9 total
Appeal from domestic assault convictions dismissed; trial judge made no reversible errors in credibility assessment.
The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his wife and son.
He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, adequately explained his credibility findings, and reasonably addressed material inconsistencies in the testimony.
A summary conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered due to the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient reasons and misapprehension of evidence.
The appellant, David Monzon, appealed his conviction for assault and the associated sentence.
The appeal court found that the trial judge committed several errors of law, including failing to provide sufficient reasons for judgment, particularly regarding credibility findings and the legal justification for self-defence.
The trial judge also misapprehended evidence by finding the appellant was the aggressor without supporting evidence and erred in making a judicial notice about the removal of an earring without considering the appellant's explanation.
The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.
The court dismissed the summary conviction appeal, upholding the assault conviction for pushing a spouse during a domestic dispute.
The appellant, Guy Baltzer, appealed his conviction for assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code.
The trial judge had convicted him for pushing his wife into a fence after locking her out of their home in sub-zero temperatures.
The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding application of force, failure to consider de minimis non curat lex, apprehension of bias due to judicial comments, and misapplication of the burden of proof or failure to conduct a proper W.(D.) analysis.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds.
The court affirmed the trial judge's factual findings and legal reasoning, emphasizing that the de minimis principle does not apply to intentional domestic violence, and that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and credibility assessment.
An offender who assaulted his child received a conditional discharge due to exemplary rehabilitation and severe immigration consequences.
The accused was found guilty of assault with a weapon (a USB charger cord) against his six-year-old son.
At sentencing, the Crown sought 30 days custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.
The court granted a conditional discharge with 36 months probation, finding that despite the seriousness of the offence, the accused's exemplary rehabilitation efforts, lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, mental health issues at the time of the offence, and strong family support warranted restraint and emphasis on rehabilitation rather than incarceration.
The court distinguished the case from Crown authorities involving offenders with criminal records and lack of remorse.
The accused was acquitted of an over 80 charge because unexplained police delays meant breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.
The accused was charged with an "over 80" driving offence.
The Crown relied on breath sample analysis to prove the accused's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.
The central issue was whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code to invoke the presumption of identity.
The court found multiple unexplained delays in the booking and testing procedures totalling approximately 37 minutes, including delays in completing administrative forms and notes, and a 28-minute gap between the two breath tests.
The court concluded that the totality of delays was unreasonable and that the Crown failed to establish the samples were taken as soon as practicable.
Without the presumption of identity, the Crown's case collapsed and an acquittal was entered.
Committal to trial was quashed because circumstantial evidence of firearm knowledge was purely speculative.
The applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorari to review and set aside his committal to trial on various firearm charges.
The central issue was whether there was any evidence from which a reasonably instructed jury could infer the applicant's knowledge of a firearm, an essential element of possession.
The court reviewed the preliminary hearing judge's reliance on circumstantial evidence, including the location of a hidden firearm, a single 9mm round in a jar, and the applicant's control over the apartment.
The court found that the inferences drawn by the preliminary hearing judge regarding the applicant's knowledge of the firearm and the link between the single round and the hidden firearm were speculative and not supported by the evidence, which was equally consistent with the co-accused's possession.
Consequently, the application for certiorari was granted, and the committal to trial was quashed.
Similar fact evidence excluded due to general propensity reasoning and risk of prejudice.
During a criminal trial for sexual assault and sexual exploitation arising from alleged touching of a student, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of other alleged sexually inappropriate remarks and gestures by the accused toward students.
The Crown argued the evidence formed part of the contextual narrative and was probative of whether the touching was sexual rather than innocent.
The court held that the proposed evidence relied on impermissible general propensity reasoning rather than a specific similar‑fact inference.
Concerns about potential collusion and contamination among witnesses further undermined any probative value.
Given the significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice, the court excluded the evidence.
Credibility concerns created reasonable doubt on all counts.
The accused was tried on three sexual offence counts and one count of threatening death arising from allegations by a family member concerning events said to have occurred when the complainant was 12 and 13 years old, and a later threat allegation.
Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court held that the Crown's case turned on the complainant's evidence, but significant reliability and credibility concerns arose from contradictory evidence about the accused's residence during the relevant period, doubts about the authenticity of photographs, and persuasive defence evidence that the complainant had attended at the accused's workplace and left a note before the April 2, 2012 confrontation.
The court rejected speculative Crown submissions that defence witnesses had concocted their evidence and emphasized the Crown's obligation to act fairly and on a proper evidentiary foundation.
The Crown failed to prove the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and acquittals were entered on all counts.
The court dismissed the accused's Charter application, finding the border officer had reasonable suspicion for an ASD demand and no right to counsel was triggered.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude breath test results.
The court found that the border services officer had formed a reasonable suspicion that the accused had consumed alcohol based on observations including the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath, red cheeks, and discovery of an empty bottle of Jägermeister.
The court determined that an approved screening device was used and that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.
The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the change in investigation from immigration/customs to impaired driving did not trigger a requirement to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel.
The breath test results were admitted into evidence.