Jeffrey Peter Wyngaarden

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his dangerous offender designation, and his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the appellant was reckless and failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the underage complainant's age.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision under the Kienapple principle to enter a conviction for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

However, the Court admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that the Crown's psychiatric expert employed a careless practice in preparing dangerous offender reports in another case.

Because the trial judge relied heavily on this expert's apparent thoroughness to impose an indeterminate sentence, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part and ordered a new penalty hearing with a fresh psychiatric assessment.

The appellant, Michael Fournier, appealed his conviction for trafficking fentanyl-carfentinil and manslaughter in connection with the overdose death of a fellow inmate.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of duress and in finding legal causation for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly found the appellant acted willingly, had safe avenues of escape, and that his trafficking was a significant contributing cause of the victim's death, despite the victim's voluntary drug consumption.

The appellant appealed convictions for robbery-related offences and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding surveillance video, which was critical to the similar act evidence application.

This misapprehension led to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for all robbery-related counts, while the conviction for possession of stolen property was upheld.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and breach of recognizance, following the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected at the Superior Court level, which found no factual basis or merit to the allegations.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, determining that the proposed appeal raised issues of fact and credibility, not law alone, and lacked significance for the administration of justice or merit, failing to meet the high threshold for a second appeal in summary conviction matters.

The appellant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal a Superior Court decision that had refused an extension of time to appeal an Ontario Court of Justice conviction for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal applied the R. v. J.C.M. test for extensions of time and found that the appellant failed to establish any of its three components, leading to the dismissal of the motion.

The court also denied the appellant's request for a s. 684 Criminal Code order for counsel, finding no justification in the record or submissions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that the pre-trial detention credit (Summers credit) was undercalculated.

The Crown conceded the undercalculation by 64 days.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence by reducing it by the conceded amount.

The appellant, R.W., appealed a global sentence of 15 years for sexual interference, making and making available child pornography, and possessing and accessing child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and demonstrably unfit, proposing a sentence of 7-10 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstances egregious, involving a massive breach of trust against his two-year-old daughter.

The court affirmed that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase, citing R. v. Friesen, and found the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors and the totality principle, imposing a consecutive sentence for child pornography counts.

The sentence was deemed not demonstrably unfit and entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The Court of Appeal applied the two-factor test for granting leave in summary conviction matters, which requires a question of law alone, considering the significance of legal issues to criminal justice administration and the merits of proposed grounds.

The court found the appellant did not meet this test, noting the detailed reasons from the Summary Conviction Appeal court and the introduction of new grounds on appeal.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The appellant, Gilbert Ryan Wilson, appealed a seven-year sentence for aggravated assault and unlawfully being in a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appellant, along with two accomplices, received the same sentence for a brutal attack.

The appellant argued for a lesser sentence, asserting that his criminal record lacked prior violent offences, unlike his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's holistic analysis, which properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's mitigating circumstances and the Gladue factors applicable to his accomplices, in arriving at a proportionate sentence for all equally responsible offenders.

The appellant appealed the length of his conditional sentence order (CSO) after it was partially collapsed due to a breach involving contact with his former intimate partner.

He sought to reduce the CSO length so that time spent detained could be credited as pre-sentence custody on a new, related criminal harassment charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original CSO length appropriate and holding that any credit for pre-sentence custody must be determined by the sentencing judge on the new charge.

The appellant, Dennis Rhodes, appealed his convictions for voyeurism, prowling, and indecent act, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal concerned Charter challenges related to arbitrary detention (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), specifically regarding the search of his vehicle and cell phones.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 9 appeal as abandoned and found no error in the application judge's Garofoli review or nexus analysis for the search warrants.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 18-month custodial sentence appropriate given the serious invasion of privacy.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to apply Gladue principles because his defence counsel did not inform the court of his Indigenous background.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the trial judge as there was nothing on the record to suggest he was aware of or required to inquire into the appellant's Indigenous claim.

The court also declined to consider a submission regarding trial counsel's duties in the absence of an ineffective assistance of counsel ground of appeal.

This is an appeal from convictions for threatening, assault, and sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding peripheral Crown witnesses and alleged misapprehension of his own evidence concerning the sexual assault incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. C.L.Y., and reasonably assessed witness credibility.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the appellant's evidence was improbable and lacked credibility.

The appellant, Robert Stack, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and breach offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the police operation constituted entrapment, an argument not raised at trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the entrapment argument, finding that the Crown would be procedurally prejudiced as they were deprived of the opportunity to lead evidence on the bona fide inquiry test at trial.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding wilful blindness and found no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed from the Court of Appeal for Ontario's finding that s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which bars accused persons from raising a defence of self-induced extreme intoxication akin to automatism, violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1.

The Court dismissed the appeals on the basis of the companion decision in R. v. Brown, 2022 SCC 18, which held s. 33.1 unconstitutional and of no force or effect.

The Court further held that ordinary horizontal stare decisis principles govern prior s. 52(1) declarations of unconstitutionality issued by superior courts within the same province, applying the Spruce Mills criteria, and that a trial judge is not strictly bound to follow such a declaration unless it is distinguishable or one of the recognized exceptions to stare decisis applies.

The Court also quashed the respondent Chan's application for leave to cross-appeal for want of jurisdiction under s. 691 of the Criminal Code, as no statutory route exists to challenge a new trial order where a conviction was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and sought leave to appeal his four-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned by the appellant.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge ignored mitigating circumstances and rigidly applied sentencing ranges.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge was aware of the appellant's background and considered rehabilitative potential.

It also held that while rigid application of ranges is an error, it only warrants intervention if the sentence is disproportionate.

The court found the sentence fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences involving his daughter.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing different levels of scrutiny, misapplication of *R. v. W.(D.)*, and misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's entitlement to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's, and finding no significant errors in the application of legal principles or assessment of evidence.

The appellant, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging six errors in the trial judge's jury charge.

The grounds of appeal primarily concerned the instructions on the use of DNA evidence, the connection of the defence theory to the facts, the limited use of expert biological evidence, the objective and critical viewing of the complainant's evidence, and whether the appellant knew the complainant did not consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the alleged errors, emphasizing that jury charges are assessed functionally and in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as the only direct evidence was his fingerprint on a stolen Bluetooth speaker.

He contended the trial judge over-emphasized this evidence and failed to consider the speaker's portability, access by roommates, and alternative perpetrator theories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence was bolstered by the complainant's testimony that he saw the perpetrator touch the speaker without gloves, lived alone, regularly disinfected the speaker, and that roommates had not been present for a month.

The court deemed alternative theories speculative.