Indictment No. CR-17-2965

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

v.

P.A.

R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. VERBEEM

on January 25, 2019 at CHATHAM, Ontario

BY COURT ORDER MADE UNDER SECTION 486.4(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, INFORMATION THAT MAY IDENTIFY THE PERSON DESCRIBED IN THIS JUDGMENT AS THE COMPLAINANT MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCASTED OR TRANSMITTED

IN ANY MANNER. THIS JUDGMENT DOES COMPLY WITH

THIS RESTRICTION SO THAT IT CAN BE PUBLISHED

APPEARANCES:

J. Boonstra Counsel for the Crown

A. Bradie Counsel for P.A.

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

BY COURT ORDER MADE UNDER SECTION 486.4(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, INFORMATION THAT MAY IDENTIFY THE PERSON DESCRIBED IN THIS JUDGMENT AS THE COMPLAINANT MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCASTED OR TRANSMITTED

IN ANY MANNER. THIS JUDGMENT DOES COMPLY WITH

THIS RESTRICTION SO THAT IT CAN BE PUBLISHED

E X H I B I T S

EXHIBIT NUMBER

ENTERED ON PAGE

A

Terms of sentence

48

REASONS FOR SENTENCE 2

Transcript Ordered:

February 1, 2019

Transcript Completed:

April 2, 2019

Ordering Party Notified:

April 2, 2019

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 2019

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. BOONSTRA: Good morning.

MR. BRADIE: Good morning, Your Honour.

CLERK REGISTRAR: Calling the matter of Her Majesty the Queen v. P.A., file number 2965/17.

THE COURT: Mr. Bradie, would you like P.A. to sit next to you or are you content with him in the prisoner’s box?

MR. BRADIE: Do you want to sit up here?

P.A.: Okay.

MR. BRADIE: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: You can sit next to him, P.A. Okay. I’m just going to return the exhibits to you.

CLERK REGISTRAR: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So just with sentencing decisions, I don’t give out a copy at the end. I will give you a copy of the sentence as imposed at the end, so you’ll - you won’t have to write that part down. There will be a transcript eventually. When there’s a transcript, we can change names to initials, I’ll put case law citations in and correct any grammar issues. Okay?

MR. BRADIE: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Any other issues before sentence?

MR. BOONSTRA: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bradie? Any other issues?

MR. BRADIE: No, sir, thank you.

R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E

VERBEEM, J. (Orally):

On November 30, 2018, the offender P.A. was found guilty of three counts of sexual assault, contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada (counts 3, 5 and 7 on the indictment, respectively) and two counts of sexual exploitation, contrary to Section 153(1)(a) of the Code (counts 4 and 6, respectively). All of the offences for which P.A. has been found guilty involve a single complainant, namely P.M., who was born on […], 1998.

P.A. was P.M.’s stepfather at all the times of the conduct upon which the findings of guilt were made.

He now appears for sentencing.

Before addressing the issues specifically related to sentencing, I will briefly deal with the Crown’s request to stay certain counts.

During the course of the sentencing hearing, the Crown requested that the Court enter a stay with respect to two of the sexual assault counts for which the offender has been found guilty, specifically counts 3 and 5. In the Crown’s view, the same factual transactions supporting those respective findings of guilt support the findings of guilt made with respect to the sexual exploitation counts, namely counts 4 and 6. In the Crown’s view, there is a sufficient factual nexus and a sufficient legal nexus between the offences specified in counts 3 and 4, respectively, and 5 and 6, respectively, such that it is appropriate to stay counts 3 and 5 in accordance with the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Kienapple, 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

Accordingly, at the Crown’s request, counts 3 and 5 are stayed. I will now turn to the determination of the fit and proper sentence for the remaining counts for which P.A. has been found guilty.

In doing so, I have had the benefit of the following:

(a) a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) prepared by Probation and Parole Officer Matthew Steele;

(b) a Victim Impact Statement completed by P.M.;

(c) a Victim Impact Statement completed by T.M., P.M.’s mother and P.A.’s former spouse; and

(d) sentencing submissions from the Crown and counsel for the offender, which I heard on January 16, 2019.

In arriving at a fit and proper sentence, I have considered both the circumstances of the offences and the offender, which I will now address, beginning with the circumstances of the offences.

On the evidence at trial, I reached the following findings beyond a reasonable doubt.

In June or July of 2015, when P.M. was 17 years old, P.A. began to sexually assault her on a frequent basis over a prolonged duration lasting more than a year. P.M. turned 18 during the time period in which the criminality occurred.

From the onset of his sexually assaultive behaviour, P.A. consistently engaged in vaginal intercourse with P.M. He also consistently performed oral sex on P.M. and he forced her to perform oral sex on him. P.A.’s criminal conduct against P.M. stopped in August 2016 when P.M.’s mother discovered certain text messages between them, which ultimately led P.M. to disclose P.A.’s history of ongoing sexual abuse.

In finding the offender guilty of the foregoing offences, I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that during the period beginning in mid-2015 and ending in early August 2016, P.A. engaged in sexual activity with P.M. approximately three times per week. The sexual activity typically occurred in the basement of the family’s residence, after the balance of the family was asleep. The activity typically followed the same pattern. Specifically, P.A. would send text messages to P.M. summonsing her for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. She would submit. He would perform oral sex on her and force her to perform oral sex on him by putting his penis in her mouth and forcing her head down. He would then engage in vaginal intercourse with her, during which she often cried. He did not say anything to her during the course of the sexual activity itself. When he was finished, he would, in P.M.’s words, “go on his way”.

Based on P.M.’s evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that P.A. inflicted the sexual activity described above on P.M., in excess of 100 times in the period beginning in June or July of 2015 and ending in August 2016. During this time period, P.A. would also direct P.M. to send him sexually explicit pictures of herself via his cell phone. Often she would comply.

P.M. did not consent to any sexual contact or conduct by P.A. at any time. Indeed, I was satisfied that P.A. was consistently subjectively aware that P.M. did not consent to the force of a sexual nature that he applied to her during any of the acts of oral sex or vaginal intercourse that occurred from mid-2015 until August 2016. Although P.A. never physically harmed or threatened P.M., she continuously felt compelled to submit to P.A., in part, because of threats she had received. In order to explain that point, a brief review of my findings with respect to the context in which P.A.’s criminal conduct took place is warranted.

