Kenneth E. Snider

This child protection trial concerned whether the two-year-old child, EL, was in need of protection and the appropriate dispositional orders.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care due to concerns about the mother's cognitive limitations and inability to protect the child from the stepfather, who had a significant history of sexual assault and criminal convictions, including against a child.

The mother and grandmother sought the child's return to their care, subject to supervision, and access.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to risks of physical and sexual harm.

It ordered extended society care, granted the mother and grandmother supervised access, and denied the stepfather any access, citing his high risk and the mother's inability to protect the child from him.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the return of the children to Toronto after the applicant mother unilaterally relocated them to Montreal without notice or consent.

The mother argued the court lacked jurisdiction and that the father had acquiesced or unduly delayed.

She also raised allegations of family violence.

The court found that Ontario retained habitual residence, rejected the mother's claims of acquiescence and undue delay, and determined that the alleged family violence did not constitute compelling circumstances to justify the unauthorized relocation.

Applying established legal principles for relocation, the court ordered the children's return to Toronto, emphasizing the importance of statutory notice requirements and discouraging self-help measures in parenting disputes.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking an order to prohibit the respondent mother from making public social media postings related to the society's involvement with her children, the children's fathers, caregivers, and society employees, and to compel the removal of existing posts.

The mother opposed the motion.

The court granted the orders, finding that the mother's postings violated subsection 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, by identifying children and parties to the proceedings.

The court also relied on its inherent power to control its own process to protect participants from cyberbullying and maintain the integrity of child protection proceedings.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs awarded to the father, O’Neil Orlando Nelson, following his largely successful motion to change a previous order.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, emphasizing their modern purposes beyond mere indemnification, including encouraging settlement, sanctioning inappropriate behaviour, and ensuring cases are dealt with justly.

The mother, Camelia Dacianne Davidson, failed to comply with court orders for parenting time and did not make any offers to settle, while the father made repeated offers that mirrored the trial outcome.

The court found the father's position reasonable and his lawyer's time and rates appropriate.

The respondent (father) sought costs for two successful motions: one to enforce parenting time and another to return the child to Toronto.

The applicant (mother) opposed, citing financial hardship and excessive claims.

The court found the father was presumptively entitled to costs due to his success and the mother's unreasonable conduct in withholding parenting time and unilaterally relocating the child.

While acknowledging the mother's impecuniosity, the court ordered her to pay $5,000 in costs, payable in monthly installments, emphasizing the need for immediate consequences for unreasonable litigation behaviour.

The respondent father brought two motions: one to enforce a final parenting order and another to change it, seeking the child's return to Toronto from Owen Sound and changes to primary residence and decision-making responsibility.

The applicant mother had unilaterally relocated the child and denied the father parenting time, citing unverified allegations against the paternal grandmother.

The court found the mother in serious breach of the final order and her relocation improper due to inadequate notice and lack of court authorization.

The court ordered the child's return to Toronto, finding it in the child's best interests, and reinstated the father's parenting time, including allowing contact with the paternal grandmother under supervision.

Following a family law trial where the respondent was largely successful in setting aside a separation agreement and establishing a resulting trust, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The respondent sought $222,540.22 on a full recovery basis, citing the applicant's unreasonable conduct and failure to disclose, while the applicant argued for costs fixed at $60,000.

Applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and noting the respondent beat her own offer to settle, the court fixed costs at $150,000 all inclusive.

The applicant husband sought a divorce relying on a 2010 separation agreement.

The respondent wife sought to set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, arguing it was signed without financial disclosure, under false pretenses to shield assets from creditors, and was unconscionable.

The court agreed, finding the husband deliberately withheld disclosure and exploited the wife's vulnerabilities.

The agreement was set aside.

The court declared the wife a 50% beneficial owner of the matrimonial home via a resulting trust, and awarded her retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support.

The applicant, Eirini Flesias, brought an urgent motion seeking exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, a primary parenting order for the youngest child (J), conduct orders, and the return of her government documents.

She also sought a certificate of pending litigation.

The court found the motion urgent due to the applicant's homelessness and inability to see her child during a public health crisis, exacerbated by the respondents' tactical conduct.

The court granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant, established a primary residence for J with the applicant and a specific parenting schedule for the respondent Paul Flesias, issued conduct orders, and ordered the return of the applicant's documents.

