Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-14-3222-01SR DELIVERED ORALLY: September 21, 2018

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – S.S.M. Applicant

Counsel: Scott Pratt, for the Crown S.S.M., acting in person

HEARD: September 7, 2018

RULING on application to vary probation

pomerAnce J. :

[1] This decision is a postscript to my earlier ruling in R. v. S.S.M., 2018 ONSC 4465. In that case, I directed a hearing that would bring together, in one courtroom, all relevant evidence bearing on safety issues in a particular family. [1] The earlier ruling sets the context for this decision. I will, from time to time, reproduce excerpts for ease of reference.

[2] Criminal and family proceedings tend to unfold independent of one another. Proceedings take place in different courtrooms, before different judges, often with different lawyers, and with little or no communication between these sectors. This case is a textbook example.

[3] Before me, S.S.M. seeks to vary his probation order to allow him to have contact with his girlfriend J.R., the victim of the serious domestic assault for which he was sentenced. Before the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”), S.S.M. is seeking supervised access to his children. The children have been apprehended and are in the care of J.R.’s aunt but J.R. exercises rights of access. Both this court, and the OCJ, are concerned with the protection and safety of individuals in this family. Yet, as is usually the case, the criminal and family courts have operated as two separate silos.

[4] As I put it in my earlier ruling:

[51] Domestic violence will often give rise to concurrent proceedings in criminal and family court. The family court may be concerned with child protection litigation or issues of custody and access in matrimonial disputes. Criminal and family proceedings are defined by different objectives and governed by different rules. Yet, there are important points of convergence. Where family violence is alleged, or established, the courts must consider the risk of harm posed by the offender to others. Whether it be criminal, child protection or matrimonial litigation, questions of contact and association are often in issue. The assessment of risk is a complicated and imperfect calculus. The more information that can be made available to a court, the better the decision will reflect the realities of the family unit. Of course, at a criminal trial, there are restrictions on admissibility of evidence that may not apply in Family Court. However, when the issue is one of bail, or sentence, or variation of a probation order, the law accommodates a more flexible approach to the receipt of information.

[52] If criminal and family courts are dealing with the same factual issues, affecting the same family, one might expect there to be a mechanism for the sharing of information between the two sectors. Yet, there tends to be little interaction between these systems. The criminal and family courts seem to operate as separate silos, through which cases move vertically, but not horizontally, toward completion. The silo approach or “two solitudes” model does a disservice to the administration of justice. It can lead to conflicting rulings and incomplete records. Important information and evidence can fall through the cracks. In the worst case scenario, the lack of coordination might result in the recurrence of serious violence. As noted in Making the Links in Family Violence Cases: Collaboration among the Family, Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems, Vol. 1, the Report of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, November 2013) [“FTP Report”]:

Because the system is fragmented and there is a lack of communication, sometimes, no one actor has a full appreciation of the nature of risk to victims.

Numerous domestic violence death reviews, inquiries and coroners reports have cited the lack of coordination between officials operating in these systems as a contributing factor in tragic family homicides.

[5] In order to address this concern, I directed a hearing in this court to be attended by all interested agencies and parties. My reasons for doing so include the following:

[58] . . . I have decided … to direct that there be a hearing in this court which brings together the various parties, agencies, and lawyers involved with this family unit. I have chosen this path not because I wish to assume primacy over the Family Court. To the contrary, that court is best situated to assess whether the children are in need of protection. I have chosen this path because somewhere, somehow, all of the relevant actors should be brought together by someone. The fragmented proceedings have left both courts in the dark on important issues. Because this matter is before me, I am directing that the hearing occur in this court. I will continue to defer to the Family Court on issues falling uniquely within its jurisdiction.

[59] There is good reason to join the puzzle pieces in this case. While S.S.M. has taken steps toward rehabilitation, he is still identified as a high risk offender. S.S.M. and J.R. intend to resume their cohabitation as a family. When the probation order expires in February 2019, the requirement of no contact between S.S.M. and J.R. will be replaced, overnight, by an unrestricted contact, with no programs to assist with the transition. The children may or may not remain in the care of a family member. S.S.M. has been denied the right to have supervised access. This constellation raises very real issues of risk and safety.

