The court finds that determination of this case by way of summary judgment motion addresses ACL’s needs and is in his best interests; resolution of this matter by way of summary judgment motion is not merely efficient and expeditious, it is also a desirable and necessary mechanism to achieve the objectives of the CYFSA.

[103] The court finds that the Society has established, on a balance of probabilities, a prima facie case for summary judgment with respect to each aspect of the relief sought, and that AC and LL have not met their onus of establishing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial on any issue.

Part 5 – What are the appropriate statutory findings?

[104] Pursuant to s. 90(2) of the CYFSA, as soon as practicable, and in any event before determining whether a child is in need of protection, the court shall determine:

(a) the child's name and age;

(b) whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child and, if so, the child's bands and First Nations, Inuit or Métis communities; and

(c) where the child was brought to a place of safety before the hearing, the location of the place from which the child was removed.

[105] There is no dispute that:

(a) The subject child’s name is ACL and that he was born ***, 2025. ACL is *** months old.

(b) ACL is not a First Nations, Inuk or Metis child.

Part 6 – Is ACL a child in need of protection?

[106] The threshold issue in child protection proceedings is whether the subject child is in need of protection.

[107] If the court finds that the child is not in need of protection, then that is the end of the Society’s protection application. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N., 2019 ONCJ 8, at para. 116.

[108] The onus of proof to determine a finding in need of protection is on the Society on a balance of probabilities. See: Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. R. (P.), 2005 CanLII 11791 (ON SC), 2005 CarswellOnt 1406 (ONSC).

[109] A child protection proceeding is unlike ordinary civil litigation. The court can choose a flexible approach when considering the timing of the protection finding in a child protection proceeding. The flexible approach allows the court to consider if the child is in need of protection at the start of the proceeding, the hearing date, or some other date. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251, at para. 85.

[110] Subsection 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA states that a child is in need of protection where there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise, or protect the child.

[111] The Society must prove that the risk of physical harm is real and likely, not speculative. See: Children's Aid Society of Rainy River (District) v. B. (C.), 2006 ONCJ 458; Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. T., 2000 CanLII 21157 (ON SC), 2000 CarswellOnt 2156 (ONSC).

[112] The Society must prove causation by act, omission, or pattern. It is not necessary to prove intention: Jewish Family and Child Service v. K.(R.), 2008 ONCJ 774 , 2008 CarswellOnt 9306 , at para. 28, affirmed at Jewish Family and Child Service v. K.(R.), 2009 ONCA 903 , 2009 CarswellOnt 7908. However, it must be more than trifling physical harm. See: Children's Aid Society of Rainy River (District) v. B. (C.), supra.

[113] There must be a causal connection between the risk of physical harm and the conduct of the parent. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.A.L., 2025 ONCJ 348.

[114] A child may be at risk even if the conduct is not directed specifically towards that child. See: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. O. (L.M.), 1995 CanLII 6216 (ON CTPD), 1995 CarswellOnt 4393 (Ont. Prov. Div.).

[115] Domestic violence (which includes verbal abuse and controlling behaviour), aggression, and inadequate shelter are common circumstance leading to a finding of risk of physical harm. See: Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. E.M.T., 2019 ONCJ 767.

[116] Further, an inability to sufficiently acquire or improve parenting skills can be the foundation for a finding of risk of physical harm. See: Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. O. (E.), 2009 CanLII 72087 (ON SC), 2009 CarswellOnt 8125 (ONSC), at paras. 211-215.

[117] The court has chosen the outset of the protection application (i.e., immediately following ACL’s birth, when he was brought to a place of safety) as the time to determine whether ACL is in need of protection.

[118] At that time, the circumstances found by Justice Meyrick in her November, 2024 reasons for judgment existed (see paragraph 47).

[119] In addition, at the time of ACL’s birth, there were further concerns regarding the nature of the relationship between LL and AC. For example:

(a) On November 19, 2024, LL met with Ms. McGarry and Ms. Balbino (Child, Youth & Family Access and Support Worker, ASW) at McGregor Community Centre. LL advised:

i. she is hoping to find a place of her own. She lives with AC and his wife in a home. She is not sleeping on the floor anymore.

ii. AC wants to know where she is all the time (he was calling her while they were in a meeting).

iii. She goes to her ex-boyfriend’s house with her friend M sometimes when AC gives her a hard time.

