8 total
Statutory deadline extended when final day fell on holiday.
Two child protection matters raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the five‑day statutory deadline for bringing an apprehended child before the court under s. 46(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.
The respondents argued the applications were late because the societies waited until the sixth calendar day following apprehension.
The court held that the computation provisions in the Legislation Act, 2006 apply unless a contrary legislative intention appears.
Because the fifth day fell on Easter Monday when the court was closed, the statutory deadline was extended to the next business day.
The applications were therefore brought within the legally defined five‑day period and the court retained jurisdiction.
The five-day statutory time limit to bring an apprehended child to court is extended if the fifth day falls on a holiday.
Two consolidated child protection cases raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the interpretation of the five-day time limit in subsection 46(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.
The respondent A.H. argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Children's Aid Society failed to bring the matter before the court within five calendar days of the child's apprehension, as the fifth day fell on Easter Monday, a statutory holiday.
The court held that the provisions of the Legislation Act, 2006 apply to the time limit, extending it to the next day that is not a holiday when the deadline falls on a holiday or when the court office is closed.
The court found it had jurisdiction to hear both cases.
The father was found in civil contempt for wilfully and deliberately breaching two child protection orders.
A child protection society brought a motion for contempt of court against a father who failed to comply with two prior court orders.
The first order, issued by Justice Zisman on March 31, 2016, required the father to attend and complete the PARS program and undergo addiction assessment.
The second order, issued by Justice Curtis on August 15, 2016, required the father to live apart from the mother and child.
The father admitted non-compliance and offered illness as a defence, but provided no credible medical evidence.
The court found the father in civil contempt, having satisfied all three elements of the contempt test: the orders were clear and unequivocal, the father breached them deliberately and wilfully, and the evidence established contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court deferred sentencing to allow the father an opportunity to cure his contempt and demonstrate remorse.
Summary judgment was granted making the child a Crown ward without access for adoption.
A child protection summary judgment motion brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking findings that a child born in 2008 be found in need of protection and made a crown ward without access for adoption purposes.
The mother opposed the motion and sought dismissal or alternatively a six-month society wardship order with access.
The court found the child in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b), (g), and (g.1) of the Child and Family Services Act based on evidence of physical harm risk, emotional harm risk, and the mother's pattern of neglect.
The court granted the society's motion and made the child a crown ward without access, finding no genuine issue requiring trial on either the finding or disposition.
The court granted summary judgment making two children Crown wards with access at the society's discretion.
A motion for summary judgment brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society seeking to make two children crown wards with access at the society's discretion.
The respondent mother opposed the motion and sought an expedited trial, arguing she had made sufficient changes to warrant the children's return to her care subject to a supervision order.
The court found that the society had met its onus of demonstrating no genuine issue requiring trial.
Despite the mother's engagement in some services and completion of an anger management program, her recent conduct demonstrated a persistent inability to control her impulses, manage her relationships with abusive partners, and prioritize the children's emotional needs.
The court granted the motion and made the children crown wards with access at the society's discretion.
Appeal of Crown wardship and no-access order dismissed; therapeutic process for potential future access outlined.
The parents appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship of their four children and denying them access.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship, finding it in the children's best interests.
The court also upheld the no-access order but outlined a therapeutic process that could lead to future access if the children desired it and professionals agreed.
An alternate plan of care proposing the children move to France was rejected.
The appeal was dismissed.
The court granted summary judgment making four children crown wards without access due to overwhelming evidence of physical and emotional abuse.
A motion for summary judgment brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto in a child protection application regarding four children.
The applicant sought protection findings under the Child and Family Services Act and a disposition of crown wardship with no access for purposes of adoption.
The respondent parents opposed the motion and sought a trial.
The court found overwhelming evidence of physical and emotional abuse of the children by the parents, including detailed and consistent disclosures by the children to multiple professionals, medical evidence, and psychological assessments diagnosing three of the four children with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial, and made orders for crown wardship without access to the parents.
Motion for a psychiatric assessment was dismissed as unnecessary due to extensive existing medical records.
The mother brought a motion under section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking a court-ordered psychiatric assessment to be conducted by a private psychiatrist, with costs to be borne by the society.
The child had been apprehended at birth due to concerns about the mother's mental health and capacity to parent.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the assessment was not necessary.
The court held that the mother's treating psychiatrist of eight years had already provided a diagnosis and treatment plan, and the court had access to extensive police records, medical records, and direct observations of the mother's behaviour during access visits.
The court found that the mother's request was essentially for a second opinion, which did not meet the statutory threshold of necessity required under the legislation.