[60] These issues are best addressed by a holistic approach that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. It can only enhance the decision making process to hear all of the relevant information and evidence, and canvass all of the interested agencies for their level of comfort or concern. Issues arising from domestic violence deserve a coordinated response. This is the time to do it. This family is at a crossroads. Safety concerns should be addressed before it is too late to do so.

[61] In short, this case calls for the court to break down the silos, or, at the very least, create a workable pathway between them. This is necessary to permit an informed decision on the probation issue. Incidentally, this approach might also assist other actors to discharge their responsibilities in a coordinated fashion.

[6] The hearing took place on September 7, 2018. I will refer to it as the “expanded hearing” to distinguish it from the earlier proceedings in this case.

The Offences Giving Rise to the Probation Order

[7] In July 2013, S.S.M. tried to run over J.R. with his pick-up truck. At the time, she was pregnant with his first child. He chased after her in his vehicle, travelling at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the street. His blood alcohol concentration was close to three times the legal limit. The victim hid behind a tree and S.S.M. crashed his truck into the front of a house, close to where she was. It was entirely fortuitous that neither she, nor anyone else, was injured.

[8] I sentenced S.S.M. to 46 months in custody which, with credit for pre-sentence custody, amounted to an additional 12 months in jail. This was followed by three years of probation, a term of which prohibited contact between S.S.M. and J.R.: see R. v. S.S.M., 2015 ONSC 3840. I imposed this term over the strong objection of J.R., who insisted that she was safe with S.S.M. and that she wished to marry him. I ruled that, despite the victim’s wishes, it was necessary to impose a term that would protect her from further violence.

[9] At the time of sentencing, S.S.M. had a lengthy criminal record, containing many past convictions for offences of violence and for breaches of court orders. He had previously been violent toward three different domestic partners, and had a prior conviction for assaulting J.R.

[10] Since 2015, S.S.M. has worked hard to change his life. He has attended programs and counselling. He says that he is a changed man. J.R. agrees, and both ask that I remove the non-association clause from the order. S.S.M. also wishes to have contact with his children. The probation order will expire in February 2019.

Protection of privacy interests

[11] Under s. 87(4) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (CYFSA), child protection hearings are presumed to be held in the absence of the public, unless the court rules to the contrary. I determined that this procedure should govern the expanded hearing, as should the other protections set out in the CYFSA. The hearing was conducted in camera. It was subject to a publication ban. The documents and audio recording are sealed, and this decision refers to all parties by their initials to protect their identity.

Parties, Counsel and Witnesses

[12] The initial hearings were attended by crown counsel and S.S.M. S.S.M. represented himself on the variation application, though he was represented by counsel, Sharon Murphy, on matters in the family court.

[13] The expanded hearing took place on September 7, 2018. On that date, the following persons were in attendance: S.S.M. (representing himself on the variation application), Crown counsel (responding to the variation application), Ms. Murphy (counsel for S.S.M. on the family matters), Ms. Monahan (counsel for the Children’s Aid Society (“Society”)), Tristen Robinette and Melissa Kelly, (family case service workers who were involved with this family), Ms. Foster (S.S.M.’s probation officer supervisor), and J.R., (S.S.M.’s girlfriend and the mother of his two daughters).

[14] Ms. Murphy and Ms. Monahan advised that they did not wish to act as parties to the criminal proceeding. This was understandable. The dispute in this court remains one between S.S.M. and the Crown. Both counsel are to be commended, however, for the assistance that they provided during the hearing. They elicited evidence from the various witnesses, and offered their insights in closing submissions. They offered a significant contribution to the process, for which I am grateful.

No Access to Transcript

[15] In my earlier ruling, I explained the difficulties that I encountered in trying to obtain transcript of the child protection proceedings:

[54] I initially contemplated that I would obtain the transcript of those proceedings or listen to the digital audio recording. However, that was not a simple matter, given the privacy interests attaching to those proceedings. Under s. 87(4) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (CYFSA), a hearing is presumed to be held in the absence of the public, unless the court rules to the contrary. Similarly, there are strict controls over who can obtain access to the transcript of the proceedings. Section 87(10) provides that:

(10) No person except a party or a party’s lawyer shall be given a copy of a transcript of the hearing, unless the court orders otherwise.

[55] The court is defined in s. 2(1) as follows:

“court” means the Ontario Court of Justice or the Family Court of the Superior Court of Justice; (“tribunal”)

[56] As a Superior Court judge, sitting in a non-Family Court, I have no jurisdiction to direct that the transcript be released for review.