(b) A meeting was scheduled to occur January 17, 2025 at the request of LL. It was to include her, Ms. BC, Ms. McGarry and the Society’s Health Specialist, Ms. Eleanor Allen. AC learned about the meeting and attended. AC told Ms. McGarry that any further conversations about the baby were to be with him present.

[120] In addition, at the time the application was commenced, the parents were unwilling to work cooperatively with the Society. At a ***, 2025 meeting:

(a) The family said that they will not share any information about the doctor, the hospital, or when the baby is due.

(b) AC advised that he was not open to Ms. McGarry visiting their home at this time. He agreed to contact her if he changed his mind, and Ms. McGarry provided him her contact information again.

(c) Ms. McGarry asked AC if she could meet with him again. He said, ‘no’, and mentioned that he would be speaking with his lawyer.

[121] The foregoing clearly establishes that ACL is a child in need of protection pursuant to subsection 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA.

Part 7 – Is a protection order necessary to protect ACL in the future?

[122] Subsection 101(1) of the CYFSA provides that where a court finds that a child is in need of protection, it must first satisfy itself that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.

[123] Subsection 101(8) of the Act provides that where a court order is not necessary to protect a child in the future, the child shall remain with or be returned to the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under the Act.

[124] In determining if a court order is necessary to protect a child in the future the court can consider protection concerns other than those that resulted in the child coming into care. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.P., 2019 ONSC 3482.

[125] It was not disputed that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect ACL in the future. The evidence relied upon to find ACL in need of protection and to make the dispositional order granted makes it clear that intervention through a protection order is required to protect ACL, both currently and for the foreseeable future.

Part 8 – What order regarding placement is in ACL’s best interests?

8.1 Legal Considerations

[126] Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the orders in subsection 101(1) or section 102.

[127] In any analysis, first and foremost, there must be a consideration of the paramount purpose of the Act, as set out in subsection 1(1), which is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. As long as it is consistent with the paramount purpose, other purposes of the Act as set out in subsection 1(2) are also designed to support the autonomy and integrity of the family unit and to utilize the least disruptive course of action available. See: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. H.F. 2020 ONCJ 526.

[128] Prior to making an order under subsection 101(1) or section 102, pursuant to section 100 of the CYFSA, the court shall obtain and consider a plan for the child’s care prepared in writing by the Society.

[129] The orders available pursuant to subsection 101(1) and section (2) are:

(a) Supervision order: the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

(b) Interim society care: the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months.

(c) Extended society care: the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated under section 116 or expires under section 123.

(d) Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision: the child be placed in interim society care and custody under for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person subject to a supervision order, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.

(e) Custody order: if the court finds that a custody order would be in a child’s best interests, the court may make an order granting custody of the child to one or more persons, other than a foster parent of the child, with the consent of the person or persons.

[130] Subsection 101(2) of the CYFSA requires the court, in determining which order to make under subsection 101(1) or section 102, to ask the parties what efforts the Society or another agency or person made to assist the child before intervention under Part V of the Act.

[131] Subsection 101(3) of the CYFSA requires that the court look at less disruptive alternatives than removing a child from the care of the person(s) who had charge of the child immediately before intervention, unless it determines that those alternatives would be inadequate to protect the child.

[132] Subsection 101(4) of the CYFSA states that where the court decides that it is necessary to remove the child from the care of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under Part V of the CYFSA, the court shall, before making an interim society care order or an extended society care order, consider whether it is possible to place the child with a relative, neighbour or other member of the child’s community or extended family under paragraph 1 of subsection 101(1), with the consent of the relative or other person.

[133] The governing factor when considering the placement of a child is the child’s best interests. Best interests are to be determined with reference to the following factors:

Best interests of child

(3) Where a person is directed in this part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

i. the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

ii. the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

iii. the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

iv. the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

v. the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

vi. the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

vii. the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

viii. the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

ix. the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

x. the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

xi. the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

[134] An order placing a child in the extended society care of the society (formerly crown wardship) is the most profound order that a court can make. To take someone’s children from them is a power that a judge must exercise only with the highest degree of caution, and only on the basis of compelling evidence, and only after a careful examination of possible alternative remedies. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton- Wentworth v. G. (J) (1997) 23 R.F.L. 4^th 79 (SCJ- Family Branch); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.O., 2014 ONCJ 523.

