CITATION: R. v. Raymond, 2017 ONSC 4864

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-3638

DATE: 20170814

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Richard Scott Raymond

Walter Costa, for the Crown

Brian D. Dube and Lana Strain, for the Accused

HEARD: May 15, 16, 17, June 26, 27 and 28, 2017

Pursuant to subsection 648(1) of the Criminal Code, no information regarding this portion of the trial shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires to consider its verdict.

By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information that may identify the person described in this ruling as the complainant may not be published, broadcasted or transmitted in any manner.

Pre-trial Rulings on Motions

MUNROE J.

[1] Richard Scott Raymond (“Mr. Raymond” or “Scott”) is charged with the first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault of Carol Shaw (“Carol”), the mother of Mr. Raymond’s girlfriend, Crystal Shaw (“Crystal”).

[2] In the early evening of February 23, 2015, Mr. Raymond was found alone with the dead body of Carol in her apartment. Both Mr. Raymond and the deceased were naked from the waist down. Mr. Raymond went to Carol’s apartment following an afternoon of heavy drinking and an argument with her daughter, Crystal. Carol’s dead body in Mr. Raymond’s presence was quickly discovered by Carol’s friend, Robert Cantelo (“Robert”), after he responded to Carol’s text messages for help.

[3] Although professing a present lack of memory, Mr. Raymond does not contest having caused the death of Carol. Indeed, he plans to enter a guilty plea to manslaughter at his arraignment. The Crown intends to decline consent, pursuant to s. 606(4) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, thus making a trial necessary.

[4] Mr. Raymond says he did not have the mens rea for murder due to alcohol intoxication. The Crown agrees that the accused was drunk at the time but says it can prove the necessary murder mental state.

[5] The requisite mental state for murder is found in s. 229(a), which states:

Culpable homicide is murder (a) where the person who causes the death of a human being (i) means to cause his death, or (ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not

[6] Evidence of intoxication and the consumption of alcohol, together with the rest of the evidence, will be considered at trial to determine whether the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Raymond had the requisite mental state for murder. Inability to do so will result in a manslaughter conviction pursuant to s. 234.

[7] Thus, the central trial issue will be the mental state of Mr. Raymond. Can the Crown prove the requisite murder mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt?

[8] Jury selection is scheduled to begin on October 23, 2017.

Pre-trial Motions

[9] Three pre-trial motions have been filed. A voir dire was held and submissions were made. This decision will rule on these three motions:

1. Crown’s motion to admit evidence of disreputable conduct;
2. Defence motion to exclude statements; and
3. Defence motion to admit post-arrest exculpatory statements.

[10] The third motion, the so-called Edgar motion, has been resolved by way of agreement between the Crown and the defence. The first motion – disreputable conduct – has been functionally resolved in most respects but requires some decision-making by me. The second motion, to exclude the on-scene oral statements of Mr. Raymond, is contested.

[11] After a review of the evidentiary background, I will address the resolved Edgar motion first, the disreputable conduct motion second, and finally, the motion to exclude the on-scene statements.

Evidentiary Background

1. Relationships

[12] Mr. Raymond and Crystal were in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship for about one year at the time of the incident. They lived together.

[13] The deceased, Carol, is Crystal’s mother. Carol lived at 475 Bruce, apartment #208.

[14] Daniel Shaw (“Uncle Dan”) is the brother of Carol and an uncle to Crystal.

[15] According to Crystal, her mother got along with Mr. Raymond but did not like him because he was “physical” with Crystal.

[16] Mr. Raymond had another relationship with Carol. Carol had a monthly prescription for Percocets, for pain. Mr. Raymond would buy some of the prescribed Percocet pills from Carol both for resale and for personal use. This was an ongoing arrangement to which Crystal says she was included.

[17] The two, Mr. Raymond and Crystal, were frequent drug users. According to Crystal, they used not only the Percocet pills but also illegal drugs including marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and, at times, methamphetamine.

[18] Robert was a friend of Carol’s at the time of the incident. He lived about a 15 minute drive away from her. Robert has an adult son, James Cantelo (“James”). Neither knew Mr. Raymond.

2. Monday Morning, February 23, 2015

[19] Crystal was with Carol for some of the morning on Monday, February 23, 2015. Carol was getting her prescription Percocet pills that morning and Crystal wanted some. Crystal went with her mother to the pharmacy. Crystal said she asked her mother for some but her mother told her she had to sell some first.

3. Uncle Dan’s

[20] In the afternoon of February 23, 2015, Mr. Raymond went to the home of Uncle Dan at 1011 Bruce. They were drinking whiskey and beer. Mr. Raymond called Crystal to come over and she did. She too started drinking. At some point, Uncle Dan and Mr. Raymond went to the liquor store for more alcohol. Uncle Dan bought a bottle of whiskey. On coming home, according to Uncle Dan, Mr. Raymond showed him a “mickey” – a small bottle – of whiskey saying, “Look what I stole.” They continued drinking and, at some point, the two men entered into a drinking contest with Mr. Raymond claiming he could drink a large quantity of beer in a relatively short time. Mr. Raymond started drinking beer rapidly but soon vomited, which ended the contest.

[21] Crystal and Mr. Raymond left together. According to Crystal, both she and Mr. Raymond were drunk. According to Uncle Dan, Mr. Raymond left sober and in a good mood.

[22] Although the evidence of the times of arrival and departure is inconsistent, it is clear that Mr. Raymond was at Uncle Dan’s for a period longer than Crystal and that both were there drinking for some hours during that afternoon.

[23] Crystal and Mr. Raymond left Uncle Dan’s to go to Carol’s apartment to pick up Percocet pills.

4. Argument/Fight

[24] As Crystal and Mr. Raymond were walking down an alley, they got into an argument. According to Crystal, Mr. Raymond was falling down drunk which irritated her. Crystal claims little memory of the details but says she was hit, punched in the face, and pushed down in the snow. According to Crystal, Mr. Raymond had hit her before.