[57] The judge who does have jurisdiction, and who presided over the child protection proceedings, quite properly advised that she will not make an order releasing the transcript unless there is a hearing, on notice to S.S.M., J.R., and the CAS, on the question of whether the transcript should be released.

[58] I have considered whether I should request that such a hearing take place. I have decided, instead, to direct that there be a hearing in this court which brings together the various parties, agencies, and lawyers involved with this family unit.

[16] It was my hope that, following my earlier ruling, I might gain access to the transcripts of the proceedings in family court. That did not come to pass.

[17] Ms. Murphy attended before me on August 2, 2018 to discuss the scheduling of the expanded hearing. She advised that a settlement conference on the child protection issues was going to take place in the middle of August in the OCJ. J.R., S.S.M. and the Society were to be present. At my request, Ms. Murphy provided a copy of my ruling to all parties who would be attending the conference, as well as the presiding Ontario Court judge. At my request, Ms. Murphy also conveyed my request that the Ontario Court judge consider releasing the transcript to me for purposes of the in camera hearing to take place September 7, 2018.

[18] I am advised that the presiding judge would not release the transcript to the Superior Court of Justice due to privacy concerns. The presiding judge declined the request for release of the transcripts at the conference, and advised that he would make the same ruling if a formal application were brought.

[19] I am not aware of any opposition to the release of the transcript by S.S.M., J.R. or the Society. S.S.M. testified freely before me. In any event, it would not lie in S.S.M.’s mouth to object to the release of information directly relevant to his application. The Society was unlikely to object; it has an interest in being privy to the evidence heard in the criminal court and in ensuring that both courts have all relevant information. J.R. attended the hearing before me by choice, and elected to testify on a purely voluntary basis. There was no indication of opposition by persons whose interests stood to be affected by release of the transcript.

[20] Nor was there any risk to the privacy interests of the children who are at the centre of the controversy. The expanded hearing was subject to all of the CYFSA protections. Only those with a direct interest in the matter were present. Had I received the transcripts, they would have also been sealed from public view. Presumably, these measures would have sufficed to ensure that privacy remained intact.

[21] I respect the decision of the OCJ. However, in its effect, it had the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing the barriers between the criminal and family court.

[22] Given the hearing before me, I no longer require access to the transcripts from the OCJ. I received evidence from the Society family case workers, S.S.M., J.R. and the probation supervisor. I also heard from counsel who had been present for the child protection proceedings. At this stage, I am probably aware of most of the evidence that was heard in the OCJ. What I am deprived of are the judicial rulings issued in that court. Both Ms. Murphy and Ms. Monahan perceived that the OCJ rulings could not be disseminated or discussed by witnesses, in light of the refusal to release the transcripts. I agreed that that was the effect of the ruling. I would have liked to benefit from the insights of judges who decided the issues in the OCJ, but I am prepared to render a decision without that material.

Child Protection: the children of S.S.M. and J.R.

[23] S.S.M. and J.R. have two children. L. is close to five years old. S. is close to one year old. S. was conceived and born during the term of the non-association clause, leaving little doubt that the clause was breached.

[24] L. was subject to a protection application in Windsor. She is currently in the care of a maternal aunt, J.R.’s sister. She has been in the aunt’s care on a kinship placement since March 2017. On October 26, 2018, the Society will bring a rule 16 motion for the aunt to have custody of L. J.R. has access to L. twice a week. The access may be supervised subject to the discretion of the aunt. The most recent access took place in a park close to J.R.’s home.

[25] S. was apprehended from the care of her mother and initially placed in foster care. She is now in the care of the same aunt that is caring for L. J.R. has access to S. five times a week, which again may be supervised subject to the aunt’s discretion.

[26] S.S.M. had unauthorized contact with L. on one occasion in 2016 in Windsor.

[27] S.S.M. applied for, and was denied access to L. by the family court. I am not privy to the judicial ruling, but I was advised of the position taken by the Society on that hearing. The Society opposed access – supervised or otherwise – because S.S.M. has not had any relationship with the child, he has a history of incarceration and therefore cannot offer stability, the suggestion of one access visit per month is not child focused, and his violent criminal history causes concern about the safety and well-being of the child.