Sometime before P.A. first began to sexually assault her, P.M., at the age of 17, began to receive unsolicited text messages from a person identifying herself as “Grace”. P.M. did not know “Grace” and she had never met “Grace”.

Eventually, “Grace” directed P.M. (via text message) to engage in sexual contact and conduct with P.A. In so doing, “Grace” advised her: that she knew P.A., that she (“Grace”) had had a sexual relationship with P.A.; and that if P.M. refused to comply, P.A. would divorce her mother; the family would be destroyed; P.M. and her mother would lose everything; and it would all be her fault. From P.M.’s perspective, “Grace” was credible. P.M. believed that she had to submit to sexual activities with P.A. or he would divorce her mother.

The first such sexual activity occurred some time in June or July of 2015, when P.M. received a text message from “Grace” between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. directing her to meet P.A. in the basement of the family’s residence. She did so. P.A. was there, in the dark, wearing only a shirt and no pants. He proceeded to take off her clothes and performed oral sex on her. Eventually, he engaged in vaginal intercourse with her. She cried while the sexual activity occurred. P.M. was afraid what P.A. would do to her if she did not cooperate. She feared that he would use force if she resisted or that he would attempt to make it look like the sexual activity was “her fault”. After the initial assault, P.A. consistently sent his own text messages to P.M. directing her to attend in the basement for his planned sexual encounters.

Over the course of time, P.M. was also contacted through text messages received from various other personas, otherwise unknown to her, who also claimed to be involved in sexual relationships with P.A. They also solicited her to engage in non-consensual sexual contact and conduct with P.A. under the threat that if she did not, he would divorce her mother and the family would be ruined.

“Grace” and the other text message personas also offered P.M. inducements to submit to sexual activity with P.A. by promising that he would provide her with material things if she did so. P.A. also offered similar inducements to P.M. that were based on the frequency with which she submitted to sexual activity, often telling her that she had to do more to get more.

Text message data recovered from P.M.’s cellular telephone confirmed that she did receive text messages ostensibly from a “Grace”. The content of those messages is generally consistent with P.M.’s evidence concerning the nature of the text messages she received from “Grace”. Notably, the Crown did not seek a finding that P.A. was, in fact, Grace or any of the other text messaging personas.

Text message evidence adduced at trial also confirms: that P.A. sent text messages to P.M. directing her to send sexually explicit photographs of herself to him; that he sent her messages directing her to meet him in the basement of the family home at night; and that he sent her very sexually explicit text messages, ostensibly arranging meetings with her for the purpose of sexual activity.

I accepted P.M.’s evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that: she felt compelled to engage in sexual conduct with P.A. out of fear that if she did not, he would divorce her mother; she honestly believed the threats made to her in that regard were real and credible; she feared what may happen to her if she resisted when P.A. summonsed her for sexual activity; she never wanted to engage in sexual activity with P.A. at any point; and she periodically engaged in avoidance techniques with respect to P.A.’s demands for sexual activity, including telling him she was sick, tired or had a headache. When she did so, she would be rebuked directly by P.A., including in text messages, as well as electronically by the “Grace” persona.

On the evidence at trial, I also found beyond a reasonable doubt that P.A. was in a position of trust and authority with respect to P.M., and she was in a relationship of dependency with respect to him at all times specified in counts 3 to 7, inclusive.

P.A. has been in P.M.’s life since she was three years old. P.M.’s mother, T.M., began dating P.A. in March of 2001 and they remained in a dating relationship until March 2009 when P.A. moved into T.M.’s residence where both P.M. and her younger brother also resided. T.M. and P.A. married in March 2012. At times, P.A.’s biological daughters (both older than P.M.) resided with the family. T.M. and P.A. co-parented all the children and both disciplined all of the children.

At trial, P.A. admitted that he stood in the role of a parent to P.M. during the time periods specified in counts 3 to 7, inclusive. Further, throughout P.M.’s family’s period of cohabitation with P.A., he consistently played a critical role in diffusing the adversity and conflict that characterized the relationship between T.M. and P.M. P.M. did not often see her biological father. Instead, she consistently viewed P.A. as her father figure, including at all times specified in counts 3 to 7. At times, she called him “dad”. P.A. consistently communicated with P.M. about parent/child issues, such as school and her part-time job, at all times specified in the subject counts. P.A. was also the family’s primary financial provider. He assisted P.M. in purchasing a motor vehicle, which he put in his name shortly before his sexual criminal conduct began, and he regularly assisted P.M. with car payments.

Ultimately, I concluded that P.A.’s commission of the offences was facilitated by his abuse and exploitation of the proximity, economic power, and general trust and authority to and over P.M. that was afforded to him in his role as her stepfather.

I will now turn to the victim impact statements.

P.M. authored a victim impact statement in which, among other things, she discloses:

(a) the profound emotional impact that P.A.’s criminal conduct has had on her, including: residual and continued feelings of anxiety and depression; a sense of self-blame for “permitting” P.A.’s criminal conduct to go on without reporting it; her post-offence social withdrawal from her friends and peer group; and her inability to discuss the subject matter of P.A.’s criminal conduct without, in most instances, breaking down and/or crying;

(b) the negative impact of P.A.’s criminal conduct on her ability to engage in a positive and healthy sexual relationship;

(c) the contemporaneous physical problems P.A.’s criminal conduct caused. Specifically, during the lengthy period over which P.A. sexually assaulted P.M., she was prone to vaginal infections. When P.A.’s sexually assaultive behaviour stopped, the infections stopped;

(d) her grave difficulties trusting other individuals, as a result of P.A.’s criminal conduct;

(e) the strained relationship she now has with her mother, her biological father and her brother in the aftermath of their discovery of P.A.’s criminal conduct;

(f) the complete loss of her relationship with P.A.’s biological children secondary to the discovery of his criminal conduct;

(g) the difficulties she has experienced maintaining employment as a result of stress and anxiety caused by P.A.’s criminal conduct;

(h) the symptoms of her Crohn’s Disease condition, which were exacerbated by her stress and anxiety related to P.A.’s criminal conduct; and

(i) her reluctance to engage in therapeutic counselling for some of the issues set out above because of the grave difficulty and significant emotional turmoil she experiences when discussing or even thinking about P.A.’s criminal conduct.

