Emma Elizabeth Taylor Byrnes

The applicant sought full recovery costs ($20,621.08) arising from successful parenting motions.

The respondent, who was largely unsuccessful on the motions, requested costs be fixed at $3,500.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including unilaterally changing the parenting schedule after the mother's death and involving police, amounted to bad faith or at least unreasonable behaviour.

While finding bad faith, the court reduced the applicant's claimed costs to $10,000, finding the original claim excessive but the hourly rate reasonable.

The respondent was ordered to pay $10,000.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the child K. was in need of protection and an order for extended society care with no access for the mother, K.C. K.C. opposed, seeking dismissal or a supervision order and continued access.

The court found K. to be in need of protection and ordered extended society care, citing K.C.'s long-standing behavioral and thought process challenges, and her inability to provide a safe, stable, and predictable environment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to summarily determine the access issue post-extended society care, ordering a mini-trial on that specific matter.

This child protection trial concerned whether the two-year-old child, EL, was in need of protection and the appropriate dispositional orders.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care due to concerns about the mother's cognitive limitations and inability to protect the child from the stepfather, who had a significant history of sexual assault and criminal convictions, including against a child.

The mother and grandmother sought the child's return to their care, subject to supervision, and access.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to risks of physical and sexual harm.

It ordered extended society care, granted the mother and grandmother supervised access, and denied the stepfather any access, citing his high risk and the mother's inability to protect the child from him.

The Applicant filed a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, alleging that the Respondent Children's Aid Society failed to hear her concerns regarding alleged abuse of her child by the father and failed to provide reasons for closing its investigation file.

Following a hearing on the merits, the Child and Family Services Review Board found that the Respondent had heard the Applicant's concerns on several issues, but failed to adequately review video evidence provided by the Applicant, failed to respond to her written concerns regarding the investigation, and failed to provide meaningful reasons for its decision to close the file.

The Board ordered the Respondent to provide written reasons addressing the Applicant's questions and explaining its verification process and application of the Eligibility Spectrum.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto and the father (R.C.) brought motions for the production of records from Boost Child and Youth Advocacy Centre concerning the child G.C.'s trauma assessment and therapy.

The society sought limited recommendations, while the father sought the complete file.

The court analyzed the relevance and privilege of the records under Family Law Rules subrule 19(11) and the Wigmore test.

The court found the trauma assessment report was not privileged, as the communications did not originate in confidence and its disclosure was essential for G.C.'s best interests and safety.

The court ordered the release of the complete unredacted trauma assessment report to the parties but dismissed the father's request for the balance of Boost's records, deeming them unnecessary at that stage.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion to suspend the mother's in-person access visits with the child, C.B., citing concerns about the mother's conduct during visits, including unsubstantiated sexual assault allegations against the father and coaching the child.

The father supported the motion, while the mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) opposed it.

The court applied the "best interests of the child" test for varying an access order, requiring a change in circumstances that renders the existing order no longer in the child's best interests and that the new order sought is in the child's best interests.

The court dismissed the Society's request to suspend in-person access, finding it too drastic and contrary to the child's expressed wishes and special needs.

Instead, the court varied the access order by imposing conditions on the mother's conduct during visits, such as prohibiting discussion of adult or court-related matters and recording the child.