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The Court of Appeal declined to hear an entrapment argument raised for the first time on appeal due to procedural prejudice to the Crown.
The appellant, Robert Stack, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and breach offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.
The primary issue on appeal was whether the police operation constituted entrapment, an argument not raised at trial.
The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the entrapment argument, finding that the Crown would be procedurally prejudiced as they were deprived of the opportunity to lead evidence on the bona fide inquiry test at trial.
The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding wilful blindness and found no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence.
The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.
No jury right arose from the securities penalty scheme; appeal dismissed.
This appeal addressed whether a provincial securities offence carrying a maximum sentence of five years less a day, together with a potential multimillion-dollar fine, engaged the right to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.
The appellate record concerned conflicting lower-court rulings on whether the penalty scheme amounted to a more severe punishment requiring jury process.
The Court held that the accused was not entitled to a jury trial and adopted the majority reasoning of the provincial appellate court.
The statutory maximum imprisonment threshold was not transformed into a constitutionally jury-entitling punishment by adding the prospect of a financial penalty.
The appeal was dismissed.
Charter jury-trial right not triggered; securities prosecution appeal dismissed.
The Court considered whether a person charged under Alberta securities legislation carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment of five years less a day, plus potential substantial fines, was entitled to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.
The lower courts held that this penalty structure did not trigger the constitutional jury right.
The Court agreed substantially with the majority below and held that the appellant was not entitled to a trial by jury.