[135] As Justice Madsen noted in Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.C. and D.C., 2019 ONSC 4229, at para. 163:

The issue for the court is whether the level of parenting being received by the children is below the minimum standard tolerated by the community, not whether the children will be "better off" with parents other than their own. Family & Children's Services of St. Thomas and Elgin v. C. (A.), 2013 ONCJ 453, 2013 CarswellOnt 11701 (Ont.C.J.) at para. 158. Courts must recognize that families living in poverty may face challenges. Parents are not to be judged by a "middle class yardstick... provided that the standard used is not contrary to the child's best interests." Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. J.D., 2018 CarswellOnt 19221 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 79; see also Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. I. (J.), 2006 CanLII 19432 (ON SC), 2006 CarswellOnt 3510 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[136] In determining which disposition is in the child's best interest, the court must be aware of the mandated parameters regarding the total amount of time a child can be placed in the care of the Society. Subsection 122(1) states:

Time limit

122(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), the court shall not make an order for interim society care under paragraph 2 of subsection 101 (1) that results in a child being in the care and custody of a society for a period exceeding,

(a) 12 months, if the child is younger than 6 on the day the court makes the order; or

(b) 24 months, if the child is 6 or older on the day the court makes the order.

[137] Pursuant to subsection 122(5), the court may by order extend the period permitted under subsection (1) by a period not to exceed six months if it is in the child's best interests to do so.

[138] Time is considered from a child’s needs and perspective. The time consideration, like all considerations, in child protection matters, should be child focused. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. D.S., 2009 CanLII 60090 (ONSC).

[139] A child's need for permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to that child's needs demands that the legal process not be used as a strategy to "buy" a parent time to develop an ability to parent. In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent's desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from a parent's evidence that they face some better prospects than what existed at the time of the society's removal of the child from their care and has developed some new ability as a parent. See: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., 2000 CanLII 3158 (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (OCJ).

[140] In Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. B. (S.), 2014 ONCJ 518, the court discussed the importance of a parent providing a child with a safe, stable and secure home as follows:

112The major protection issue is the mother's ability to be able to provide the child with a safe, secure and stable home. This is a critical aspect of being a parent. Children need stable housing. They need their parents to have a stable plan for them. Children need their parents to be consistent and reliable and to exercise good judgment. They need to be protected from conflict and crisis. The mother has just started to take some steps to be able to address these protection concerns, but she is still not close, at this time, to establishing that she can provide these basic needs for the child. The mother has had difficulty looking after herself, let alone the needs of a vulnerable child. Terms of supervision would be inadequate to protect the child.

8.2 Analysis

Society’s plan of care

[141] The Society filed, and the court considered, the Society’s plan of care pursuant to section 100 of the Act. This plan is consistent with the position the Society has taken in this case and ACL’s best interests.

Services

[142] The court finds that satisfactory efforts have been made to assist the parents:

(a) AC completed the Beyond the Basics Parenting Program in December, 2022.

(b) Society worker Yogesh Patel referred AC to Dr. Murphy for the assessment referenced above and dated January 18, 2024.

i. AC’s plan was to connect with Developmental Services Ontario to explore the services available to him.

ii. AC reported that he has taken four anger management courses, and he advised that he would not agree to take another.

iii. LL was receiving supports from Taibu Community Health.

(d) On November 24, 2024, Karen Luke, the Ongoing Service Supervisor, advised that the Society could schedule a pest control company to do monthly checks to monitor the status of AC’s home.

(e) LL engaged the services of BL Nelson, a social worker in the prenatal clinic at St. Michael’s Hospital.

(f) On December 12, 2024 Ms. McGarry completed a referral for the Society’s Health Specialist to offer prenatal support. On January 17, 2025 a meeting took place at which Ms. Allen (the health specialist), Ms. McGarry, the parents, and Ms. BC were present. AC declined Ms. Allen’s services but was open to taking Ms. Allen’s business card and calling her if they had any questions regarding the pregnancy/baby.