[28] Similar concerns inform the Society’s position about access by S.S.M. to S. There has yet to be a final order in connection with that issue.

[29] Once custody is granted to the children’s aunt, the Society will no longer be supervising contact between the children and J.R. Issues of access will be left to the aunt to police and enforce. The family services worker who works with the family advised that the aunt has reported breaches in the past and that the Society trusts the aunt to enforce any court order that prohibits contact between S.S.M. and his children. It was apparent, however, that once the probation order expires, and S.S.M. is unrestricted in his contact with J.R., the Society may request a requirement that J.R.’s access be supervised.

Child Protection: J.R.’s other child

[30] J.R. has another child, Z., born of a different father. J.R. has unsupervised access to that child on weekends. That child is not to have contact with S.S.M. There is a safety plan in place. Z. is 15 years of age, and he owns a cell phone. It is contemplated that, if S.S.M. is present when he is with his mother, he will call his paternal grandfather, who will, in turn, contact the Society. The family service worker that works with this child testified that he believes that Z. is capable of keeping himself safe, though once the probation order expires, and there is no longer a non-association clause, the Society may request that J.R.’s access to Z. be supervised.

Rehabilitation and Safety Concerns

[31] In my earlier ruling, I summarized the evidence regarding S.S.M.’s rehabilitation. S.S.M. has taken positive steps toward rehabilitation, for which he is to be commended. His probation officer, while supportive of his progress, maintains concern about the risk he poses to J.R. and other domestic partners. I share those concerns, as explained in the following passage from the first ruling:

[36] Mr. S.S.M. is to be congratulated for the steps he has taken to change his life and address his issues. He has attended programming. He has seen counsellor and psychiatrists. He has an excellent attendance record with his probation officer. I detected a marked change in Mr. S.S.M.’s demeanour before the court. In 2015, he was openly contemptuous and hostile toward the court. On the last two appearances, he was polite and respectful.

[37] It is hoped that Mr. S.S.M. will continue to follow through with counselling and other programs even after his probation order expires.

[38] Mr. S.S.M.’s probation officer is very supportive of Mr. S.S.M. and has seen him achieve personal growth. However, she has identified red flags that warrant continuing concern.

[39] First, Mr. S.S.M. was unwilling to re-attend on the PARS program, despite his probation officers encouragement to do so. This program is directly relevant to the conduct that Mr. S.S.M. is trying to change – his tendency to be violent with domestic partners. It is not clear why he was unwilling to repeat a program that is central to his rehabilitation. It is possible that he is tired of the process and just wants to be done. He said as much during his testimony. If that be the case it does not bode well for the future.

[40] Second, Mr. S.S.M. is ambivalent about attending programs dealing with alcohol abuse. If the past is any indication – and it usually is – alcohol is a gateway to violence for Mr. S.S.M.. Most of his antecedents have been fueled by intoxication, including the attempt to run over Ms. J.R. with his truck in 2013.

[41] Third, the backdrop to all of this is Mr. S.S.M.’s history of domestic violence. I have to hope that his desire to change his life is genuine. However, in light of his history, good intentions may not be enough to control his anger. These are long standing issues. I do not suggest that Mr. S.S.M. cannot change his behavioural patterns. I believe with the proper work and commitment he can. The question is whether he is now in a place where these issues are under control.

[42] Fourth, I also note the extent to which the parties have knowingly breached the non-association order to date. The evidence would indicate that, for a time, Mr. S.S.M. and Ms. J.R. had regular contact with one another. If there has been compliance over the last while, it is likely more a function of Mr. S.S.M.’s desire to avoid jail than it is a respect for court orders. Mr. S.S.M. might have best expressed the point when he said that his love for Ms. J.R. trumped any probation order. Mr. S.S.M. has already been punished for two breaches, with jail terms, and it is not my intention to punish him again, nor to punish him for uncharged breaches. However, the blatant disregard of the order in the past means that Mr. S.S.M. does not come before this court with clean hands. Ms. J.R. has been an equally willing and blatant participant in the breaches of the non-association clause.

[43] Fifth, I have considered Ms. J.R.’s request that she have contact with Mr. S.S.M.. I will say little about this, save to note that she took the same position in 2015, when Mr. S.S.M. was being sentenced for trying to run her down with a pick-up truck.

[32] The expanded hearing did not detract from the conclusions set out above.

