Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.T., 2026 ONCJ 167

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

DATE: March 25, 2026

COURT FILE NO. CFO525/22

BRENT BALMER, for the APPLICANT

and –

JEAN HYNDMAN, for the OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN and TRUSTEE, legal representative of the RESPONDENT J.T.

HEARD: MARCH 19, 2026

Part One – Introduction

1The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the society) has brought a motion for summary judgment for final orders within its twice-amended protection application regarding the subject child, I.T., who is six years old (the child).

2At the outset of the motion, the parties consented to the statutory findings regarding the child. They also agreed that the child is in need of protection pursuant to clause 74 (2) (k) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act 2017 (the Act).

3The society seeks a disposition order that the child be placed with it in extended society care. Its primary protection concern is that the respondent J.T.’s (the parent’s) mental health challenges preclude him from safely parenting the child. It asserts that the parent has been unable or unwilling to mitigate the protection concerns and that it is in the child’s best interests to have a permanent placement.

4The society seeks an order that the child have access with the parent a minimum of six times each year, at its discretion as to location, duration, level of supervision and method, or as otherwise agreed between the parties. It further seeks an order that the child be the access holder and that the parent be the access recipient.

5The parent is the only parent of the child as defined in the Act.¹ He states that he is an intersexual person and was assigned female at birth. He identifies as male and uses he/him pronouns. He carried and delivered the child.

6The court found the parent to be a special party on October 28, 2025, and appointed the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), to act on his behalf as his legal representative.

7The PGT, on behalf of the parent, asks that the child be placed in the parent’s care and custody subject to terms of society supervision. If the child is not placed in his care, it seeks a minimum weekly in-person visit between the parent and the child, with the level of supervision, if any, to be in the society’s discretion. In addition, it seeks virtual access between the parent and the child a minimum of one time each week, with the level of supervision, if any, to be in the society’s discretion. Lastly, it seeks an order that the parent and the child be made reciprocal access holders and access recipients.

8The child has been in the society’s care since he was brought to a place of safety on September 17, 2024. He was in the society’s care under a previous protection application from December 9, 2022, until July 21, 2023. In total, the child has been in the society’s care for almost 26 months.

9The parent’s access with the child has been fully supervised since the child was brought to a place of safety. Presently, he has virtual parenting time with the child once a week.

10The child has been diagnosed with Autistic Spectrum Disorder and Intellectual Delay. He has significant special needs.

11This matter has twice been scheduled for trial. It was first set to be heard during the trial sittings at the 311 Jarvis court site for the week of April 25, 2025. The parent was self-represented. Amicus had been appointed to assist the court. That trial was adjourned when the parent was hospitalized two weeks before the trial under the Mental Health Act.

12The trial was scheduled again at the 47 Sheppard Avenue court site for the week starting on October 20, 2025. The parent was incarcerated at that time. At the outset of the trial, the parent said he would not participate in it. Based on his presentation that day, the society and amicus asked the court to adjourn the trial so the society could bring a special party motion.² That request was granted.

13The society subsequently chose to bring this summary judgment motion. The parties agreed that this court should hear the motion.

14The parties also agreed that on this summary judgment motion, the court could rely on the affidavits of the society workers that had been filed for the trial.³ At the outset of the trial, the court made evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of portions of those affidavits. The parties agreed those rulings would apply to this motion.

15The society filed supplementary affidavits from one of its workers and the child’s foster mother.

16The parties filed a joint document brief for the trial. They agreed the documents would form part of the evidence on this motion. This brief included hospital records, police occurrence reports and a psychological assessment of the child. They jointly filed another document brief for this motion comprised of access observation notes.

17The PGT filed an affidavit from the parent for this motion. It attached medical and society records to it. The PGT also filed a transcript of out-of-court questioning that it conducted on the society’s present Family Service Worker (JS). The court also watched two short videos presented at the hearing by the PGT at the parent’s request.

18The parent did not attend this hearing. Counsel for the PGT said she was prepared to proceed with this motion in his absence.

19The court must determine if the relief sought by the society should be granted by way of summary judgment and determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial on any of the following issues:

a) What disposition orders are in the child’s best interests?

b) What access orders are in the child’s best interests?

c) If an order is made placing the child in extended society care, who should be the access holders and who should be the access recipients?

Part Two – Legal considerations for summary judgment

20The society brings this motion pursuant to rule 16 of the Family Law Rules (all references to rules in this decision are to the Family Law Rules) – the summary judgment rule.

21The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. Pursuant to subrule 16 (4), the party moving for summary judgment shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

22Pursuant to subrule 16 (4.1) the responding party to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The responding party must put their best foot forward on the motion. The judge is entitled to assume that the parties have put before her or him all of the evidence that they would be able to adduce at trial. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. K.T. 2000 20578 (ON CJ), 2000 O.J. No. 4736 (Ont. C.J.); Sweda v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200.

23Although subrule 16 (4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”, this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. See: Kawartha Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, paragraph 2 of paragraph 80 (Kawartha).

24Subrule 16 (6) provides that if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

25Subrule 16 (6.1) provides that in determining if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties, and the court may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be only exercised at trial:

Weighing the evidence
Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.
Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

26Pursuant to subrule 16 (6.2), the court may, for the purpose of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule 16 (6.1), order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on its presentation.

27In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-step process for determining whether summary judgment should be granted.

28Hyrniak sets out that the judge must first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based on the evidence without using the additional fact-finding powers set out in subrule 16 (6.1). If, after this initial determination, there still appears to be a genuine issue for trial, the judge may resort to the additional fact-finding powers to decide if a trial is required.

29There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result (Hryniak - paragraph 49). As the Supreme Court stated, at para. 50 of Hryniak, “the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute.” See: Kawartha, paragraph 63.

30As applied to child protection proceedings, a fair and just determination on the merits must recognize that such proceedings engage Charter rights for a vulnerable segment of our society. Consequently, courts have stressed the need to take a cautious approach to granting summary judgment in child protection proceedings. This cautious approach promotes Hryniak’s principle of reaching a fair and just determination on the merits. See: Kawartha, paragraph 76.

31Hryniak’s fairness principles for summary judgment must be applied recognizing the distinctive features of a child protection proceeding. In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court must exercise exceptional caution and apply the objectives of the Act, including the best interests of the child. See: Kawartha, paragraph 1 of paragraph 80 and paragraph 64.