I have little difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that P.M. has suffered and continues to suffer psychological and emotional trauma and symptoms as a result of P.A.’s conduct, which has negatively affected virtually all aspects of her life.

Notwithstanding the candour of P.M.’s victim impact statement, there are elements of it which are not admissible and which I have not considered when arriving at a fit and proper sentence in this instance, specifically as follows:

(a) her complaints and expression of frustration concerning the criminal court process (see page 1);

(b) her complaints that P.A. was released on bail conditions pending trial (see page 1);

(c) her characterization of P.A. as a “pathological liar” (see page 1);

(d) her comment that, “...now I can think positively that you’re getting your consequences now finally for what you put me through” (see page 4); and

(e) the entirety of page 5, in which P.M.: refers to P.A.’s post-trial breach of his bail conditions (not in relation to her); poses a rhetorical question about the potential consequences of that asserted breach; and states, in part: “I’m not scared for him, he deserves everything that’s coming to him.”

T.M. also provided a victim impact statement in which she discloses, among other things:

(a) she and her entire family are “an emotional wreck” as a result of P.A.’s conduct;

(b) her feelings of guilt for failing to protect P.M. from P.A.;

(c) the financial difficulties she sustained after discovering P.A.’s criminal conduct. Specifically, owing to stress and anxiety, she was required to reduce her working hours and ultimately went bankrupt;

(d) she attended counselling and took anti-anxiety medication for a significant period of time after discovering P.A.’s criminal conduct; and

(e) she suffered considerable weight loss and a compromised immune system secondary to stress and anxiety after discovering P.A.’s criminal conduct.

As part of T.M.’s victim impact statement, she included correspondence dated December 18, 2018 from M.M., a vice-principal at P.M.’s former high school. The defence agreed that the court could receive that correspondence as evidence in that form.

Mr. M.M. worked with P.M. in a student/administrator capacity from September 2012 to February 2017. He recalls that through Grades 9 to 11, P.M. regularly attended school and was on track to graduate in June 2016. However, during P.M.’s Grade 12 year, which I find commenced in September 2015, there was a drastic negative change in P.M.’s attitude towards school, which was reflected in her school work and her attendance. P.M. started missing classes on a regular basis. Her school work was incomplete and she missed tests. Her grades plummeted and she did not achieve certain credits. He had several discussions with her throughout her Grade 12 year and it was obvious to him that she was struggling physically, mentally and emotionally. Ultimately, P.M. did not finish her Ontario Secondary School diploma or graduate in the normal expected time frame.

In my view, it is clear that Mr. M.M.’s observations of P.M.’s negative performance in her Grade 12 year were made during the same time period that P.A. was routinely engaged in the criminal sexual conduct towards P.M. that forms the basis of the counts for which he had been found guilty.

I now turn to the circumstances of the offender. P.A. is a 52 year old first-time offender. He was born in Italy and immigrated to Canada with his parents at the age of two years old. He had a positive upbringing and continues to share a positive relationship with his mother, his two younger siblings, his first ex-wife and his two biological daughters. His father has passed away.

P.A. has been married twice. He initially married at the age of 20. That marriage ended 11 years later. From that relationship, P.A. has two daughters who are now adults.

Next, P.A. was involved in a 15-year relationship with P.M.’s mother, T.M. According to P.A., he and T.M. dated on and off for approximately 11 years and were ultimately married in 2012. Their relationship ended in 2016. P.A. reports the two most significant stressors in his relationship with T.M. were finances and the absence of a relationship between T.M. and his biological children. Contrary to the evidence adduced at trial, which I accepted beyond a reasonable doubt, P.A. now asserts that historically his relationship with P.M. was distant. He now asserts that he did not share a father-daughter relationship with her because, in his view, P.M. isolated herself from her family and struggled with depression and bipolar disorder, which contributed to her isolation.

T.M. also provided information to the author of the PSR. She reported that she separated from P.A. in 2016 due to the subject matter of the offences for which he was ultimately found guilty. She identified P.A.’s “controlling behaviour, dishonesty and persistent lying” as the most significant stressors in their relationship.

T.M. indicates that during the course of her relationship with P.A., he took on a parental role with respect to her children, being P.M. and her brother. T.M. acknowledges that her own relationship with P.M. was strained and, as a result, P.A. often took on a fatherly role, intervening and resolving disputes between them. T.M. reports that P.M. felt more comfortable dealing with P.A. than her. She believes that P.A. manipulated, abused and took advantage of that relationship in the commission of the subject offences.

There is limited contribution from other sources to the content of the PSR. P.A.’s mother is not aware of the circumstances before the court in this proceeding, and therefore, he requested that she not be contacted for the purpose of the PSR. Attempts to contact P.A.’s siblings were unsuccessful. Similarly, attempts to contact P.M. for the purpose of the PSR were also unsuccessful.

On a different issue, P.A.’s educational and vocational history are commendable. After completing high school, he graduated from a two-year college level motive-power technician program. Since that time, he has been employed as a service technician and manager through car dealerships for approximately 25 years.

P.A. presents with no alcohol or drug addiction issues. Substance abuse is not identified as a factor in his offences.

As it relates to P.A.’s “character, behaviour and attitude”, the author of the PSR observes that P.A. minimized the offences before the court and placed blame on the victim. He claims that P.M. initiated conversations of a sexual nature with him. Although P.A. admits that he participated in such conversations and sent P.M. sexually explicit text messages, he denies, as he did at trial, that any sexual interaction occurred between them. Although he testified at trial that he could not offer any explanation for sending sexually explicit test messages to his stepdaughter, he now suggests that he participated in such conversations because it felt like he was speaking to someone else. He acknowledges that he knew that he was speaking with P.M., but he states that the conversations “didn’t feel real” because he was conversing with her over a screen. P.A. claims to have done so based on his own stupidity, but maintains nothing actually happened, in fact. He insists that he is not sexually attracted to P.M. or children, in general.