(g) On April 9, 2025, Ms. Intelisano asked the parents if they have been to a parenting class. AC answered that he does not need it and that he attended one before. Ms. Intelisano asked the parents if they participated in the Circle of Security (a program run through Surrey Place). AC responded that he did not like that one and explained that he believed if the Society is paying for the parenting group, the facilitators will lie.

(h) On May 26, 2025, AC was reminded that the Society offered to pay for an exterminator, but AC refused saying he first needed to get new furniture which he could not currently afford to do due to costs associated with the appeal of Justice Meyrick’s November, 2024 final order.

(i) Ann Lindsay, service coordinator with Surrey Place was assigned through Lumenus Urgent Response to provide service coordination for LL. Lumenus supports ended in early 2025 as no further service goals were identified; LL was not interested in day supports, community programs, or any other supports that she could offer.

(j) Prior to Lumenus’ services ending, Ms. Lindsay referred LL to Montage Support Services; this is a service that helps clients identify goals and then connects clients to community services and programs to assist in meeting those goals. Montage assisted LL with a variety of issues, such as with her application for Wheel-Trans and with finding a swimming program at Variety Village. On August 14, 2025 Ms. Hemingway of Montage advised Society worker Ms. Hall that their contact with LL is needs-based, and they usually meet with her once a month, but they have met more frequently, when required. Montage’s overall goal is to help LL build a meaningful routine and engage in activities, and to support her mental health.

(k) LL also had the support of Ms. Balbino, Access Support Worker.

Community and family plans

[143] The court finds that the Society has met its obligation to explore alternate family and community plans for ACL.

[144] The parents did not propose any family or community plans for ACL.

[145] At the hearing of this summary judgment motion, LL requested that if ACL could not be returned to the care of his parents, she wished for ACL to be placed with Ms. BC.

[146] In addition to the evidence noted above regarding Ms. BC’s historical failed attempts to adequately care for BL and AD, in Justice Meyrick’s 2024 reasons for judgment, the following findings were made about the maternal grandmother at paragraph 113, “The concerns raised about the maternal grandmother also follow an overall theme. The maternal grandmother is unwilling or unable to follow instructions for a sustained period to meet the basic needs of the child. The maternal grandmother has trouble retaining information and applying it. The maternal grandmother takes absolutely no responsibility for any of the concerns that have given rise to the children being removed from her care. The maternal grandmother is unwilling or unable to engage in a forthcoming manner with the Society. The maternal grandmother has little, or no, insight into the risks that may be present for a child and how to mitigate against those risks.”

Placement

[147] The evidence is overwhelming that it is in ACL’s best interests to be placed with the Society in extended society care.

[148] The risk of ACL suffering physical and emotional harm if placed with AC is unacceptably high.

[149] In reaching this conclusion, the court has been very careful to not conflate AC’s limitations with LL’s challenges.

[150] AC has not demonstrated an ability to meet all of ACL’s rudimentary needs on a consistent basis during supervised access, despite intensive, hands-on teaching and direction. AC has learned some basic skills, but it has taken him an exceptionally long time to do so, and the breadth his parenting abilities is still quite limited. He has not gained a sufficient skill set to move from one hour of fully supervised access.

[151] AC did not advance past supervised access with AD and AM as well.

[152] As ACL ages, his needs will continuously evolve and become more complex. His caregiver will need to be able to identify these changes and accompanying needs and respond in a timely and appropriate manner. Given that AC has struggled to meaningfully progress with reading and responding to the cues of a small child, it is very likely that he will continue to have significant challenges in this regard as ACL grows older.

[153] ACL has special needs and is very vulnerable. He requires a caregiver who can work collaboratively with service providers and be accepting of their opinions and recommendations. AC has demonstrated great difficulties in this regard.

[154] ACL’s gains made in the Society’s care would be compromised if he was placed with AC.

[155] Given AC’s limitations, he would require an exceptionally strong support system to aid him in parenting ACL, if the child was placed with him. This safety net would have to be available with much more frequency than Society workers can be; support would have to be around-the-clock. AC does not have such a network. He has not availed himself of services, such as DSO, which may have opened possibilities for such assistance. The only support AC identifies is the Society.