32The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial. See: Kawartha, paragraph 3 of paragraph 80. The court conducted that screening in this case.

33The cautious approach enunciated in Kawartha neither precludes the use of summary judgment in child protection matters, nor suggests a different summary judgment test in this context. See: L.M. v. Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel, 2019 ONCA 841.

Part Three – Brief background facts about the parent

34The parent lives on his own in Toronto. He is in receipt of Ontario Disability Support Plan benefits (ODSP).

35The parent was born in the Bahamas. He moved to Atlanta, Georgia on May 2, 2019. The child was born in Atlanta and lived there for the first three months of his life. The parent was involved with the Atlanta child protection agency.

36The parent and the child came to Canada in September 2019. The parent made a claim for refugee status and included the child in his claim. The parent deposed they were granted refugee status on August 23, 2021, based on a well-grounded fear of persecution due to sexual orientation.

37The parent attested that the family who adopted and raised him still lives in the Bahamas. He said he has been estranged from them due to the abuse he suffered in his childhood.

Part Four – Child protection involvement from 2020 until August 2023

38In February 2020, the parent was involved with the Peel Children’s Aid Society after a report from a hospital that the child had sustained fractures to both his ankles while in the care of a 15-year-old babysitter at the family shelter where they lived. No criminal charges were laid.

39In March 2020, the child protection file was transferred to Durham Children’s Aid Society after the parent and the child moved there. It closed its file in April 2020, after the parent and the child moved to a shelter in Toronto.

40The society became involved with the parent in April 2022 after a referral from the Toronto Police Services. The society provided supportive services to the parent and closed its file in August 2022.

41In November 2022, the parent contacted the society for support for a housing transfer. He had been involved in an altercation with a neighbour that resulted in the parent being charged with assault.

42The society’s family service worker (JK) met with the parent after receiving a series of odd messages from him. JK deposed he presented as dysregulated, tangential and expressing paranoid thoughts during her initial contacts with him. The parent told her he felt very isolated.

43On December 9, 2022, the child was brought to a place of safety after the parent had a mental health crisis and was apprehended under Form 1 of the Mental Health Act. The parent had been acting erratically, knocking on neighbours’ doors and declaring he was God. The parent was reportedly unresponsive when emergency services arrived. The child was alone in the parent’s apartment at that time.

44On December 14, 2022, the society issued its protection application, and the child was placed in its temporary care and custody.

45The parent remained in the hospital until December 30, 2022. He was discharged with a working diagnosis of “First Episode Psychosis”. He was referred to Unity Health’s Starting Treatment Early for Psychosis Service (STEPS) program for his aftercare treatment.

46The parent worked well with the STEPS program. His access with the child was gradually increased.

47On July 21, 2023, on consent, the child was returned to the parent’s care under a temporary supervision order.

48On August 22, 2023, on consent, the child was found in need of protection under subclauses 74 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act (risk of physical harm). The child was placed with the parent for six months, subject to terms of society supervision.

49On January 31, 2024, the supervision order was terminated. The parent had worked cooperatively with the society, had engaged in his mental health treatment and was mentally stable. The child was going to school. The parent agreed to work voluntarily with the society for three months.⁴

Part Five – February 2024 to October 2024

50In February 2024, the parent advised JK that he was experiencing depression, intrusive thoughts, was not sleeping well and that he was missing appointments with his mental health team. He had stopped taking his medication for several months. The parent advised JK that he sometimes kept the child home from school because he (the parent) had trouble getting up in the morning.

51On May 2, 2024, JK conducted a wellness check on the parent and the child. The parent did not answer the door. Instead, he sent JK several texts and voice memos. JK deposed the parent did not sound well. He was tangential and agitated. JK asked him why he was not sending the child to school for the past few months. The parent responded that he was afraid that school staff were trying to hurt the child. He said he did not trust the government and planned to homeschool the child. He then told her he was planning to leave Canada and he wanted everyone to leave him alone. JK offered to come the next day and bring the parent and the child breakfast. The parent agreed and gave her the breakfast order.

52JK brought breakfast the next morning. The parent accused her of poisoning the food. He spoke about systems being connected and that these systems were working with a common goal to kill the child. JK expressed her concern to the parent about his mental health. She asked him if he was willing to see his psychiatrist. The parent responded that he didn’t need to – he had already told his psychiatrist and mental health worker that he was done with them.

53From July to September 2024, the society received community referrals expressing concern about the parent’s mental health.

54On August 13, 2024, society worker CN met with the parent. The parent had had an incident with his landlord the day before and the police had been called. He told CN that he and the child are hermits and want to be left alone. He said he does not like to go outside and prefers to stay in the apartment with the child. He told her that he reads a lot of conspiracy theories that are often accurate and that does not make him mentally ill. He said he planned to take the child back to the Bahamas. CN saw that the home was messy. The child’s bed was disassembled and on one side of the living room. The parent said he wanted the child to go to school but the child was not in the right program.

55On September 16, 2024, the society issued a protection application seeking a supervision order. The parent resisted service of the application.

56The parent did not attend court on September 17, 2024. Justice Susan Sullivan ordered that the child be brought into the temporary care and custody of the society. She endorsed that:

a) The child is not registered in school.

b) When JK attended the parent’s home the previous day, he refused to open the door and shouted at her.

c) The parent sent JK multiple (19) text messages the previous day in which he advised he would not be attending court and that she was not to contact him again.

57The child was brought into the society’s care later that day. JK observed that the child was disheveled. His clothes were dirty, and he had dried food and substances on his skin. His hair was matted. There were pieces of hair hanging off his head in small clumps. It looked like his hair hadn’t been cared for in a long time.

58The police occurrence report from the apprehension of the child on September 17, 2024, sets out the following:

a) As soon as the officers left the parent’s unit, the parent opened the door and threw a water bottle at them.

b) The parent then grabbed a kick box training pole, threw it and struck one of the officers. He was arrested for assaulting a police officer and placed in the back of the police car.

c) The parent was able to escape from his cuffs and began to swing the loose end of the handcuffs on the inner glass of the police vehicle. He had to be pulled out of the vehicle. He was handcuffed and given leg restraints to control him.

d) When he was being transported to the police station the parent began talking about how the FBI and the CIA live above him and they’re watching. He also told officers that if he were to see them on the streets that he would kill them.

59The parent was taken to the hospital to be assessed by a doctor. He was released and then taken to the police station.