From a physical health perspective, P.A. was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the late 1980s in which he suffered a lower spinal injury necessitating surgical intervention and a period of rehabilitation lasting approximately five years. P.A. asserts that the accident caused permanent nerve damage to his “lower spinal discs”. As a result, he has consistent discomfort in his low back for which he has been prescribed opioid medication which he rarely takes.

P.A. has never been diagnosed with mental health issues.

Finally, in regards to P.A.’s presentation, the author of the PSR indicates that he lacked emotion through the interview, particularly when discussing the offences. He minimized his behaviour and he deflected blame towards the victim. He appeared to have limited insight into the offences and lacked any understanding of the consequences of his behaviour. Finally, the author of the PSR notes, “Despite denying any sort of sexual attraction towards the victim or children, there does appear to be an underlying deviant sexual interests as evidenced by the sexual nature of the offence[s].”

At the sentencing hearing, P.A. was permitted the opportunity to address the court. He declined to do so.

In determining a fit and proper sentence, I have also had regard to the statutory sentencing parameters for the offences with which P.A. has been found guilty.

Section 153(1.1)(a) of the Code prescribes a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment and a minimum sentence of one year imprisonment for the offence of sexual exploitation.

Section 271(1)(a) of the Code prescribes a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment for sexual assault. No minimum sentence is prescribed.

Within that statutory framework, I turn to the position of the parties.

Relying on jurisprudence from the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Crown submits that:

(1) Adult offenders in a position of trust, who sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis, over a substantial period of time, ought to receive a mid to upper single digit penitentiary term: see R. v. D.D., (2002), 2002 44915 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 788 of the Ontario Court of Appeal at paragraph 44.

(2) When the abuse involves full intercourse, anal or vaginal, and it is accompanied by other acts of physical violence, threats of violence or other forms of extortion, upper single digit to low double digit penitentiary terms would generally be appropriate: see D.D. at paragraph 44.

(3) In cases where these elements are accompanied by a pattern of severe psychological, emotional and physical brutalization, still higher penalties will be warranted: see D.D. at paragraph 44.

(4) Although sentencing is an individualized process of decision making, in circumstances where an adult offender in a position of trust has engaged in prolonged sexual abuse and assault of a child, including penetration, the minimum sentence will be five or six years in the penitentiary: see R. v. D.M., 2012 ONCA 520, 11 O.R. (3d) 721 of the Ontario Court of Appeal at paragraph 46.

In the context of the foregoing “range” or guidelines, the Crown submits that the applicable sentence in this instance is 8 years imprisonment on each of the two counts of sexual exploitation and 8 years imprisonment on the count of sexual assault, all to be served concurrently, together with: a DNA order; a 10-year weapons prohibition on each count pursuant to Section 109 of the Code; a Sex Offender Information Registration Order; and an order that the accused refrain from communicating with P.M. or T.M. during the period of his imprisonment.

The Crown correctly submits that both the applicable jurisprudence and the Criminal Code mandate that the primary objectives for sentencing in this instance are denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown posits that the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in Sections 718.2(a)(ii), (ii.1), (iii) and (iii.1) are all operable in this instance.

The Crown further submits that other aggravating circumstances include:

(a) the lengthy duration of the offender’s criminal conduct;

(b) the offender’s apparent lack of insight. While the Crown does not challenge the offender’s right to maintain his innocence, even after findings of guilt have been made, the Crown observes that even where the offender admits to non-criminal misconduct, specifically sending his 17 year old stepdaughter sexually explicit text messages, he blames the victim for his conduct;

(c) the offender took advantage of a vulnerable victim. Based on the content of the PSR, P.A. describes P.M. as an isolated youth prone to suffer from mental health issues. In the Crown’s submission, P.A. exploited her vulnerability in that regard when he engaged in ongoing sexual conduct with her.

The Crown identifies: P.A.’s lack of a criminal record; his pattern of consistent employment and correspondingly, his contribution to society over the last quarter of a century; the absence of difficulties in relationships involving his biological family; and his apparent supportive family network as mitigating circumstances.

The defence acknowledges that P.A. has been found guilty of very serious offences and a penitentiary term of imprisonment is appropriate in the circumstances. However, the defence submits that the appropriate term of imprisonment is less than the term sought by the Crown. The defence observes that the principles related to the periods of custodial incarceration articulated in D.D. are operable in circumstances where the victims are “very young children” i.e. for the most part the victims in D.D. were all of single digit ages. In this instance, on the findings made by this court and certainly not on any admissions made by P.A., who continues to maintain his innocence, P.M. was 17 years old when the initial sexual assault occurred. The defence submits that because P.M.’s age at the time the criminal conduct was found to have occurred is significantly higher than the age of the children involved in D.D., the principles expressed in that case attract less relevance in determining the appropriate period of imprisonment in this instance.

The defence also submits, in effect, that from a parity perspective there is a discord between the comparative circumstances in this case and those in D.M. and the period of imprisonment sought by the Crown in this case. I will briefly explain.

In D.M., the complainant was originally a 15 year old girl who immigrated to Canada from Fiji in order to improve her life. She was sponsored by and stayed with her aunt and uncle. Shortly after her arrival, her uncle began to groom her for sexual activity and eventually, committed various forms of sexual assault against her, progressing to full intercourse on a repeated and prolonged basis. The increasingly intrusive abuse by the offender occurred while the complainant was between the ages of 16 and 19 years old. In that case, the offender administered birth control pills to the complainant. He required her to watch pornographic videos while he was at work. As a method of grooming her, he inserted a carrot into her vagina. He also threatened to have her deported to Fiji, in the event that she disclosed his conduct to anyone.

Similar to P.M., the victim in D.M. suffered significant emotional trauma and symptoms as a result of the offenders’ conduct. In that case, the court observed that although the complainant was a teenager, she presented with “extra vulnerability” because she was an immigrant to Canada and totally dependent on the offender and his wife for everything, including the ability to remain in this country. She was within the offender’s power in every way: see D.M. at paragraph 47.