Breaches of the Probation Order: Evidence of S.S.M.

[33] At the initial hearings S.S.M. testified in what I perceived to be very frank terms. He did so again at the expanded hearing. S.S.M. testified that, in addition to the breaches for which he was charged, there were many other breaches of the non-association clause. For a period of time, he and J.R. spent almost every day together. She would come pick him up in Windsor and take him to her home where he spent the day. S.S.M. testified that he had not had contact with J.R. since May 2017, largely because he did not want to go to jail again. He made it clear however that he considered his relationship with J.R. to be more important than any court order.

[34] At the first hearing, he succinctly put it this way: “My love for J trumps the probation order”.

[35] At the second hearing, he explained that he breaches the order not because he disrespects the court but because “it is too hard to stay away”. S.S.M. acknowledged that, even if the court denies the variation, he is likely still going to see J.R.

Breaches of the Probation Order: Evidence of J.R.

[36] J.R. testified on the second hearing. She said that she believes that S.S.M. is a changed man and that she is not at risk. She asked for an order that would allow her to revoke contact with S.S.M. if she feels threatened. She testified that if she felt threatened she would call police.

[37] I have concerns about the testimony given by J.R. to this court.

[38] First, J.R. was less than forthright about the extent to which she and S.S.M. had disregarded the non-association clause. To be blunt, I find that she lied to the court. She testified that there had been fewer than five breaches. I accept S.S.M.’s testimony that, in fact, there had been numerous breaches, at least 50 over the duration of the order. S.S.M. had no reason to lie about the extent of his unlawful behavior. It may be that S.S.M. did not convey to J.R. the extent to which the “cat was out of the bag”. J.R. was clearly not mistaken about how many times she breached the order. The difference between 5 and 50 breaches is not something amenable to honest error. I have no alternative but to conclude that J.R. gave false testimony to the court, presumably in a misguided effort to support S.S.M.’s application for a variation.

[39] J.R. also minimized the extent to which she requires protection. She has, throughout this process, insisted that she is not at risk of harm, even at the time of the original sentencing for S.S.M.’s attempt to run her over with a vehicle. She downplayed the seriousness of the originating event, saying that the way it was portrayed in the media was serious, but suggesting that, in fact, it was not.

[40] I am not willing to leave the issue of J.R.’s safety in J.R.’s discretion. I do not believe that her perceptions are a reliable gauge of reality. If she is aware of the risks, she is deliberately downplaying them. In either event, there is reason to distrust her evidence and her willingness to take this matter seriously.

[41] As I noted in my original decision in 2015, it is one thing to allow J.R. to gamble with her own safety. It is quite another to allow her to gamble with the safety of her children. At present S.S.M. is not allowed to have contact with L., S. or Z. Can J.R. be trusted to ensure that her children are not exposed to S.S.M.? Given past breaches of the non-association clause, such trust might be misplaced. Her lack of candour about the breaches only reinforces this concern.

Should the variation be granted?

[42] The question for me to determine is whether the no contact clause between S.S.M. and J.R. should be lifted for the duration of the probationary term, which is set to expire in February 2019.

[43] On the one hand, I must not reward a pattern of blatant disregard for this court’s orders. On the other hand, I must recognize the realities of the situation.

[44] In February 2019, S.S.M. will have completed his probation order. He no longer will be under community supervision. As he put it, he is “going home”. He and J.R. will resume their cohabitation as a family. Given the parties’ expressed intentions, there is little doubt that they will live together when the probation order expires.

[45] The difficulty is that there is no transition in place to assist S.S.M. and J.R. to gradually adjust to their new relationship. The evidence indicates that they have been together for much of the probationary period, in breach of the order. However, they have not been at liberty to speak about their relationship issues, as to do so would be to admit culpability. Therefore, so long as the no contact clause is in place, the parties either will have no contact, or will have contact that they are not at liberty to speak about. In either instance, there is little opportunity for them to gain the input of counsellors, or S.S.M.’s probation officer, to assist them in creating a healthy relationship dynamic.

[46] Given the seeming inevitability of a continuing relationship between S.S.M. and J.R., there may be wisdom in providing for a transitional period of supervised contact. To go from no contact to unrestricted contact overnight may create its own difficulties. It may make it difficult for S.S.M. to address his anger issues within the relationship; it may make it difficult for J.R. to develop an effective response to situations of danger. Absent a transition, there is no chance for the parties to build or practice healthy relationship skills. If the ultimate goal is to maximize the safety of those in the family unit, this might be best facilitated through contact in a supervised and perhaps, therapeutic, setting.