60On September 18, 2024, between 2 a.m. and 7 a.m. The parent sent JK a series of rambling and disparaging emails.

61On October 1, 2024, the parent sent JK an email saying he was “bout to tear her up in court” and “today better be the last time I see your face”. The society decided to send a different worker to court.

62Justice Sullivan heard a temporary care and custody motion on October 9, 2024. On October 22, 2025, she released written reasons for decisions. She ordered that the child remain in temporary society care, with the parent’s access being in the society’s discretion.

63Justice Sullivan made the following findings in her decision:

a) The parent suffered a mental health crisis that negatively impacted his ability to care for the child.

b) There had been a concerning decline in the parent’s mental health since early in 2024.

c) The parent is a self-described hermit. His explanations do not justify his extreme behaviour.

d) The parent does not meaningfully acknowledge his mental health concerns.

e) The parent is not consistently receiving services or treatment to address his mental health concerns.

f) The parent lacks insight into the risk factors.

g) The child is young and vulnerable and has specialized special needs.

h) The child was isolated in the parent’s care, not attending school and not receiving any supports or services.

i) There were clear signs of neglect when the child was brought to a place of safety.

j) The parent is unwilling to work with the society. A supervision order is unworkable.

64No evidence was presented at this motion that changes any of those findings.

65The parties consented to a finding that the child is in need of protection pursuant to clause 74 (2) (k) of the Act.⁵ The evidence supported that finding. The parent was arrested and then hospitalized on September 17, 2025. No one was available to care for the child, and he was brought to a place of safety that day.

Part Six – Events from October 2024 until April 2025

66The society arranged for supervised access to take place between the parent and the child twice each week at its office.

67On October 22, 2024, the parent sent the society’s children’s services worker (the CSW) a series of angry emails.⁶ He continued to send her rambling and angry emails in December 2024.⁷ He sent similar emails to another worker during November 2024.

68On December 16, 2024, the society amended its protection application to seek a six-month, interim society care order. On December 29, 2024, the parent served and filed his Answer/Plan of Care seeking the return of the child to his care. The parent was represented by counsel at that time.

69At a visit on December 30, 2024, CN noted that the parent made a series of odd comments. He commented that he was in the American army and “we were going to find out who he is once Trump is in power, and we become part of the U.S.” He said that he will come after the society.

70The parent became escalated during this visit. Society worker IP heard the parent telling the child, “Every holiday they kidnap you. You know that? And all they give me for the holidays is an extra hour. Every holiday they kidnap you”. IP saw that the child was not responding to the parent. The parent continued making this statement, getting louder and started yelling, “Every holiday! Every holiday!”.

71On January 8, 2025, a trial management conference was held. The case was placed on the April trial sittings at 311 Jarvis court.

72On January 29, 2025, JK received an email from the parent that attached an audio recording. He threatened her, her family, the CSW and the CSW’s family.⁸ The police were contacted, and the parent was criminally charged. His criminal release conditions set out that he could not have any contact with JK or the CSW or come within 100 meters of any place where they work, live, go to school or frequent.

73On January 30, 2025, the parent sent the society supervisor several angry and rambling emails. Like many of the texts and emails referred to above they were indicative of someone with serious mental health issues.⁹

74The society changed the family service worker from JK to JS. The parent subsequently sent many hostile and rambling messages to JS.

75The parent’s access could no longer take place at the society’s office because of his criminal release conditions. The society arranged for supervised visits to take place at the Yonge Street Mission.

76In February 2025, the parent’s counsel was allowed to be removed as his counsel of record.

77On March 27, 2025, the society amended its protection application for the second time to seek a disposition of extended society care for the child.

78On April 10, 2025, there was a serious incident at the Yonge Street Mission. The parent accused the access supervisor of inappropriately touching the child. The parent tried to leave with the child. He was told he was not allowed to take him from the building.¹⁰ He tried to push past the access supervisor. A co-worker helped the access supervisor block the parent from taking the child away. The child was crying. The police were called. The parent was involuntarily admitted to hospital under the Mental Health Act. He was not charged with a criminal offence.

79The parent was hospitalized until April 28, 2025.

80The parent filed a psychiatric record from the hospital. The psychiatrist noted that he now understands the parent’s case to be consistent with a primary psychotic disorder. He noted that the parent agreed with him that several of his comments upon admission were bizarre, especially the comments about the FBI working through him to take the American government down. The psychiatrist wrote he encouraged the parent to get back on antipsychotic treatment and to abstain from cannabis use.

81The discharge summary from the hospital sets out:

a) Throughout most of his admission, the parent was treated as an involuntary patient under Form 3 of the Mental Health Act.

b) The parent was initially found to be incapable of making treatment decisions. He was found capable of making these decisions shortly after.

c) The parent was emotionally escalated when he first saw a physician at the hospital. A code white was called to restrain him. He was verbally de-escalated and restraints were not required.

d) The parent claimed his psychosis was cannabis induced.

e) The parent claimed the hospital staff left him in a room and had done something to poison the air.

f) The parent made several comments which seemed to be based in persecutory delusional thinking (being poisoned, having mics implanted in his body).

g) The parent was calm on discharge but was not willing to take medication. He was not willing to accept that his thoughts have led to aggressive behaviours.

82On April 28, 2025, Justice Sullivan removed the case from the trial list because of the parent’s hospitalization. The case was adjourned to the trial sittings during the week starting October 20, 2025.

Part Seven – Events since April 2025

83Virtual visits were set up between the parent and the child twice a week for 30 minutes each after he was released from the hospital.

84Dr. Daniel Fitzgerald conducted a psychological assessment of the child on August 13, 2025. This will be summarized later in this decision.

85The parent continued to send long rambling emails to society workers.

86The parent did not attend Assignment Court at 311 Jarvis court.

87On September 12, 2025, the parent was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats and mischief regarding an incident with his neighbour.

88On September 29, 2025, the parent was charged with mischief and breach of release conditions regarding the same neighbour.

89The parent was incarcerated for several weeks in September and October 2025. He was in jail when the trial was scheduled to start on October 20, 2025. He filed no trial material.

90At the outset of the trial on October 20, 2025, the court was advised that the parent became violent in the room set up at the prison for his zoom participation. He was returned to his cell. Corrections staff told the court staff that the parent would attend in the afternoon. The trial started again. The matter was introduced, the parent said he declined to participate and left the room. The trial was adjourned at the request of the society and amicus.