In all the circumstances before it, the court in D.M. found the trial judge’s global sentence of three years imprisonment to be unfit and substituted a sentence of seven years imprisonment.

In the defence’s submission, the aggravating circumstances in D.M. were more egregious than they are in this instance, particularly with respect to: grooming; the ongoing threat of the deportation; and the victim’s reliance on the offender for everything in her life.

The defence, therefore, submits that P.A. should be sentenced to a lesser period of imprisonment than the offender in D.M., not a greater period of imprisonment as the Crown contends.

On a different issue, the defence observes that there are several mitigating factors in this instance. P.A. presents as a first-time offender. He has maintained steady, high paying employment for the past 25 years, and has been a contributing member of the community during that time. He presents with no history of substance abuse or alcohol abuse. He has a history of chronic back pain, but avoids using opioids. He has been a law abiding citizen his entire life. Although he maintains his innocence despite the findings of guilt, he has a right to do so.

In addition, on P.M.’s evidence, P.A. did not engage in any threats or acts of gratuitous violence with respect to her, nor did he counsel her not to tell anyone about the criminal sexual conduct, as found.

Instead, P.M. acknowledges that she only received threats of negative consequences for non-compliance with P.A.’s sexual directions via text messages from the “Grace” persona. P.M. acknowledges that P.A. did not make such threats directly to her and she did not discuss “Grace” or the content of “Grace’s” text messages with him. The Crown agrees that for the purpose of sentencing, any threats or other statements made by “Grace” to the complainant via text message ought not to be attributed to P.A.

The defence submits that it is critical that the court remain mindful of the lack of threats attributable to P.A. when evaluating the aggravating circumstances in this instance.

Ultimately, the defence did not endorse a specific term of imprisonment in its submission. Instead, a range of three to five years was suggested and the defence further submitted that the court may, on its own initiative, consider three years to be sufficient to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, in all of the circumstances of this case. The defence does not take issue with the ancillary orders sought by the Crown.

I will now address the applicable principles of sentencing.

The fundamental purpose of sentencing, as set out in Section 718 of the Code, is to contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by the imposition of just sanctions.

The imposition of just sanctions requires me to consider the sentencing objectives referred to in Section 718 of the Code, which I should attempt to achieve through the sentence imposed.

Those objectives include denunciation, deterrence, both specific and general, separation of offenders from society when necessary, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and an acknowledgement of the harm which criminal activity brings to our community.

The fundamental principle of sentencing is reflected in the principle of proportionality. Specifically, a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

In imposing a sentence, I must take into account a number of other principles, including:

(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances related to the offence or the offender;

(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances, the so-called parity principle;

(c) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(d) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victim or to the community, should be considered for all offenders.

Appellate jurisprudence clearly establishes that objectives of denunciation, deterrence and the need to separate sexual predators from society for society’s well-being and the well-being of our children are the primary objectives in sentencing an offender such as P.A. Specifically, an offender who engages in prolonged sexual assault, including intercourse, against a vulnerable young person while in a position of authority: see D.M. at paragraph 39 in which paragraph 76 of R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81 is cited with approval. Further, Section 718.01 of the Code mandates that in imposing a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of 18, the court must give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

In my view, P.A.’s ongoing and persistent sexually exploitive and sexually assaultive conduct against P.M. from mid-2015 to her 18th birthday in […] 2016, decidedly falls within the scope of “abuse of a person under the age of 18 years”. As a result of all the foregoing, the primary objectives of sentencing in this instance are denunciation and deterrence.

The primacy of those objectives does not, however, render considerations relating to rehabilitation moot nor does it supersede the principle of proportionality.

Instead, a balancing of all relevant sentencing goals, including the prospects of rehabilitation, and all relevant considerations, including applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must be undertaken with denunciation and deterrence remaining the primary objectives.

I will now resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the parameters of the applicable range of sentence in this instance.

As I indicated previously, the defence urges this court to conclude that the general range of sentence identified by the Court of Appeal in D.D. is not applicable in this instance. The position of the defence is anchored in paragraph 44 of the court’s reasons where the court prefaced its stated guidelines on range with the following passage:

To summarize, I am of the view that as a general rule, where adult offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular basis ..., they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms.

The defence submits that the range, identified in D.D. is, therefore, predicated on the offender’s repeated sexual abuse being committed against a “young child” by a person in a position of trust or authority. For greater context, D.D. sexually abused four young boys ages five to eight years old for periods of time between two and seven years. The abuse included oral sex and attempted and completed anal intercourse. The offender’s relationship to the boys was as a close family friend and, in one case, an assumed stepfather. He used violence and threats to obtain both compliance and secrecy.

The defence contends that because the sexually exploitive and sexually assaultive conduct against P.M., as found, did not begin until she was 17 years old, the “young child” criteria upon which the range in D.D. is premised, is absent in this instance.

In the defence’s submission, the farther the victim’s age moves away from the “young child” range, the less grave the criminal conduct becomes. The defence posits that given the age of the victim at the commencement of the criminality, as found in this instance, the appropriate range of sentence is better viewed as something in the neighbourhood of three to five years of imprisonment.

The defence’s proposed range harkens back to a general range of sentence of three to five years for sexual intercourse by an adult in loco parentis to a child that was recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. B.(J.), a 1990 decision. That case dealt with a sentence appeal by an offender who had engaged in sexual intercourse and oral sex with his stepdaughter from the time she was six years old until she was 14 years old. The offender was sentenced to eight and one-half years imprisonment for sexual assault and five years concurrent for indecent assault.

The sentence appeal was dismissed. Although the court acknowledged the general range noted above, it held that sentences significantly beyond that range would be appropriate in response to egregious circumstances. Of course, B.(J.) was decided prior to certain amendments to the Criminal Code, including the addition of sections 718.01, 718.2(a)(ii.1) and (iii), which identified the primary objectives of sentencing and certain statutory aggravating factors in circumstances in which persons under 18 years of age are sexually abused. Those provisions have subsequently been found to be much more consistent with the guidelines expressed in D.D. rather than the range set out in B.(J.): see R. v. P.M., 2012 ONCA 162, 289 O.A.C. 352 in that regard.