[25] People in a neighbouring house were alerted by the sound of female screams from the alleyway. Amber Phillips (“Amber”) said she was at her mother’s home and heard the screams. She looked out the window and saw a man hitting or attacking a woman in the alley. The woman was on the ground with the man bent over her. Amber saw the man had a bottle up and was about to hit the woman.

5. Interference/Response

[26] According to Amber, she and her mother ran outside onto their porch and told the man to get off of her or they would call the police. The man, Mr. Raymond, stopped the attack. The woman, Crystal, came onto the porch and Mr. Raymond opened their gate. He either came onto the porch or onto the steps of the porch. Amber’s mother had a rake apparently for protection. Mr. Raymond grabbed the rake and threw it aside. He called the women “bitches” and made other threatening comments, the precise words being unstated. Amber’s sister told Mr. Raymond that the police were coming. At that, Mr. Raymond left. Crystal stayed on the porch until the police came.

[27] According to Amber, Mr. Raymond was drunk. She could smell alcohol, she could not understand much of what he was saying, and he slipped on the ice.

6. Carol’s Texts to Crystal

[28] While with the police, Crystal received text messages from her mother. These included the following:

Scott is at my house come here … my shit is getting broke up here n I’m not fucken happy at this moment Well his did u get so pissef drunk then he standing with no pNts on come n get him out

[29] The last message from Carol was at 6:30 p.m. on February 23, 2015.

7. Carol’s Texts to Robert and Robert’s Response

[30] At about 6:31 p.m., Robert received the following text from Carol while at his home: “U need ur help please come.” As Robert was preparing to leave, he received another text from Carol at about 6:32 p.m.: “Hurru he’d busting my house up.” After reading the texts to his son James, both Robert and James drove to Carol’s apartment. It took approximately 15 minutes to get there. On arrival, Robert parked in the back parking lot. At 6:47 p.m. Robert texted Carol notifying her that he had arrived. Usually Carol would then throw down her keys so Robert could gain access to the apartment building. This time there was no answer from Carol. Robert went around to the front of the building and buzzed Carol. Again, there was no response. Robert texted Carol at 6:50 p.m. advising her that he was at the front door. There still was no response. Robert believed something was not right. He finally got a person to let him into the building. Robert and James ran up to the second floor and to Carol’s apartment #208.

8. Knocking on Door/Response

[31] Robert knocked on Carol’s front door. There was no response, not even the usual dog barking. Robert kept banging on the door. Rustling sounds could be heard from inside the apartment. Finally a male voice from inside the apartment spoke. Although the exact words are not the same in the evidence of Robert and James, the essence is identical: “Fuck off. We’re having sex.” Robert yelled back challenging this claim and demanding that the door be opened immediately. Robert was concerned for his friend. In addition to the very recent, disturbing text messages from Carol, the lack of any response from Carol, and the absence of any dog barking, Robert did not recognize the male voice. Robert began kicking the door loudly. After about five minutes, the door opened at around 6:55 p.m.

9. Door Opened/Struggle Ensued

[32] Mr. Raymond opened the front door to Carol’s apartment. He was naked from the waist down. Robert could see past Mr. Raymond in the doorway. He saw Carol laying on the floor not moving.

[33] Robert wanted to get to Carol. The evidence of Robert and James regarding the entry and the initial struggle is not identical. Regardless, a struggle began between Robert and Mr. Raymond as Robert entered the apartment to check on his friend Carol, who he could see lying motionless. The two men went to the floor, knocking over items as they struggled. James jumped in to help his father, including by kicking Mr. Raymond multiple times. Eventually Robert and James got Mr. Raymond to the floor with Robert on top of Mr. Raymond.

10. Pinned on Floor

[34] Robert and James got Mr. Raymond pinned on the floor. Mr. Raymond’s back was to the floor and Robert was sitting on top of his chest, straddling him. James assisted by holding an arm. Robert started punching Mr. Raymond in the face. According to Robert, every time Mr. Raymond kept fighting or tried to get up, Robert punched him. He said he did not want Mr. Raymond getting up and coming after him. Robert was clear: he was not letting Mr. Raymond up until the police came. He was holding Mr. Raymond for the police. He believed Mr. Raymond killed Carol. In their evidence at the voir dire, both Robert and James agreed that they were executing a citizen’s arrest of Mr. Raymond until the police arrived.

[35] During this time both Robert and James were repeatedly and loudly yelling for someone to call 911, the police, and an ambulance. James finally was able to let go of Mr. Raymond’s arm because Mr. Raymond’s struggling lessened. James then called 911 from Carol’s cell phone that he saw on a nearby table. At the direction of the 911 operator, James went to Carol and attempted to assist her from this point until the EMS personnel arrived.

[36] The force used by Robert and James against Mr. Raymond did injure him. Mr. Raymond was bloody and swollen about the face. Subsequent photographs show swelling, cuts, two black eyes and other bruising on the face of Mr. Raymond. In addition, x-rays establish broken ribs.

11. Statements while Pinned

[37] The precise sequence of events and the exact words used are difficult to determine from the evidence. It was not recorded and we are left with memories of details about a fast-moving, highly charged event. The essence of the statements can be categorized into three general groupings: a) let me up; b) denials; and c) neutral.

A. let me up

[38] Repeatedly, Mr. Raymond tried to get Robert off of him. Mr. Raymond was pinned to the ground and was struggling to get free. He made essentially two types of statements in this effort. The first was, in essence, “Let me up and I’ll wait for the police.” The second was, in essence, “You better get off of me because when the police come they will blame you and arrest you.” Again this was during the time when Robert and James were yelling for someone to call 911, the police, and an ambulance.

B. denials

[39] Also while pinned, Mr. Raymond made statements denying any wrongdoing. Essentially he said: “I only did what she asked me to do”; “Why would I do this to someone I don’t even know”; “She was asking for it”; and “She’s my girlfriend.” He also denied that Carol texted Robert in response to Robert’s statement to Mr. Raymond that she texted him. These statements were interspersed during the time Mr. Raymond was pinned. These statements angered Robert. According to Robert, he did not want to hear it and so he punched Mr. Raymond every time he spoke.