91The parent’s charges regarding JK and the CSW were resolved by a guilty plea on October 24, 2025. He was sentenced to time served plus 10 days. He was placed on probation for two years with conditions like those in his bail conditions. He is not to have any contact with JK or the CSW or be within 100 meters of them or the society offices.¹¹

92On October 28, 2025, the parent was found to be a special party. The PGT was appointed to be his legal representative. Amicus was discharged.¹²

93This summary judgment motion was first scheduled to be heard on January 16, 2026. It was adjourned because counsel for the PGT was ill.

94The parent has been exercising virtual parenting time with the child once each week. The visits are scheduled for one hour but usually last about 20 minutes. The visits are generally positive. However, the court was advised that in the last six weeks The parent has missed a few of the virtual visits.

95The parent deposed he is regularly seeing a psychiatrist and that he is working with a mental health worker. The parent filed no evidence from these persons. He filed medical records that pre-dated his incarceration in September 2025.

Part Eight – Is there any genuine issue requiring a trial?

96The court has considered that it should exercise exceptional caution before proceeding on a summary basis in a child protection case. It recognizes and has considered that in child protection proceedings there are Charter implications at stake for vulnerable litigants.

97The court finds that it is in the interests of justice for the court to determine this case summarily. This process allows the court to make the necessary findings of fact and to apply the law to the facts. It is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. The summary judgment process allows the court to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute.

98The court finds that it can do so based on the evidence before it, and without the need to use any expanded powers to weigh evidence or assess credibility.

99The court finds that the evidentiary record, and particularly the facts not in dispute, set out above, are sufficiently comprehensive on all aspects of the case for the court to make a fair and just determination of the issues on the merits without the need for a trial. Cross-examination of witnesses would add little, if any, value to the court’s analysis.

100An unusual aspect of this summary judgment motion was that the material facts required to make this decision were either not in dispute or were not meaningfully contested by the parent. The task for this court was to decide what orders to make based on these material facts.

101Given the length of time the child has been in society care, the court finds that the resolution of this matter by way of summary judgment motion is not merely efficient and expeditious – but it is a desirable and necessary mechanism to achieve the objectives of the Act.

102The court finds that the society has established, on a balance of probabilities, a prima facie case for summary judgment with respect to each aspect of the relief sought, and that the parent has not met his onus of establishing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial on any issue.

Part Nine – Disposition

9.1 Legal considerations

103The society filed, and the court considered, the society’s plan of care pursuant to section 100 of the Act. That plan is consistent with the position it took in this case.

104Subsection 101 (1) of the Act provides that where a court finds that a child is in need of protection it must first satisfy itself that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.

105In determining if a court order is necessary to protect a child in the future, the court can consider protection concerns other than those that resulted in the child coming into care. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.P., 2019 ONSC 3482.

106In any analysis, first and foremost, there must be a consideration of the paramount purpose of the Act, as set out in subsection 1 (1), which is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. As long as it is consistent with the paramount purpose, other purposes of the Act as set out in subsection 1 (2) are also designed to support the autonomy and integrity of the family unit and to utilize the least disruptive course of action available. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. H.F., 2020 ONCJ 526, per Justice Roselyn Zisman.

107If a court order is determined to be necessary to protect a child in the future, the court shall make one of the orders set out in subsection 101 (1) or section 102 of the Act in the child’s best interests. These read as follows:

Order where child in need of protection

101 (1) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 102, in the child’s best interests:

Supervision order

That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

Interim society care

That the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months.

Extended society care

That the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated under section 116 or expires under section 123.

Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision

That the child be placed in interim society care and custody under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.

102 (1) Subject to subsection (6), if a court finds that an order under this section instead of an order under subsection 101 (1) would be in a child’s best interests, the court may make an order granting custody of the child to one or more persons, other than a foster parent of the child, with the consent of the person or persons.

108Subsection 101 (2) of the Act requires the court to determine what efforts the society or another agency or person made to assist the children before intervention under Part V of the Act.

109Subsection 101 (3) of the Act requires that the court look at less disruptive alternatives than removing a child from the care of the persons who had charge of the child immediately before intervention unless it determines that these alternatives would be inadequate to protect the child.

110Subsection 101 (4) of the Act requires the court to look at community placements, including family members, before deciding to place a child in care.

111In determining the appropriate disposition, the court must decide what order is in the child’s best interests. The court considered the criteria set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act in making this determination. This subsection reads as follows:

Best interests of child

(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

112It is important not to judge a parent by a middle-class yardstick, one that imposes unrealistic and unfair middle-class standards of childcare upon a parent, provided that the standard used is not contrary to the child’s best interests. See: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. B.-H. (R.), 2006 ONCJ 515.

113In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 866, this court wrote the following about mental health and protection concerns:

113It does not automatically follow that a child will be in need of protection just because a parent has mental health challenges. Many parents with mental health issues parent their children well – others can’t. There is a wide range of mental illnesses that affect parents differently and, by extension, affect their children differently.

114The court needs to assess several factors to determine if a parent’s mental illness places a child at risk of harm and if so, whether a child can still be placed in the parent’s care. These factors include:

a) The type of mental illness the parent has.

b) The severity of the mental illness.

c) The frequency of the parent’s mental illness symptoms – whether they are situational or chronic.

d) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s functioning.

e) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s parenting.

f) Other risk factors impacting on the mental illness, including substance abuse, difficulties with interpersonal relationships, domestic violence and other stressors such as unstable housing and financial problems.

g) The impact of the mental illness on the children.

h) The insight of the parent into their mental illness.

i) The ability of the parent to meaningfully engage with supports to address the mental health issues.

j) Whether the parent is compliant with treatment recommendations.

k) The strength of the parent’s support system, the insight of those support persons into the parent’s mental health issues and the ability of those persons to prioritize a child’s needs to those of the parent’s and to protect the child.

l) Whether the children have any needs that make them more vulnerable to compromised parenting.

114The length of time a child is in care is at all times a relevant consideration in determining placement when a child is found to be in need of protection. Time is considered from a child’s needs and perspective. The time consideration, like all considerations in child protection matters, should be child focused. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. D.S., 2009 60090 (Ont. S.C.J.).

115A child’s need for permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to that child’s needs demands that the legal process not be used as a strategy to “buy” a parent time to develop an ability to parent. In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent’s desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from a parent’s evidence that they face some better prospects than what existed at the time of the society’s removal of the child from their care and has developed some new ability as a parent. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H. 2000 3158 (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. C.J.).

