R. v. S.S.M., 2015 ONSC 3840

CITATION: R. v. S.S.M., 2015 ONSC 3840

Oral Decision: June 18, 2015 COURT FILE NO.: 14-CR-3222 AND – COURT FILE NO.: 15-CR-3395

DATE: 20150618

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

S.S.M.

Accused

Elizabeth Brown, for the Crown

Kenneth Marley, for the Accused

HEARD: June 8 and 10, 2015

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

pomerance j.:

[1] S.S.M. has a history of violent offences. He is once again before the court to be sentenced on two assaults and one count of drive over 80. The first assault was committed against his domestic partner, J.R. In July 2013, he chased after the victim while driving her truck, threatening to hit her with it. At the time, his blood alcohol concentration was close to three times the legal limit. While he was initially charged with attempted murder, the Crown accepted a plea to assault with a weapon (the weapon being the truck), on the basis that his intoxication prevented him from forming a specific intent to kill.

[2] The second assault took place while S.S.M. was in custody awaiting trial. In October 2013, he assaulted a fellow inmate for failing to bring contraband into the institution. For this, he pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

[3] The Crown and defence agree on most aspects of the sentence. S.S.M. has served 23 months in pre-sentence custody. The Crown agrees that, with enhanced credit, this is the equivalent of 34 and a half months. Counsel jointly propose that S.S.M. serve an additional 12 months, which would result in a total sentence of 46 and a half months for all offences. Counsel also agree that the custodial sentence should be followed by a term of probation for three years.

[4] There remain two points of controversy:

1. Should the probation order prohibit contact between S.S.M. and the victim of the domestic assault, despite the objection of the victim?; and

2. Should the court order restitution to compensate the insurance companies who reimbursed the direct victims for their loss?

[5] I will address the circumstances of the offences and then turn to the issues.

THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT

[6] S.S.M. and J.R. began dating in November 2012. There were some early difficulties. In December 2012, police attended at J.R.’s home to find her in the fetal position with blood coming from her mouth, bruising to her face, and a broken jaw. S.S.M. was charged with assault causing bodily harm, but was acquitted of the charge after J.R. testified that he did not cause the injury.

[7] While S.S.M. was on bail for that charge, he was prohibited from associating or communicating with J.R. He breached that term, as did the victim. J.R. initiated contact with S.S.M. by writing to him, thereby acting as party to the breach. Both were found guilty of the breach of recognizance.

[8] The offences currently before the court took place on July 7, 2013. S.S.M. and J.R. were on their way home from a friend's house. J.R. was driving her truck. S.S.M. became angry and began kicking at the dashboard of the truck, trying to activate the air bags. He kicked the stereo and rear view mirror and then slapped J.R. in the face with an open hand. He then punched the glass out of the side mirror, cutting his hand. J.R. was afraid. She pulled the vehicle over to the side of the road to get out of the car. S.S.M. grabbed her just as another vehicle drove by. He pretended to hug her, but once the other vehicle passed, he punched her in the face with a closed fist. He warned her that things would get much worse.

[9] J.R. got out of the truck and began running away on foot. She ran about a block when she looked back and saw the truck, being driven by S.S.M., coming directly toward her. She hid behind a tree and the truck passed her, crashing into the front of a house, either two or four doors down from where she was. A witness who saw the events from her window confirmed that the vehicle was chasing J.R., driving at “expressway speed” on the wrong side of the street. In her statement to police, J.R. said that she believed that S.S.M. was trying to hit her with the truck.

[10] It was later determined that, at the time of driving, S.S.M. had a blood alcohol concentration of between 240 and 260 milligrams percent.

[11] While speaking to police, J.R. said that S.S.M. had assaulted her on June 22, 2013, by choking her, punching her, and pushing her into a dresser. She did not report that assault to the police. She has since resiled from the claim.

[12] The gravity of the assault on J.R. is self-evident. She was terrorized in the vehicle as she was driving. She was assaulted and threatened as S.S.M. damaged the interior of the vehicle in a violent rage. Not surprisingly, she was in fear and felt the need to escape from the truck. This only incited further aggression, as S.S.M. tried to run her down with the vehicle. He was not simply driving alongside her, but was in pursuit of her. It was fortuitous that he struck the front of a house, rather than his intended victim.