C. neutral

[40] Robert and Mr. Raymond also engaged in a very neutral, short exchange near the end of the time Mr. Raymond was pinned. Mr. Raymond said he wanted to talk, so Robert asked Mr. Raymond his name. Mr. Raymond said, “Scott.” Robert responded, “My name is Bob.” According to Robert, he added, “If she’s not breathing, you’re going to jail.”

12. Ambulance

[41] An ambulance was dispatched to 475 Bruce, apartment #208, at 7:11 p.m. EMS attendants Peter Morasutti and Sarah Fox arrived at the address at 7:15 p.m. and at apartment #208 at 7:17 p.m.

[42] On entry, Mr. Morasutti went to Robert and Mr. Raymond. Ms. Fox went to James and Carol. Ms. Fox reports that Carol was on her back, facing up with no clothes from the bra down. Carol’s vital signs were absent.

[43] Mr. Morasutti saw Robert on top of Mr. Raymond holding him down with Robert’s hands around Mr. Raymond’s neck. Mr. Morasutti directed Robert to get off. After a brief exchange, Robert did so.

[44] The voir dire evidence differs on what happened next. According to Mr. Morasutti, he directed Mr. Raymond to roll over and Mr. Raymond complied. Mr. Morasutti denied ever physically touching Mr. Raymond. The police arrived shortly thereafter.

[45] According to both Cst. Tony Smith and Cst. Albert Fredericks Jr., when they arrived at apartment #208, the three men – Robert, Mr. Raymond and Mr. Morasutti – were on the floor with Mr. Raymond being held down by the other two.

[46] Mr. Raymond made no statements between the arrival of the EMS and the police arrival.

13. Police

[47] Two Windsor Police Services officers, Smith and Fredericks, arrived shortly after being dispatched at 7:11 p.m. They had been assigned earlier to Crystal’s domestic violence incident. That call was made at 6:07 p.m. and the officers had brought Crystal to her home at 6:33 p.m. The officers were aware of Mr. Raymond and had formed the grounds to arrest him on the domestic violence matter for assault with a weapon.

[48] As they approached the apartment, the building manager said, “I think he killed her. We’ve got him.” On entry, Cst. Fredericks went to Ms. Fox, the female EMS attendant who was with a naked female and James. According to Cst. Smith, the naked female looked dead. He saw clumps of hair near Mr. Raymond that looked like the same colour as the naked female’s hair.

[49] Cst. Smith went to Robert, Mr. Morasutti and Mr. Raymond. The two were holding Mr. Raymond down. Mr. Raymond was squirming, yelling, and rolling from side to side. Mr. Raymond was actively resisting and it looked like the two were having trouble holding him down. Cst. Smith believed that he had sufficient grounds and thus arrested Mr. Raymond for murder at 7:17 p.m. Cst. Smith replaced Mr. Morassutti in holding Mr. Raymond by placing his knees in the back of the prone Mr. Raymond. With the help of Robert, Cst. Smith handcuffed Mr. Raymond. The officer then advised Mr. Raymond, while he was on the floor, of his arrest. Once Mr. Raymond was secure, Cst. Smith directed the civilians - Robert, James and the building manager - out of the apartment and into the hall. Thereafter, Cst. Smith directed all unnecessary official personnel out of the apartment. (The scene was described as somewhat chaotic with the presence of police and other official personnel.) At 7:20 p.m., once the apartment was secure, Cst. Smith got Mr. Raymond on his feet and read him his rights to counsel. Thereafter, Cst. Smith obtained a towel to cover the lower, naked part of Mr. Raymond’s body. In addition, Cst. Smith, seeing the facial injuries to Mr. Raymond, called for another ambulance to treat him.

[50] James testified that while in the hall he heard a male voice, from the inside of the apartment, say, “If he moves, kick him.” He did not recognize the voice. There is no other evidence that anyone else heard such a statement. Robert, Cst. Smith, and Cst. Fredericks did not hear it and the two officers denied saying it. There is no evidence that Mr. Raymond heard the statement.

14. Statements in Police Presence

[51] According to Cst. Smith, on his arrival - with Mr. Raymond still pinned to the floor - Robert yelled, “He killed her. He raped her.” Mr. Raymond responded, “I didn’t kill her. I didn’t kill her. I love her.”

[52] According to Cst. Smith, when reading Mr. Raymond his rights, he stated, “I didn’t kill her. She’s my girlfriend’s mom. I just came here to buy Oxys.” Mr. Raymond was crying when he said this. Mr. Raymond repeated these statements. They were not in response to any question by the officer.

[53] Cst. Smith turned the custody of Mr. Raymond over to Cst. St. Pierre after about five or six minutes.

15. On Scene Sobriety/State of Mind

[54] Robert testified that Mr. Raymond seemed “wired”, like not all there. He was not acting normally. But, he agreed Mr. Raymond appeared to understand what was going on and responded appropriately. He did not slur his words. Robert did not smell booze on Mr. Raymond.

[55] James testified that something was not right about Mr. Raymond. He said Mr. Raymond was probably sober. There was no smell of alcohol and there was nothing unusual about his speech. He had no difficulty standing. But there was something “off.” He did not seem normal.

[56] Cst. Smith found Mr. Raymond obviously intoxicated. He had a strong odour of alcohol. His speech was slurred. He had trouble standing. The officer also noticed a “foaming” at the mouth – a white build-up around the lips.

[57] Blood from Mr. Raymond was drawn at the hospital around 8:40 p.m. His blood was tested for blood alcohol content. By agreement, Mr. Raymond’s blood alcohol level at the estimated time of Carol’s death (between 6:32 p.m. and 6:47 p.m.) was between 212 and 242 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. At the estimated time Mr. Raymond left the home of Uncle Dan (between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m.), by agreement, his blood alcohol level was between 222 and 267 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

16. To Hospital

[58] Cst. Gawadzyn testified at the voir dire. He arrived at apartment #208 at about 7:21 p.m. On arrival he saw three males in the hallway. He saw Cst. Smith with Mr. Raymond. Mr. Raymond had a towel around his waist. EMS treated Mr. Raymond. Constables Gawadzyn and St. Pierre carried Mr. Raymond on a backboard to a waiting ambulance. They left the scene at 7:51 p.m. Cst. Gawadzyn rode with Mr. Raymond. During the ride, Mr. Raymond was not aggressive and appeared to be in and out of consciousness. They arrived at Hotel Dieu Hospital at 7:56 p.m.