[156] A supervision order would not be an effective instrument of risk management in this case.

(a) The Society cannot provide the level of intense support that AC requires.

(b) For a supervision order to be effective, the person subject to the order must meet a minimum threshold of cooperation, and reliability. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S. (P.N.), 2015 ONCJ 164, 2015 ONCJ164 and Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.D. and A.Z., 2018 ONCJ 68. When a parent has cognitive limitations, the person’s ability to work honestly and cooperatively with the Society and other helping professionals is particularly important; there must be sufficient trust between the Society and the parent for a genuine therapeutic alliance to be formed for there to be a successful outcome. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.D.E., 2012 ONCJ 530. While AC’s interactions with Society workers have improved from when he was involved with the agency regarding AD and AM, there are still significant concerns regarding his level of openness and cooperation with the Society. He is suspicious of the Society. He has not shared relevant information with the Society (such as his separation from DM). He has not demonstrated an ability to accept the Society’s direction regarding ACL’s needs and has actually been defiant in this regard. He has not been accepting of the Society’s efforts to refer him to services.

(c) For any support system (the Society or otherwise) to be effective at mitigating risk, AC would have to acknowledge his shortcomings and be accepting of assistance to address them. While AC states in his affidavit that he acknowledges his limitations, he does not state what they are, and at no other time has he shown meaningful insight into his challenges. In contrast, he has made bold, positive statements regarding his parenting abilities that are not borne out by the evidence. Given that AC does not meaningfully acknowledge that there are issues with his functioning and parenting, it is extremely unlikely that a supervision order (or any other type of support system) would mitigate the risks and keep ACL safe.

[157] AC’s plan to reside with ACL, LL, and DM at his current residence, with no involvement by these women in the child’s care, raises many foreseeable issues that AC has not addressed. For example:

(a) At supervised access, AC and LL routinely co-parent ACL. AC has not taken the lead at visits and shown he can independently care for ACL.

(b) There is no evidence from DM that she supports ACL residing in her home.

(c) DM has no relationship with ACL; she is a stranger to him. Even if she is not going to parent him, it is inevitable that they would interact with each other while residing together. It would be in the child’s best interests for there to have been a development of a relationship between ACL and DM prior to a request for the child to be placed in her home.

(d) There is no evidence as to the specifics of DM’s medical conditions, which seem serious. Even if she is not involved in parenting ACL, it is necessary to know what ACL may be exposed to in this regard.

(e) There is no evidence as to why AC and DM have separated. There is no suggestion in Justice Meyrick’s November, 2024 reasons for judgment or otherwise that a separation was either suggested or is a pre-requisite to a consideration of ACL’s placement with AC. Without knowing why the separation occurred, the court is concerned about the potential for ACL to be exposed to adult conflict.

(f) There is no evidence as to why AC and LL have separated. There are concerns regarding potential exposure to adult conflict in relation to this relationship as well.

(g) There is also no evidence as to the practicalities of how AC is going to exclude LL from being involved in parenting ACL, particularly when LL clearly wants and expects to be involved in the child’s care. This heightens the court’s concerns regarding ACL’s exposure to adult conflict.

(h) There are also the practicalities of where four persons will sleep in the two-bedroom apartment. AC’s plan does not include securing a residence for just him and ACL, or that LL and DM will move out.

[158] The court has serious concerns regarding LL potentially being in an unsupervised caregiving role for any period, given the profound nature of her longstanding parenting shortcomings. Given AC’s own limitations, and the uncertainty of the dynamics of their relationship, AC is not an appropriate supervisor of her care of ACL.

[159] A Society worker has not been to AC’s home since ACL’s birth. First, AC refused to permit this to occur. Then, there was an infestation of bed bugs that precluded a worker from being able to attend. The court has not been provided with a reason as to why a worker has not been to AC’s home since the bed bug issue was addressed. However, this does not in any way impact the court’s decision regarding proceeding via summary judgement and making an order for extended society care. Even if AC’s home was physically appropriate, the totality of the circumstances clearly establishes an insurmountable level of risk that precludes ACL being returned to AC’s care.