[13] J.R. was not the only person placed at risk by this conduct. S.S.M.’s reckless pursuit of J.R., behind the wheel of a car, while his blood alcohol concentration was three times the legal limit, endangered other members of the public. It is fortunate that no other individuals were in the path of the oncoming vehicle.

[14] The courts have long recognized that offences of domestic violence call out for deterrent and denunciatory sentences. This is now codified in s. 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which confirms the aggravating nature of crimes committed against domestic partners. Here, there is also a compelling need for specific deterrence. S.S.M. has committed several domestic assaults in the past, as disclosed by his criminal record. Previous sentences have not deterred him from this pattern of conduct.

THE ASSAULT IN CUSTODY

[15] The assault committed by S.S.M. on a fellow inmate was captured on videotape and played at the sentencing hearing. The video is chilling. It depicts several inmates together in a confined area. S.S.M. is seen to approach the victim and assert control over him. He is seen to punch and kick the victim repeatedly, with some degree of force, as other inmates stand in the vicinity. He is seen to walk away, leaving the victim on the ground. Another inmate then set upon the victim, inflicting some additional blows.

[16] The victim suffered serious injuries, requiring, among other things, facial reconstruction surgery and removal of all of his teeth.

[17] It was admitted by S.S.M. that he attacked the victim because the victim failed to bring contraband into the institution.

[18] Any assault in custody is serious; an assault that punishes someone for failing to smuggle contraband is of heightened gravity. It reduces safety within the institution by perpetuating an atmosphere of coercion and non-compliance, placing other inmates and correctional officers at risk. As depicted in the video, one act of institutional violence often begets another. After S.S.M.’s assault, another inmate gratuitously intervened and assaulted the victim as he lay in a vulnerable state.

[19] S.S.M. was initially charged with aggravated assault. The Crown accepted a plea to assault causing bodily harm, on the basis that it could not determine who had caused the disfiguring injuries. I accept the Crown’s position, though, on video, S.S.M. is the prime instigator and the more violent of the two. Moreover, having initiated the attack, S.S.M. might be legally responsible for the victim’s injuries, even those inflicted by the second inmate. Be that as it may, the Crown has exercised its discretion in favour of S.S.M. I accept that and he will be sentenced on the basis agreed to by counsel.

THE JOINT SUBMISSION

[20] The Crown and defence jointly propose that S.S.M. be sentenced to serve an additional 12 months in custody. Together with credit for pre-sentence custody, this would constitute a total sentence of 46 and a half months, 45 days short of a sentence of four years.

[21] I am mindful of the deference that is to be paid to joint submissions put forward by experienced counsel. The proposed sentence is lenient, but within the range. Given the nature of the offences, and S.S.M.’s criminal record, he could well have faced a lengthier term of incarceration. I accept, however, that his pleas of guilt are indicative of remorse, and further, that the Crown might have had difficulties of proof had the case gone to trial.

[22] I also accept that S.S.M. has an alcohol addiction and that he is amenable to treatment for it. To that end, he asks that the court recommend that he be placed in an institution with intensive addiction treatment programs.

[23] I am prepared to accede to the joint submission as it relates to 12 months additional incarceration followed by three years of probation.

Probation: Should there be no contact between S.S.M. and J.R.?

[24] The most contentious issue in this case relates to the probation order. The Crown asks for a term that would absolutely prohibit S.S.M. from associating or communicating with J.R. over the three year term. The defence strongly objects to this term.

[25] J.R. testified on the sentencing hearing, making it clear that she wants to continue a relationship with the offender, perhaps leading to marriage and additional children. J.R. is largely unperturbed by S.S.M.’s history of violence. She claims to know him in ways that others do not know him. She testified that he has a kind heart.

[26] The Crown asserts that, despite J.R.’s wishes, there should be an order prohibiting contact between her and S.S.M. In essence, the Crown says that J.R. must be protected from herself; that she is not able to exercise the necessary judgment to protect herself and her children. The court must do it for her, by preventing association and communication with the offender for the duration of his probation.

[27] The defence objects to the proposed term, arguing that J.R.’s wishes should be respected. It is said that J.R. is a competent adult, able to make her own decisions. J.R. wants to pursue a relationship with S.S.M. and should be entitled to do so without interference by the court.