17. At Hospital

[59] While in the emergency room, Mr. Raymond was handcuffed to the bed. Mr. Raymond had been quiet when suddenly, and without any apparent trigger, Mr. Raymond sat up and started yelling and screaming. He repeated, “Where is my girlfriend?”; “Why am I in the hospital?”; “Where is my girlfriend? The last time I saw her she was alive.” Given this aggressive behaviour, the hospital put Mr. Raymond in restraints. They also affixed a spit-guard on his head although I received no evidence of any spitting or threats to spit. Mr. Raymond did not cooperate, but rather struggled. The hospital then decided to sedate Mr. Raymond. They did so at 8:24 p.m. Mr. Raymond was unconscious from that time until roughly 10:04 p.m. when he was cleared to leave the hospital. When he woke up, Mr. Raymond was agitated and began yelling again.

[60] When Cst. Gawadzyn escorted Mr. Raymond to the transport wagon for the trip to the police station, at about 10:30 p.m., the officer again advised Mr. Raymond that he was under arrest for murder. Mr. Raymond responded, in essence, “Murder. I’ve never hurt anyone.” The officer asked him if he want to speak with counsel. Mr. Raymond responded, in essence, “Fuck you. Not until you tell me who I murdered.” Because Cst. Gawadzyn did not know the name of the deceased, he told Mr. Raymond it was the woman in the apartment. Mr. Raymond resisted, and was not cooperative, on the way to the transport wagon.

18. Video of Transport Wagon Ride

[61] The ride from the hospital to the police station was roughly from 10:36 p.m. to 10:41 p.m. Mr. Raymond was transported in a police transport wagon which made an audio and video tape of the ride. The video was introduced and played at the voir dire.

[62] Mr. Raymond was in restraints with a spit-guard over his head – similar to a beekeeper’s head covering. He was alone. He struggled against the restraints. Eventually he was able to remove the spit-guard. He whimpered. He repeated, over and over, utterances - not all intelligible - saying, among other things, “Who have I murdered?”; “I am not a violent person”; “I am not that kind of person”; and “I don’t murder people.”

19. At Police Station

[63] Mr. Raymond arrived at the police station at 10:41 p.m. At 11:08 p.m., he requested to speak with counsel. On the way to the telephone, Mr. Raymond asked who he murdered. The escorting special constable said that he did not know. Mr. Raymond spoke with counsel until 11:15 p.m. At 6:37 a.m. the next morning, Mr. Raymond’s counsel called into the holding facility to speak with Mr. Raymond. Mr. Raymond spoke with his counsel until 6:40 a.m. At 9:08 a.m., Mr. Raymond asked what he was charged with. When he was told first degree murder, Mr. Raymond said, “How? I am one who got beat up. Look at me.” At 11:05 a.m., Mr. Raymond asked when people are going to “show me proof on why I am here and who it was I killed.” At 11:35 a.m., Mr. Raymond was removed from his cell for photos. After the photos, Mr. Raymond met with his counsel. At 1:24 p.m., Mr. Raymond was removed from his cell for an interview with Det. Corey.

20. Police Video Statement

[64] The police interviewed Mr. Raymond on video tape on February 24, 2015, from 1:26 p.m. to 3:08 p.m. The interview was conducted by Windsor Police Det. Brett Corey. During the first part, Mr. Raymond repeatedly asked who he killed, stating that he did not know who he murdered. About two thirds of the way into the interview, the detective advised Mr. Raymond that he killed Carol Shaw. When advised of this, Mr. Raymond cried and expressed disbelief.

[65] The interview included uncharged disreputable conduct including drug use, drug trafficking, and domestic violence against Crystal. Mr. Raymond also made statements arguably asserting his good character like “I’ve never harmed a person in my life.”

[66] Additionally, the detective asked Mr. Raymond if he was a psychopath and, when challenging Mr. Raymond’s claimed lack of memory, the detective said that he would have 25 years to figure it out.

21. Opinion of Centre of Forensic Science

[67] A forensic scientist opined that given the high blood alcohol level of Mr. Raymond, memory loss may have been present and it may have been partial or complete. However, the scientist also opined that memory loss is not equivalent to automatism and it is not possible, when intoxicated by alcohol, to lose consciousness and still be able to function.

Edgar Motion

[68] The defence seeks to introduce certain statements made by Mr. Raymond after his arrest. Specifically, the defence seeks to introduce his hospital statements, his statements made on video during his transport from the hospital to the police station, and his statements made at the police station, including those made during the police interview by Det. Corey. The essence of these statements is an asserted lack of memory of the killing.

[69] The defence offers these statements pursuant to two recognized exceptions to the general rule that post-arrest exculpatory statements made by an accused are not admissible. First, the defence says they are admissible under the Edgar exception: see R. v. Edgar, 2010 ONCA 529. Second, the defence asserts they also are admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule: see R. v. Edgar (2000), 2000 CanLII 5162 (ON CA), 142 C.C.C. (3d) 401, 128 O.A.C. 125, at paras. 23 - 24.

[70] This motion now has been resolved by agreement between the Crown and the defence. More specifically, the Crown does not oppose the admission of these statements during the defence case after the accused has taken the stand to testify. This condition is in accord with Edgar (2010), at para. 24. The Crown wants to cross-examine the accused on these statements. The Crown, however, does seek some redactions to the police video interview of matters which add little but are quite prejudicial. Specifically, the Crown seeks to redact the detective asking Mr. Raymond if he was a psychopath, and stating that Mr. Raymond had 25 years to think. The defence does not oppose some redactions but does not want significant editing of the video interview. Counsel were directed to confer on an editing plan and to report back to the court on August 14, 2017.