The defence posits that the circumstances of this case are not so egregious as to justify a global sentence beyond the range contemplated in B.(J.), which the defence submits ought to apply in the absence of a victim that is a “young child”, which would otherwise trigger the application of the guidelines expressed in D.D. Conveniently, a similar argument was made in D.M., where the victim was 16 to 19 years of age at the time of the offender’s criminal conduct.

Specifically, at paragraph 34 of D.M., the court states:

The respondent asks the court to attribute significance to the fact that D.(D.) does not mention the B.(J.) case or the three- to five-year range, arguing that it was not the intent of the court in D.(D.) to change the range of three to five years for cases where there is one victim and not multiple victims, where the victim is not very young or where there is no gratuitous violence other than the sexual assault.

The court then finds, among other things, at paragraph 35:

...this interpretation misunderstands the intent and effect of the decision in D.(D.)

In the paragraphs that follow, Feldman J.A. explains the basis for her conclusion in that regard. I will not revisit her reasoning here. Ultimately, however, she concludes at paragraph 44:

To conclude on the issue of the proper range of sentence, although sentencing is always an individualized process of decision making, where there is prolonged sexual abuse and assault of a child, including penetration, by an adult in a position of trust, the minimum sentence will be five or six years in the penitentiary.

I am mindful that in that paragraph the court employs the word “child” when describing the criteria that will render the minimum sentence set out therein operable. The question is, does that word choice render the applicability of the minimum sentence identified in D.M. to the circumstances in this case, vulnerable to the same type of reasoning that the defence relies on to suggest that D.D. has no direct application in cases where the victim is a “young person” within the meaning of the Code as distinct from a “young child”.

In my view, it does not. D.M. itself conclusively dispels any concerns in that regard. The court’s reasons clearly recognize that the minimum sentence described therein is a defining parameter of the appropriate range of sentence for “prolonged sexual assault including intercourse by a person in authority on a vulnerable young person”. Indeed, the court framed one of the two issues before it by utilizing that very language: see D.M. at paragraph 27 in that regard.

Further, at paragraph 47, the court finds as follows:

This case presented the court with a variant of the pattern of conduct of adult abusers in a position of trust over children. Here, the child was a teenager, but her extra vulnerability came from the fact that she was an immigrant to Canada, totally dependent on the respondent and his wife for everything in life, including the ability to remain in this country. She was in his power in every way.

Thus, the court expressly recognizes that a “teenager” could be considered a “child” for the purpose of the minimum sentence range set out at paragraph 44 of its decision.

Thereafter, at paragraph 50 of D.M., the court imposes a sentence of seven years imprisonment because it found, on the circumstances before it, that “a sentence higher than the lower end of the range was warranted”. In my view, that disposition reflects that the court determined that the five to six year minimum sentence applied in the circumstances before it, even though the victim was 16 to 19 years old at the time of the criminal conduct.

Thus, the issue in determining whether the minimum sentence in D.M. is applicable to the circumstances in this case is not restricted to whether the victim was a “young child” or a “young person” within the meaning of the Code. Rather, the inquiry is appropriately directed at whether P.M. was a particularly vulnerable young person at the time of P.A.’s criminal sexual conduct. Clearly, she was.

Not only was P.A. in a position of trust and authority in relation to P.M., I have already concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that from P.M.’s perspective P.A.’s status as the family’s primary financial provider and the status as her mother’s husband were inextricably linked to the compulsion she felt to engage in sexual activity with him when he pursued it, despite her desire not to do so.

I have also previously found in my reasons for verdict that there would have been no opportunity for P.A. to have engaged in sexual activity with P.M. but for his role as her stepfather and the power and authority that that role gave him and the vulnerability that P.M. had in the dynamics of that relationship.

I would add, the evidence on the sentencing hearing reveals that, to P.A.’s knowledge, P.M.’s vulnerability was further heightened by her particular social and mental health circumstances. P.A. described P.M. as having been a teenager who was isolated from her family. That observation is also confirmed by the trial evidence. P.M.’s relationship with her biological father was distant and her relationship with her mother was extremely combative and adversarial. P.A. was the peacekeeper. That dynamic made P.M. more vulnerable in relation to any abuse of trust by P.A. Further, P.A. states that P.M. struggled with mental health issues, including symptoms of depression and bi-polar disorder which, in my view, rendered her even more vulnerable to P.A.’s breaches of trust in relation to her.

Finally, at trial, I concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that P.M. was in a relationship of dependency in respect of P.A. and that P.A.’s criminal conduct was facilitated through his abuse and exploitation of the proximity, economic power, and general trust and authority to and over P.M. that was afforded to him in his role as her stepfather and father figure.

In the result, I find that owing to P.M.’s heightened vulnerability arising from all of the circumstances in this instance, the aspects of the appropriate sentencing range articulated at paragraph 44 of D.M. are applicable in this case. Notwithstanding that finding, the determination of the sentence to be imposed on P.A. remains an individual exercise engaging the case specific application of the principles I have previously set out.

With the applicability of the minimum sentence expressed in D.M. determined, I will now identify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this instance.

I find that the Crown has established the following aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) In committing the offences for which he is sentenced (except count 7), the offender abused a person under the age of 18, namely P.M., a statutory aggravating factor pursuant to Section 718.2(a)(ii.1) of the Code;

(2) The offences committed by the offender have had and continue to have a significant impact on P.M.’s health and, to a lesser extent, P.M.’s financial situation.

Dealing with the latter point first, P.M.’s ability to maintain employment was impaired as a result of the profound emotional impact the offender’s criminal conduct had on her, including the exacerbation of her Crohn’s Disease. Further, her school performance and attendance dramatically suffered during the time that P.A.’s criminality was operative. As a result, her graduation from high school was delayed.

Dealing with the first point, during the time period that P.A. was routinely sexually assaulting and exploiting P.M., she was prone to vaginal infections, which resolved when P.A.’s conduct stopped.