116In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.B., 2014 ONCJ 518, this court discussed the importance of a parent providing a child with a safe, stable and secure home as follows:

112The major protection issue is the mother’s ability to be able to provide the child with a safe, secure and stable home. This is a critical aspect of being a parent. Children need stable housing. They need their parents to have a stable plan for them. Children need their parents to be consistent and reliable and to exercise good judgment. They need to be protected from conflict and crisis. The mother has just started to take some steps to be able to address these protection concerns, but she is still not close, at this time, to establishing that she can provide these basic needs for the child. The mother has had difficulty looking after herself, let alone the needs of a vulnerable child. Terms of supervision would be inadequate to protect the child.

9.2 Continuing need for a protection order

117It was not disputed that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future. The evidence overwhelmingly supports that finding. The protection concerns will be set out in more detail below.

9.3 The child

118The child has remained in the same foster home since he was brought to a place of safety on September 17, 2025. The foster mother provided the following evidence about the child:

a) He had minimal speech when he first came to the foster home. Most of his language consisted of yes and no.

b) He had frequent outbursts when he first came into care. These have subsided.

c) He is doing well. He is healthy and usually happy.

d) He regularly attends school in grade 1. He is struggling in a mainstream classroom. He has frequent outbursts at school which include throwing chairs and screaming.

e) The child requires one-on-one attention for most tasks. He requires extra attention in the community.

f) The child is developing some emotional regulations skills. However, he still becomes overwhelmed and struggles to complete tasks.

119Dr. Fitzgerald wrote the following about the child in his psychological assessment:

a) His cognitive ability was in the extremely low range.

b) The most pronounced difficulties of his autism are with communication, social skills and adaptive functioning.

c) His presentation is characterized by withdrawn behaviour and poor communication. This limits his ability to effectively interact with his peers.

d) His diagnosis is Intellectual Disability and Autism Spectrum Disorder with accompanying intellectual and language impairment.

120Dr. Fitzgerald’s recommendations for the child include:

a) A full-time educational assistant to support him.

b) An individualized education plan.

c) Communication and speech language therapy.

d) Occupational therapy.

e) Behavioural and social skills intervention.

f) Home and community support.

121Dr. Fitzgerald wrote that collaboration between all professionals and his foster parents is critical to ensure that the child’s educational, social and emotional needs are met.

9.4 Services provided to the family

122The society has tried very hard to support the parent and the child. It supported the child’s return to the parent in July 2023 after the parent’s first mental health crisis. It worked closely with his treatment team. The society arranged for access to take place at the Yonge Street Mission after the parent was prevented from attending its office because of the criminal charges. It has unsuccessfully attempted to engage with and support the parent. He has been resistant to this.

123The society funded a psychological assessment of the child.

9.5 Community and Family Plans

124The society met its obligation to explore alternate family and community plans for the child. It explored a possible family plan with the parent’s adoptive mother in the Bahamas. The parent is strongly opposed to this and was very upset the society was investigating this option. This plan has not materialized.

125The parent did not propose any other family or community plan.

9.6 The Plans of Care

126The society’s plan is that the child will be placed with it in extended society care. It will provide the child with the support of an Adoption Worker to locate a suitable adoptive home. The plan is for the child to remain with his current foster family until a permanent home is found. The society intends to implement the recommendations made by Dr. Fitzgerald in his psychological assessment. It is exploring funding sources for autism services for the child.

127The parent’s plan is for the child to be returned to his care. He is prepared to agree to a three-month supervision order. He set out his plan as follows:

a) They will live in a two-bedroom home he has through Toronto Community Housing.

b) He will financially support the child through his ODSP payments.

c) He will stay at home to care for the child.

d) He has clothing, books, toys and supplies for the child.

e) He has applied for Ontario Autism Program funding.

f) He wants the child to attend a specialized program to meet his special needs. He would like him to attend Montessori school.

128The parent believes that he provided good care for the child. He also feels he is the person best able to understand the child’s needs because he is also neurodivergent.

129The parent believes that the society has misunderstood him. He says it never provided him with a worker who was a racial or cultural match or understood his culture. It did not understand his cultural orientation.

130The parent acknowledged in his affidavit that he has said inappropriate things in his texts and emails to society workers. He attributed this to unresolved trauma from his childhood and having been traumatized by his involvement with the society and the police.

9.7 Analysis

131The evidence is overwhelming that it is in the child’s best interests to be placed with the society in extended society care for the following reasons:

a) The risks of the child suffering physical or emotional harm if placed with the parent remain unacceptably high due to exposure to the parent’s dysregulated conduct.

b) The parent’s mental health challenges are severe. He has had two major involuntary hospitalizations in the past four years. His conduct in September and October 2025 was evidence of serious mental health issues. He was found to be a special party arising out of this conduct.

c) The parent becomes irrational, aggressive and sometimes violent when his mental health declines. He lacks impulse control and any judgment. He has been arrested several times in the past few years.

d) There is no supporting evidence that the parent is being regularly treated for his mental health or that he is taking recommended medications. This increases the likelihood that there will be more mental health incidents.

e) It appears that the parent is isolated. He filed no supporting affidavits. He did not attend this hearing.

f) The parent shows no insight into how frightening his conduct is to those who have to deal with him when he is unwell. He blames his conduct on his trauma and says he does not mean to harm anyone.

g) The child has significant special needs and is very vulnerable. He requires a stable and calm caregiver who can work collaboratively with service providers to meet his needs. The parent lacks those attributes. He reacts with hostility and aggression to those who do not agree with him.

h) The child’s gains made in society care would be compromised if returned to the parent.

i) The child showed signs of serious neglect when he was brought to a place of safety. The parent kept him inside and did not send him to school because of his mental health challenges. There is a high likelihood this would happen again if the child was placed with the parent.

j) The child has now been in care in excess of the statutory time limit of two years.¹³ The court’s options are to return the child to the parent or to make an extended society care order. The parent has not demonstrated that it is in the child’s best interests to have unsupervised access at this time, let alone having him returned to his care.

k) The child has endured considerable disruption and instability in his life due to the parent’s dysfunction. The child needs permanency and stability. The parent cannot provide this for him.

l) The society’s plan will best meet the child’s need for continuity and stability.

m) The society’s plan will best meet the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs.

n) The society’s plan will best meet the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.

o) The society’s plan will better address the child’s needs than the plan proposed by The parent. It is the only viable plan before the court.