[71] Although the statements contain some hearsay, they are offered as circumstantial evidence of the state of mind of Mr. Raymond at the time of the alleged murder. Importantly, Mr. Raymond does not contest the killing, only having the mens rea for murder. It will be up to the jury to determine, based on all of the evidence, whether the Crown has proven the mental state required for murder. Both counsel agree that these statements should go before the jury for its consideration on the mental state issue. I endorse the agreement of counsel and find these post-arrest statements of the accused admissible during the defence case after, or during, the testimony of the accused.

Motion to Admit Evidence of Disreputable Conduct

[72] The Crown seeks leave to introduce certain evidence of a disreputable nature to answer the stated defence position of a lack of the murder mens rea due to alcohol intoxication. More specifically, the Crown seeks to admit the following evidence of disreputable conduct by the accused:

1. theft

[73] While drinking with Uncle Dan, the accused and Uncle Dan went to the liquor store for more alcohol. Uncle Dan bought a bottle of whiskey and the accused stole a bottle of whiskey. They returned to Uncle Dan’s home and continued to drink.

2. assault

[74] After leaving Uncle Dan’s home, Crystal and the accused were going to her mother’s apartment to get more Percocet pills. The two got into an argument and Mr. Raymond pushed and struck Crystal. On hearing female screams, neighbours looked out the window and saw the attack, including the accused holding a bottle over his head seemingly about to strike Crystal. The neighbours yelled at the accused to stop or the police would be called. The accused stopped the attack on Crystal.

3. name calling

[75] Crystal ran onto the porch of the neighbours. The accused came to the porch and called the neighbour women “bitches” and otherwise verbally threatened them.

4. the rake incident

[76] On seeing the accused come onto their property, one of the women obtained a rake and held it in front of her. The accused grabbed the rake from the woman and threw it down. The accused was told the police were coming. The accused left.

5. rude, aggressive and disruptive behaviour at hospital

[77] While under arrest and handcuffed in hospital, the accused suddenly, and apparently without provocation, began yelling, screaming, and fighting against his restraints. One officer described his conduct as “wild.” The hospital acted by placing more restraints on the accused and then by sedating him. A spit-guard head covering was put on the accused. Some time later, when the accused woke up, he continued his aggressive and combative conduct.

1. Positions of the Parties

[78] Submissions revealed that counsel were not far apart on a total resolution of this motion. Both counsel made concessions and narrowed the issues.

A. Crown

[79] The Crown seeks the admission of these disreputable acts to counter the defence position that the accused lacked the requisite murder mental state. The Crown concedes Mr. Raymond was drunk. But, according to the Crown, these acts show an operating mind, a mind which recognized stimuli and responded rationally. The Crown agrees some “editing” is appropriate and a jury instruction necessary. When both are done, the prejudice is reduced and the probative value leads to the admission of the requested disreputable conduct evidence.

[80] Specifically, the Crown’s position regarding the individual contested areas follows:

1. theft

[81] Although the Crown says the theft of the liquor bottle shows an operating mind and more sophistication than a simple purchase of the bottle, the Crown is content with limiting the evidence to the accused’s personal acquisition of the bottle without evidence that it was obtained by theft.

2. assault

[82] The Crown says the assault on Crystal is important both for the narrative as well as to show the mental abilities of the accused. The assault occurred after Crystal and the accused had left Uncle Dan’s and were proceeding to Carol’s to obtain pills. Among other things, this explains why the accused went to Carol’s alone and why Crystal subsequently refused to go to Carol’s despite her mother’s pleas. Additionally, the neighbours intervened and Mr. Raymond responded by stopping the assault, showing his mental ability.

[83] The Crown is content to omit any striking or attempting to strike with a bottle, but believes it is important to include evidence of the accused standing over Crystal striking her to fairly explain why there was a neighbour intervention and the accused’s subsequent response.

3. name calling

[84] The Crown is content to omit any evidence of name calling and verbal threats.

4. the rake incident

[85] The Crown asserts that the rake incident is necessary both for the narrative and to show that the accused had the mental ability to recognize a potential weapon and to respond appropriately by taking it away. This is not a case in which the accused then used the rake as a weapon. Importantly, the accused threw it down. When told the police were coming, the accused walked away.

B. Defence

[86] Initially, the defence narrowed the contested issues here by removing any request to exclude Mr. Raymond’s conduct in hospital because the defence now wants to admit said evidence as shown by its inclusion in their Edgar motion. Further, the defence concedes some probative value of the evidence on the central trial issue of the accused’s mental state and now focuses its challenge to four areas: theft, assault, the rake incident, and name calling.

1. theft

[87] The defence has no problem with the evidence of the accused obtaining more alcohol. The defence only objects to how it was obtained, by theft.

2. assault

[88] The defence wants the jury to hear that the accused was going to Carol’s for the purpose of buying pills. The defence agrees that the assault on the way to Carol’s has some probative value as to the narrative and on the issue of intent. Thus, the defence does not seek to completely eliminate this evidence, but rather seeks to limit it. Specifically, the defence seeks to exclude any mention of the bottle and to limit the extent of the assault.

3. name calling

[89] The defence does not want any of this evidence admitted calling its probative value weak or non-existent and its prejudicial effect high.

4. the rake incident

[90] The defence seeks to eliminate any mention of the rake incident. According to the defence, the significance of the incident is the accused’s response of departure upon being told the police were coming. Thus, the defence is content with evidence of the accused coming up to, or on to, the porch and responding when told the police were coming. To the defence, the rake incident otherwise is unnecessary and prejudicial.

2. Applicable Principles

[91] Evidence of an accused’s uncharged disreputable conduct that shows only that the accused is a person likely to have committed the offence charged is inadmissible: see R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, at para. 31; R. v. J.A.T., 2012 ONCA 177, at para. 51. If, on the other hand, the uncharged disreputable conduct evidence also is relevant to a material issue, such evidence is admissible if its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effect: see Handy, at para. 41; J.A.T., at para. 51.

[92] The prejudicial effect from the admission of uncharged misconduct can be found in three main ways: first, by assuming the accused is a “bad person” thus more likely to be guilty of the crime charged; second, by punishing the accused for the uncharged misconduct by convicting on the crime charged; and third, by confusing the jury leading to a conviction based on the extrinsic misconduct rather than on the crime charged: see Handy, at para. 31; J.A.T., at para. 52. Thus, the prejudice of concern here is the influence this evidence may have on a jury to engage in improper reasoning.