From an emotional and psychological perspective, P.A.’s criminal conduct has left P.M. with symptoms of anxiety, depression and social isolation. She now approaches sexual activity with apprehension and caution. She no longer trusts people. Her self-image has been negatively affected. Clearly, the offender’s conduct has had a substantial impact on P.M., which continues to date. The harm he has visited on this young lady is immense. His criminal conduct has altered her life in a most profoundly negative manner.

(3) In committing the offences, the offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to P.M., a statutory aggravating factor pursuant to Section 718.2(a)(iii) of the Code. I have previously explained the basis of my conclusion in that regard in the course of these reasons.

(4) The prolonged duration of the offender’s sexual abuse of P.M. and the relatively high frequency of such conduct during that time. The offender’s criminal conduct spanned a period of slightly over one year in duration, during which he sexually assaulted P.M. approximately three times a week, despite her efforts to avoid such contact.

In arriving at a fit and proper sentence in this matter, I remain mindful that the duration of the criminality in this instance was not as long as it was in the cases referred to by counsel. Specifically, in D.M., the sexual abuse continued for three years. In D.D., the sexual abuse of four victims lasted varyingly from two to seven years. The sexual abuse of the victim in B.(J.) spanned approximately eight years. Nonetheless, the duration of the sexual abuse in this instance was substantial and prolonged.

(5) P.M. was young and particularly vulnerable during the period of time she was sexually abused by P.A. I have already explained the basis for my conclusion in that regard when determining the applicability of the minimum sentence expressed in D.M. to the circumstances of this case. In my view, for reasons previously expressed, P.M. was exceptionally vulnerable and a relatively easier target for P.A.’s criminal sexual conduct.

(6) P.A. repeatedly violated P.M.’s dignity, personal security and sexual integrity in the commission of the offences.

I am not satisfied that the Crown has established that in committing the offences, P.A. abused his spouse, T.M., as contemplated by Section 718.2(a)(ii). The Crown posits that by sexually abusing P.M., P.A. abused T.M.’s trust. In my view, that is not the thrust of the identified section. As Section 718.2(a)(iii) indicates, Parliament uses clear language to articulate the circumstances in which an abuse of a position of trust will constitute a statutory aggravating circumstance. It did not do so in Section 718.2(a)(ii).

Finally, before leaving the subject of aggravating circumstances, I observe that in this instance, there is an absence of certain factors found to be aggravating in other cases, including:

(1) In the commission of the offences, P.A. did not employ gratuitous violence beyond the violence inherent in the sexual assaults or employ threats of violence or other threats, in order to secure compliance or secrecy; and

(2) P.A. did not engage in overt acts of sexual grooming prior to the sexually assaultive and sexually exploitive criminal conduct.

I will now turn to the mitigating circumstances in this instance.

On the balance of probabilities, I find the following mitigating circumstances are supported by the evidence:

(1) P.A. does not have a prior criminal record;

(2) P.A. is a positive, contributing member of society. He has been gainfully employed in a skilled trade for the last quarter century.

(3) P.A. appears to have a close relationship with his biological family, which may, in turn, offer him access to a supportive network.

(4) P.A. does not present with substance abuse or alcohol abuse issues.

The following factors are properly viewed as the absence of potentially mitigating circumstances:

(1) P.A.’s lack of a guilty plea.

(2) P.A.’s lack of any demonstrated remorse for his criminal conduct and the impact it has had on P.M., T.M. and other members of P.M.’s family and even his own family.

(3) P.A.’s lack of insight into the seriousness of his criminal conduct or its impact on P.M. and the other persons identified above.

Of course, P.A. maintained his innocence throughout the trial as was his right to do. He offered sworn evidence denying he engaged in any sexual contact with P.M. at any time. He continues to maintain his denial, as is his right to do. The sentence imposed on him will not be more severe because he maintains his innocence.

In the context of the foregoing, I will now impose sentence.

For reasons I have previously set out, I accept that in the circumstances of these offences, namely, the prolonged sexual abuse and assault, including repeated penetration, of a highly vulnerable teenager, P.M., by an adult offender in a position of trust, P.A., the five to six year term of imprisonment set out in D.M. represents the minimum end of the applicable sentencing range.

The decided cases considered in D.M. and the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal in D.M. illustrate that there may be circumstances of the offence and/or the offender that can render a sentence above the five to six year term as being a fit one. Is this such a case?

P.A. comes before the court as a first-time offender at the age of 52. Until he engaged in the very serious criminal conduct forming the subject matter of the findings of guilt, he was, ostensibly, a law abiding citizen and a productive member of his community. He had a close relationship with the members of his immediate and extended biological family. He was continuously employed and capably supported the blended family of which P.M. was a member.

However, the ongoing sexual exploitation and sexual assault of a vulnerable young person entering early adulthood by a person standing in loco parentis to the victim is exceptionally serious criminal conduct and has given rise to the very serious offences for which P.A. must be sentenced. P.A.’s conduct must be firmly and unequivocally denounced by the sentence imposed.

In committing the offences, P.A. preyed on the vulnerability of his stepdaughter, a young lady who was in his life since she was three years old, who looked to him as a parent and who at times called him “Dad”.

In the ordinary course of events, P.M. should have been able to rely on P.A. to protect her in his parental capacity or, at the very least, not to harm her. That is what parents do. That is what parents are supposed to do. That did not happen in this instance.

Instead, P.A. exploited his position of trust and P.M.’s vulnerabilities to satiate his own selfish desire for sexual gratification. There is no evidence that he lent any consideration to how his conduct would or even could impact P.M. Of course, the effects of P.A.’s criminality are not limited to P.M. They extend to T.M., to P.A.’s biological daughters and to both P.M. and P.A.’s extended family.

What was done to P.M. cannot be undone. For P.M., the abuse has stopped, but its damaging effects continue. Her victim impact statement speaks to the enduring trauma she continues to experience as a result of P.A.’s conduct. For both P.M. and others, the family dynamic consequences of P.A.’s actions also continue to endure.