The motion for a certificate of pending litigation was adjourned pending the commencement of the main application, but a "no dealing" order was issued for the property in the interim.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant, with Paul Flesias solely responsible for parenting-related costs and Paul and Basile Flesias jointly and severally responsible for property-related costs.

The parties separated in 2015 and continued to reside in the jointly owned matrimonial home.

At trial, the court determined the parties' net family property, including the division of contents, vehicle valuation, and date of marriage deductions.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment and half of the post-separation capital expenses for the home, but not utilities.

The applicant was granted exclusive possession of the home pending its sale and retained a right of first refusal to purchase it.

Following a three-day trial on child support, spousal support, and income imputation, the mother was successful on all issues.

The father was ordered to pay child support of $4,476 per month based on an imputed income of $175,000 (rather than his claimed $40,000), and spousal support of $1,240 per month.

The mother subsequently sought costs of $36,477.29.

The court awarded costs of $31,425.04, applying a 25% reduction to pre-trial preparation hours due to the mother's counsel failing to segregate hours before and after the offer to settle date, but otherwise awarding full recovery of costs from the offer date forward pursuant to the presumption in Family Law Rule 18(14).

A trial decision on child support and spousal support following the separation of two spouses who were married for approximately 22 years.

The primary issue was the determination of the respondent father's income for support purposes.

The mother sought an imputation of $175,000 annually, while the father claimed his income should be imputed at $30,000.

The court found the father's evidence severely lacking in credibility due to numerous inconsistencies, undisclosed assets, questionable expense deductions, and non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court imputed income to the father at $130,000 and ordered child support of $4,431 per month (comprising $3,647 table amount plus $784 for section 7 expenses) and spousal support of $1,240 per month for an indefinite duration, subject to review after five years.

The mother was found entitled to support on both compensatory and needs-based grounds, given her significant childcare responsibilities, hearing loss disability, and diminished earning capacity.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion decision regarding temporary custody of a six-year-old child and temporary spousal support.

The court had previously granted the applicant (mother) temporary sole custody and ordered the respondent (father) to pay temporary spousal support of $884 per month.

The applicant sought costs of $2,712, while the respondent argued no costs should be awarded.

The court found the applicant was the successful party and awarded costs of $1,800 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable at $150 per month commencing February 1, 2018.

The mother and father brought competing motions for temporary custody of their six-year-old daughter with special needs.

The mother sought temporary spousal support of $884 per month.

The father initially sought custody but changed his position during the hearing to request either no custody order or a joint custody order.

The court granted temporary custody to the mother, finding that the level of communication between the parties was too poor to justify a joint custody order.

The court also found that the mother was entitled to temporary spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds and ordered the father to pay $884 per month in spousal support and $528 per month in child support.

This is a costs endorsement following a focused trial in which the respondent (father) sought to prohibit the applicant (mother) from changing the names of their three children.

The court dismissed the father's claim and awarded costs to the successful mother.

The mother sought $1,356 in costs while the father submitted costs should be fixed at $500.

The court fixed costs at $1,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, payable in monthly installments of $200 commencing November 1, 2017.

The respondent father sought an order prohibiting the applicant mother from changing the surnames of their three children from Kiarie to Hermanson-Kiarie, and from adding a middle name to the youngest child.

The parties had resolved all parenting and financial issues and agreed to a focused hearing on this remaining matter.

The court considered whether prohibiting the name change was in the children's best interests under the Children's Law Reform Act, applying established jurisprudential factors.

The court found that the mother was acting in good faith and that the proposed name change was in the children's best interests, particularly given practical difficulties the mother faced as a mixed-race parent with a different surname from her children.

The court granted the mother permission to change the children's names as proposed, subject to a prohibition on any further changes without the father's written consent.

The applicant mother removed the parties' child from Poland to Canada and subsequently commenced a family proceeding in Ontario seeking a divorce and sole custody.

The respondent father brought a motion within the proceeding for the return of the child to Poland pursuant to the Hague Convention.

The mother argued that the father had consented to the child's relocation to Canada.

The court found that the written consent was ambiguous and did not establish a shared intention to change the child's habitual residence.

The court concluded that the child was wrongfully removed and ordered his return to Poland.