3. Principles Applied

[93] The trial issue identified here, to which the extrinsic misconduct relates, is the mental element of murder. The defence says the accused lacked the murder mens rea because of alcohol intoxication. The Crown agrees the accused was drunk but says, when considering the whole of the evidence, the accused had the requisite specific intent for murder.

[94] The defence agrees generally that each uncharged misconduct act offered by the Crown does advance the narrative and does, to varying degrees, provide evidence of the accused’s mental state but says the prejudice attached to some of the evidence sought exceeds its probative value.

[95] Each contested act will be reviewed separately.

1. theft

[96] I endorse the functional resolution of the parties. The Crown can lead the personal acquisition of the bottle of liquor from the LCBO. However, the means by which he acquired the bottle – namely by theft – shall not be allowed. Acquisition by theft adds very little to the assessment of the mental element but starkly shows the accused to be dishonest. Thus, for the theft evidence, the prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

2. assault

[97] It is clear, and it is conceded, that this evidence is helpful both to the narrative – in understanding how the events unfolded – and to the mental state of the accused shortly before the homicide. I agree with both counsel that the inclusion of the bottle adds little to the value of the evidence.

[98] Additionally, the defence seeks to further limit the evidence with regard to the assault itself by minimizing it. I disagree. The extent of the attack – without any mention of the bottle – is necessary to understand the reason for the intervention by the neighbours and the response of the accused. Crystal was not injured nor did she have any visible marks on her. If the attack on Crystal is made out to be trifling, then both the neighbour intervention and Mr. Raymond’s response become clouded.

[99] This is not to suggest that the Crown has leave to go beyond eliciting this piece of circumstantial evidence by emphasizing the violence or otherwise distracting the jury from the central issue of the case – the mental state of the accused. It does not.

[100] Accordingly, the evidence of the assault on Crystal shall be allowed but without any mention of the use, or attempted use, of a bottle. I exclude any evidence by Cst. Smith that he arrested the accused on the domestic assault incident for assault with a weapon. Finally, I exclude any evidence of any prior violence by Mr. Raymond against Crystal without prior leave of the court.

3. name calling

[101] I endorse the resolution of the parties. Evidence of the accused calling the neighbour women “bitches” and making verbal threats to them is disallowed. It adds very little to the mental element at issue and is extremely prejudicial to the accused, especially because the person who was killed minutes later was a woman.

4. the rake incident

[102] It is clear, and it is conceded, that this evidence is helpful both to the narrative and to the mental state of the accused. The defence seeks to limit the evidence to the accused coming up to the porch, being told that the police are coming, and the accused leaving. I disagree with this limitation. Interestingly, the defence is satisfied with evidence of acts which are quite aggressive and threatening, namely the going on to someone’s property and either up to the porch, or on to it. Yet, the defence challenges acts which are less aggressive – namely disarming a person with a rake, without more. The rake incident shows the accused knew what was going on and had the ability to respond rationally. The woman armed herself with a rake. This was February. There is little other reason to pick up a rake in February. The accused recognized the rake as a potential weapon and responded appropriately by disarming the woman – he grabbed the rake and threw it down. This evidence is quite probative of his mental abilities at the time. The prejudicial effect of the rake incident adds little to that which is conceded – the accused coming up to the porch. In sum, the probative value of the rake incident far exceeds its prejudicial effect.

[103] Accordingly, the evidence of the rake incident shall be allowed.

Motion to Exclude On-Scene Statements

[104] The defence seeks to exclude all utterances attributed to the accused at the scene, apartment #208. The lone exception to this motion is the response to the door knock. That statement is not contested. All on-scene statements were oral.

[105] For purposes of this challenge, the statements can be divided as follows: those made while Mr. Raymond was restrained by the Cantelos and those made after the arrival of the police.

1. Positions of the Parties

A. Defence

[106] The defence seeks to exclude all utterances made by Mr. Raymond while pinned on the floor of apartment #208 because they were a product of violence – Robert repeatedly and forcefully punched Mr. Raymond in the face while he was pinned to the ground and thereby injured Mr. Raymond. According to the defence, the force used by Robert was initially proportionate, but once Mr. Raymond was pinned to the ground, the force used was excessive and not reasonable in the circumstances. Mr. Raymond was saying anything to try to stop this violence against him. Thus, the statements were a product of violence and were otherwise made during oppressive circumstances. They were not voluntary and should not be admitted.

[107] With regard to these statements made to civilians, the Cantelos, the defence says the Cantelos were “persons in authority” thus making the confessions rule applicable. The Cantelos were making a citizen’s arrest and were holding Mr. Raymond for the police. The circumstances, taken as a whole, establish that the accused subjectively believed that the Cantelos could influence or control the proceedings against him and that belief was reasonable.

[108] Alternatively, the defence seeks to exclude these statements pursuant to the common law authority of the court to ensure a fair trial and to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute. The defence specifically relies on the court’s common law authority and not on the Charter.

[109] With regard to the statements made in the police presence, the defence says that they were a product of the earlier involuntary statements or otherwise did not satisfy the voluntariness requirements given their close proximity in time to the extreme violence against Mr. Raymond. In this regard, the defence also suggests that the “if he moves, kick him” statement provides the “bridge” between the violence of Robert and the police. The defence specifically does not raise any Charter issues with regard to these statements.

[110] The defence withdrew “operating mind” as an issue on all statements.

B. Crown

[111] The Crown says the subjective component of the “persons in authority” requirement has not been satisfied. Taking everything into consideration, it is clear that Mr. Raymond knew the Cantelos were not the police and could not influence the police. The power of citizen’s arrest does not turn the citizen into a “person in authority” for purposes of the voluntariness rule. The citizen’s duty is to turn the person arrested promptly over to the police, which the Cantelos did here. It is the police who make the decision whether or not to continue the arrest.