P.A.’s criminal conduct must be strongly denounced and a strong message of deterrence must be sent through the sentence I impose. Those are the primary sentencing objectives in this instance. Nonetheless, in arriving at a fit sentence, I must also consider P.A.’s prospects of rehabilitation. Apart from his continuing criminal sexual misconduct and notwithstanding T.M.’s characterization of his personality type, P.A. does not present with any other behavioural or substance abuse related issues. He is well entrenched as a contributing member of society.

Unfortunately, P.A. does not accept responsibility for the offences before the court. He is under no obligation to do so and his conduct in that regard is not an aggravating factor in sentencing. However, I am concerned that unless and until P.A. accepts responsibility for his conduct and acknowledges and addresses the issues that led him to engage in that criminality, meaningful rehabilitative measures may be frustrated in whole or in part. I should add that I have not discounted the prospects of rehabilitation in this matter, nor will I impose a harsher sentence because of the offender’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for his offences.

Given the serious nature of the offences, the circumstances of the offender and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including the impact of the offender’s conduct on P.M. and the primacy of denunciation and deterrence, a lengthy period of imprisonment is warranted in this instance. However, from a parity perspective, an eight-year sentence is not. In D.M., the offender was sentenced to seven years in circumstances where: threats were used by the offender to secure silence and complacency; grooming was involved; and the sexual abuse extended over three years. Those aggravating circumstances are not present in this instance, although the offender’s conduct in this instance did occur over a prolonged period of time.

P.A., I accept that you have, for the majority of your life, been a positive contributing member of society and a law abiding citizen. I have considered that in arriving at your sentence. However, the criminal sexual conduct you committed against your stepdaughter was prolonged, serious and has resulted in devastating consequences to her.

I appreciate that you maintain your innocence. That is your right. However, from this court’s perspective, it’s clear that you need help, sir, to address the cause of your behaviour. If and when such help is offered to you, I encourage you to take it.

In the meantime, your conduct cannot and will not be tolerated. In my view, the following sentence adequately meets the objectives of denunciation and deterrence while also recognizing the prospects of rehabilitation, in all of the circumstances before me.

P.A. is convicted on counts 4, 6 and 7.

At the request of the Crown, counts 3 and 5 are stayed.

Sentence to go as follows:

1. P.A. is sentenced to a global term of imprisonment of six years (a total of 2,190 days). The sentence is broken down as six years on count 4, six years on count 6 concurrent to count 4, and six years on count 7 concurrent with counts 4 and 6.

P.A. has spent a total of 41 days in pre-sentence custody. I am of the view that it is appropriate to allow the offender credit of 1.5 days for each day of pre-sentence custody served in accordance with the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575.

Further, although P.A.’s pre-sentence custody arose from his bail being revoked pursuant to Section 524 of the Code, the provision of the Code that restricted credit for pre-sentence custody to one for one in that circumstance has been found to be unconstitutional: see R. v. Meads, 2018 ONCA 146.

Therefore, P.A. will be credited with 61 days of pre-sentence custody.

As a result, P.A. is sentenced to serve a further 2,129 days in custody (that’s 2190 less 61 days pre-sentence custody based on 41 days of actual custody at a rate of 1.5 credit for one day served equals 2,129 days remaining sentence).

2. P.A. shall be prohibited from possessing any weapons, ammunition and explosive substances as set out in Section 109(2)(a) of the Code for a period of ten years and any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition as set out in Section 109(2)(b) of the Code for life.

Such orders will attach to counts 4, 6 and 7.

In my view, the force used by P.A. in the commission of the sexual assault and the sexual exploitation of P.M., as found, constitutes conduct that falls within the scope of Section 109(1)(a) of the Code.

3. Sexual assault (Section 271 of the Code) and sexual exploitation (Section 153(1)(a)) of the Code are designated offences pursuant to Section 490.011(1)(a) of the Code. Therefore, the court must impose an order requiring P.A. to be placed on the Sex Offender Registry.

Pursuant to Section 490.013(2.1) of the Code, the order shall be for life because P.A. was convicted of more than one offence set out in Section 490.011(1)(a) of the Code.

4. Both sexual assault and sexual exploitation are primary designated offences pursuant to Section 487.04 of the Code. Therefore an order will go in accordance with Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of samples including blood from the offender for the purpose of DNA analysis.

5. P.A. shall not contact or communicate with T.M. or P.M. either directly or indirectly during the custodial portion of his sentence, pursuant to Section 743.21(1) of the Code; and

6. P.A. shall pay a victim surcharge on each of counts 4, 6 and 7 in the amount of $200, respectively, within 180 days, pursuant to Section 737(2)(ii) of the Code.

I will attach a copy of the terms of the sentence to the indictment and sign it. I will endorse the indictment with the specific counts for which convictions were made and the counts that were stayed, and I will add: “For oral reasons given, sentence is imposed in accordance with the attached sentencing endorsement.”

I also have a copy of the terms of the sentence imposed for counsel and I’m going to mark a copy of that as Exhibit A to the sentencing hearing.

CLERK REGISTRAR: Exhibit A.

EXHIBIT A - Terms of sentence - produced and marked

MR. BRADIE: Thank you.

THE COURT: You can have a seat, P.A. I’m just going to - I’m going to write up the indictment and once I read that then you’ll be taken back into custody, sir. Thank you. Okay. So I’ve endorsed on the indictment, “[P.A.] is convicted of counts 4, 6 and 7. At the request of the Crown, counts 3 and 5 are stayed. Sentence is imposed in accordance with the attached sentencing endorsement.” I have signed the sentencing endorsement which is also dated January 25th, 2019 and I will attach that to the indictment. Thank you.

MR. BRADIE: Thank you, sir.

FORM 2

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT (SUBSECTION 5(2))

Evidence Act

I, Jennifer Coffin , certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the digital recording of R. v. P.A. in the Superior Court of Justice held at 425 Grand Avenue West, Chatham, Ontario taken from Recording No. 1611-CR201-20190125-103005-10-VERBEEGR , which has been certified in Form 1.

_April 2, 2019 _

(Date) (Signature of authorized person)

This certification does not apply to the Reasons for Sentence which were judicially edited.