[160] ACL has been in care for thirteen months; this is more than the statutory time limits permit. It is not in ACL’s best interests to extend the timelines and order interim society care. AC is no where near being in the position of meeting ACL’s physical, mental, and emotional needs on a continuous basis. Delay in the determination of ACL’s permanency plan is not child focused.

[161] In reaching its conclusions, the court has been careful to not let the past conduct evidence suffocate evidence of the parents’ current conduct, circumstances and functioning, and has used that evidence only as a reliable backdrop against which to measure the extent to which the parents’ abilities and circumstances have changed.

[162] The court has also been mindful that it is to apply a ‘good enough’ standard of parenting and not consider whether ACL would be ‘better off’ with parents other than his own.

[163] The court wholly accepts that AC and LL love ACL and they would like nothing more than for the court to order that ACL can return home.

[164] The reality is that when the evidence is considered as a whole, AC’s plan to have ACL placed in his care is not meritorious. AC has not demonstrated that it is in ACL’s best interests to have unsupervised access at this time, let alone having him returned to his care.

[165] The Society’s plan to pursue an adoptive placement is in ACL’s best interests:

(a) It will best meet ACL’s need for continuity and stability.

(b) It will best meet ACL’s physical, mental, and emotional needs.

(d) It will better address ACL’s needs than the plan proposed by the parents. It is the only viable plan before the court.

[166] There would be no other realistic outcome if this issue went to trial. The least disruptive alternative, consistent with ACL’s best interests, is to place him in extended society care with the Society.

Part 9 – What order regarding access is in ACL’s best interests?

9.1 Legal Considerations

[167] Subsection 104(1) of the CYFSA sets out the court’s powers in relation to access. It reads as follows:

Access orders

104(1) The court may, in the child's best interests,

(a) when making an order under this part; or

(b) upon an application under subsection (2),

make, vary or terminate an order respecting a person's access to the child or the child's access to a person, and may impose such terms and conditions on the order as the court considers appropriate.

[168] Subsection 105(4) states that where the court makes an order that a child be in extended society care, any order for access is terminated.

[169] Subsection 105(5) sets out that in considering the issue of access to a child in extended society care, the best interests of the child is the test. The court may not order access to a child unless it is satisfied that the order would be in the child’s best interests.

[170] As noted above, Subsection 74(3) of the CYFSA sets out the best interests factors the court is to consider when determining access.

[171] Subsection 105(6) of the CYFSA sets out additional factors to be considered when determining whether an access order would be in the best interests of a child in extended society care. These are:

(a) Whether the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and

(b) If the court considers it relevant, whether the ordered access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

[172] With respect to the determination of access post an extended society care order:

(a) The approach to access for children has significantly shifted as a result of the passage of the Act in 2017. It is now a broad, holistic best interests analysis; whether the child's relationship with a parent is meaningful and whether access would impair the child's opportunities for adoption, while important, are only two of many factors to consider, where relevant. See: Kawartha; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.G., 2020 ONCA 415 (J.G.).

(b) The legal test acknowledges that the CYFSA is remedial legislation enacted for the protection of society’s most vulnerable children, and as such it must be liberally construed to the benefit of the child. See: J.G.

(c) There is no longer a presumption against access for a child placed in extended society care. See: Kawartha; LM. v. Peel Children’s Aid Society, supra, at para. 70. The issue of onus is more nuanced. The court is not called upon to determine past events and to make findings. Instead, the court must consider and weigh a number of factors, past, present, and future. A child’s best interests in connection with future access involves a delicate weighing and balancing of multiple factors. It is not a fact-finding mission, and the exercise is not assisted by determining what the onus is or where it lies. See: J.G.

(d) A parent who is not able to provide primary care may still have a meaningful and beneficial relationship with their children such that access post an order for extended society care is warranted. See: Kawartha.

(e) There are qualitative differences in the amount of contact a party will have with the child before and after an extended society care order is made. The granting of an extended society care order means the end of any effort to return the child to the parent's care. Part of the reason for access prior to an extended society care disposition is to work on re-integration and to assess the nature and quality of the parenting ability and the relationship between parent and child. After an extended society care disposition, the access is simply to preserve a form of the relationship that has shown a positive benefit for the child. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.R., 2024 ONCJ 233, para. 197.