[112] Moreover, the statements made by Mr. Raymond while being pinned to the floor were not a product of the punches by Robert. There was no confession. Indeed, Robert did not want Mr. Raymond to talk. Furthermore, the punches to Mr. Raymond were reasonable to effect the citizen’s arrest because Mr. Raymond continued to struggle.

[113] With regard to the alternate theory of relief, the Crown says there is no suggestion of unreliability here, nor is there any abusive or coercive conduct by state actors. Thus, according to the Crown, this theory fails to raise any reason for the court to exercise its inherent common law powers.

[114] Finally, with regard to the statements made in the presence of the police, they were voluntary and not a product of any earlier violence by Robert.

2. Applicable Principles

A. Voluntariness and Persons in Authority

[115] Generally, an accused’s out-of-court statements are admissible at trial under the “party admissions” exception to the hearsay rule: see R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 20. When such statements are made to ordinary persons, they are presumptively admissible without the requirement of a voir dire: see S.G.T., at para. 20.

[116] A different rule applies when such statements are made to persons in authority. This is the confessions rule. Where an accused has made a statement to a person in authority, the Crown must prove the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt on a voir dire as a prerequisite to its admission: see S.G.T., at para. 20; R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 34. Voluntariness, in this regard, encompasses not only the classic Ibrahim rule – “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” – but also embraces the absence of an “atmosphere of oppression”, the operating mind doctrine, and police trickery: see R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 24, 27, 63 & 65. A contextual approach is required: see R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 11.

[117] Before embarking on a voluntariness voir dire resolution, however, the “person in authority” issue is a threshold question.

[118] Whether the recipient of a statement is a person in authority is determined from the point of view of the accused: see S.G.T., at para. 22; Grandinetti, at para. 38; R. v. Hodgson, 1998 CanLII 798 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at paras. 32 - 34. In S.G.T., at para. 22, the Supreme Court states:

To be considered a person in authority, the accused must believe that the recipient of the statement can control or influence the proceedings against him or her, and that belief must be reasonable.

[119] In other words, according to Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 4, persons in authority are

[t]hose persons whom the accused reasonably believes are acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceedings against him or her ….

[120] The accused bears an evidential burden to establish that there is a valid issue for consideration in relation to the person in authority requirement: see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37. Once that burden is met, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the recipient was not a person in authority or, if it is found that the recipient was a person in authority, that the statement was voluntary: see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37.

B. Citizen’s Arrest

[121] Arrests by citizens are statutorily authorized pursuant to s. 494(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46:

(1) Any one may arrest without warrant (a) a person whom he finds committing an indictable offence; or (b) a person who, on reasonable grounds, he believes (i) has committed a criminal offence, and (ii) is escaping from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to arrest that person.

[122] A person making a citizen’s arrest has a statutory duty to turn the arrested person over to the police “forthwith” pursuant to s.494(3):

Any one other than a peace officer who arrests a person without warrant shall forthwith deliver the person to a peace officer.

C. Exclusion of Statements under Common Law

[123] In R. v. Wells, 2003 BCCA 242, the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted, at para. 64, the existence of an alternative avenue for exclusion of statements where the recipient is not a person in authority:

[I]n my respectful view, the majority opinion in Hodgson cannot be taken to require that all confessions to persons not in authority, regardless of whether the confession is obtained by violence or threats of violence, must be admitted into evidence. To so hold would ignore the court’s discretion to exclude evidence, the probative value of which is outweighed by [its] prejudicial effect, and the power and discretion of the courts to ensure the fair trial of an accused.

[124] In reaching this conclusion, the Wells court relied on R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, and R. v. Terry, 1996 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207, where the Supreme Court found that a trial judge has discretion under common law to exclude evidence that would result in an unfair trial.

[125] A similar rationale was subsequently endorsed in Grandinetti where the Supreme Court concluded, at para. 36:

There is no doubt, as the Court observed in Hodgson at para. 26, that statements can sometimes be made in such coercive circumstances that their reliability is jeopardized even if they were not made to a person in authority. The admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like abuse of process at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to prevent the admission of statements that undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

D. Tainting

[126] A prior involuntary statement can taint a subsequent statement rendering the subsequent statement involuntary as well: see R. v. I.(L.R.), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504. However, a necessary predicate is a prior involuntary statement.

3. Principles Applied

A. Persons in Authority

[127] I do not find the Cantelos to be “persons in authority” in the circumstances of this case. To be “persons in authority”, Mr. Raymond must have believed that they, or one of them, could control or influence the proceedings against him. The defence urges me to read this requirement broadly to include the physical acts of arrest and detention.

[128] Mr. Raymond did not give evidence, as is his right. But that omission leads to a search for evidence of his subjective belief from the rest of the evidence. That evidence, taken collectively, falls short. I am especially drawn to Mr. Raymond’s statements that include references to the police: “Let me up and I’ll wait for the police” and “You better get off of me because when the police come they will blame you and arrest you.” These statements were made while the Cantelos were repeatedly yelling for someone to call 911, the police, and an ambulance. These statements do not suggest that the Cantelos were working with or for the police. Indeed, they show the opposite. More importantly, they provide clear evidence that Mr. Raymond knew that the Cantelos were not the police and had no ability to influence the police.

[129] I decline the defence’s invitation to conclude that a citizen’s arrest transforms a citizen into a “person in authority” within the meaning of the confessions rule. There are no reported cases directly on this issue. However, in para. 36 of Hodgson, the Supreme Court suggests against such a blanket proposition.

The important factor to note in all of these cases is that there is no catalogue of persons, beyond a peace officer or prison guard, who are automatically considered a person in authority solely by virtue of their status. … [T]he person in authority requirement has evolved in a manner that avoids a formalistic or legalistic approach to the interactions between ordinary citizens.

[130] I apply this approach. First, the statutory authority for a citizen’s arrest does not grant the citizen any authority to control or influence the proceeding against the arrestee. Rather, s. 494(1) is limited to the act of obtaining the physical custody of a person and goes no further. The citizen has a statutory duty to promptly deliver the person to the police. Second, the courts have been reluctant to extend the confessions rule beyond its mooring to ensure that statements are not influenced or affected by the coercive power of the state. A citizen making a citizen’s arrest does not enjoy the coercive power of the state. Adding a citizen’s arrest, without more, would expand the confessions rule beyond its mooring. Finally and perhaps most importantly, in this case, regardless of the existence of the statutory authority to make a citizen’s arrest, there is no evidence that Mr. Raymond believed that the Cantelos had the ability to control or influence the proceedings against him. The evidence shows just the opposite.

