Linda Paterson-Kelly

This decision addresses a long motion in family court concerning parenting time and reunification efforts for two daughters.

The court considered the applicant's compliance with previous orders, the implementation of therapist recommendations, and the issue of costs.

A significant aspect was the termination of orders affecting an adult child (Flora) based on a recent Court of Appeal decision (J.F.R. v. K.L.L.) which requires adult children to be heard before parenting orders are made concerning them.

The court found the applicant acted in bad faith and awarded substantial costs to the respondent.

The Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for extended society care for the child, S.C., who had been in temporary care since birth.

The respondent parents opposed, arguing for a trial to present their plans for the child's care, including family assistance in Ontario or a move to British Columbia.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the parents' unresolved mental health issues, chronic housing instability, history of domestic violence, and inconsistent access visits demonstrated their inability to provide a stable and safe home.

The court dismissed the parents' proposed plans as unviable and granted the Society's request for extended care, ordering monthly supervised access for the parents.

The Dnaagdawenmag Binnoojiiyag Child and Family Services (DBCFS), the Respondent Mother, and the Respondent Father each brought motions to vary a temporary supervision order concerning the child, L.T.C., following the Mother's discharge from a mothering house due to dishonesty and a positive drug test.

The court found a material change in circumstances.

While the Agency and Mother sought to continue the Mother's primary care under supervision, the Father sought equal shared care.

The court, applying the legal tests for varying temporary placement orders, found the Father's plan for shared care to be more comprehensive and in the child's best interests, providing greater accountability for both parents and opportunities for the Agency to assess parenting capacity.

The court ordered a week-about shared care arrangement under the supervision of the Agency and both maternal and paternal grandmothers.

This decision addresses a costs motion following a 34-day family law trial.

The applicant, Mr. Southorn, sought costs arguing he was the more successful party, while the respondent, Ms. Ree, also sought costs.

The court found Mr. Southorn significantly more successful on the key issues of decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and support.

Both parties were found to have behaved unreasonably and exhibited some bad faith regarding testimony and financial disclosure.

Mr. Southorn's offer to settle was deemed reasonable, while Ms. Ree's was unreasonable and vague.

The court awarded Mr. Southorn $97,500 in all-inclusive costs, with specific allocations for parenting and support issues, and provisions for collection via a support deduction order and a charge on the respondent's property.

The applicant father and respondent mother separated in 2016 and have two children.

The father sought joint decision-making responsibility, equal parenting time, and the termination of spousal support.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, a continuation of the status quo parenting schedule (primary residence with the mother), and ongoing child and spousal support based on imputed income for the father.

The court found that despite some conflict, the parties were capable of communicating adequately and ordered joint decision-making responsibility.

The court also ordered an equal, week-about parenting time schedule, noting the children's expressed preferences for more time with their father.

The court imputed income to both parties due to their self-employment and under-employment, setting the father's income at $75,000 and the mother's at $30,000 for 2022.

Child support was ordered based on a shared parenting arrangement under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines, and spousal support was reduced to a token amount of $1 per month.

The Respondent brought a motion seeking overnight access for his stepchild, Onyx, and a reduction in child support.

The Applicant opposed overnight access for Onyx, citing parental autonomy and alleged neglect/deprecation, but consented to overnight access for their natural child, Bronx.

The court found the Respondent demonstrated a "settled intention" to treat Onyx as his own, making the parental autonomy doctrine inapplicable.

The court dismissed the Applicant's claims of neglect and deprecation as inconsistent or unproven, and found her decision to withhold overnight access for Onyx arbitrary.

The court granted the Respondent parallel access for Onyx as for Bronx, and varied child support downwards based on the Respondent's updated income.

The Simcoe Muskoka Child Youth and Family Services (the Society) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order finding the child, L.M., in need of protection and placing him in extended Society care with no access for the parents, for the purpose of adoption.

The respondent parents, K.R. (Mother) and M.M. (Father), opposed the motion, arguing that there were genuine issues requiring a trial and seeking expanded access.

The court, exercising exceptional caution due to the Charter implications in child protection cases, allowed limited oral evidence and cross-examination of the parenting capacity assessor.

The court found that the parents, both with significant cognitive and emotional limitations and a history of non-cooperation, had not demonstrated any measurable improvement or ability to provide "good enough" parenting.