(f) There is no presumption in the Act for reduced access for children who are placed in extended society care. Each case must be determined on its own unique facts; “case-by-case consideration of the unique circumstances of each child is the hallmark of the process.” See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. Z.C., 2024 ONSC 5854.

(g) The challenge in making an access order for a child in extended society care is finding the fine balance between what will preserve a relationship in the best interests of the child and, at the same time, what will permit flexibility to allow the mental and emotional transition towards permanency by the child in their new adoptive home. See: Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. J.B., 2017 ONSC 1194.

(h) It is an error in law for a trial judge to delegate all discretionary decisions on the type, frequency, and duration of access in the discretion of the Society. Minimum rights of access must be established by the court. See: J.S.R. v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa, 2021 ONSC 630 (Div. Ct.); CAS of Waterloo v. T.D.R. and J.S., 2021 ONSC 2362.

(i) Access can come in many forms that depart from in-person visits and includes the exchange of gifts, emails, video chats, or phone calls. See: J.G.

(j) Access provides many benefits for children in extended society care:

i. It is very important for children to know their story, their history and where they come from;

ii. Many children will want to search out their birth parents at adolescence if they have no contact. It can help them remove any fantasy about their birth parents and have a more realistic understanding of who they are;

iii. It can help build a child's identity - to know who they are;

iv. It can help a child be more secure in where they have come from and where they are going. It might provide the child with a greater sense of security moving forward;

v. It helps the child understand their roots, heritage, culture and religion - about foods and events that are important in their culture;

vi. It helps the child understand why decisions were made about them and why they live where they live. It can inform them that they were and are loved by the birth parent;

vii. It definitely promotes self-esteem and can help meet the emotional needs of the child;

viii. It can provide the child with readier access to medical information. This can be very important if genetic concerns develop. This is also important information for the adoptive family to have;

ix. It allows the adoptive family to reinforce the child's ability to understand their story and their history.

See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 866, affirmed on appeal at 2020 ONSC 4993.

9.2 Analysis

[173] The court has undertaken a holistic approach to the determination of what access arrangements, post an extended society care order, is best for ACL.

[174] The evidence clearly establishes that the order requested by the Society is in ACL’s best interests.

[175] In reaching this conclusion, the court has considered:

(a) The positives and challenges associated with access to date, as noted above.

(b) Given the nature of AC’s and LL’s parenting limitations, their challenges are not likely to meaningfully change. As such, supervised access will be required to ensure ACL’s physical and emotional safety at visits for the foreseeable future.

(c) As ACL ages, access to his parents will provide ACL with the opportunity to know his story; where he came from. This may assist him as he builds his own identity. Access will allow ACL to understand his East Coast heritage and culture. Access will also provide ACL with access to medical information.

(d) The court has no concerns regarding the merits of the Society’s plan to find ACL an adoptive home. As such, the balance to preserve ACL’s relationship with his parents and to permit flexibility so as to allow for his mental and emotional transition towards permanency in his new adoptive home is key. The access requested by the Society will accomplish this.

[176] There would be no other realistic outcome if this issue went to trial.

Part 10 – Who should be the access holders and access recipients?

10.1 Legal Considerations

[177] Pursuant to subsection 105(7) of the CYFSA, the court must specify who is an access holder and who is an access recipient in its decision.

[178] This is an important distinction, because only a holder of access may apply under subsection 196(1) of the Act to the court for an openness order, following notice that a child is being placed for adoption.

[179] The court's preference is, where it is in the child's best interests, to make the parents access holders. This gives them a say in the contact they will have with the child post-adoption and they don't have to rely on the child welfare agency or the Office of the Children's Lawyer (if the child is made the access holder) to determine the contact. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. Y.M., 2019 ONCJ 489, at para. 362.

[180] One’s right to be an access holder to bring an openness application should not be removed lightly. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.T., 2026 ONCJ 167, at para. 173.

