Nancy Quirino Chaves

A costs endorsement following a successful motion by a stepmother for temporary access to a nine-year-old child.

The stepmother sought costs of $4,571 after obtaining one weekend per month access, which the parents had opposed entirely.

The court awarded costs of $2,400 total, with the father paying $1,600 and the mother paying $800, payable in monthly installments.

The decision addresses the principles governing costs awards for self-represented litigants and the application of Family Law Rules cost factors.

Two consolidated child protection cases raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the interpretation of the five-day time limit in subsection 46(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent A.H. argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Children's Aid Society failed to bring the matter before the court within five calendar days of the child's apprehension, as the fifth day fell on Easter Monday, a statutory holiday.

The court held that the provisions of the Legislation Act, 2006 apply to the time limit, extending it to the next day that is not a holiday when the deadline falls on a holiday or when the court office is closed.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear both cases.

The payor brought a motion to vary the terms of a refraining order previously granted by Justice Scully, seeking to reduce ongoing child support payments from $772.43 per month to $349 per month, commencing September 1, 2016.

The motion was heard by the case management judge presiding over the related motion to change proceedings.

The court declined to grant the variation, finding that the payor had not demonstrated a prima facie case for change and that granting the relief would effectively predetermine triable issues pending the scheduled trial in the motion to change, which was only twelve weeks away.

The court also expressed concern about the jurisdictional basis for varying a refraining order granted by a different judge in enforcement proceedings.

The applicant father sought an order under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction directing the return of his adopted daughter E. to Hungary after the respondent mother wrongfully removed and retained the child in Canada without notice.

The respondent resisted the application, invoking exceptions under Articles 13(b) and 20 of the Convention, claiming that return would expose the child to grave risk of physical and psychological harm due to persecution of Roma people in Hungary and the respondent's activism, and that the child's wishes should be respected.

The court found that the child was wrongfully retained, that the respondent failed to establish the Article 13(b) exception on the balance of probabilities, and that while the child expressed a preference to remain in Canada, this preference was influenced by the respondent and did not override the principles of the Convention.

The court ordered the child's return to Hungary.