The assessment concluded no attachment relationship existed between L.M. and either parent, and severing the relationship would have no negative consequences for the child.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding L.M. in need of protection and ordering extended society care with no access for the parents, for the purpose of adoption, subject to sibling access.

The applicant sought an interim order for shared custody or increased parenting time based on an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

The respondent opposed, disputing the OCL report's conclusions and methodology.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no compelling circumstances to change the established status quo, especially with a trial imminent.

The court also expressed concerns about the OCL investigator's methodology, including reliance on unqualified opinions and a presumptive approach to shared custody, and the high conflict between the parents.

The parties separated after an 11-year marriage with two young children.

The father sought joint custody and equal parenting time, while the mother sought sole custody, citing concerns about the father's mental health, volatile temper, and lack of historical involvement in the children's care.

The court admitted expert psychological evidence indicating the father did not suffer from a mental illness.

However, applying the principles for joint custody, the court found the parents lacked the necessary communication and cooperation.

The mother was granted sole custody as she had been the primary caregiver and demonstrated better insight into the children's needs.

The court also resolved equalization of net family property and ordered the father to pay child support.

Following a review clause in earlier minutes of settlement, the payor spouse brought a motion to change seeking a reduction, step-down, and eventual termination of spousal support.

The recipient spouse sought an increase, cost-of-living indexing, reinstatement of benefits, and other relief.

The court conducted a full review of entitlement, quantum, and duration under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act and the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

It found the recipient spouse had a strong non-compensatory entitlement and that self‑sufficiency was not realistically achievable within a reasonable time given her education, employment history, and economic circumstances following the marriage breakdown.

The court increased support to the SSAG mid‑range, ordered cost‑of‑living adjustments, declined to impose a termination date or further review, and imposed disclosure and insurance proof requirements.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that four children were in need of protection due to the mother's continued relationship with a man who had sexually assaulted one of the children's friends and was alleged to have abused one of the children.

The mother provided sworn evidence that she had ended the relationship and had not exposed the children to the man for over a year.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the mother's intentions and actions raised a genuine issue of credibility that could only be resolved at trial.

In a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the society sought summary judgment for Crown wardship without access in order to pursue adoption of the child by foster parents.

The father opposed the motion and advanced a plan of care proposing that the child reside with him and the paternal great‑grandmother, with daycare and extended family support.

The court held that the society had not established that there was no realistic probability of an outcome other than Crown wardship and that several material issues required a full trial, including the legitimacy of the re‑apprehension, the father’s alleged rehabilitation, kinship placement options, and potential Indigenous heritage considerations.

The court concluded that these matters required credibility assessments and cross‑examination that could not be resolved on a summary judgment record.

The society’s motion for summary judgment and the father’s motion for interim care were both dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

In a child protection proceeding, the child’s maternal aunt brought a motion seeking to be added as a party and requesting the appointment of legal counsel for the child pursuant to s. 38 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court held that the aunt was not a necessary party under the Family Law Rules and that her proposed parenting plan could be advanced through the mother without granting her party status.

The court emphasized that adding additional parties may cause unnecessary delay and is not generally contemplated under s. 39 of the Act.

However, the court found that legal representation for the child was desirable given the presence of competing parenting plans and the importance of ensuring that the child’s views and interests were adequately presented.

The motion to add the aunt as a party was dismissed, but the request for legal representation for the child was granted.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking findings that two children were in need of protection and requesting Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

The court considered whether any genuine issue for trial existed under the Family Law Rules and the Child and Family Services Act.

The evidence showed longstanding instability, domestic violence, mental health issues, and parenting incapacity affecting the parents, as well as sporadic parental contact and delayed paternal involvement.

The court concluded that neither parent established a triable issue regarding placement or access and that the children’s best interests required permanent placement.

Crown wardship orders without access were granted.

In a family law motion concerning a child’s schooling, the moving party sought a temporary order requiring the child to return to her former elementary school after the other parent unilaterally enrolled her in a new school following a residential move.

The court considered the child’s best interests, the parties’ joint custody arrangement, and the procedural history of negotiations and delays.

The evidence showed the responding parent had repeatedly raised the issue, proposed mediation, and acted due to a medical condition affecting her ability to drive long distances, while the moving party delayed initiating court proceedings.

Given the child had already been attending the new school for several weeks and further disruption was likely if she were transferred back on a temporary basis, the court declined to disturb the status quo.

The motion was dismissed and the child was permitted to remain at the new school pending further proceedings.