[28] This issue discloses a tension between the need to protect the public, on the one hand, and the need to respect citizens’ autonomy, on the other. The goal of protecting the public informs enforcement of the criminal law. It is reflected in various sentencing principles, including deterrence, denunciation and, in some cases, separation from society. It is an express consideration when the court is called upon to craft individualized terms of probation: see s. 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada: “the sentencing judge is well placed to craft conditions that are tailored to the particular offender to assist in his rehabilitation and protect society” (emphasis added): see R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399 at paras. 13-14.

[29] At the same time, the law values the rights of citizens to make independent and autonomous decisions about their lives. Persons are generally at liberty to decide how they will live, and with whom. The criminal law refrains from interfering with lawful and consensual intimate relationships.

[30] Both objectives – protection and autonomy – are important. Yet, in this case, they are mutually exclusive. The court cannot achieve one without sacrificing the other. To protect the victim is to deny her the right to associate with the man she wants to eventually marry. To respect the victim’s autonomy is to potentially expose her and her children to future acts of domestic violence.

[31] Individual autonomy is important and should be respected where possible. Courts should tread carefully before foisting protection on an unwilling recipient. However, there will be cases, perhaps rare, where the need for protection will override the victim’s freedom of choice. For example, in R. v. B.(M.A.), 2006 ABQB 578, Lee J. refused to lift a no contact clause between the offender and the victim, saying the following at paras. 12-13:

I do appreciate that the complainant has come forward to support the accused’s request to lift the no contact provision. The complainant obviously has no fear of the accused, but the court is concerned about the real possibility of further spousal violence, particularly given the accused’s drinking problems and related record.

While by default this complainant will likely have contact with this accused irrespective of what the court says or does, it is still my duty in these circumstances to refuse to lift the no contact provision given the danger that the accused poses to his wife.

[32] In R. v. L.R.K., 2011 BCPC 304, Donegan Prov. Ct. J. stated at para. 74:

Ms. L., despite her emphatic denials to the contrary, does require protection from Mr. K. at this stage. The history of violence, both emotional and physical, and his complete control over every aspect of her life makes her incapable, in my view, of adequately assessing the risk that he poses to her. I have a body of material in front of me that indicates Mr. K. has a long way to go in developing a true awareness of his offending and what he might do to prevent it from happening again. The court must seek and provide – pardon me, provide protection for Ms. L., a victim of domestic violence even when she does not seek it. Her view, as I had indicated earlier, is but one factor that I must take into account, and I am cautious of giving it too much weight.

[33] See also R. v. M. (R.D.), 2003 ABQB 105; R. v. Basran, 2008 CarswellBC 2893 (BC Prov. Ct.), aff’d 2008 BCCA 338; R. v. Deschamps, 2002 CarswellOnt. 4880 (ONCJ), aff’d on other grounds [2003] O.J No. 503 (ONCA); but see: R. v. M.(D.M.), 2003 ABQB 867.

[34] At first blush, this approach might seem a paternalistic solution to the problem of domestic violence. But it is important to remember the public nature of the criminal law and its role in maintaining societal norms of conduct. A sentence is not a private remedy any more than a criminal offence is a private wrong. A crime – even a crime against an individual victim – offends the broader public interest. Crime and punishment have implications that extend beyond the individuals appearing in court: see Michelle Madden Dempsey, “Public Wrongs and the Criminal Law’s Business: When Victims Won’t Share” in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff, eds., Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: the Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (Oxford University Press, 2011).

[35] This was not always the case. For far too long, domestic violence was erroneously seen to be a private or family matter, leaving victims with little or no protection. We now accept that the public has a compelling interest in seeing that offenders are fairly prosecuted and, where convicted, properly sentenced. The wishes of a victim are relevant and must be considered, but can never be determinative. Whether a plea for leniency or a cry for retribution, a victim’s view may conflict with what is in the public interest. Where that occurs, it is the public interest that must prevail.

[36] Moreover, the dynamic of domestic violence is complex. The victim and offender share an emotional bond, have a common history and may be planning a united future. The relationship may involve elements of affection and trust in addition to manipulation and control. Victims may experience fear, love, optimism, despair, denial and/or resignation. They may be influenced by romantic entanglement, fear of retaliation, economic need, and/or the symptoms that comprise battered woman’s syndrome. Whatever the cause, recantation is a notorious problem in these cases, with victims often reluctant to cooperate with the prosecution. The Crown anticipated that there might be a recantation in this case. Victims often return to, or remain with, a violent partner despite the risk of future harm. In extreme cases, this can lead to tragic, even fatal, outcomes: see Domestic Violence Death Review Committee 2012 Annual Report, Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario, February 2014.