[47] All of this is contingent on J.R.’s continuing desire to interact with S.S.M. If she declines to do so, that is the end of the matter. At present, the indication is that she intends to reside with him as soon as she can.

[48] For reasons I have already explained, I am not prepared to leave the issue of contact in the discretion of J.R. I am, however, prepared to give S.S.M.’s probation officer flexibility that would allow her to determine whether transitional contact is appropriate.

[49] During her testimony on the first hearing, I asked Ms. Rusnak, S.S.M’s probation officer, whether there were any resources that would permit this type of transition to take place. She testified that there were no recognized programs of this nature, but that she had some ideas of situations that might allow contact within a supervised or therapeutic setting.

[50] At the second hearing, the probation officer supervisor, Ms. Foster, testified as Ms. Rusnak was not available to re-attend. According to Ms. Foster, while there is no recognized program for transitioning contact between offender and victim, Family Services Windsor offers counselling sessions and may authorize up to five sessions without cost to the parties. That may be a good starting place. This information was confirmed in a letter sent by Ms. Rusnak to the court on September 19, 2018. Additional steps must be taken before the parties can qualify for this counselling, but these steps can be completed within a month. Transportation issues may impede the ability of S.S.M. and J.R. to attend this program. I will leave it to Ms. Rusnak to assess the suitability and practicality of these sessions and/or any other options that may present themselves.

[51] While I see transitional contact to be in the interests of justice, this is neither a reward for past breaches, nor an invitation to breach in the future. J.R. and S.S.M. must know that any contact not approved in advance by the probation officer will be a breach of the order, for which both may be liable. Given the history of breaches, extra enforcement and supervision may well be appropriate, but that is for others to determine.

[52] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the probation order should be varied to provide the S.S.M. is not to contact or associate with J.R., directly or indirectly, unless such contact/association has been approved in writing by S.S.M.’s probation officer and consented to by J.R..

Conclusion

[53] The expanded hearing was of assistance to me as the decision maker on the probation issue. It offered the missing pieces to the jigsaw puzzle. It allowed me to appreciate the full ramifications of any decision I might reach. It highlighted the extent to which issues of contact between S.S.M. and J.R. might affect the safety of L., S., and J.R.’s other son Z.. It underscored the importance of a plan that will prevent any unauthorized access from taking place.

[54] Ideally, protocols will be developed to guide and facilitate information sharing in future cases. Various models have been discussed in academic commentary [2], and in reports commissioned by the Department of Justice. [3] It is unclear how this goal is best achieved. What is clear is that treating the criminal and family courts as separate silos does a disservice to the administration of justice, and the families that it serves.

[55] I will close by saying that I am impressed with S.S.M.’s progress. I accept that he is a different person than the man who stood before me in 2015. Yet the fact remains that S.S.M. and J.R. are willing to breach court orders if it suits their purposes to do so, and J.R. is willing to lie about such breaches. This sets a troubling tone for the future of this family. That will be for others to address, particularly after the probation order expires. It is my hope that the sharing of information at the expanded hearing might, incidentally, shed light on issues arising in the child protection context. I peered into the adjacent silo for my own judicial purposes. Mercifully, I know that the sightline works in both directions.

Renee M. Pomerance Madam Justice

Released orally: September 21, 2018

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – Respondent – and – S.S.M. Applicant RULING ON APPLICATION TO VARY PROBATION Pomerance J. Released orally: September 21, 2018

[1] As that hearing was in camera and subject to a publication ban, this decision will refer to all parties by their initials to protect identity.

[2] see e.g. Dr. Linda C. Neilson, Enhancing Safety: When Domestic Violence Cases are in Multiple Legal Systems (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, 2013); Joseph Di Luca, Erin Dann & Breese Davies, Best Practices where there is Family Violence: Criminal Law Perspective (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, 2012); Nicholas Bala & Kate Kehoe, Concurrent Legal Proceedings in Cases of Family Violence: The Child Protection Perspective (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, 2013).

[3] Making the Links in Family Violence Cases: Collaboration among the Family, Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems, Vol. 1, the Report of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, November 2013).