132Even if the child was returned to the care of the parent, it would have to be pursuant to strict terms of supervision. For the court to make a supervision order, it would need to be confident that the parent would comply with the order. See: Windsor-Essex CAS v. L.H., 2004 ONCJ 196, [2004] O.J. No. 3889 (OCJ) and this court’s comments in Jewish Family and Child Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227.

133The evidence informs the court that the parent would not comply with a supervision order. He remains hostile to the society and has not meaningfully engaged with its workers. He becomes angry and lashes out when upset. The prior attempt to return the child to him with a supervision order quickly fell apart.

134There would be no other realistic outcome if this issue went to trial. The least disruptive alternative, consistent with the child’s best interests, is to place him with the society in extended society care.

Part Ten – Access

10.1 Legal considerations for access orders

135Subsection 105 (4) states that where the court makes an order that a child be in extended society care, any order for access is terminated.

136Subsection 105 (5) sets out that in considering the issue of access to a child in extended society care, the best interests of the child is the test. The court may not order access to a child unless it is satisfied that the order would be in the child’s best interests.

137Subsection 74 (3) of the Act (set out in paragraph 111 above) sets out best interests factors for the court to consider in determining access.

138Subsection 105 (6) of the Act sets out additional factors to be considered in determining whether an access order would be in the best interests of a child in extended society care. These are:

a) Whether the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and

b) If the court considers it relevant, whether the ordered access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

139In Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316 the Court of Appeal wrote the following:

a) The changes to the access test are significant (par. 47).

b) The changes are not just semantics. They represent a significant shift in the approach to access for children in extended society care (par. 48).

c) The burden is no longer on the person requesting access to demonstrate that the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child and will in no way impair the child’s future adoption opportunities (par. 49).

d) Instead, the court is to undertake a best interests analysis, assess whether the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and consider impairment to future adoption opportunities only as part of this assessment and only where relevant (par. 49).

e) Similarly, while any evidence of possible impairment to adoption opportunities would have thwarted previous requests for access, under the new Act, access is to be ordered for a child with otherwise excellent adoptive prospects if it is in her overall best interests (par. 49).

f) The court should reference the best interest considerations in subsection 74 (3) of the Act in making its decision (par.53).

g) The “presumption against access” to “Crown Wards” test no longer exists (par. 53).

140The challenge in making an access order for a child in extended society care is finding the fine balance between what will preserve a relationship in the best interests of the child and, at the same time, what will permit flexibility to allow the mental and emotional transition towards permanency by the child in their new adoptive home. See: Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. J.B., 2017 ONSC 1194.

141An order for extended Society care does not, by implication, necessitate minimal or no access. In CAS Niagara v. JKPT, 2021 ONSC 2930, the court ordered weekly access for a child with his mother, where the evidence was that the child was well bonded with her, and she truly loved the child and wanted what was best for him. The court found that this “could only be beneficial”. The court also found that access is not a “frill” or an “extra” for children – it is in fact a need.

142There is no presumption in the Act for reduced access for children who are placed in extended society care. Each case must be determined on its own unique facts: "case-by-case consideration of the unique circumstance of each child is the hallmark of the process". See: CCAS of Hamilton v. Z.C., 2024 ONSC 5854.

143In J.S.R. v. The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa, 2021 ONSC 630 (J.S.R.), the Ontario Divisional Court wrote that it is an error in law for a court to delegate all discretionary decisions on the type, frequency and duration of access in the discretion of the society. Nothing in the language of sections 104 or 105 of the Act either explicitly or implicitly includes the power to subdelegate the decision as to terms or conditions of access to a nonjudicial actor such as a society.

144The court in J.S.R. also set out that it is acceptable for a court to order access in society discretion if it significantly circumscribes the discretion of the society as to form, duration and frequency by setting minimum access rights. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.G., 2020 ONCA 315, where the trial court ordered a minimum of 6 in-person visits each year for one hour each and to ensure that the society provided the mother a recent picture of the child 4 times each year.

145Generally, it is in a child’s best interests for courts to take an active role in structuring and reviewing access, at all stages of a case, to give the parent/child relationship the best chance to succeed. However, there will be cases where the protection concerns are very serious, access is problematic, the facts rapidly change, and the society needs considerable flexibility to safely manage access for a child. The court will review below why this case has many of these elements. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. Y.D., 2025 ONCJ 590

10.2 The parties’ positions

146The society is asking that the parent’s access be a minimum of six times a year, and at its discretion as to location, duration, level of supervision and method, or as otherwise agreed to by the parties.

147The society submitted it would like to start in-person supervised visits for the parent, but it has been unable to do so because he will not engage with it. At this point, the parent has refused to provide consents for the society to speak to any of his service providers. The society submits it needs the ability to assess what risk he poses to the child and its workers.

148The PGT on behalf of the parent seeks an order for in-person visits, a minimum of once a week, for two hours, with the level of supervision, if any, to be in the society’s discretion. He also seeks virtual access once a week, with the level of supervision, if any, to be in the society’s discretion.

10.3 Material facts not in dispute

149In addition to the facts previously set out in this decision, the following material facts about access are not in dispute:

a) The parent has only had virtual access with the child since April 2025.

b) The visits are weekly, although the parent has recently missed some visits.

c) The visits are scheduled for one hour, although they often end after 20 minutes. This is because of the child’s attention level, not because of anything the parent is doing wrong.

d) The visits are generally positive. The parent and the child engage well together. The parent is kind and supportive with the child. He tries to instruct the child. The court saw one video where he instructed the child about different types of trains.

e) The parent and child are happy to see one another. They love one another.

f) Access is beneficial and meaningful for the child.

g) When the parent was unable to exercise access, the lack of visits negatively affected the child. He became more dysregulated.

h) The parent is not engaging with the society workers. It is very difficult for it to assess what safety risk he poses to the child and its workers.

i) The society is reluctant to start in-person access. It is concerned about the safety of its workers.

150The court finds that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial on this issue. The court has the necessary material facts before it to make this assessment. Further cross-examination of witnesses (JS was questioned out-of-court) would not add anything to the court’s analysis. The task is to decide what access orders are in the child’s best interests based on these facts.

