Maria V. Carroccia

The applicant, charged with importing and trafficking fentanyl, brought a Charter application alleging his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated during his arrest and the subsequent seizure and search of his cellphone.

The police had conducted a controlled delivery of a package containing fentanyl to a residence where the applicant was found in close proximity to the package shortly after it was opened.

The court found the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest based on the totality of the circumstances.

The court also upheld the seizure of the cellphone as a valid search incident to arrest and found the subsequent search warrants were properly issued.

The application was dismissed.

The offender, a 26-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and carrying a concealed weapon after fleeing from police.

The court considered the offender's positive pre-sentence report, lack of criminal record, and motive of self-protection against the aggravating factor of possessing a loaded firearm while fleeing.

Finding the offender's conduct fell between a mere licensing infraction and truly criminal conduct, the court imposed a sentence of 29 months' imprisonment.

The applicant, Dylan Travis, sought to exclude evidence (a loaded firearm and other items) under ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unlawful detention, arrest, and unreasonable search.

Police officers, investigating a domestic assault, mistook Travis for another individual (Daymien Kennedy) who was subject to an arrest warrant.

Travis fled upon seeing the police, was apprehended, and a loaded revolver was discovered.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Travis based on his resemblance to the suspect, his presence in the suspect's drop-off vicinity, and his immediate flight.

Consequently, the detention and subsequent search incident to arrest were deemed lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The applicants were charged with drug and firearms offences in June 2010.

After a first trial resulted in acquittals that were later overturned on appeal, a second trial was ordered.

The applicants brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

Applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan, the court calculated a total delay of 79 months.

After deducting defence delay and appellate delay, the net remaining delay was 38 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the transitional exceptional circumstance did not apply and stayed the proceedings.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where victim surcharges were ordered concurrently for two theft offences.

The court examined whether victim surcharges, considered ancillary orders rather than fines or penalties, could be imposed concurrently.

It concluded that there is no legal impediment to concurrent victim surcharge orders, consistent with the totality principle and judicial discretion in sentencing, and that the jurisprudence precluding concurrent fines does not apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and the concurrent victim surcharge orders were upheld.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples on the grounds that they were not obtained as soon as practicable, contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code and breaching the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found a breach occurred due to unexplained delays totalling approximately one hour between the demand and the first breath sample.

However, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the breach was not serious state conduct, the intrusion was minimal, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving was significant.

On the merits, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The accused was charged with attempt to commit murder.

During trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police.

The accused had voluntarily contacted police to report historical homicides allegedly committed by his father and attended the police station voluntarily.

During questioning, the accused disclosed that he had brought his father to a river with the intention of killing him by throwing him in, but did not proceed because the river was frozen.

The court found that while the initial statements were voluntary, the police breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter when they continued questioning after the accused disclosed the assault element of the attempted murder.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding that the police acted in good faith, the breach was not deliberate or flagrant, and the evidence would have been obtained in any event from third-party witnesses who corroborated the accused's statements.

The accused were charged with possession of cannabis marijuana and production of cannabis marijuana following a search of their home.

The accused brought a section 24(2) Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during the search.

The court found that the search warrant was issued without sufficient grounds.

The officer relied on an anonymous tip from Crime Stoppers, verification of the accused's residence, and minimal marijuana residue found in a garbage pull.

The court concluded that objectively, there were insufficient grounds to believe the accused were growing marijuana.

The warrant should not have been issued, constituting a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

Despite the officer's professional conduct and the seriousness of marijuana grow operations generally, the court excluded the evidence, considering the modest amount of marijuana found was clearly for personal use and the intrusive nature of a home search.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery contrary to s. 343(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether a conditional sentence was available given that the offence involved the use of violence.

The Crown argued the offence constituted a serious personal injury offence, precluding a conditional sentence.

The court found that the accused's intentional application of force during the robbery—grabbing the deposit bag and causing both men to fall to the ground—met the definition of a serious personal injury offence under s. 752.

Accordingly, a conditional sentence was not available.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of nine months followed by two years probation, with credit for 36 days of pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further sentence of seven months and 24 days.