[131] I do not mean to suggest that a citizen’s arrest should never be considered in a “persons in authority” analysis. I do say that a citizen’s arrest standing alone is not determinative. I also say that in the facts of this case, the citizen’s arrest does not overcome the balance of the evidence.

[132] Considering everything contextually, and even assuming satisfaction of the initial defence evidential burden, I find the Cantelos were not persons in authority beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Common Law Exclusion

[133] I do not find the need to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law on the use of force by the Cantelos against Mr. Raymond with regard to this issue. The basis of this exclusionary rule is to ensure that unreliable statements do not undermine trial fairness or the integrity of the judicial process. Because the reliability of the statements was never challenged or made an issue, and because I see no reliability issue, there is no such concern here.

[134] The on-scene utterances themselves are not classically confessional. Indeed, the ones that are directed to the deceased, are either denials or justifications. The Crown’s intended use is not to prove that Mr. Raymond was the killer. It is anticipated Mr. Raymond will admit that in front of the jury by a plea of guilty to manslaughter. Rather, its intended purpose is to show, by circumstantial evidence, that the accused, regardless of his intoxication, possessed the mental ability to understand his surroundings and to appropriately react to them. In other words, the Crown’s purpose is to assist the jury in deciding the murder mental element, the key issue of the case. By all accounts, for that purpose, the statements are reliable and the defence does not argue to the contrary. Indeed, some of the statements arguably favour the defence position at trial.

[135] Thus, I find that this is an inappropriate case for me to exercise my common law power to exclude these statements. Under the circumstances, their probative value far exceeds any prejudice.

C. Police Statements

[136] Given my finding that the Cantelos were not persons in authority, the statements to them were not involuntary, thus eliminating a necessary predicate to subsequent tainting.

[137] But that is not the end of the inquiry. The two statements made after the arrival of the police were unquestionably made to a person in authority, a uniformed police officer. Thus, I must examine all of the evidence to determine whether the will of the accused had been overborne by the conduct of the police: see Oickle, at paras. 57-58; Spencer, at para. 13. Again, I am left to draw conclusions from circumstances in the absence of any evidence from the accused.

[138] It is clear, and I find, that from the arrival of the police there was no extraneous use of force against Mr. Raymond. He was treated professionally. The police promptly obtained a towel to cover his exposed private areas and a separate ambulance was called to examine him.

[139] The first statement was made in response to a direct accusation by Robert. The second statement was made spontaneously, without any question or other prompting, during the reading of rights by Cst. Smith.

[140] Addressing the “kick him if he moves” statement, I find that it adds little or nothing to the analysis. First, only one person claimed to have heard such a statement, James. No other witness on the scene supports the existence of the statement. Second, there is no evidence that the accused heard it, assuming it was made. He did not say so. Cst. Smith, who was with the accused while in the apartment, did not hear it. And third, there is no evidence that the alleged utterance was made during or before the two police statements made by the accused at the scene. James said he heard it while he was in the hall. That puts it at least after the first statement. The civilians did not get removed from the apartment until after the arrest of the accused, which was after the first statement. The second statement was made within a few minutes after the arrest. For these reasons, the statement shall be considered by it adds very little, if anything, to my analysis.

[141] I consider everything contextually. There were no promises, threats or inducements of any kind made to Mr. Raymond by Cst. Smith or by either Cantelo in the presence of the officer. There was no police trickery. There was no atmosphere of oppression. The officer was very polite, respectful and professional throughout. Considering everything, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the police statements were made voluntarily.

Conclusions

On the basis of the above reasons, I order as follows:

1. Edgar Motion

[142] The defence motion to admit post-arrest exculpatory statements is granted with conditions. The post-arrest statements of the accused - specifically his hospital statements, his statements made on video during his transport from the hospital to the police station, and his statements made at the police station, including those made during the police interview by Det. Corey - shall be admitted in evidence during the case for the defence either during or after the testimony of the accused.

[143] The video of the police interview shall be edited to remove all unnecessary prejudicial portions. Counsel shall meet and attempt to agree on an edited trial version of the video interview. This proposed edited trial version shall be reviewed in open court for the Court’s approval before commencement of jury selection.

2. Disreputable Conduct

[144] The Crown’s motion to admit evidence of disreputable conduct is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. theft

[145] The evidence of the accused’s personal acquisition of the bottle of liquor from the LCBO is allowed. However, the means by which he acquired the bottle – namely by theft – shall not be allowed.

2. assault

[146] The evidence of the assault on Crystal shall be allowed but without any mention of the use, or attempted use, of a bottle. I exclude any evidence by Cst. Smith that he arrested the accused on the domestic violence incident for assault with a weapon. Finally, I exclude any evidence of any prior violence by Mr. Raymond against Crystal without prior leave of this Court.

3. name calling

[147] Evidence of the accused calling the neighbour women “bitches” and making verbal threats to them is disallowed.

4. the rake incident

[148] The evidence of the rake incident is allowed.

[149] A limiting jury instruction shall be given.

3. On-Scene Statements

[150] The defence motion to exclude statements is dismissed. The statements of Mr. Raymond, both to Robert while pinned to the floor, and later in the presence of Cst. Smith, are admissible. The statements made in the presence of Cst. Smith were voluntary.

4. Jury Instructions

[151] Counsel shall consider and propose any mid-trial or final jury instruction either party deems appropriate with regard to these rulings. All proposals are due before jury selection.

“original signed and released by Munroe J. and made a Court Exhibit”

Kirk W. Munroe

Justice

Released Orally: August 14, 2017

CITATION: R. v. Raymond, 2017 ONSC 4864

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-3638

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Richard Scott Raymond

Pre-Trial RUlings on Motions

Kirk W. Munroe

Justice

Released Orally: August 14, 2017