10.4 Analysis

151It is essential that the child be emotionally and physically safe at visits. When the parent is dysregulated, this compromises the child’s safety. The child has limited resources to process dysregulated behaviour from an adult. The parent has not shown that he has adequately addressed his mental health challenges. The risks to the child posed by his conduct when he is unwell are profound. It is imperative, at this time, that the parent’s access with the child be supervised.

152It is also critical that anyone supervising the parent’s visits with the child feel safe. The society needs the discretion to evaluate the safety of in-person access. It has an obligation to protect the child, its employees and its agents.

153The parent will also need to be much more transparent about his mental health and cooperative with the society before in-person visits can take place. The court finds the society should have the discretion to determine the mode of access and the level of supervision. This means, at this time, the access will remain virtual and supervised.

154The society submitted that the child’s visits with the parent should be significantly reduced because, due to his special needs, the child should have a stable routine. However, an important part of the child’s stable routine has been having frequent virtual access with the parent. It is not in his best interests to disrupt this routine to the extent proposed by the society.

155The court considered that the parent has been disrupting this routine by missing several recent visits with the child.

156The society expressed a concern that the virtual calls will require the child to miss school. Missing school is not in the child’s best interests. However, if the calls are scheduled for 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, this should not disrupt the child’s schooling. Access will not be reduced for this reason.

157The society submitted that the nature of access changes once there is an extended society care order. Access should not be ordered with a frequency that may impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption. The court recognizes that it is no longer trying to reunify the child with the parent. The purpose of the access order now is to preserve a beneficial and meaningful relationship for the child. See: Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v. C.H., 2018 ONCJ 453; Family & Children’s Services v. B.S., 2019 ONSC 6577; Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. M.J.C., 2024 ONSC 2669.

158The following factors support ordering minimum access at least once a week:

a) The present level of access is positive for the child.

b) The child previously became dysregulated when there was an interruption in the parent’s access.

c) In her cross-examination, JS agreed it would be a very significant change in routine if the child went from weekly visits to six visits a year, as sought by the society.

d) The child’s only connection with a family member is with the parent.

e) The parent can instruct the child about his cultural heritage and religion with more frequent visits.

f) No evidence was provided about the child’s adoptability. The society agreed it will be challenging to find an adoptive placement for the child because of his significant special needs.

g) If the child is placed for adoption, the court can either increase or decrease the parent’s contact with the child within an openness application.

h) If the society believes that the level of access ordered is impairing the child’s opportunities for adoption it can move to vary the order.

159These factors are outweighed by the following factors:

a) The parent’s mental health challenges and his failure to adequately address them.

b) The parent’s anger.

c) The parent’s dysregulated conduct that has sometimes been violent.

d) The parent’s lack of insight into his mental health issues, conduct and the protection concerns.

e) The parent’s unwillingness to work cooperatively with the society.

f) The parent’s lack of transparency with the society.

g) The parent has recently missed a few of his weekly access visits. The court does not want to lock the society into an overly aggressive minimum access requirement when there will be times the parent does not exercise it.

h) The society needs the flexibility to reduce the frequency of access visits when the parent’s mental health and conduct declines. It is not in the child’s best interests to require the society to return to court to change the order every time this happens.

i) The parties agreed that there will likely be a limited pool of potential adoptive families because of the child’s significant special needs. It is not in the child’s best interests to create further barriers for adoption. Prospective adoptive families will likely be dissuaded from coming forward if it appears they will have frequent engagement with the parent.

160The minimum access proposed by the society is insufficient. The court finds it is in the child’s best interests to order that his access with the parent take place a minimum of once every other week. The society will have the discretion to determine the location, duration, level of supervision and method of the access.

161The court wants to emphasize that this order allows the society to continue the weekly virtual access visits. It also allows the society to arrange in-person visits once it can ensure the safety of the child, its employees and agents.

162The parent has an obligation to the child to exercise his access responsibly. He needs to attend visits consistently because it is confusing and disappointing to the child when he misses them. He also needs to exercise his access calmly and respectfully. The court will further circumscribe the parent’s access as follows:

a) The society shall have the discretion to end any visit early, if, in its opinion, the parent is acting inappropriately.

b) If the parent misses four access visits in any two-month period, his minimum access shall be reduced to once a month.

Part Eleven – Who should be the access holders and access recipients?

11.1 Legal considerations

163Subsection 105 (7) of the Act recognizes the importance of the distinction between who is an access holder and who is an access recipient, by requiring such identification when making an access order to a child who is placed in extended society care.

164The distinction between who has been granted an access order (the access holder) and who is the person with respect to whom an access order has been granted (the access recipient) has now become a critical consideration because only the access holder has the right to bring an openness application if served with a Notice of Intent to place a child for adoption. The access recipient only has the right to be given notice of the society’s Notice of Intent to place a child for adoption.

165The best interests consideration of impairment of the opportunity to be adopted takes on heightened importance when assessing whether a person should be made an access holder. The court might only order the person to be an access recipient if there is a concern that they might frustrate, delay or undermine the adoption process. See: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. E.U., 2014 ONCJ 299, [2014] O.J. No. 2939 (OCJ); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.C., 2023 ONCJ 527; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. K.G., 2021 ONCJ 621; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.A.L., 2024 ONCJ 146.

166The phrase “impair the child’s future opportunity for adoption” means more than just impairing a child’s opportunity to actually be adopted. The impairment also applies to an undue delay in the child being adopted. To interpret this phrase otherwise would be contrary to the paramount purpose of the Act set out in subsection 1(1) – to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. See: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. M.M., 2012 ONCJ 369, [2012] O.J. No. 2717; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. Y.M., 2019 ONCJ 489; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.A.L., supra.

167In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.F., 2015 ONCJ 678, the court set out the following attributes of persons who may impair a child’s future opportunities for adoption:

166The first attribute is a difficulty with aggression, anger or impulse control. Persons with this attribute are often confrontational. This attribute may threaten the physical or emotional security of the adoptive parents and their family.

167The second attribute is a lack of support for an alternate caregiver of the child. This might manifest itself in an undermining of the adoptive placement and the child’s sense of security with the adoptive family. Persons with this attribute may be relentlessly critical of the adoptive parents and make their lives very difficult. They are usually unable to accept their reduced role in the child’s life.

168The third attribute is dishonesty and secrecy. Persons with this attribute can often not be trusted to comply with the terms of court orders or to accurately report any important issues about the child.

169The fourth attribute is a propensity to be litigious. Persons with this attribute are usually unable to accept a reduced role in the child’s life and are likely to engage in openness litigation.