[37] I am not equipped to unpack the dynamic in this case. I do not know enough about J.R.’s relationship with S.S.M. to hazard a hypothesis about why she wants to remain in the relationship. What I do know is that S.S.M. assaulted J.R. by threatening to run her over with a truck, while she was pregnant with his child. I know that he slapped and punched her before the chase and threatened her that the violence would get worse. I know that she was sufficiently afraid for her safety that she fled from the truck on foot. I know that she ran from the vehicle as he chased her with it. I know that he crashed the truck into the front of a house not far from where she was seeking cover. I know that, after the offence, she was found curled up in fear hiding behind a bush.

[38] The facts read in by the Crown suggest that there might have been other assaults on J.R. The police were called (by someone other than J.R.) when she suffered a broken jaw. S.S.M. was acquitted of that assault, largely because J.R. testified he did not cause the injury. Similarly, J.R. told the police that she was assaulted by S.S.M. on a prior occasion, but has since resiled from that claim. I must approach these allegations with caution. S.S.M. admitted the assault with the truck, but did not admit any other assaults upon J.R. The Crown has not proved any other assaults beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal must be taken at face value and treated as a positive finding of innocence: see R. v. Grdic, 1985 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 810, 59 N.R. 61. I, therefore, attach no weight to the other injuries suffered by J.R. during her relationship with S.S.M.

[39] I do, however, attach weight to S.M.M.’s criminal antecedents. Whether or not he has assaulted J.R. more than once, he has assaulted others on prior occasions. He has accumulated over 40 criminal convictions since 2004 (his first conviction as an adult), with new convictions added each year between 2004 and 2013. Many of these were for breaching court orders. Many others were for crimes of domestic violence. S.S.M. has, in the past, assaulted, threatened, criminally harassed and choked his partners. Assaults and threats have occurred on multiple occasions.

[40] It is against this backdrop that I must consider J.R.’s statement that she will be safe if she has contact with S.S.M.

[41] Mr. Marley argued that I should defer to J.R.’s opinion because she is an educated 30 year old woman who is competent to make her own life decisions. It was said that she likely knows S.S.M. better than anyone else in the courtroom. I accept that J.R. is an educated, intelligent woman. However, it does not follow that she is either exempt from partner abuse, or impervious to its impact. Domestic violence crosses geographical, cultural and socio-economic barriers. It cuts across incomes, professions and education levels. Victims of domestic violence are not exclusively women; nor are they exclusively young, poor or uneducated women. The forces at play in this context are powerful and sometimes subtle. Abuse and its aftermath do not always come with clear warning signs.

[42] Does J.R. know S.S.M. better than anyone else? Perhaps. Perhaps not. Her contact with him over the last 23 months has been artificially constrained by his detention in custody. J.R. believes that S.S.M. becomes violent with alcohol. Because he is no longer drinking, she believes she will be safe. But the alcohol is not the only problem. When he assaulted a fellow inmate in October 2013, S.S.M. was in custody and, according to him, had no access to alcohol. On that occasion, he was sober, but angry. It was his anger that caused him to punch and kick the victim to the point of bodily injury.

[43] In short, J.R.’s assessment of her safety does not correspond to the objective facts. Given her emotional attachment, J.R. may wish to shield herself from the uncomfortable realities. She may choose to be wilfully or wishfully blind. She wants to believe S.S.M. will not assault her again. She may genuinely believe it. The difficulty is that she may genuinely be mistaken.

[44] This is not to say that S.S.M. will necessarily re-offend. I hope that he does not re-offend. I hope that he receives the counselling he needs to curb his anger and control his aggressive impulses. But that has yet to happen. I must consider the evidence that is currently before the court. If future behaviour is best predicted by past behaviour, there is a reasonable likelihood that S.S.M. will become violent again in the future.

[45] Even if I were inclined to allow J.R. to gamble with her own safety, I cannot permit her to gamble with the safety of children in her care. J.R. has custody of the child fathered by S.S.M. She cares for her two other children, fathered by other partners, on alternate weekends. The presence of children in the home heightens the concern about domestic violence. Were an assault to take place, the children might be present to witness it or otherwise be affected by the dysfunction. This would not be in anyone’s interests, let alone the best interests of the children. If S.S.M. wishes to have contact with his child when he is released on probation, he may apply for an order from the court in the context of a family law proceeding: see R. v. Cowell, 2001 BCCA 158 at para. 13.