[181] The best interests consideration of impairment of the opportunity to be adopted takes on heightened importance when assessing whether a person should be made an access holder. The court might only order the person to be an access recipient (if access is ordered at all) if there is a concern that they might frustrate, delay or undermine the adoption process. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.R., supra, at para.196.

[182] The phrase "impair the child's future opportunity for adoption" means more than just impairing a child's opportunity to actually be adopted. The impairment also applies to an undue delay in the child being adopted. To interpret this phrase otherwise would be contrary to the paramount purpose of the Act set out in subsection 1(1) - to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.R., supra, at para. 188.

[183] The court has set out the following attributes of persons who may impair a child’s future opportunities for adoption:

(a) A difficulty with aggression, anger or impulse control. Persons with these attributes are often confrontational. These attributes may threaten the physical or emotional security of the adoptive parents and their family;

(b) A lack of support for an alternate caregiver of the child. This might manifest itself in an undermining of the adoptive placement and the child’s sense of security with the adoptive family. Persons with this attribute may be relentlessly critical of the adoptive parents and make their lives very difficult. They are usually unable to accept their reduced role in the child’s life;

(c) Dishonesty and secrecy. Persons with this attribute can often not be trusted to comply with the terms of court orders or to accurately report any important issues about the child;

(d) A propensity to be litigious. Persons with this attribute are usually unable to accept a reduced role in the child’s life and are likely to engage in openness litigation; and

(e) A person with a mental health condition, substance abuse issues, transience or chaotic lifestyle. Persons with this background may be difficult to deal with and their personal issues may result in there being difficulty in making arrangements with them for contact and as a result dissuade adoptive parents.

See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.E., 2023 ONCJ 154; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.P., 2019 ONCJ 631; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.F., 2015 ONCJ 678; JFCS v. E.K.B., 2019 ONSC 661; and Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. I.B., 2020 ONSC 5498.

10.2 Analysis

[184] There are no current concerns regarding AC’s and LL’s lack of support for an alternate caregiver for ACL. For example, during the period of virtual access, there was occasion for AC and LL to interact with ACL’s foster mother, and there were no issues when they did so.

[185] There are no current concerns regarding aggression, anger, or impulse control regarding the parents. However, AC can be quite difficult to deal with, and this may compromise the emotional security of the adoptive parents and their family.

[186] There is some concern regarding AC being secretive; he ought to have advised the Society of key information regarding his plan (his separation from DM) prior to it first being revealed in his affidavit for this motion.

[187] The court’s prime concern is that AC has a propensity to be litigious, and this will likely unduly delay the adoption process. AC launched an appeal of Justice Meyrick’s 2024 final order regarding AD and AM but was unable to follow through with what was required of him to perfect his appeal. There were six status hearings in the Superior Court of Justice, and at each hearing, AC was granted time and opportunity to perfect his appeal and to comply with the Family Law Rules. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed for delay. At the September 11, 2025 plan of care meeting, AC advised that he plans to appeal the decision made in this matter, like he did for his other children.

[188] Independently, LL does not pose the same concerns as AC does in relation to being litigious. However, the court’s concern is that AC would use LL’s rights to further his own agenda, and this would result in a delay in permanency for ACL. LL appears to be quite susceptible to AC’s direction.

[189] Based on the foregoing, AC and LL shall be access recipients. ACL shall be the access holder.

[190] There would be no other realistic outcome if this issue went to trial.

Part 11 – Order

[191] The following statutory findings shall be made:

(a) The subject child’s name is ACL. He was born ***, 2025. ACL is *** months old.

(b) ACL is not a First Nations, Inuk or Metis child.

[192] ACL shall be found to be in need of protection pursuant to subsections 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA.

[193] ACL shall be placed in extended society care of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto.

[194] LL and AC shall have four in-person, fully supervised access visits a year. The location and duration of these visits shall be at the discretion of the Society in collaboration with the caregiver and the child’s schedule. This in-person access may be supplemented by cards and letters and gifts sent by the parents to be monitored by the Society.

[195] ACL shall be the access holder and LL and AC shall be the access recipients.

Released: March 30, 2026

Justice Susan Sullivan

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.L., 2026 ONCJ 455

Case Summary

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.L., 2026 ONCJ 455

Case Summary