168A fifth attribute was added by Justice Roselyn Zisman in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.P., 2019 ONCJ 631, being: a person with a mental health condition, substance abuse issues, transience or chaotic lifestyle. Persons with this background may be difficult to deal with and their personal issues may result in there being difficulty in making arrangements with them for contact and as a result dissuade adoptive parents.

169The attributes set out in A.F. and in A.P. were accepted and applied as proper considerations in appeal decisions in JFCS v. E.K.B., 2019 ONSC 661 and in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.E., 2025 ONCA 623.

11.2 Analysis

170The PGT on behalf of the parent seeks an order that the parent and the child be reciprocal access holders and access recipients.

171The society seeks an order that the child shall be the access holder, and that the parent shall be the access recipient.

172The court finds that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial on this issue. The court has the necessary material facts before it to make this assessment. Cross-examination of witnesses at trial would not add anything to the court’s analysis.

173In reviewing the case law, the court finds the following factors in favour of making the parent an access holder:

a) His rights to be an access holder to bring an openness application should not be removed lightly.

b) He has had a pleasant relationship with the child’s foster mother. He has not done anything to undermine the child’s placement.

c) He has not been dysregulated at a virtual access visit since October 2025.

174These factors are outweighed by the following factors against making the parent an access holder:

a) He has difficulty with anger, aggression and impulse control. He has often been confrontational. He has been arrested several times for his aggression. He was convicted of threatening two society workers. This attribute may threaten the physical or emotional security of any adoptive parents and their families.

b) He has not been transparent with the society about his mental health and treatment.

c) He has not engaged appropriately with the court process. He did not follow filing directions for the trial that was scheduled to start on October 20, 2025. He declined to take part in the trial. He did not attend at this hearing. It raises issues about how governable he is.

d) He has serious mental health issues. His life has been chaotic. Prospective adoptive parents will likely be reluctant to directly arrange visits with him.

e) He has not been inappropriately litigious. He was entitled to ask that the child to be returned to him. However, the reality is that his mental health challenges have seriously delayed the court process and the planning for the child’s future.

The April 2025 trial date had to be vacated because he was hospitalized for mental health issues. The October 2025 trial dates could not proceed because he was unwell and refused to participate. This resulted in him being found to be a special party.

This hearing took place almost one year after the original trial was scheduled. This was highly prejudicial to the child.

If he is made an access holder, there is a real possibility that an openness application would be similarly delayed. If the adoption pool for the child is going to be limited, it is even more important to remove potential barriers for prospective adoptive parents coming forward.

175Any Notice of Intent to place the child for adoption will need to be served on the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. Given the child’s age and relationship with the parent, it is highly likely that the child would bring an openness application. There will be a mechanism to ensure that the child’s relationship with the parent is preserved if the child is adopted.

176The court finds it is in the child’s best interests that he be the access holder and that the parent be the access recipient.

177The court will order that any Notice of Intent to place the child for adoption be served on the PGT. It can reach out to the parent if this happens and provide him with direction. This is a safeguard to respect the importance of the parent’s relationship with the child. The society consented to this order being made.

Part Twelve – Conclusion

178A final order shall go on the following terms:

a) There is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Summary judgment is granted.

b) Statutory findings are made as requested in paragraph 1 of the society’s notice of motion for summary judgment dated December 1, 2025.

c) The child is in need of protection under clause 74 (2) (k) of the Act.

d) Pursuant to subsection 101 (1) of the Act, intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.

e) The child shall be placed in extended society care of the society.

f) The child shall have access to the parent a minimum of once every other week. The society will have the discretion to determine the location, duration, level of supervision and method of the access. The society will also have the discretion to increase the frequency of access.

g) The society shall have the discretion to end any visit early, if, in its opinion, the parent is acting inappropriately.

h) If the parent misses four access visits in any two-month period, his minimum access shall be reduced to once a month.

i) The child shall be the access holder. The parent shall be the access recipient.

j) The society should serve the PGT with any Notice of Intent to place the child for adoption.

179The court was left with no doubt that the parent loves the child and wants what is best for him. Unfortunately, the parent’s mental health challenges required the court to make this order.

180The parent still has an important role to play in the child’s life and encourages him to be consistent with his visits. The child looks forward to them.

181The court also encourages the parent to be open with the society about his mental health and treatment so that it can provide him with help, and so that he can move towards in-person visits.

182The court thanks counsel for their sensitive and professional presentation of the case.

Released: March 25, 2026

Justice Stanley B. Sherr

(k) the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise the rights of custody over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;

Footnotes

An order was previously made that the child has no other parent, as defined in the Act.
Subrule 2 (1) of the Family Law Rules sets out that “special party” means a party, other than a child party, who is or appears to be mentally incapable for the purposes of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the case and who, as a result, requires legal representation.
The society’s affidavit brief contained an unsworn affidavit from society worker MZ. The court did not rely on that affidavit.
The facts in Part Four are in two Statements of Agreed Facts from the first child protection proceeding. They were filed for this motion.
This clause reads as follows:
These are set out in paragraph 36 of the CSW’s affidavit in tab 9 of the society’s affidavit brief.
See paragraphs 37 to 39 of the CSW’s affidavit.
The society supervisor transcribed the recording in paragraph 11 of his affidavit. This is at tab 8 of the society’s affidavit brief. The recording is indicative of someone with serious mental health issues.
The emails are contained in Tabs 1-9 of the society’s exhibit brief. The parent’s response was that he was upset with society workers for putting the child in a pink princess car and for contacting his family in the Bahamas about a possible placement. He claimed he was not threatening to personally harm the workers, however, but rather inferred that they would eventually pay for what they had done to him and the child.
The parent deposed that he was not trying to leave with the child - he simply wanted to go out and gets some fresh air because he was feeling stressed and triggered. Nothing turns on this disputed fact.
The court did not receive any evidence about the status of the criminal charges related to the parent’s neighbour.
Ms. Hyndman acted as amicus and then as agent for the PGT.
The child has been in care over two years. Subsection 122 (1) of the Act sets out that the court shall not make an order for interim society care that results in a child 6 or older being in the care and custody of the society for a period exceeding two years. Subsection 122 (3) of the Act sets out that in calculating time the court must include any previous periods that the child was in a society’s care and custody during the preceding five years. This means the time the child was in care from December 9, 2022, until July 21, 2023, must be included in the calculation.