[46] For all of these reasons, the probation order will absolutely prohibit association and communication between S.S.M. and J.R. I regret overriding J.R.’s wishes, but there is no meaningful alternative. The public interest demands that protection be a paramount consideration in this case – protection of J.R. and protection of other citizens who might be affected in the event of future offences.

[47] The Crown has asked that I prohibit contact between S.S.M. and J.R. during the period that S.S.M. is in custody. The court does have the power to make such an order, pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code. However, I do not think it appropriate in this case. The no-contact clause is in the probation order to protect the safety of J.R. and her children. The concern is that S.S.M. might become violent in their presence. This concern is only triggered once S.S.M. is released from custody. It does not arise while he is incarcerated. If S.S.M. and J.R. have contact during the custodial portion of the sentence, it may be more difficult for them to remain apart during the probationary part of the sentence. It is for them to deal with that issue. To prohibit contact when there is no meaningful safety concern would be to over-extend the jurisdiction of the court.

[48] I will make one final point before leaving this issue. The probation order will prohibit contact for three years, but S.S.M. may seek to vary the order if there is a material change in circumstances. If S.S.M. is serious about receiving counselling and working towards rehabilitation, and if he is able to lead evidence as to his progress, it may provide the court with the assurance that it needs to vary the order and permit contact between S.S.M. and J.R. The balance is presently tilted in favour of protection, but it could shift. This may provide an additional incentive to S.S.M. to work toward his goals. The no contact order is set to run for three years, but its actual duration may, in the final analysis, be up to S.S.M. and the degree of his commitment to change.

THE RESTITUTION ORDER

[49] The Crown seeks a restitution order in this case. J.R. is said to have suffered a loss in the amount of $17,295 for her stolen vehicle. The owner of the house crashed into by S.S.M. is said to have suffered a loss of $30,733. Both J.R. and the homeowner have been compensated for their losses by their respective insurance companies. The Crown seeks restitution orders not to compensate the victims, but the insurance companies who have indemnified them for their loss.

[50] The court has a broad discretion to determine whether a restitution order should issue. Usually, restitution is sought in order to restore the victim of the crime to the position that he or she occupied before the offence took place. In these circumstances, restitution is directly linked to the consequence of the crime. It becomes more remote when the victim has already been compensated and the Crown seeks reimbursement of the insurance company.

[51] It is open to the court to order restitution in these circumstances. In R. v. Fitzgibbon, 1990 CanLII 102 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1005, 107 N.R. 281 Cory J. held that a provincial law society could be the recipient of a compensation order where it had paid defrauded clients for losses caused by dishonest lawyers. As he explained at paras. 31-32:

The appellant submitted that the Law Society could not be the recipient of compensation under s. 653 of the Criminal Code because it was not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of that section. It was contended that only the individual clients who were defrauded by the appellant could invoke a claim under this section.

I cannot accept this contention. At the outset, it should be observed that one of the goals and aims of s. 653 was to provide a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim. Why should a victim of crime in a situation where the amount involved is readily ascertained and acknowledged by the accused be forced to undertake the often slow, tedious and expensive civil proceedings against the very person who has stolen from or defrauded the victim? The Law Society has attempted to simplify the task for the defrauded client and to provide a sure and speedy means of repayment. Upon proof of the victim's claim, the Law Society makes payment on behalf of the dishonest solicitor. The policy of the Law Society flows from sound and responsible provisions found in the Law Society Act. By these provisions all lawyers recognize and accept responsibility for the acts of their dishonest colleagues. The Law Society should not be penalized for compensating the defrauded clients. Based on common law principles and for sound policy reasons, the Law Society should be subrogated to the rights of the defrauded clients which it has compensated.

[52] More recently, in R. v. Popert, 2010 ONCA 89, 258 O.A.C. 163 the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the propriety of a restitution order made in favour of an insurance company defrauded in a case of arson. In that case, the insurance company was the direct victim of the crime. The accused burned down his house for the purpose of fraudulently collecting insurance proceeds. The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order, largely because the judge had failed to consider the offender’s ability to pay. But the court ruled that, as a general principle, the court may order restitution to an insurance company, given the wording of s. 738(1)(a) and the principle of subrogation. Laskin J.A. stated:

First, on a plain reading of s. 738(1)(a), its scope is not restricted to persons whose property has been directly damaged, lost or destroyed as a result of an offence. Section 738(1) empowers the court to order restitution to “another person” in the case of damage, loss or destruction of the property of “any person”. This is to be contrasted with the predecessor provisions (ss. 653(1) and 725(1)), which limited the court to making compensation orders in favour of the person whose property had been lost or damaged.

