Megan Alicia Cleland

Following a four-day trial, the offender was convicted of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The assault involved forced vaginal penetration of the complainant, a trusted friend, without consent or a condom.

At sentencing, the Crown sought four years imprisonment while the defence sought three years.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of three years and six months, reduced by pre-trial custody credits and bail condition credits to a net term of three years.

The court balanced mitigating factors including the offender's role as a father, courses completed in custody, and personal losses, against aggravating factors including the breach of friendship, exposure to disease, and the serious nature of forced penetration.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, a 10-year firearms prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a non-communication order with the complainant.

The accused, James Scott Gallan, brought an application under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of certain records (videos and text messages from the complainant's phone) in his sexual assault trial.

The Crown objected, arguing an application was necessary despite the complainant's prior consent to police obtaining the information.

The court ruled that the complainant's consent to police disclosure did not waive the need for a s. 278.93 admissibility application, rejecting the reasoning in R. v. Martiuk.

The court then proceeded to rule on the admissibility of specific messages, admitting some relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate, while excluding others deemed to have high privacy interest and marginal probative value, such as those related to the complainant's mental health or irrelevant content.

The youth offender was found guilty of multiple sexual offences against a child family member.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the offender sought a deferred custody and supervision order.

The court found that the victim suffered serious psychological harm, which constitutes serious bodily harm, thereby precluding a deferred custody order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Emphasizing the profound harm caused by child sexual abuse and the breach of trust, while balancing the offender's youth and rehabilitative prospects, the court imposed a 10-month custody and supervision order followed by 12 months of probation.

During a trial for sexual assault, the complainant was discovered to have handwritten notes with her while testifying via videoconference.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings or a mistrial, arguing the notes tainted the evidence and rendered the trial unfair.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused failed to prove irrevocable prejudice.

The court held that full cross-examination and the judge disabusing himself of an uncharged incident mentioned in the notes were sufficient remedies.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied release on the tertiary ground.

He faced multiple drug trafficking and firearms charges.

The reviewing judge found no error in the initial detention order but concluded that an amended release plan, which included a new residential surety, a significant financial pledge, and a professionally installed security system, constituted a material change in circumstances.

Considering the strict house arrest conditions and the elevated risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities, the court granted the application and ordered the applicant's release.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding no breach of his right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and in finding the breath test readings proved his blood alcohol exceeded the legal limit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Charter ground, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, holding that the trial judge erred in law by relying on inadmissible roadside screening device results to prove the offence, and that the breath technician's evidence of readings with a preceding decimal point (e.g., .170) did not prove the blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80mg in 100ml.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The accused stood trial on a charge of manslaughter arising from a fight in which the deceased later died after a cardiac arrest.

The Crown's causation theory depended entirely on forensic pathology evidence inferring neck compression by a headlock, despite the absence of any eyewitness evidence of that act and the accused's denial.

Applying the causation standard, the W.(D.) framework, and the circumstantial evidence principles in Villaroman, the court found the expert opinion insufficiently robust to exclude reasonable alternative explanations for the cardiac arrest, petechial hemorrhages, and internal neck fracture, including resuscitation efforts.

The Crown failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges arising from repeated sexual abuse allegations made by his daughter over many years during her childhood.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant credible and reliable despite discrepancies in timing, relying in part on detailed evidence about the family home and a distinctive tattoo on the accused that strongly corroborated her account.

The court rejected suggested motives to fabricate based on support for a spouse's complaint and family conflict over sexual orientation.

The Crown proved incest, the charged historical sexual offence against a young person, and sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Darryl Reid, appealed his conviction for assaulting his domestic partner, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony and accepting the complainant's, despite her demonstrable lies and motive to fabricate, were inadequately articulated and suggested a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Two defendants were charged with unlawful confinement under section 279(2) of the Criminal Code for apprehending a suspect in connection with a break-in at a video store and bringing him to the police station.

The Crown alleged the defendants made an unlawful citizen's arrest without reasonable grounds and without lawful authority.

The defendants argued they had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was the perpetrator and that the police were not investigating the matter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove forcible confinement beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the lack of physical force or restraints, the complainant's ability to leave at any time, the inadequate police investigation, and the defendants' reasonable belief in the complainant's guilt.