Andrew J. Bradie

The accused sought a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, arguing the Crown improperly repudiated a plea agreement and disclosed the accused's intention to plead guilty to witnesses.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the Crown's conduct—the arbitrary repudiation of a judicially approved plea agreement without full inquiry and the premature disclosure of the plea to witnesses—deprived the accused of the right to a fair trial under s. 7 of the Charter.

Instead of a stay, the court ordered the enforcement of the original plea agreement as a just and appropriate remedy.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person, S.B., on a charge of sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact regarding the complainant's certainty that the accused heard her express non-consent, and erred in law or mixed fact and law by failing to establish the accused's knowledge of absence of consent.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons functionally adequate.

The court clarified that the trial judge did not make the factual findings attributed by the Crown, but rather expressed reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility and the reliability of her evidence, particularly concerning inconsistencies in timing and the purpose of being at the location of the alleged assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after driving at extreme speed, consuming alcohol, and texting, resulting in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court considered mitigating factors, including the early guilty plea, genuine remorse, youth, and lack of prior record, alongside aggravating factors such as the "trifecta" of dangerous driving (drinking, excessive speed, distracted driving) and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Emphasizing general deterrence as the predominant sentencing objective, the court analogized distracted driving causing death to impaired driving causing death, highlighting the voluntary nature of the risks involved.

The accused was sentenced to 3.5 years imprisonment, a 69-month driving prohibition, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants and sought to exclude seized evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the first Information to Obtain (ITO) fatally defective due to a systemic practice of not swearing ITOs, and the second telewarrant invalid because the precondition of impracticability to appear in person was not met.

Considering the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, including deliberate deception and systemic disregard for warrant procedures, the court excluded the firearm, shell casings, and surveillance equipment seized from the accused's residence.

The accused, Asser Omar Gayle, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and subsequent search, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and sought to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the police lacked objective reasonable grounds for the arrest, thus breaching sections 9 and 8.

However, applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court balanced the seriousness of the state conduct (police acted in good faith but showed lack of professionalism in testimony), the impact on the accused's Charter interests (reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, respectful treatment), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits (highly reliable evidence, exclusion would gut the Crown's case).

Ultimately, the court concluded that the factors favoring admission outweighed those favoring exclusion, and the evidence was admitted.