Moreover, I see no reason in principle to interpret the scope of s. 738 narrowly so as to limit it to persons whose property has been directly damaged, lost or destroyed as a result of an offence. As the Crown notes, unduly limiting s. 738(1)(a) could denude the section of its force, given the pervasive presence of insurance in modern society.

Second, this interpretation accords with a purposive reading of s. 738(1). The purpose of s. 738(1) is to provide a “convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery” for victims. The insurance company is, in a very real sense, a victim of the arson. Just as the Supreme Court recognized in Fitzgibbon that the Law Society should not be penalised for having compensated defrauded clients, so too insurance companies should not be penalized for having compensated insured persons.

[53] I do have jurisdiction to make the order sought by the Crown. I also have a discretion to determine whether it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. I find that it is not.

[54] As in Popert, there is a very real concern in this case about the ability of S.S.M. to pay a restitution order in the amount sought. He has been in custody for several months and will remain there for another year, without any meaningful source of income. By virtue of the victim surcharge, he will be required to pay $600 for the three counts on which he was convicted. While restitution orders can serve a salutary purpose, “they are to be made with restraint and caution”: see Popert, para. 40. They should not be made where the resulting financial burden could affect the ability of the offender to rehabilitate.

[55] Nor should they be made where there is some uncertainty over the amount of loss that is at issue. The monies paid out by an insurance company may not perfectly correspond to the loss directly attributable to the offence. I accept Mr. Marley’s submission that S.S.M. should have the opportunity to examine and challenge the monetary amounts that are claimed. He will have that opportunity if the insurance companies choose to initiate civil proceedings.

[56] On balance, I am not satisfied that there should be a restitution order. The application brought by the Crown on behalf of the insurance companies is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

[57] I therefore sentence S.S.M. as follows:

Indictment 14-3222: Count 2: Assault with a weapon:

• Total sentence: 46 and a half months

• Pre-sentence custody: 23 months, with enhanced credit, 34 and a half months

• Time to be served in custody: 12 months

[58] I recommend to correctional officials that S.S.M. be allowed to serve the custodial portion of his sentence in a facility that offers intensive treatment for alcohol/substance abuse such as the Algoma Treatment and Remand Centre, or the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre.

[59] The custodial sentence is to be followed by three years’ probation. In addition to the statutory terms, S.S.M. is to abide by the following:

• Report as required

• Reside at an address approved by probation officer, and notify probation officer of any change.

• Do not associate or communicate directly or indirectly with Randy Coulter.

• Do not associate or communicate directly or indirectly with J.R. or her children.

• Abstain from consumption of alcohol and non-medically prescribed drugs.

• Do not possess weapons.

• Attend counselling as required by the probation officer, including counselling for substance abuse and anger management.

Indictment 14-3222 Count 9: Drive while over 80:

• 6 months incarceration, concurrent (already served in pre-sentence custody)

Indictment 15-3395: Count 1: Assault Causing Bodily Harm of Randall Coulter

• 2 years’ incarceration, concurrent (already served in pre-sentence custody)

[60] S.M.M. shall be subject to a s.109 weapons prohibition for life.

[61] He shall be subject to a driving prohibition under s.259 of the Criminal Code for a period of six months.

[62] I direct that a DNA data bank order be made in respect of each of the three counts for which he was convicted.

[63] A victim surcharge of $200.00 per count is imposed, resulting in a total surcharge of $600.00. I allow S.S.M. the maximum time to pay, which is 60 days, subject to further extensions that might be ordered by the Court.

[64] Finally, I direct that Crown counsel serve a copy of this decision upon the Windsor Essex Children’s Aid Society, to ensure that they are aware of the relevant family circumstances.

Original signed by “Renee M. Pomerance”

Renee M. Pomerance

Justice

Released: June 18, 2015

CITATION: R. v. S.S.M., 2015 ONSC 3840

COURT FILE NO.: 14-CR-3222

AND – COURT FILE NO.: 15-CR-3395

DATE: 20150618

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

S.S.M.

REASONS FOR sentence

Pomerance J.

Released: Oral Decision – June 18, 2015